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The thesis is based on a longitudinal study of the automobile industry 
in the U. S. A. from its inception around the turn of the century, to the 
1950s. Charting the changes in methods of production, organisational 
structure, demography and skill configurations among the workforce, and 
institutional and political formations at the workplace, the study focuses 
upon the meaning of these developments in terms of the control of work and 
the personnel directly involved in that control - the changing role of foremen in 20th century industry. 
Using a range of sources including contemporary governmental and 
industrial surveys, company and trade union records and oral histories, a 
picture is built up of the way in which methods of production, and the 
control of that production, are mediated through a series of social, 
demographic, spatial and ideological factors, in all of which the foreman 
is a central character. 
In examining the role of shop floor supervision in shaping workers 
experience and actual structures of control at the workplace, and showing 
how the experience of foremen, individually and as a group, in turn are 
affected by changing patterns of work, the thesis constructs a historical 
modification to accounts of the labour process which stress a progressive, 
teleological exodus of control from the shop floor. The study points out 
for example, that the role of shop-floor supervisor during the inter-war 
period, largely supposed to have been proscribed and marginalised by 
technological and bureaucratic developments, remained in fact the focal 
point of control over hiring, firing, wage levels, production levels and 
methods of work, in short almost all aspects of the industrial workers' 
experience of factory life. 
Having established the boundaries of power and control surrounding the 
foreman in pre-war mass production, and discussed the meaning of these 
boundaries in terms of class, ideology and divisions among the workforce, 
the thesis then examines the origins and effects of unionisation on the 
role of supervision. Following an account of the restructuring of power and 
control which comes with the establishment of production workers unions in 
the industry, the advent of the unionisation of foremen themselves is 
examined. The Foremen's Association of America (FAA), which saw its genesis 
and principal area of recruitment in the automobile industry, represented 
the most serious attempt to organise supervisory workers in the USA this 
century, and marks a pivotal point in the spread of unionisation, 
managerial response and state intervention in industrial relations. 
Building on earlier sections outlining the position of foremen in terms of 
power and ideology, the thesis proposes a complex, multi-level dynamic 
behind the formation, growth and decline of the FAA as a corrective to 
previous accounts which stress the primacy of legislative and institutional 
explanatory frameworks. 
Finally the thesis charts the post-war response of management in the 
industry to the threat of foremen's unionisation, locating ensuing attempts 
to restructure the role, status and prestige of foremen in terms of the 
historical impact and progress of competing managerial theory, in 
particular that of the human relations school. 
Chapter One: Introduction: The Foreman and Structures of Supervision. 
This thesis concerns itself primarily with the changing 
historical experience, and role in industrial development, of a group 
of workers - first-line supervisors or foremen - in American industry 
in the first half of the Twentieth century. It will take for its 
primary focus developments in the automobile manufacturing and related 
industries, from the period around the turn of the century which marks 
the birth of the industry, through the period of expansion into mass 
markets and intensive rationalisation of methods of production into 
the inter-war years, the depression and emergence of industrial 
unionisation, and on through the experience of World War Two and 
reconversion. 
The study of this particular group of workers necessitates 
confrontation with a number of debates current in labour history, 
which can themselves only be fully understood by inclusion of an 
understanding of the position of foremen. Indeed the centrality of the 
foreman to many of these debates presents unique complexities in 
considering the historical development of this sector of the 
workforce. The foreman's role lies at the heart of the labour process 
debate for example and issues concerning the control of work, the 
structures of bureaucracy, the functioning of labour markets etc. 
cannot be adequately explained without reference to the effects upon, 
and influence of, the personnel of supervision on the shop floor. 
Similarly discussions concerning the generation and replication of 
ideology or class at work must take account of the foreman's shifting 
historical position and influence. In the development of unionisation 
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the role of first line supervision needs to be understood in terms of 
its part in promotion or retardation of collective bargaining in 
addition to understanding the dynamics of its own supervisory and 
white collar union development. Simple numerical terms justify 
increased attention to this sector of labour. Estimates put the number 
of foremen and supervisors in American industry at 1,500,000 in 1941 
for example, General Motors alone employing around 20,000 foremen by 
1945. (1) 
The automobile industry represents an important sector in which 
to locate a longitudinal study of this nature. Symbolic of the rise of 
mass production in the twentieth century, the industry grew from a 
total output of around 20,000 cars in 1904 to over 4k million by 1925. 
By 1929 the 'big three' producers of Ford, GM and Chrysler dominated 
what was now the largest industry in the US in terms of the value of 
its manufactured output. Some idea of the developing scale of 
production can be gleaned from Ford statistics for the River Rouge 
plant in 1936 when inputs included 54,000 tons of steel, 47,000 tons 
of iron ore, 3,960,000 lbs. of rubber and 1,244,000 square feet of 
glass. 
(2) This rapid expansion and consolidation saw the industry 
building upon a number of manufacturing techniques developed in 
predecessor and related industries but also rapidly assuming the 
leadership in innovations in production methods and organisation 
applied to the manufacture of a complex product. In assuming a role 
at the forefront of rationalisation and mass production ("Fordism" 
becoming a term widely used to denote highly rationalised automated 
processes) the industry drew together a workforce and constructed a 
labour market whose composition in terms of heterogeneity of 
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backgrounds exemplifies the volatile nature of industrial change in 
the years before World War Two. The industry was also one of the major 
arenas in which the struggle over industrial unionisation took place 
in the 1930s, the sitdown strikes at GM for example remain a potent 
symbol of a pivotal point in the success of the CIO. On the specific 
issue of supervisory unionism the automobile industry was the centre 
of attempts to instigate a general movement of unionised foremen, and 
played the central role in determining the fate of this movement. 
The periodisation chosen, 1900 - 1950, reflects these major 
developments in the industry. The establishment of methods and scales 
of production and related labour market restructuring underwent an 
initial period of growth and change which was at its most pronounced 
between 1900 and the late 1920s, perhaps not be emulated until the 
impact of developments in information technology, computer controls 
and restructured world markets of the 1970s. Unionisation in the 
industry was a phenomenon of the 1930s which saw the heightened role 
of the state during the interventions of the New Deal, the splits in 
the labour movement which led to the formation of the CIO and the 
growth of industrial unionisation, and arguably laid the foundations 
for the pattern of industrial relations which was to emerge in the 
post-war period. The Second World War saw changes in production with 
the switch to armaments manufacture leading the industry through 
another phase of expansion and rationalisation, increased labour 
market turbulence, new levels of state intervention, and importantly, 
saw the genesis and rapid growth of the movement to unionise foremen. 
Reconversion into the early 1950s saw a restoration of automobile 
production into what were to be long term post-war rhythms, the 
Chapter One -3- 
resolution of formal industrial relations typified by pattern 
bargaining and "business unionism", and the implementation of the 
modifying legislation of the Taft-Hartley Act, coincidental with the 
decline of the foremen's union movement. 
Within this period we see the role of foreman in industry going 
through a series of fundamental changes in terms of power and control 
in the labour process; control of the labour market; levels of skill; 
ideology, status and prestige - as perceived by themselves and others; 
attitudes towards and involvement in the labour movement; and their 
place in management strategy. It is clear that the role of the 
foreman in the 1950s, working in an environment of mass production 
with its attendant extensive division of both supervisory and direct 
labour, complex organisational and bureaucratic structures, and 
formalised collective bargaining and industrial relations systems, is 
markedly different to that of what might be termed his 19th century 
predecessor. The latter was perhaps to be found working in an 
environment typified by high levels of individual skill and 
discretion, assuming wide powers of control over planning and 
production, controlling working conditions, selection of workers, 
intensity of work, wage levels, discipline and so on. A figure to be 
held in some degree of awe on the shop floor (although clearly a wide 
variety of labour processes and work situations existed in both 
periods). The contrasts are numerous, and at first sight it would seem 
that the roles and attitudes of the supervisory worker at each end of 
this continuum have little, if anything in common. Take for example 
Edwards' description of the power of the foreman in the initial period 
of the emergence of the hierarchically controlled factory; "The work 
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tasks were ordered and controlled by the continuous, direct, ad hoc 
and arbitrary instructions of the foreman. They were enforced by 
positive rewards, by physical force, and/or by dismissal of 
workers... Power was unmistakably vested in the person of the 
supervisor. " Both Melling and Nelson refer to the "empire" over which 
this "traditional" foreman ruled, Melling elaborating ways in which 
the British engineering foreman's power and influence extended beyond 
the confines of the factory. 
( 3) As rationalisation progressed , 
Weber's observation that "foremen increasingly became the 
administrators of impersonal rules rather than dispensers of personal 
fiats" becomes the basis of many accounts. 
(4) As authority became 
vested in the "legal", rational structures advancing bureaucracy, 
foremen are seen as correspondingly governed by, and limited to the 
administration of, rules and procedures of a fixed and determinate 
nature, a process compounded by the advent of formalised industrial 
relations with the advent of unionisation. Epithets referring to the 
subjection of the foreman to these processes are numerous; "men in 
the middle", "marginal men", "forgotten men of management", 
"cinderella of industry", "inhabiting a twilight zone" etc. By the 
early 1950s C. Wright Mills felt able to assert that, "Of all 
occupational strata, in fact, none has been so grievously affected by 
the rationalisation of equipment and organisation as the industrial 
foreman. "(5) Yet as we trace the contours of change it becomes clear 
that, historically, certain aspects of supervisory power and control 
decline at uneven rates, may involve a shift rather than erosion, and 
in some cases may involve the substitution or enhancement rather than 
decline in the status and power of the personnel of supervision. 
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Similarly attitudes and ideologies among those engaged in supervision 
evolve at an uneven rate, to rhythms which are in part dictated by the 
contours industrial change, but which are also subject to the inertia 
and influence of wider social pressures and which at times reveal a 
pronounced dissynchronicity with the imperatives of mass production. 
For example it will be shown that the foreman's power over the 
experience of factory life for workers in the technologically and 
bureaucratically rationalised factory of the early 1930s in many ways 
exceeded the influence available to the "traditional" foreman of the 
19th century workshop. 
The theoretical position of human supervision, the optimal role 
of the foreman in managerial structures, has been the subject of many 
elaborations, changing with the emergence of the increasingly complex 
systems of the 20th century, and also reflecting the cleavage between 
rationalist and humanist approaches. 
The scientific management schema outlined by Frederick Taylor can 
in many ways be seen as a wellspring from which a number of variants 
were later to emerge. Taylor's work, while not totally original in its 
approach, was nevertheless perhaps the first formally systematised 
scheme presented as the key to managing modern production. Taylorism 
sought to implant the principles of engineering rationality to all 
aspects of work extending the constant improvement of tools and 
machinery to the selection of the best method of undertaking residual 
human labour. To this was coupled rigorous selection and training 
procedures to ensure that work was carried out by the "first class 
man". 
(6) At the heart of Taylorism, and subsequently one its most 
criticised aspects, lay the insistence that factors involving 
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decisions over the way in which work should be carried out must be 
made unilaterally i. e. by the employer or, more precisely, specialist 
departments. Workers would be the recipients of codified and rigidly 
defined instructions - the "one best way" to undertake the task in 
hand. In this way the conception and execution of tasks could be 
separated out in what Gramsci later termed the breaking up of the 
"psycho-physical nexus" of work. 
( ) Supervision of work was to be 
undertaken by a series of "functional foremen" - the route clerk, 
instruction card man and cost and time clerk were to be based in the 
office or planning room while the shop-floor would be supervised by a 
gang boss, speed boss, repair boss, inspector and disciplinarian. 
(8) 
While the Taylor system was rarely formally installed in its entirety, 
least of all the roles of functional foreman, it nevertheless 
represents an important articulation of structural developments in the 
control of work and a useful benchmark by which to assess its 
subsequent derivatives. 
(9) 
The rational technical aspects of Taylorism can be seen to form 
the basis of two subsequent strands of managerial strategy; time and 
motion study, initially outlined most comprehensively by Gilbreth, and 
what has come to be known as Fordism, a system never fully articulated 
in the forms used by Taylor or Gilbreth but arguably the most 
portentous system actually implemented. Gilbreth's work built on that 
aspect of Taylorism based in ergonomics and sought, by means of expert 
observation and measurement, to harmonise human and machine movement 
to produce optimal output levels. Time and motion echoed Taylorism in 
its appropriation of the knowledge of work; "All the traditional 
knowledge is literally collected, measured, sorted, tagged and 
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labelled. "(10) Fordism on the other hand was a system which laid 
stress on the machine solution to problems of control. Whereas 
Gilbreth's work still relied on the compliant participation of the 
worker and called for traditional methods of supervision, the Fordist 
alternative, by substituting machinery for both the manufacture and 
transfer of production, attempted to incorporate supervision within 
the pace and direction of work as determined by those involved in the 
setting up of the machinery of production. 
While Fordism strove to tie workers to machines and motion study 
sought to turn workers into machines yet another strand of managerial 
thought continued to stress incentive based schemes as a solution to 
the problem of control, especially that aspect of control concerned 
with the levels of discretionary effort available to workers. Payment 
systems linked to productivity levels - simple piecework - had a long 
history. Indeed it was inherent conflict around worker regulation and 
employer rate-cutting which which Taylor's system was designed to 
eradicate. The essential feature of payment systems as a means to 
intensify labour was that it sought to tap into worker's compliance. 
If simple piecework led to general social manipulation of rates of 
output then the solution was simply to devise a system of individual 
or group bonuses linked to productivity which would offer 
progressively greater reward over certain basic levels of production, 
ideally on a basis which seemed to offer equitable gain for both 
employer and worker. Such systems could be used as an alternative or 
an adjunct to machine pacing or time and motion and were seen as 
especially useful in jobs where automation was not a viable 
alternative. Again this movement echoed an element of Taylorism 
in 
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that Taylor had proposed offering a differential wage system whereby 
'first class' men would earn high bonus rates. 
A great many bonus systems rapidly came to be on offer by the 
early years of the car industry, varying from bespoke systems offered 
by specialist companies to various in-house derivatives. 
(ll) Such 
systems usually enabled a certain level of devolution of 
responsibility over the pace of work rather than the content or 
overall design and direction of production, nevertheless in certain 
circumstances, there did develop a potential to restructure shop- 
floor supervision. Self regulating gang systems for example could 
develop their own control of hiring, job allocation, methods and pace 
of working and so on. In short, they could eliminate the need for the 
presence of immediate shop-floor supervision altogether. 
(12) 
Some systems available in package form from specialist firms 
attempted a fusion of elements from both rationalisation and incentive 
based strategies. Systems such as that designed by Charles Bedaux and 
popular in Britain and the USA in the 1920s and 30s sought to combine 
absolute job measurement of machine and human action by trained 
experts within a general framework of bonus units linked to "laws" 
governing human effort and strain and the fixed capacity of 
machinery. 
(13) Such systems offered recourse to the "neutrality" of 
outside experts in determining the pace and direction of work and 
again incorporated a major shift in responsibility for many aspects of 
shop-floor control away from foremen towards outside experts. 
In addition to the above rational-technical and incentive based 
methods to control work a third strand of managerial thought began to 
develop during the early 20th century which focussed primarily on the 
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consent aspect recognised by incentive schemes. The 'human relations' 
school, instead of obtaining cooperation in production through 
financial incentives, sought to use the tools of behavioural 
psychology to understand and modify industrial activity. Modern 
production and the division of labour had created barriers to willing 
cooperation on the part of workers which could only be surmounted by 
the careful selection and training of workers and reorienting their 
goals on a path convergent with those of the firm. Human relations 
built on another aspect of Taylorism, that of rigorous selection 
procedures to ensure a precise fit between worker and job, but went 
on to stress the need to tap into rather than suppress workers social 
requirements. For human relations advocates, enlightened supervision 
was the key to harmonious industrial production. The personnel 
department became the centre for general administration of this schema 
while the foreman, himself carefully selected and trained in relevant 
aspects of psychology, was to become team-leader and father figure, 
coaxing optimum effort from newly compliant workers. 
(14) This strand 
of thought also had roots in the movement for welfare and social 
provisions at work as a means of fostering worker company-loyalty, 
but forms a constantly regenerating theme to be found in the work of 
Mayo, Myers, Walker, Guest, Roethlisberger and Likert and so on. 
McGregor's Theory X- Theory Y for example still rests on the basic 
dichotomy between distrust and compulsion on one hand and fostered 
consensus on the other. 
(15) 
Each of the above methods of control of production had the 
potential to radically restructure the role of the shop floor 
supervisor. Taylorism split his job into component specialities, each 
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in receipt of instructions determined from other specialists in turn. 
Fordism and time and motion each had the potential to eliminate direct 
supervision altogether beyond the residual need for disciplinary 
functions. Incentive based schemes substituted self regulation and 
autonomy and reduced the need for and overseer, even in an individual 
disciplinary role. Human relations, while not diminishing the need for 
a direct supervisory presence, sought to impart an entirely new range 
of personnel skills into the role of foreman to take precedence over 
previously dominant technical skills. 
The debate surrounding the levels of application and actual 
impact of the various managerial schemas outlined above is of course 
unresolved. Braverman's restressing of Marx's analysis of the labour 
process and the insistence that Taylorist derivatives form the 
dominant mode and rationale behind the control of work has more 
recently drawn down a reinvigorated discourse around the precise forms 
in which such control was and is actually practised. Alternatives to 
unilinear deskilling, division of labour and alienation include 
Burawoy's recognition of compliance through structures of consent and 
Friedman's elaboration of the multiplicity of strategies as actually 
implemented by managements aware of spatial limits to their potential 
to control work. 
(16) The debates have also been reinvigorated by the 
imperatives of managing more recent developments in industry including 
the restructuring of world markets, political and institutional 
reorientations of industrial relations and the development of a new 
range of technological processes. New interest in humanist methods of 
control - quality of working life schemes, employee involvement and 
similar participative systems has arisen in tandem with these 
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developments giving rise to the reexamination of the balance between 
rationalist and humanist applications. 
(17) 
In reality, components from each of the above strands of 
management theory were incorporated to some degree in a variety of 
work methods in the car industry. Each was initially defined, mediated 
and shaped by a range of pressures and inert areas within both social 
and technological configurations at the workplace. In the following 
chapters we will attempt to elaborate the ways in which the personnel 
and roles of shop floor supervision influenced, and were affected by, 
the implementation of managerial strategies, and the foreman's 
position in the constant renegotiation of forms of work. In doing so 
it is necessary to elaborate the types of technology and 
organisational systems governing the labour processes of automobile 
manufacture; the forms of labour market accompanying these systems; 
and the ethnic, racial and gender configurations and influences in the 
general workforce and among supervision itself. Chapters two, three 
and four will explore these themes to show that in spite of a phase of 
intensive rationalisation throughout the industry up to the early 
1930s, and extensive deskilling and division of labour which, when 
applied to the role of foreman saw an increasing horizontally and 
vertically divided supervisory role, foremen on the shop floor 
retained areas of power and control far in excess of those usually 
attributed to this strata. In showing the ways in which foremen 
continued to exert a dominance over the everyday life of all workers 
engaged in production, in terms of powers to hire, fire, control 
production and work rates, and determine wages and conditions it will 
be shown that accounts such as Jacoby's for example which stress the 
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increased bureaucratisation of work, and resultant proscription of the 
foreman's levels of discretion by the 1930s, need serious 
qualification when specifically applied to the automobile 
industry. (18) In addition chapter five will explore notions of class 
and ideology among the supervisory workforce and delineate the nature 
of division and separation in this respect between those engaged in 
production and those engaged in supervision on the shop floor. 
Having established the structures of power and control, both 
formal and informal, which typify the industry by the early 1930s the 
study will go on to consider the changes wrought upon these structures 
with the advent of unionisation. Firstly chapter five will examine the 
ways in which the union movement of the production workers was 
affected by, and in turn, restricted, compromised or reshaped the 
roles and attitudes of shop floor supervision. The impact of the 
proceduralisation of industrial relations on the formal role of 
foremen and the influence on actual practice of those involved in 
supervision will be assessed. Chapters six and seven will then go on 
to consider the dynamics and nature of one of the most portentous 
developments in the automobile industry in respect of its impact on 
the shaping of industrial relations in the USA - the advent of the 
Foremen's Association of America (FAA). This union for supervisory 
workers was to become the most highly visible attempt in America this 
century to recruit the ranks of supervision into the labour movement. 
The FAA went on to generate a level of controversy and a scale of 
response from employers and government far in excess of its numerical 
importance. The dynamic behind the FAA will be assessed in terms of 
both long term developments in the labour process and labour markets 
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and also in terms of more immediate shifts in workforce demography and 
methods associated with the advent of war production. Membership 
profiles, aims (of both leadership and rank and file) and activities 
of the FAA will be examined as will the union's relationship to the 
labour movement in general, in an attempt to outline why an ostensibly 
reactionary, conservative or at least moderate sector of the workforce 
came to engage in some of the most radical forms of industrial 
activity of the period. 
Chapter eight, in tracing the decline of the FAA will examine the 
role played by the state and employers in either stimulating or 
retarding the growth and influence of the union. By highlighting the 
way in which the institutions of the state both provide an arena in 
which employers can pursue industrial relations goals, but also the 
ways in which state agencies can act in conflict to the imperatives of 
employers, the history of state activity concerning supervisory 
unionism represents an interesting empirical test of recent theories 
of the role of the state in capitalist societies. Employer attitudes 
to the FAA will also be used to reveal the ways in which the lower 
sectors of supervision conformed to general managerial strategies in 
the industry and certain key variables in strategy - notably between 
Ford and GM - will be highlighted, revealing the non-monolithic nature 
of employers reactions to both the role of first line supervision and 
ideas of unionisation.. 
Finally chapter nine, in considering managerial responses to the 
"problems" of supervision revealed by the FAA, will show how 
divergences in employer attitudes and strategies with regard to shop 
floor supervision were realigned into a more homogeneous pattern. The 
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chapter will also show the ways in which a search for a resolution to 
what had become the "foreman problem" was to revivify attempts to 
implement the tenets of the now submerged humanist managerial 
strategy. In taking a long term historical appraisal of the impact of 
human relations related schema on the industry, from the First World 
War onwards, the chapter will map out the content and aims of such 
systems, and pinpoint the agencies involved in their promotion. By 
revealing what was seen to be a general failure in modern methods of 
production and industrial relations to engender a managerial ethos in 
lower levels of supervision, the FAA was one of the major stimulants 
to the new wave of interest in human relations which accompanied the 
period of reconversion following World War Two. In assessing the 
impact of such schemes we will return to the general theme of the 
primacy of conflictual versus consensual structures of control and 
power in industry, and the way in which the role of the personnel of 
shop floor supervision in emergent post war period shape or react to 
such systems. 
A longitudinal historical study of this nature clearly has 
advantages and disadvantages over other methods. In choosing to study 
one specific group of workers in one industry the advantages of a 
comparative perspective are compromised to a degree. Differing labour 
processes which, if we follow the typologies initially advanced by 
Blauner and Woodward for example(19), themselves determine the style 
of formal and informal supervisory structures, could be useful 
in 
highlighting determining factors in the development of foremanship. By 
way of compensation in this respect a historical study of this 
length 
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carries its own comparative mechanisms - comparing the developing 
phases of automobile production, and also to some extent the differing 
labour processes within the industry. 
The precise delineation of a group of workers as "foremen" also 
creates problems. In gender terms alone the word is misleading since 
there were some women employed in shop floor supervisory roles. In the 
period under study however the overwhelming majority of supervisory 
posts were held by men and therefore, with some apologies, the text 
generally sticks to the term "foreman" unless specifically referring 
to forewomen. A greater problem is encountered in attempting to define 
the limits of the group in question. With the developing division of 
labour which accompanies mass production supervision itself becomes 
broken down into a number of agencies, some remote and some local to 
the shop f loor. Those remaining on the shop floor are themselves the 
subject of a number of further divisions of a functional and 
hierarchical nature. Quality control or time study staff for example 
begin to perform functions on the shop floor of an implicitly 
supervisory nature, once the preserve of foremen proper, each can also 
be said to comprise a distinct sub-group with its own hierarchical 
structures. Similarly assistant foremen or superintendents flank the 
foreman as links in an expanding supervisory chain, performing 
markedly different jobs yet arguably (certainly from the point of view 
of some statistical data) classifiable as shop floor supervision. 
(20) 
More will be said about these definitional problems in chapter two and 
throughout later chapters considering the legal and jurisdictional 
arguments surrounding unionisation. For now it will be enough to note 
that the definitional compromise settled upon for the "foreman" under 
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study is that of a supervisory worker who works exclusively in a shop 
floor location and directs, but under normal circumstances takes no 
part in production - he does no work "at the tools". 
Particular methodological difficulties present themselves with a 
study of this nature. Recent movements in history aimed at the 
recovery of hitherto "hidden" groups, in particular women's history, 
black history and the strand of labour history which has moved beyond 
institutional study, face common problems, most notably in terms of 
sources. Oral history can fill some gaps, dependent on periodisation, 
but contains notorious difficulties in terms of accuracy, selectivity 
and objectivity. 
(21) Source problems of this nature are compounded in 
a study of the type undertaken here in that some of the issues being 
addressed - attitudes, ideologies etc. - present difficulties for 
analysis in the present, let alone historically. Sociologists working 
on similar issues from a current perspective have available techniques 
of questionnaire, interview and observation which are simply not 
available to historical study, and yet even these methods continue to 
pose problems of objectivity and interpretation. 
(22) Bearing such 
problems in mind the thesis will refer to a number of different types 
of sources including reports of government hearings, company and union 
minutes and general records, contemporary surveys, oral history 
collections, and press and journal articles. 
In some ways the foremen of modern industry do not constitute a 
"hidden" group. Indeed there are periods in the 20th century when the 
amount of literature referring to this group is extensive. Most of 
this literature is however of little use to the social historian 
comprising as it does partial descriptions of idealised supervisory 
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attributes designed for consumption by "personnel" practitioners and 
having little empirical g grounding. '' There are other, less numerous, 
but compensatory sources however. Apart from the expected secondary 
text, journal and press sources which are available to some degree 
throughout, the earlier part of the period under study presents 
perhaps the greatest difficulties and it is here that oral histories, 
particularly those compiled by the Ford Museum and Wayne State 
University archives, provide a valuable service. In addition there are 
company records and reports and contemporary surveys. Ford statistical 
material is especially good in this respect and other types of 
testimony, such as the "operator 15" secret reports at Ford, provide 
useful insights into shop floor life. (Attempts to gain admission to 
the historical records of General Motors drew a blank in the face of 
company reticence - an experience common to many other researchers in 
this field. ) The 1930s is perhaps better served given the increasing 
attention of the state into industrial practices. In particular there 
are reports of the investigations by the Works Progress Administration 
on issues such as hiring, labour markets, productivity etc.. Unions 
such as the United Automobile Workers (UAW) generated sources 
throughout the 1930s many of which predate the formal records 
generated following agreements when minutes, grievance records etc. 
provide information on actual shop floor practice. Towards the end of 
the period the problem of scarcity of sources is somewhat reversed as 
wartime brings a greater role again for the state and the issue of 
foremen's unionisation generates numerous inquiries as to the role of 
foremen in American industry. The NWLB for example set up a special 
" See for example Dun's Review, April, 1966, p. 45. 
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panel in 1944 precisely to determine the position of foremen in 
automobile manufacturing. The collected testimony eventually ran to 22 
volumes. 
In using what tends to be a diverse range of evidence the 
possibilities of constructing an elaborate quantitative model are 
clearly restricted. Analysis of the type favoured in many recent 
accounts by theorists and historians of industrial relations for 
example cannot be easily attempted using the types of evidence 
available. Statistical analysis such as that used by Norsworthy and 
Zabala to determine worker attitudes and behaviour in relation to 
productivity levels in the automobile industry for example, which 
relies heavily on complex algebraic models of the production process, 
are inappropriate given the form of evidence and the lines of enquiry 
pursued here. 
(23) 
Zeitlin has recently called for a reemphasis of institutional 
factors in labour history, in reaction to the preponderant 
concentration on history from below. 
(24) In taking a broad focus, 
incorporating both developments in the labour process and experiences 
of shop floor workers in addition to studying institutional 
developments surrounding the American foremen - the structures and 
strategies of the foremen's union and the role of employers and the 
state - it will be shown that developments in these spheres are 
inextricably linked. To study one aspect, be it the institutional 
aspect or changing structures of control in the labour process, to the 
exclusion of another is to provide only a partial and incomplete 
account. The dynamics behind the FAA for example can only be 
understood in terms of a balanced assessment of both institutional 
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and shop floor developments, and it is balance which this thesis sets 
out to achieve. 
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Chapter Two; Technological Change and Redivision of Labour; New Forms 
of Coordination and Control. 
This chapter will map out the transition to mass production in 
car manufacture which took place between the turn of the century and 
the 1930s. This transition meant the implementation of factory systems 
incorporating methods of production and organisational structures 
which were radically different from those employed in 19th century 
manufacturing industry and consequently these new systems engendered 
major change in the form and personnel of shop floor supervision. An 
outline of these developments necessitates engagement with a number of 
related debates including meanings and variations of skill among the 
workforce, the dynamics of technological and organisational change in 
terms of control or coordination, and changing levels of discretion in 
work activity for both worker and supervisor. Following an outline of 
the major changes in products and methods of manufacture the impact of 
the subsequent extension of the division of labour, both of production 
work and the supervisory function, will be undertaken. The outline 
will also form the basis of the subsequent chapters which will go on 
to evaluate the impact of the above changes on the supervisory 
workforce in terms of ideology, attitudes, status, class location and 
power, in terms of both the workplace and society. 
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Methods of Production 
The car industry, although almost totally a 20th century 
phenomenon, was the inheritor of many major advances in production 
technology from the 19th century and earlier. The essential advances 
picked up very rapidly by the nascent car industry were those which 
tended towards standardisation of parts for interchangeability and 
speed of production and assembly, while maintaining or improving 
acceptable levels of quality. Quality in this sense is defined as a 
balance between function, design and production standards. A common 
pool of technology can be found throughout the industry developing 
among the major users at roughly the same pace although the 
arrangement and methods of employment of various machine tools can be 
seen to vary from setting to setting. 
Many traditional historical accounts tended to trace the 
evolution of production technology via a series of epoch making 
personalities - Eli Whitney, Cyrus McCormick, Samuel Colt and so on to 
Henry Ford - whereas most change is in fact better understood in 
organic rather than teleological terms. The industry inherited 
significant advances in production engineering from related 
predecessor industries. Lathes, milling machines, planers etc. - 
machines designed to reduce rough metal via a series of stages to its 
final desired dimensions - had gone through several stages of 
refinement, including the incorporation of various jigs and fixtures 
designed to guide such machines through the production cycle with 
minimal operator intervention. Manufacturers involved in complex 
production, notably those in the cycle, carriage, steam and gas 
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engine, armaments and farm equipment industries had provided the 
foundations for the car industry to advance production engineering 
techniques in this respect, but it was the latter which was soon to 
assume the mantle of pacesetter and the major generator of change. 
(') 
The most radical change in production methods attributable to the 
automobile industry is that of the introduction of extensive 
mechanical pacing. Ford's motorised assembly line was initiated in 
1913. This did not represent a sudden fracture between either old and 
new methods or between Ford and his contemporary car making rivals 
however. Rather it was a combination of existing practices in other 
industries - moving hoppers in brewing, the "disassembly lines" of the 
Cincinnatti and Chicago meatpackers, and an extension of practices 
already in use in the car industry - gravity-fed production lines, 
moving overhead trolleys, sequential arrangement of production and so 
on. 
(2) The Ford method of paced assembly lines spread very rapidly 
throughout the American car industry - in less than three years Paige, 
Maxwell, Hudson, Dodge, Packard and Saxon were all employing this 
technique. This rapid diffusion of manufacturing techniques may be in 
part a reflection of the unusual degree of willingness by car 
companies at the time to exchange information on both products and 
methods, at least following the resolution of the Selden patent 
case. 
(3) While this innovation, in the form and extent employed by the 
industry, is an important landmark, it must be remembered that 
automobile manufacture continued to involve a complex product using 
disparate materials and labour processes. Consequently major changes 
in manufacturing methods encompass a wide range of machinery and 
production engineering developments. 
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The changes which characterise the shift to mass production fall 
into two general categories. Firstly those concerned with machine or 
material developments, i. e. developing tools to effect faster or more 
efficient work, or utilise better materials, and secondly, those 
changes concerned with the interconnection of those machines or 
materials. Also it must be noted that from the earliest phases of the 
industry the major factories were characterised by the growing 
vertical integration of production processes. As part of the overall 
shift from concentration on assembly of bought in components to the 
extended and direct control over processes ranging from production of 
raw materials to ownership or control of sales outlets, the typical 
factory complex saw the consolidation of an extended series of 
production stages from basic parts manufacture to final assembly. 
Developments in these processes are more easily understood when 
examined in progressive fashion. 
Beginning with the foundry, where basic stock is converted to 
rough castings prior to machining, moulding machinery was introduced 
in this department around 1912. Processes involving the use of damp 
sand to make moulds were also mechanised around this time and core 
making subjected to endless chain production line methods. 
( 4) Drop 
forging and die casting machinery replaced moulders and core makers 
completely in some areas. In addition many parts began to be made 
from alternative materials, e. g. alloys and steels, with the 
resulting elimination of a major series of processes including 
forging, annealing, straightening, rough turning and rough 
grinding. 
(5) It must be noted that larger castings such as engine 
blocks could not be made using these latter materials and processes 
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and in certain areas jobs involving sand mixing, coremaking and 
moulding retained significant levels of skill well into the 1930s. 
(6) 
In general however the period from around 1910 to the 1920s was 
typified by a developing scale of production which often meant 
millions of identical castings produced by means which rendered the 
skilled foundry worker such as pattern makers, moulders etc., able to 
produce accurate castings from complex blueprints, virtually 
obsolete. 
(7) Some measure of the scale of the increase in 
mechanisation can be gleaned from the statistics of the Ford factories 
where rationalisation of foundry techniques included successful 
attempts to cast engine blocks directly from the molten metal 
producing furnaces. Between 1916 and 1930 output per man almost 
quadrupled from 150 pounds to 585 pounds per day-(8) 
The next stage in the manufacturing process, the accurate 
machining of rough castings to their final dimensions, also underwent 
significant rationalisation as machine design was progressively 
modified to achieve increased output of standardised components while 
incorporating simplicity of operation. These developments did not 
necessarily mean increased accuracy, since many skilled workers had 
previously been capable of working to extremely fine tolerances. What 
these new machines, jigs and fixtures did ensure was that fine 
tolerances could be rapidly reproduced, each piece to exactly the same 
dimension as the rest of the batch and matching the dimensions of any 
compatible components. Interchangeability, thus guaranteed, eliminated 
the need for individual fitting and the resultant saving of labour 
time was often spectacular. The universal grinder is a good example of 
this new generation of machine tools. Introduced around 1900 by 
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Charles Norton and extensively used from the early years of car 
manufacture, this machine utilised developments in artificial 
abrasives and the rigidity of massive machine tool construction. Using 
such a machine the time required to surface grind a crankshaft for 
example was reduced from five hours to. fifteen minutes. 
(9) The 
manufacture of cars requires the production of many such hardened 
steel parts, which, in the process of hardening, become distorted and 
require correction by grinding. Machines such as Norton's meant that 
the file, previously perhaps the most common tool in the shop, and the 
skilled fitter wielding that file, practically disappeared. His 
replacement - the machine operator - had an entirely different job, 
summed up in a 1930s trade advertisement for the Norton D-85 crankpin 
grinder; "... operated as easily as the modern day automobile. .. The 
interlocking control feature requires the operator always to do the 
correct thing at the right time - he cannot do otherwise"(10) 
Similar principles underpinned the new phase of designs in a 
range of machine tools. Lathes, planers, millers, broaching machines, 
drilling machines and presses were all modified to incorporate 
increasingly automatic, controlled operation, minimising intervention 
and often simultaneously enabling one operator to attend a number of 
machines. 
(ll) Multiple operations were also incorporated into a single 
machine wherever possible resulting in the widespread use of multiple 
spindle automatic lathes, combination turret lathes, multi-station 
drilling machines and other similar tools. An example of the latter 
would be a drilling machine designed to sink holes in four faces of a 
cylinder block simultaneously. One such machine performed 132 
operations on each engine block. 
(12) The 1930s also saw the beginnings 
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of tracer technology - hydraulic and electronic sensing and devices 
using patterns and templates. 
Supplementing the above redesign of machine tools were a number 
of developments in materials. In addition to the increasing use of 
hard alloys and finishing materials such as chromium plate in finished 
parts, new tool materials with superior cutting qualities came into 
widespread use. High speed steel, pioneered by Taylor himself at the 
end of the 19th century, was superseded by compound tungsten carbides 
in the 1920s producing further dramatic reductions in output 
times. (13) 
Car body construction also underwent radical change during the 
early years of the industry. Initially car bodies were mainly built in 
a unit construction method using wooden frames and metal panels. 
Highly skilled cabinet makers, carriage builders and sheet metal 
workers were among those involved in the long and complex process of 
manufacturing and assembly which incorporated significant degrees of 
worker self regulation. As car worker Joe Brown recalled, "The 
bodyworkers set their own pace. Each paneller had his own bench near a 
wall. He took a body from the aisle, clamped it to the wall in front 
of his bench and worked on it until finished. "(14) Processes were 
rapidly developed however to reduce and finally eliminate this method 
of production. The mid 1920s saw the widespread introduction of the 
all metal body produced by presses which made integrated stampings 
from single sheets of steel which in turn were joined together using a 
series of developments in welding techniques. 
(15) Underbodies 
involving the assembly of over 30 separate parts - sills, floorboards, 
seat risers etc. - were being produced in a single section by 1935. 
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Similarly the one piece top superseded numerous roof rails, windshield 
headers, roof bowers etc.. The joining together of larger integrated 
panels saw the supersession of riveting by spot, butt and flash 
welding using gas, and later on, electric techniques incorporated 
wherever possible into fixed welding machines. By 1935 the Ford Fordor 
for example utilised a total of 3415 electric welds, almost all 
automatic. 
(16) 
While the introduction into the 1930s of more streamlined body 
designs called for a reintroduction of soldering and sanding processes 
this was rapidly overcome by the advent of one piece body stamping or 
more sophisticated welding processes and the dissipation of skill 
levels continued. The multi-hydromatic electric welders at Dodge for 
example producing "Airflow" bodies in 1934 were said to "standardise 
the floor to floor time by eliminating the human element that is 
usually present in welding work"(17) By the mid 1930s the Works 
Progress Administration (WPA) car industry researchers estimated that 
around 90% of the hand labour used in the various stages of body 
manufacture prior to painting had been eliminated. 
(18) 
Finally, the painting and finishing processes involved in body 
manufacture also went through a series of rationalisations by the 
1920s. Originally, successive coats of filler, lamp black, paint and 
varnish - often as many as 21 coats in all - were carefully applied by 
hand brushing with intermediate rubbing down using materials such as 
pumice stone, cuttlefish bone or horsehair. The whole process usually 
took several weeks of highly skilled work. With the introduction of 
fast drying nitro-cellulose paints such as Dupont's "Duco", first 
marketed in 1919 and used by General Motors, new methods of 
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application became possible. Flowing, spraying and dipping and baking 
of whole body sections replaced the hand painter, striper and touch-up 
man throughout the 1920s. A job which had previously taken three to 
four weeks could now be completed, ready for shipping, in less than 
one day by workers needing very limited skills compared to their 
predecessors. 
(19) In addition, the plating of many parts with 
materials such as chromium led to the automation of polishing and 
buffing processes, again reducing throughput times. (20) 
This brief excursion through the mechanical and material changes 
in production must be placed within the overall context of the 
separation of the above processes into their respective departments 
and the development of purpose built factories designed to facilitate 
production flows within and between manufacturing stages. Overall 
factory design became specialised early on. Ford's Highland Park plant 
of 1908 is frequently used as an exemplar of this change although all 
major manufacturers were building plants with layouts to facilitate 
sequential production lines around this time. 
(21) One important agent 
of change in this respect was the introduction of electric motors 
compact enough to give each machine an individual power source. This 
allowed greater flexibility in machine placement and the removal of 
the many overhead belts, used to drive machinery from a common power 
source, which had previously been a feature of factory shop floors. 
The net effect was that machinery was now grouped in order of 
operation on any particular component - lathe, miller, grinder and so 
on - instead of being grouped generically. The removal of belt drives 
also created space for overhead conveyor systems, thus bringing 
machine shops into line with developments already taking place in 
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other departments. With machinery now placed sequentially in close 
proximity and conveyors moving material at a constant pace from the 
foundry to heat treatment, on through the machine shops and press 
shops to the painting and finishing processes and ultimately on to 
final assembly, amounts of stock standing idle awaiting operations 
could be greatly reduced. 
(22) This increasingly rapid turnover and 
reduction in stock inventory levels was a crucial aspect of the fully 
automated factory since it released capital for further investment and 
generated profits at a faster rate. 
The culmination of this stream of integrated, f lowing production 
was the assembly process. The application of the principles of 
mechanically driven pacing to the final assembly process is of course 
the most controversial, and most widely commented upon 20th century 
labour process. The car assembly line is everyone's popular image of 
Chaplinesque alienation, indeed for many the final assembly is the 
labour process in cars. Although only the last in the series of 
processes outlined above, each of which, as we have seen, had been 
rationalised and arranged to incorporate some form of pacing 
mechanism, and although assembly never employed more than a large 
fraction of the total workforce, it is nevertheless an important 
sector. The links between the pace of final assembly and overall 
factory production, because of the increasing integration of the 
systems noted above have led commentators to talk of it as symbolic of 
a "kinetic spirit" pulsing through the car factory. Both Fine and 
Norwood for example refer to the "rhythm of production" determined by 
final assembly. 
(23) 
The earliest conveyorised application in the car industry was 
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probably Ford's magneto flywheel assembly line. Production was pushed 
between "man high" work stations along rollers. Gravity slides 
performed similar functions. (24) Pacing of such a line was regulated 
by the speed of the fastest worker, bottlenecks in production 
highlighting slower workers. In this sense such a work arrangement 
functions in the same way as a mechanically paced line in that the 
whole group is compelled to work at a uniform speed. The essential 
difference between this and motorised lines is that the former relied 
on speed regulation through the agency of the fastest worker whereas 
the latter incorporated a nominally remote method of speed control. 
The widespread use of motorised pacing followed rapidly from 
Ford's initial installation in 1913 and by the 1920s had become the 
standard mode of operation in the industry. 
(25) Lines were extended 
as far as possible. By 1927 for example the Buick engine assembly line 
was one and a half miles long. 
(26) Completed cars now began to emerge 
at increasingly faster rates. At Hudson in 1926 for example a 
completed car came off the assembly line every 30 seconds. Mirroring 
the reduction in output times achieved in the foregoing manufacturing 
departments, assembly times under mechanical pacing were substantially 
reduced. Ford front axle assembly was reduced from two hours and 
thirty minutes in 1913 to just 26 minutes in 1915. Engine assembly at 
Ford in 1913 was reduced from nine hours and 54 minutes to five hours 
and 56 minutes in just six months. By 1931 the more complex Model 'A' 
engine took only two hours to assemble. 
(27) 
Taking an aggregate of productivity gains through improved 
machinery, work flow changes and increased intensity of work - about 
which more will be said below - the sum total was an increase on a 
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massive scale. Chalmers' calculations show that, using 1924 as an 
index of 100, output per man rose from a level of 12.8 in 1909 to 
126.8 in 1929. (28) 
From the preceding survey it seems clear that the "Fordist" 
derivative of scientific management became the predominant form of 
control exercised over the many labour processes involved in car 
production. Mechanisation was a feature of each step in the train of 
operation from the foundry to final assembly. Design of work, 
direction of flow of materials and pace of work were all controlled, 
via machinery, by remote personnel. Operator and assembler, by the 
1920s, became the dominant work category on the shop floor as jobs 
characterised by low levels of intrinsic skill and discretionary 
activity were generated by this new phase in the redivision of labour. 
These technological and organisational changes represented a 
major phase of restructuring the manufacturing process and signal a 
marked fracture with general 19th century practice. Developments in 
machine tools and shop floor organisation were not to go through a 
comparatively rapid phase of development again until the introduction 
of new levels of automation based on computer controls in the 
1970s. (29) Even so, many sequential workflows and assembly 
configurations remain in the forms set up by the 1920s. Before turning 
to an examination of the ramifications of this change in terms of 
shop-floor supervision however, a number of qualifying factors need to 
be taken into account. 
In a factory system producing a complex product, in this case a 
motor car, such a unilinear outline of a general deskilling process 
must be modified to recognise the uneven nature of historical change. 
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Different processes change at different rates. New products may 
generate new processes which engender new skill requirements among 
the workforce. Also, an adequate definition of the term 'skill' is 
extremely difficult to pin down, more so given the history of social 
constructions placed upon the word by employers, governments unions 
and commentators. 
(30) It is often argued that changes in work design 
always involve a shift rather than a wholesale reduction in skill, 
that new areas of skill appear to compensate for those lost. Bearing 
these comments in mind there are several caveats which must be taken 
into account before positing a universal "degradation of skill" 
accompanying the "Fordist" rationalisation of the labour process in 
cars during the period up to the 1930s. 
The first major problem to confront the trend towards total 
automation of the labour process is that of inflexibility. Constant 
modifications to the manufacturing process were possible while the 
Model 'T' production line, for example, turned out a uniform product 
with minimal design variation . As one sector of production was 
rationalised and speeded up bottlenecks in other sectors would appear 
and be modified in turn. There were inherent weaknesses in this 
process however which were partly generated in the market and partly 
by Ford's competition. Due to a combination of market saturation and 
the introduction of competition around stylistic diversity - the 
advent of the annual model change -a totally standardised product 
like the Model 'T' became increasingly unmarketable. There developed 
what Marsden has since termed a "dynamic link between innovations and 
the production process" ,a developing trade off between 
standardisation and high productivity on one hand, and the ability to 
Chapter Two -38- 
respond to market and product variations on the other. 
(31) Model 
variation, sometimes referred to as "Sloanism" after the strategy 
initiated by General Motors while headed by Alfred Sloan, impacted on 
the labour process by forcing the breaking down of the rigidity 
inherent in Fordist work design. Examples of this process include the 
Model 'A' retooling at Ford's River Rouge plant in 1927 when workers 
needed significant levels of retraining to enable the construction of 
the more complex successor to the Model 'T'. 
(32) The Chrysler Plymouth 
introduction in 1932 had similar effects, causing the reintroduction 
of more flexible machine tooling. 
(33) Assembly times could also be 
affected - the synchro-mesh gearbox almost tripled labour times when 
it was introduced in the early 1930s and the assembly of a fender on 
one car took three times as long in 1930 than it did in 1922. 
(34) 
Two factors arising from the impact of Sloanism need to be 
clarified, however. Firstly the apparent reincorporation of skill into 
areas of the labour process should not be overemphasised. This trend 
did not represent a reversal of the Fordist developments noted above. 
In many cases machine tools were further redesigned to incorporate 
more versatile , complex mechanisms which required no extra skill in 
operation. 
(35) Assembly jobs in general simply called for more work of 
the same nature in assembling more complex parts. Secondly, the major 
part of annual design changes were of a cosmetic nature only - body 
styles, fittings etc.. Major mechanical features underwent a longer 
development cycle. Engines, for example, typically changed over a five 
year period, often longer. 
Sloanism was a more complex phenomenon than the simple transition 
to annual product changes. GM's strategy, as Kuhn has outlined, was 
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based on a rationalised control structure incorporating decentralised 
production units but with a centralised or "cybernetic" control of 
overall corporate strategy. This was allied to sophisticated market 
feedback monitoring market tastes and demands. GM's apparent emphasis 
on planning and design in managerial systems, in Kuhn's analysis, 
forms the basis for their successfully eclipsing Ford as the major 
producer by the later 1920s. 
(36) Kuhn goes on to assert that, in 
contrast to the revisions undertaken by Sloan and Donaldson Brown at 
GM, Ford management displayed an "anti-design" attitude. 
Grounded as it is in an examination of higher managerial 
structures and using evidence based on returns on invested capital as 
indicators of GM's and Ford's differing trajectories, Kuhn's account 
fails to take account of a continuing similarity in production 
techniques. Certainly Ford's overreliance for an extended period on 
the Model 'T' led to an unacceptable rigidity in production/market 
interaction, but, given that the car was a proven and popular model 
and that when Ford did switch to production of the Model 'A' in 1927 
the latter was to prove a market leader in its own right, then 
accusations of an anti design culture at Ford are difficult to 
sustain. 
(37) More importantly, while managerial and financial 
structures certainly varied between the two corporations, innovations 
in production techniques at a broad level remained essentially 
parallel throughout the inter-war period, in line with the general 
contours of deskilling common to both these and the other major car 
producers. 
Another factor to be highlighted in qualifying the assertion of 
general trend of deskilling in the industry is the that of certain 
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resistant or inert areas within the labour process - jobs which prove 
difficult to rationalise. Assembly jobs are one category which remain 
difficult to automate beyond redesigning components and the ergonomics 
of work stations. The putting together of a complex product or 
component defies to this day the substitution of machinery for human 
hands. (38) The division of this process into small steps and 
consequent low exploitation of human potential marks this job off as 
one which may be subject to low levels of machine substitution, but 
not an area of retained skill however. Another, more persuasive 
argument can be made for the survival of skill in other, albeit 
increasingly marginal, sectors of the workplace. 
As control over the design of work shifted to remote planning 
areas or became consolidated within machinery some areas of skill 
remained on the factory floor. Examples include tool and die workers, 
electricians and maintenance workers. Tool and die work for example 
involves the construction and maintenance of the components of machine 
tools which cut or shape the materials fed in - cutters on lathes and 
millers, dies on presses etc.. Working with difficult basic materials 
to extremely precise tolerances workers in these jobs retained 
significant levels of skill, indispensable in that tools and dies 
remained variable as design changed or parts wore out. Some advances 
were made in automating aspects of tool and die work - welded 
construction of dies for example. Also changes prolonging the life of 
tools were made as new materials were introduced. Carboloy cutters and 
chrome plated forming dies are examples. 
(39) In spite of these 
developments the toolroom did retain its position as a major residual 
area of skill on the shop floor, an area employing at times up to 15% 
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of the overall workforce. 
(40) Important as the above pockets of skill 
remain, they nevertheless represent only a minority of jobs on the 
shop-floor following the major phase of deskilling up to the 1920s. 
New skilled jobs created by the above changes were also only a 
marginal feature. 
(41) 
The term "skill" is of course highly contentious, categorisations 
ranging from the crude skilled/semi-skilled/unskilled, through 
Reitel's six stage car industry typology, to the general 17 level 
typology of Bright. 
(42) The general term "semi-skilled" is a good 
example of the way in which social and political constructions shape 
categorisations. First used by the Bureau of Census in the 1930s as an 
arbitrary half way measure, the term led to the artificial upgrading 
of millions of jobs irrespective of their actual intrinsic difficulty 
or level of specialisation. 
(43) No rigorous categorisation is proposed 
here beyond the assertion that the above noted trends in mechanisation 
and rationalisation produced a majority of jobs typified by a low 
requirement of mental and motor skills. These characteristics can be 
revealed in short job learning cycles and interchangeability. 
Various contemporary job classifications lists seem to refute 
this last assertion. The US Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) surveys 
for example seem to point to an increasing diversity of occupations. 
In 1922 they list 254 job titles under 38 general headings. The 
classification "body builders" for example incorporates 25 jobs 
including band saw operators, cabinet makers, dovetail operators, 
squeakmen, steering wheel groovers and frame dressers. By 1925 the BLS 
report lists 556 jobs in 22 departments, "body builders" now having 
increased to 50 jobs with dingmen, top assembler and top slatter among 
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the new additions. The 1928 report continues with 1925's 
definitions. (44) Similarly a list compiled by personnel at Ford's 
River Rouge plant in 1935 contains 596 separate job categories. 
(45) 
Two points must be made concerning these lists however. Firstly the 
numbers employed in each occupation vary greatly. In the Ford list for 
example there are 3,330 assemblers, 5,646 labourers, 954 machine 
setters, 3,676 punch press operators and 1052 stock men, while babbit 
men number 31, belt men 31, cable splicers 5, flue men 13 and so on, 
the greater number of occupations employing few workers. Secondly, 
what level of real skill differential is embodied in each title? WPA 
researchers in 1937 were content to point to the majority of workers 
being in the ubiquitous "semi-skilled" bracket. 
(46). A later union 
agreement drafted by the United Automobile Workers at the Ford 
Edgewater Road plant in 1944 is illuminating in this respect. It lists 
219 jobs within 3 categories of interchangeability for seniority 
provisions. In other words, in the view of both management and union 
jobs such as assembly, welding, machine operation or painting could 
all be performed by the same worker with little extra training, thus 
revealing a low level of intrinsic skill requirement for each job. 
(47) 
A more straightforward method of establishing skill levels is to 
examine the length of training necessary to competently perform 
various jobs. Dunn estimated that 44% of all jobs in one Cleveland car 
plant in 1915 required less than one month's training, while only 1% 
required four years. 
(48) By 1923 Ford's own figures listed 43% of jobs 
requiring only one day's training, 36% two days, and 6% two weeks. 
Only 4% of jobs required training of over one year. 
(49) The comments 
of a Yale student who went to work at Fisher Body in 1928 illustrate 
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the training experience of a growing majority of car workers 
throughout the period; "This was a fast line and every operation was 
very simple. I was 100% efficient one minute after I started. "(50) 
Thus we can see that the period between the inception of the car 
industry and the 1930s was one typified by intense rationalisation of 
machinery and methods of production with the result that an increasing 
number of jobs became, when using short training cycles and 
limitations on worker discretion as indicators, deskilled. 
Technological and organisational change as delineated above was not 
solely about the control of workers. Coordination and the rapidity and 
precision of machine production and pacing are also major elements in 
the incentive to install new work methods. Machine production could 
and did produce the measurability, standardisation, interchangeability 
and volume of production necessary to create and sustain growing mass 
markets. Nevertheless the result of these changes was a major 
restructuring of control of workers and, whether or not this was the 
primary causation, this restructuring bought with it a total 
reorientation of methods of supervision. 
The change in structures of supervision needs to be viewed at 
several levels. Firstly, the switch to a complex, totally coordinated 
mass production system ushered in the need for a formalised 
bureaucracy to deal with labour and materials. Thus the role of 
supervision became divided in line with the general division and 
deskilling taking place on the shop floor and also in line with the 
separation of certain functions between the shop-floor and remote 
departments and offices. The second major impact on the role of 
supervision, at least for that element of supervision remaining in 
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direct contact with the shop-floor, was that the above changes bought 
new imperatives to the way in which the foreman's job could be 
undertaken. A new kind of worker emerged, constrained to work to new 
methods and generating new forms of shop-floor activity relating to 
the way in which work was carried out. 
The formal role of the foreman changed substantially from that of 
his 19th century counterpart as a degree of functional division was 
implemented in line with the new rationalised work structures. The 
actual role, in terms of the configurations of power which remained in 
the spaces in control generated by the new work methods, was in many 
ways enhanced rather than diminished during this period. Before 
turning to an examination of these newly emergent shop-floor power 
configurations however it is necessary to map out the formal 
structures of supervision which accompanied the rationalised car 
factory. 
Supervising Fordism: Bureaucracy and the division of supervisory 
labour 
The car industry foreman's 19th century predecessor had a wide 
range of discretionary power over most aspects of the labour process. 
Situations varied between industries and systems in use, but in 
general the foreman of the pre-mass production era exercised wide 
controls over labour, materials and work flows and most aspects of 
production. The transition from handicraft production to factory 
production had generated the role of overseer or foreman to replace 
the autonomous regulation typical of domestic or small scale 
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production, and in this sense marks the beginning of the division of 
supervisory labour - between the self-supervision of handicraft 
production in a non-factory setting and the advent of a specialised 
supervisory function marked off by non-participation in actual work. 
The advent of a specialised foreman's role was thus linked to the 
switch in control systems which observers such as Marglin and Clawson 
have identified as the central dynamic in the implementation of the 
factory system. 
(51) This non-participation in actual work did not mean 
that foremen were incapable of performing to the same standard as 
workers, often quite the contrary. In a system such as Offe has 
categorised as 'task continuous production' the foreman would follow a 
route to supervision based upon technical competence. As one late 19th 
century commentator insisted, "It is difficult to place too much 
stress upon the point of superior manipulative skill on the part of 
the foreman engineer". 
(52) W. H. M. Jackson outlined the skill of the 
'traditional' engineering foreman who could, "charge his memory with 
everything related to the work, and he could make an extremely close 
guess at times, weights, speeds and feeds... if such a man were 
challenged upon a single variable, the guess might come within ten 
percentum. "(53) Foremen also had direct control over material and tool 
purchase and production flows and schedules. The incorporation of 
variables within the set-up of machinery and the integration of 
production flows to preset schedules were, as we shall see however, to 
obviate this skill and reduce the foreman's level of technical 
requirement to that of workers in general. 
In terms of overall control over the workforce - hire and fire, 
job allocation, wages distribution etc. the 19th century foreman again 
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wielded a wide range of power. As noted above systems varied. The 
internal contract system for example was popular in New England 
Factories and elsewhere up until the turn of the century. Under this 
system materials, production and workers were controlled through the 
parcelling out of authority to semi-autonomous sub-contractors. Such 
sub-contractors relied heavily on the role of foreman and his 
knowledge of local labour markets and work practices in assessing 
prices for jobs. 
( 54) In general supervision was of a personal, 
sectional nature during this period often determined by craft 
imperatives. As Nelson notes, "the factory of 1880 remained a 
congeries of craftsmen's shops rather than an integrated plant". 
(55) 
Shops under this system often were referred to by the name of a 
particular foreman in charge. Hiring and firing of workers and setting 
of pay rates was largely at the discretion of individual foremen 
restrained only by labour market conditions and individual skill 
factors. Workers often followed particular foremen from one job to 
another. 
It must be noted that where work was of a skilled nature this 
often worked to contradict unilateral foreman power. Workers were 
often resentful of intrusion upon work patterns by anyone, the foreman 
included. Mining was one example. Goodrich quoted a Lanarkshire 
miner's testimony indicating why an overman never saw a certain miner 
working; "They always stop work when they see an overman coming, and 
sit down and wait till he's gone - even take out their pipes if it's a 
mine free from gas. They won't let anybody watch them. "(56) 
Coal mining, before the long wall method came to be employed, was 
essentially a group regulated activity by virtue of the remote 
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location of the coalface, but even in other industries where fairly 
advanced factory systems were established skilled workers often showed 
similar antipathy to over-zealous foremanship. As one British foundry 
worker at the turn of the century asserted, "... if a foreman stood 
over me... he could finish the job. I would not tolerate it. "(57) This 
antipathy was a manifestation not only of the skilled worker's 
insistence on self regulation of the way in which work was to be 
carried out but also the speed at which tasks were to be undertaken. 
These attitudes persisted into the early phases of car production 
while significant skill levels were still required. Bodyworkers were 
one such example; "If two stopped working and talked together they 
paid no attention to foremen or straw bosses.. . if they chose they went 
early to lunch and returned late. Foremen were accustomed to this way 
of doing things. As long as the daily production was turned out what 
the body makers did was their own business. 1(58) Such a situation was 
often reinforced where a unionised environment existed, especially one 
in which the foreman was also required to take up union 
membership. 
(59) 
For workers without the protection that accompanied skill, or 
even for skilled workers during periods of a downturn in economic 
activity, the foreman's range of powers were largely unconstrained. 
Outside the compromises imposed by some sectors of the workforce, the 
car industry foreman's predecessor commanded what Melling has outlined 
for British shipyard workers as "a formidable realm" extending beyond 
the factory environment into society in general. 
(60) He hired workers 
and fired them with no recourse to any higher authority, he supervised 
training, set out production schedules and work intensity and 
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determined wage and bonus levels. To obtain a job, to keep it and to 
make it worth having it was as well to stay on the right side of the 
foreman, in the factory or outside. 
The process of Fordist rationalisation outlined in the previous 
section was to have profound ramifications for this style of 
foremanship. It was to bring with it a phase of restructuring of the 
overall bureaucracy of control of work and a nominal segmentation of 
the role of supervision -a functionalisation which in many ways 
echoed the tenets of Taylor's ideal structure. 
(61) This restructuring 
was not to eclipse the power of the foreman over many aspects of 
factory life, but did change the nature and range of job skills 
required of the foreman. Before turning to an examination of the ways 
in which the foreman continued to exert great influence over the daily 
experience of factory life it is necessary to outline the change in 
the nominal job content of supervision. 
Supervisory and control tasks became divided both within the 
confines of the shop-floor and beyond, and were subject to both a 
horizontal and an extended hierarchical division. Horizontal division 
saw the establishment of separate departments to deal with technical, 
production related aspects of work - purchasing, costing, production 
planning and control, quality control, maintenance etc. - and also 
personnel related aspects - timekeeping, personnel, welfare etc.. 
While some of these departments kept a direct presence on the shop- 
floor e. g. inspectors and progress clerks, most became removed to 
remote office based locations. 
Of the supervisory tasks remaining on the shop-floor a 
hierarchical division and further degree of specialisation rapidly 
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built up. Below the role of foreman a range of intermediate control 
jobs developed. Leaders, relief men, utility men, foremen's clerks, 
straw bosses and assistant foremen were to be found in varying ratios 
in all car factories from the 1920s onwards. Above the foreman general 
foremen, assistant superintendents and superintendents, each with 
varying departmental or plant wide responsibility, formed the links 
between shop floor life and formal management positions. 
We shall examine each of these lines of division in turn, 
beginning with the horizontal divisions - the departmentalisation of 
the supervisory function. Clearly with the extended redivision of 
labour engendered in the fully integrated and synchronised production 
typified by the car factory of the 1920s, the old style foreman with 
knowledge and control of all aspects of the labour process could not 
endure. The scale of production and diversity of component parts meant 
the rapid establishment of specialist departments to control the 
purchase of materials and machinery, the design and scheduling of 
production, the control of stock and inventory levels, maintenance of 
machinery and storage and dispatch of production. Information gathered 
from these separate functions began to feed developing cost accounting 
functions to support the predictability underlying investment 
decisions now far removed from the shop-floor. 
(62) As early as 1909 
the Cadillac company for example had established separate purchase, 
cost accounting, production control, research and development, 
timekeeping departments in addition to 44 separate manufacturing 
departments. (63) Each of these now separated departments was subject 
to its own further internal subdivision of tasks and extending 
supervisory structures. 
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Research and development, in which the 19th century engineering 
foreman would have contributed in at least an advisory capacity, was 
one of the first functions to become specialised. Foremen might be 
called in to aid in the design of the shop-floor layout when new 
production configurations were being installed, as was foreman Roscoe 
Smith during Ford's move from Highland Park to the River Rouge in 
1925. (64) As far as product design went however foremen had by the 
1920s little if any input. Indeed, by the 1930s production foremen at 
Fisher Bodies were not allowed to enter the engineering and 
experimental department where new designs were being developed. 
(65) 
While purchase, costing, stock control and sales procedures 
became completely removed from the shop-floor(66) there still remained 
a necessary feedback element to these activities. Foremen's roles soon 
became limited to one concerned with the supply of basic information 
of ten through the mediating role of specialist clerks. The foreman's 
exclusion from this aspect of the overall control of production is 
illustrated by the experience at Ford during the 1920s when production 
foremen were forbidden even to keep production records. In fact Ford 
foremen resorted to keeping clandestine accounts of output and manning 
levels, computing costs in hidden notebooks. 
(67) This restriction was 
in line with the general Ford policy of the time that no-one be 
allowed to sit down at work. Desks therefore occupied minimal shop- 
floor space and if installed at all were of a tall, stand-up design. 
As foreman Smith recalled, "You never got off your feet. . . You weren't 
supposed to keep records on cost but I always had one. Of course you 
had to carry them in your pocket ... I got away with the extra record 
keeping by the grace of god. "(68) This system was relaxed in the mid 
Chapter Two -51- 
1920s in an attempt to break up the growing preponderance of 
bureaucracy and reestablish foremen's control over shop-floor cost 
accounting but this revision was short lived and of ter two to three 
years the function was relocated away from the shop-floor once 
more. 
(69) Ford may be an extreme example in this respect, nevertheless 
the switch to specialist departments controlling medium and long term 
inputs and outputs was well established throughout the industry by the 
early 1920s. 
The transmission of immediate information on the flow of 
production was a crucial aspect of the move to totally integrated 
production and represents an area where the foreman's role was further 
segmented. Shortages, bottlenecks or unscheduled changes of priority 
required rapid rectification or implementation. Ford's system for 
example was designed to convert raw material into finished cars in 
around 52 hours, and, (in a system which anticipated one of the 
current tenets of Japanese style 'just in time' production methods), 
depended on minimal inventory levels to reduce costs. 
(70) 
Interruptions to the flow of production represented a potential 
escalation of these costs. To facilitate the flow of information on 
the on-going state of production a coordinatory function was set up. 
The 'shortage chaser' or 'expediter' liaising between shop-floor, 
planning and stock departments, compiled and administered various 
written and blackboard lists highlighting and controlling immediate 
production problems and recording actual production and target 
levels. (71) Shortage chasers tended to have an ad hoc field of 
responsibility, often moving urgent materials themselves, driving 
'jitneys' or fork lift trucks and frequently assuming the authority of 
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supervisor in his absence. 
The corollary to the production-related progress chaser linking 
planning and stock departments to the shop floor was the quality 
control function set up to monitor the standard as opposed to volume 
of output. This represents one of the most interesting fractures 
within the structure of supervision originating around this period. 
Inspectors began to appear in large numbers from the early phases of 
rationalisation of car production. The Arnold and Faurote survey at 
Ford in 1915 reveals 50 inspectors in the foundry and over 200 in the 
machine shop. Ford factory counts reveal 1092 inspectors by 1917. 
(72). 
Checks might involve visual appraisal or extensive measurement to 
ensure compliance with specified tolerance ranges. A cylinder machined 
in 1915 for example required 21 separate gauging operations. 
(73) 
The job of inspection, in line with most other functions, soon 
became subdivided and rationalised. Inspectors might sample a required 
percentage of component production or test every piece made. They 
might work with simple "go" or "no go" gauges designed to rapidly 
determine the suitability of a component simply by its fit within a 
pre-set limits or alternatively they might work with micrometers, 
'clocks' and similar gauges needing more discretionary operation. 
Inspectors might work on a time basis making regular rounds or 
patrols, sampling each output station at periodic intervals or 
alternatively operate from fixed positions. The later method was 
usually adopted when total output inspection was carried out and was 
open to the same trend of work measurement as production proper. The 
1915 piston inspection at Ford for example was restricted to an eight 
second cycle per piece. 
(74) 
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There is an apparent contradiction in this increase in the level 
of inspection in the rationalised factory. Given the increased 
repeatability and standardisation inherent in the new machinery and 
controls outlined earlier it might reasonably be expected that there 
would be a resultant decrease in the need for monitoring variances in 
production. Also a progressive built-in monitoring of production in 
machine operations might be expected to run counter to the need to 
increase human inspection. Taking the latter point first, certain 
developments were made in the 1920s and 30s such as the automatic 
monitoring of furnaces in the foundry, and automatic photo-electric 
and mechanical gauges in machine shops. 
(75) In addition complex 
measuring equipment was devised, such as that introduced in 1934 to 
measure eight cylinder wall thicknesses simultaneously. 
(76) Despite 
these moves towards automatic monitoring the growing presence of a 
separate quality control staff on the shop floor is a feature of this 
period. There are a number of reasons for this. 
Firstly in a fully integrated production line operating at 
increasing speeds undiscovered errors in production create rapidly 
accumulating losses and it must be noted that even the most 
rationalised of technology is subject to periodic failure or human 
error in operation. The pace and design of jobs often left little room 
for individual operators to progressively check their work. Secondly 
with the fixed nature of standardised output designed for 
compatibility with related components, production which is out of 
tolerance cannot be adapted to fit. Also a faulty component in a 
complex product such as a car engine can have expensive repercussions, 
especially if undiscovered at the point of production. Under the 
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individual machinist system a mistake was likely to have been a one 
off and could possibly be filed or remachined to fit. The Fordist 
system allowed neither the time nor facility for this mode of 
correction therefore errors needed to be located as early as possible. 
The third reason for the expansion of a specialised quality 
function lies in the nature of the work itself and its effect on the 
workforce. Even where work was highly automated there still often 
remained significant areas of operator discretion and where work 
continued to be manually controlled, certain assembly operations for 
example, workers also retained significant control. More will be said 
about this below. Here it is enough to note that a certain level of 
quality discretion remained in the hands of the workforce, hence the 
need for continued inspection. Where piecework systems were in 
operation inspection was called for to monitor output and discourage 
scrap production, especially so since speed of output and quality 
often vary in inverse proportions. The central point here is that, 
under the prevailing extensively divided work that typified car mass 
production, responsibility or interest in production became shifted 
away from the individual worker. It has become axiomatic over recent 
years that repetitive detail labour carries with it low levels of 
commitment to either the quality of production or, ultimately, to the 
goals of the firm. Tasks structured for intrinsic job interest and 
variety on the other hand are held to generate a high levels of 
commitment to product quality and thus contribute significantly to the 
success of the firm. 
(77) Projecting this notion backwards to pre mass 
production manufacture we can see that, for those involved in the 
overall craft based method of work a commitment to quality lay within 
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the worker himself. The ploughmen recalled by John Grout in Blythe's 
'Akenfield' might well stand for the ethos of most craft workers; 
"' free rent for good work'. That could mean an extra £5 a year. The 
men worked perfectly to get this, but they also worked perfectly 
because it was their work. It belonged to them. It was theirs. 1(78) 
Since, following the rapid phase of rationalisation in the car 
industry the dominant mode of work was that of extensive deskilling 
and division allied to increasing reliance on a high wage/high effort 
bargain or compulsion generated in local labour markets, a separate, 
external, form of regulation had to be imposed to assure the quality 
of production. Someone else beside the worker had to take an interest 
in the standard of production, hence the genesis of functional, 
autonomous quality control departments. 
This particular division of supervisory labour affected foremen 
in a number of ways. The traditional foreman would, on a personal 
basis, oversee or reinforce quality decisions made by individual 
workers. Indeed during the early years of the car industry this method 
of working continued to be a feature. Roscoe Smith, a foreman in the 
generator and starter department at Ford in the 1920s, carried on the 
assumption of responsibility by setting up his own unofficial quality 
control department in line with the clandestine record keeping noted 
above. 
(79) Smith is probably the exception however. While foremen on 
the shop floor became deskilled in line with general operatives they 
still retained, through their continuing responsibility for levels of 
output, a reasonably effective veto over decisions made by quality 
control staff. Nevertheless the criteria used in acceptance of 
production - standards and tolerance limits - were now set by staff 
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involved in the set up and design of work. Foremen's discretion was 
thus increasingly confined within limits defined by remote personnel. 
The conflict between production levels and quality undoubtedly 
generated a certain amount of hostility between the nascent quality 
control personnel and the foreman who was coming under ever increasing 
pressure to push production out. 
There was without doubt a rational element in the decision to 
set up separate departmental responsibility to oversee the quality of 
production, i. e. the impracticality of foremen controlling the quality 
of mass production, yet the shift of responsibility also represents a 
tacit acceptance that not only the workforce, but also its own 
immediate supervision could no longer be trusted to produce to set 
quality standards without the presence of an autonomous regulatory 
body. As such this development represents an important element in the 
split between shop floor staff and those with an indirect location, 
ultimately office based. 
So far we have covered some of the production oriented divisions 
within supervision. In addition certain personnel related functions 
became nominally separated out from shop floor control during the 
early phase of rationalisation in the industry. There was a general 
increase in interest in specialist personnel departments around the 
time of the first world war, stemming from a number of sources. 
Firstly, the increased size of many workforces generated the need for 
an administrative machinery able to cope with the employment details 
of a workforce often numbering many thousands. Secondly, methods of 
recruitment and selection pioneered in the armed forces and based on 
applied behavioural psychology began to be promoted by managers and 
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consultants in some sectors of industry. The latter trend coincided 
with efforts promoted by a loose federation of 'personnel' advocates 
among middle class reformers, academics and professional 
administrators. 
The number of 250-plus employee firms with specialised personnel 
departments rose from around 5% in 1914 to around 25% by the end of 
the war, 32% in metal working factories. 
(80) The car industry was 
fairly well represented among these. By 1916 Ford, Packard and Dodge 
had centralised employment offices charged with overseeing and 
recording recruitment and dismissals. Briggs and Fisher soon 
followed. (81) The spread of welfare departments mirrored this growth 
of personnel departments up to the 1920s. 
(82) 
The general movement behind the rising number of specialised 
personnel departments during this period was, as noted, comprised of 
disparate elements. Though no doubt part of the general trend of 
rationalised bureaucracy which accompanied changes in technology, the 
movement also had a certain political constituency. The work on I. Q. 
tests, job psychographs, aptitude tests and related measurement 
techniques promoted by Walter Dill Scott, Ordway Tead and others 
around the time of world war one were aimed at 'scientific' selection 
of workers (or soldiers as in the case of armed forces 
recruitment). 
(83) Rational selection procedures such as these f itted 
in with the ideas of progressive elements seeking to promote the 
replacement of ad hoc selection methods as one way of eliminating 
industrial strife. Sumner Slichter and others saw rational personnel 
management as a potential 'third force', a neutral agency between 
manager and worker, echoing the detachment promoted by scientific 
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management advocates from Taylor onwards, although in practice such 
systems were always underpinned by economic criteria. For Tead, 
selection procedures, professionally administered, could be aimed to 
promote dignity, workmanship and 'constructive feeling' among workers. 
Professional control of hiring, firing and discipline should thus 
'supersede' the arbitrary controls administered by the foreman. 
(84) 
The movement formed around a nexus of progressive elements 
forging corporate-academic links such as those headed by Meyer 
Bloomfield, and often under government sponsorship. Packard for 
example sent staff on government training courses implemented during 
the war. It was around this time that most major universities began to 
take an interest in vocational guidance courses. 
(85) The growth of 
organisations such as the National Fmployment Managers Association and 
the burgeoning literature of the field - Jorgensen-Esmaili calculates 
that 2,750 books and magazine articles on personnel administration and 
human relations in industry appeared between 1917 and 1922 - reflect 
the increasing interest in the field, if not the level of 
application. 
(86) The expansion of interest in professional personnel 
staff during wartime also clearly reflects a heightening of 
intervention in industry by the state and consequent increased levels 
of bureaucracy. By way of a comparison this expansion is a feature of 
world war two in Britain. 
(87) 
In the U. S., interest persisted following 1918, at least partly 
in response to union activity. Professionalised personnel practices 
were held to be instrumental in retarding trade union development. The 
increasingly costly problem of labour turnover was also a major 
factor, and this was seen by many as a direct consequence of the 
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continued power of foremen over personnel practices. 
(88) More will be 
said about the foreman and labour turnover below, here it is enough to 
note that the movement to install professional personnel management 
levelled off into the 1920s. By 1928 there were still only around 34% 
of 250-plus factories with personnel departments. 
(89) Nevertheless 
personnel departments did establish a permanent and widespread 
presence in the car industry throughout the inter-war period, and it 
is thus necessary to establish the precise nature of their power and 
examine the relationship of their function to that of shop-floor 
supervision during this period. 
The roles which personnel departments were supposed to cover 
extended to hiring, firing and ongoing disciplinary, wage and training 
related issues. In reality these departments, where in operation, 
usually fell well short of achieving control over those functions. One 
good example of this process, particularly in view of its high 
visibility in many historical accounts, is that of the series of Ford 
personnel initiatives between 1914 and the 1920s. Ford's 'Sociological 
Department' was set up in 1914 under the rubric of a recognition of a 
growing "human problem" at work (manifested in Ford's extremely high 
turnover problems) and as part of a general paternalism, in vogue with 
Henry Ford at this time. The department was set up to oversee the 
implementation of set of initiatives designed to monitor and adjust 
workers behaviour inside and outside the factory. 
(90) 
As far as the extra-factory domestic intrusions were concerned 
the department sought to promote or gain information about employees 
on such issues as drinking, gambling, marital stability, propensity to 
save money etc.. In short, to measure conformity to a strict moral 
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code devised largely from Ford's personal foibles. The threat of 
withdrawal of the accompanying high wage - the notorious "$5 dollar 
day" - was supposed to ensure worker adherence to this code. The 
rationale behind these enquiries was outlined by J. R. Lee the 
system's original administrator when referring to the Ford belief that 
domestic "worries" could "put a satisfactory human unit entirely out 
of harmony with the things that were necessary for production. "(91) 
The Sociological Department and attendant behavioural coercion 
represented perhaps the most vigorous of Ford's sporadic forays into 
the world of paternal or welfare employment policies extending beyond 
the factory - sponsored gardening, house building and maintenance 
projects and church sponsorship were among the programmes 
underwritten by the company at various times throughout the 
period. 
(92) As far as the enforced moral codes were concerned, in 
spite of much contemporary positive (and subsequent negative) rhetoric 
the scheme probably had a minor impact. If workers did tolerate the 
intrusions of the Sociological Department it is unlikely that many 
changed their habits on a permanent basis, besides, staff for domestic 
monitoring were somewhat limited. Changes wrought to the structure of 
supervision inside the factory are, however, of more direct concern 
here. 
The existing regime of supervision at Ford was, as far as Lee was 
concerned, responsible for many of the problems which the Sociological 
Department attempted to eradicate; "... the most important cause of 
dissatisfaction (among the workforce) is the unintelligent handling of 
the men on the part of the foremen and superintendents.,, 
(93) Most 
important of the new department's powers in this respect was that of 
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control of hiring and firing. Hiring was now to be in the hands of 
heads of departments only and no longer concern lower foremen. 
(94) 
More importantly the power to sack workers was now to be subject to an 
official process of mediation and reappraisal. In Henry Ford's words, 
"no foreman in the company has the power to discharge a man. He may 
send them out of his department if they do not make good, but the man 
is then sent to a clearing house, covering all departments, and again 
repeatedly tried in other work until we find a job he is suited 
for... "(95) 
This version of the changes at Ford from 1914 onward has been 
accepted, largely uncritically, by a number of accounts both 
contemporary and current. 
(96) Evidence suggests that on the factory 
floor things continued much as before however, with only an irritating 
increase in official interference. As foreman Smith asserted, "We 
could fire them ... They went to the employment office ... We usually sent 
a man and he stuck. "(97) William Klann, also a foreman at this time, 
concurs, "It wasn't true that the foreman couldn't fire a man before 
it went through the sociological department... they would fire them for 
us. We would just send them over with a report. t(98) 
Whether or not workers were given a retrial in another department 
was often of little consequence to foremen who continued to rule over 
territorially defined areas. Klann recalled the tenor of instructions 
to the sociological department, "We don't care where the fellow goes 
to. Just get him out of our way. Get him out of our hair... we would 
get somebody else in there that we could drive. "(99) In reality the 
move to another department, if carried out, usually meant pressurising 
the worker into quitting altogether since it was unlikely to involve 
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an easier but rather a 'punishment' job, often used as an example to 
other workers. 
Pretexts for referral of workers to the sociological department 
were still the unquestioned preserve of the foreman and often 
disguised the real reason for dismissal. "Poor attendance" for example 
might in reality mean refusal on behalf of the worker to participate 
in one of the 'kick back' or bribery schemes involving many 
foremen. (100) In any case reasons for rejection did not need to be 
very elaborate. Even Arnold and Faurote who accepted the notion of the 
"impartial tribunal" of Ford's new system admitted that, "wilful 
insubordination is, of course, absolutely intolerable and Ford workers 
must be, first of all, docile. "(101) 
From the workers perspective complaints about work, if anyone 
was bold enough to venture them, still had to be directed, in the 
first instance, to the foreman and if the only prospect was a transfer 
to an unknown and probably more hostile work environment, it seems 
unlikely that many would have taken up the option. 
Even if the Sociological Department did represent an erosion of 
the personnel based functions remaining on the shop-floor it was a 
short-lived phenomenon. By 1917, only three years after its inception, 
each of its investigators had responsibility for over 700 workers - 
far too many to be effective - and by 1918 only a handful of staff 
remained. 
(102) The department was largely abandoned in 1921 due to a 
mixture of costs and a general shift away from welfare oriented 
solutions to labour problems. The corollary to this latter shift at 
Ford was the implementation of a 'service' department, based upon a 
regime of intimidation by a quasi autonomous group of 'servicemen' -a 
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form of industrial police force answerable in its methods to a 
separate managerial hierarchy. More will be said about the functions 
and extent of influence of the servicemen's department in the 
following chapter. 
Another reflection of the demise of the Sociological Department 
was the eclipse of Ford's 'five dollar day' high wage strategy, 
negated by the pressure of wartime inflation and imitative pay rises 
by competitors. Even this measure had, in reality, taken little away 
from the foreman in terms of wage determination. 
(103) Foremen were 
still able to determine which pay band workers went into. More 
important perhaps was the unofficial instruction to foremen which went 
with the five dollar day, "... drive, drive, drive. After 1914 when we 
gave the $5 day it was the same way. They called (the foremen) in and 
said since they were getting twice the wages they wanted twice as much 
work. "(104) 
Personnel related divisions of supervisory labour, as indicated 
by the Ford example above, had not had the same impact on the role of 
the foreman as had the functional, production related divisions 
ushered in by mass production. Whereas the movement towards 
enlightened personnel management received, and continues to receive, a 
high profile, in application such initiatives had little lasting 
impact on shop floor life. Specialist employment departments had a say 
in the selection process, and served in a necessary administrative 
capacity given the increase in size and complexity of the workforce, 
but their function as such was limited to a remote supportive function 
in terms of ongoing shop floor control. Every-day personnel functions 
were to remain a preserve of the foremen at least for the time being. 
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In addition to the horizontal divisions of supervisory labour 
into separate shop floor functions and remote departmental functions, 
mass production also generated an extended vertical division of labour 
as complex hierarchies of managerial control were set up. Each of the 
above departmentalised functions - quality control, production 
control, personnel etc. - incorporated its own internal extended chain 
of command within a developing staff and line management framework. In 
terms of shop floor supervision the line of authority which travelled 
through the role of foreman began with the various subservient shop 
floor jobs such as utility and relief men, group leaders and assistant 
foremen, and carried on upwards through the role of general foreman, 
superintendent, plant manager and so on. It is also at this point 
which we confronted with the need to define the precise meaning of the 
title of "foreman" within the shifting and multivariate definitions of 
shop floor supervision. 
A general criteria for the definition of a foreman might be that 
of a worker who takes no direct manual involvement in regular 
production duties, but who nevertheless works almost exclusively on 
the shop floor or its immediate environs. It is this group of workers 
with which we are primarily concerned. Nevertheless even this narrow 
definition of a foreman can be seen to fit several categories of 
worker. Individual plants, even within large corporations, usually had 
their own bespoke hierarchy of shop floor supervisors. The following 
are examples of typical variations in place by the 1920s and 1930s. 
Ford hierarchies included section foremen, assistant foremen, foremen, 
division foremen and division shift foremen. At Packard there were 
general foremen, foremen, assistant foremen and "special assignment 
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men" on the shop floor. At GM Chevrolet there were no assistant 
foremen but a category of "tool and relief men" who fulfilled the same 
functions. At the Dodge Main and Plymouth plants a category of 
assistant general foremen was interposed between foremen and general 
foremen, whereas the Dodge Forge plant had no such intermediate 
job. (105) 
In terms of numbers the job of foreman was by far the dominant 
category. At Chrysler's Highland Park plant in the 1930s for example 
there were eight foremen for each general foreman. One general foreman 
at Ford in the 1920s was in charge of 29 foremen. Similarly with 
assistant foremen, although these were generally more numerous than 
any other category surrounding the role of foremen the latter still 
outnumbered them in ratios typically in excess of three to one. At 
Hudson in 1930s for example there were 316 foremen and 100 assistant 
foremen. At Packard 597 foremen controlled and 84 assistant foremen 
and 59 special assignment men in the early 1940s. Ratios fluctuated 
depending on levels of productivity and individual departments. In 
times of expanding output more assistant foremen would be promoted to 
meet increased demand for example. Each individual department or 
sector of production also had its own supervision profile. 
Nevertheless the majority of supervisory workers on the shop floor 
were categorised as what might be termed ordinary foremen. 
(106) 
General foremen and superintendents form the link between shop 
floor supervision and the formal, remotely based management positions. 
Being office based themselves, albeit in proximity to the shop floor, 
usually with the attendant clerical facilities of office based work, 
this strata had less direct contact with actual production in terms of 
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the overall content of their day's work. More often they liaised with 
foremen on matters concerning output, manning levels etc. On the lower 
side of the shop floor hierarchy, the various roles of assistant 
foreman, relief man etc. were more numerous and involved a complex and 
indeterminate position in regard to those engaged full time in 
production work. 
Many factories employed the category of "leader" or "group 
leader" to supplement the activity of foremen. Leaders would often be 
involved in the direction of labour but not be formally involved in 
disciplinary functions. They usually received increased wages, but 
only marginally above those of ordinary production workers. Chrysler 
for example paid leaders an extra 10c. per hour in the 1930s. They 
were still expected to work at production and often took over while 
workers were away from the line or to speed output through developing 
bottlenecks. Some measure of the amount of time which leaders actually 
spent engaged in production is indicated by the readiness of the UAW 
to admit this class of worker to membership following 1937. Indeed, 
Walter Reuther himself had been a leader at Ford in the early 
1930s. (107) Another similar group of workers included "relief men", 
"trouble men" and "utility men" each of which was called in to assist 
the foreman or fill in gaps in the production process on an ad hoc 
basis. (108) Usually paid more than leaders they had a slightly 
enlarged role usually encompassing a degree of progress chasing and 
more responsible tasks. Packard's "exceptional employee" category 
performed a similar role. 
(109) This particular class of working 
supervisor was generally referred to by ordinary production workers as 
the "straw boss" and was frequently the subject of general resentment, 
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being not foreman proper but nevertheless adopting a disciplinary 
role. 
(110) In addition many foremen could call on the services of 
stock chasers, who though not officially under the direct control of 
shop floor foremen, were usually instructed by them. Stock chasers or 
shortage chasers (or expediters as they were known at Hudson) did no 
actual production work but were principally involved in eradicating 
bottlenecks in production or speeding through various "hot parts". In 
emergencies foremen would often draft in the services of any available 
worker to fulfil this function, frequently using tool setters. 
(111) 
By contrast assistant foremen did no work at production under 
normal circumstances. Like foremen they were frequently to be found 
taking over jobs either for ratesetting purposes or in troubleshooting 
problem areas, but their formal function closely mirrored that of 
foremen proper i. e. organising labour, disciplinary functions and so 
on. In addition some plants employed another separate category of 
supervisors not permanently fixed to any particular department. 
Packard for example employed a large group of "special assignment men" 
to fill in for regular foremen in cases of absence or for 
troubleshooting. These operated in the same way as assistant foremen 
however in that they were not ordinarily expected to undertake any 
production work. 
(112) 
Clearly there are definitional problems in referring to "foremen" 
as a group on the shop floor. Undoubtedly many accounts, in particular 
oral history accounts, will involve some confusion in this respect, 
conflating straw boss or superintendents for example under the 
general heading of "foreman". This problem reflects the 
larger 
definitional inaccuracy of general data involving categories such as 
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"supervision". Indeed this definitional problem, the argument over 
what precisely constitutes a "foreman", was later to form one of the 
core debates when the unionisation of supervisory workers occurred. 
With this caveat in mind i. e. that a certain amount over overlap in 
reference to groups of workers immediately surrounding the shop floor 
foreman is unavoidable, the dominance of assistant foremen and foremen 
in numerical terms, and the general criteria that these are workers 
whose day is spent predominantly on the shop floor directing the work 
of others, adequately delineates a specific class or sector of the 
workforce. 
In summary, this chapter has outlined the changes in 
technological and bureaucratic structures involved in the shift to 
mass production. The automobile industry established itself early on 
as one of the leading sectors in the rationalisation of manufacturing 
methods, both in terms of hard technology and in organisation. Market 
imperatives and an uneven pattern of susceptibility to rationalisation 
meant that this was not a universal and uncompromised process; 
nevertheless for an increasing majority of automobile workers, jobs 
involving relatively low levels of training and skill became the norm. 
This process was in its advanced stages by the 1920s. 
These changes in the scale and style of production affected the 
role of supervision in profound ways. The foreman in a typical 19th 
century engineering enterprise would possess a wide range of skills 
and power, including intricate technical knowledge and control over 
both the production process in all its aspects and a complete range of 
personnel related tasks. The subdivision of the supervisory role with 
mass production, in common with the extended division of labour 
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generally, produced a new set of imperatives for the role of foreman. 
Although it must be noted that the "traditional" foreman's power was 
likely to be proscribed by custom and regulation among craft workers, 
the structural changes in the parameters of supervisory power which 
came with mass production contained the potential at least to restrict 
the shop floor foreman's discretionary power to a minimum. Horizontal 
divisions saw such aspects as product development, costing, purchase 
and stock and production controls leave the shop floor to become the 
preserve of specialised departments, the foreman retaining only the 
role of a link in the chain of information supporting these aspects. 
Quality control was a particularly pertinent fracture within the job 
of supervision as a shop floor presence was maintained to fulfil this 
function, but through the offices of specialised personnel rather than 
the foreman himself. Personnel related functions became likewise 
subdivided with the burgeoning amount of specialist employment and 
welfare departments intervening in labour allocation, discipline and 
morale. Vertical divisions of supervisory labour also transmuted the 
role of shop floor supervision into a series of steps on an extended 
hierarchical ladder stretching from leading hands to superintendents. 
Some of these changes in the role and power of shop floor foremen 
need to be placed in perspective however. While many of the major 
decisions affecting the overall design and style of production were 
undoubtedly removed from the shop floor, other subdivisions had only a 
nominal impact. In particular the personnel related division - the 
establishment of specialist departments to deal with hiring, firing 
and discipline of workers - needs to be understood in the light of the 
continuing ability of foreman to exert control. The example of Ford's 
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Sociological Department underlines the way in which foremen were able 
to retain power in spite of the implementation of a formal, 
bureaucratised system. In the following chapters we shall extend this 
theme to highlight the precise configuration of power remaining with 
the shop floor foreman, beneath the formal structure of control, and 
the ways in which, as a group, foremen were to continue to exert a 
crucial level of influence over the control of, and experience of, 
work on the factory floor. 
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Chapter Three: The Foreman's Power in Mass Production: Labour Markets, 
Ethnicity, Race and Gender 
This and the following chapter will outline the ways in which the 
power of the shop floor foreman persisted through phases of 
rationalisation of production and organisation. In this chapter an 
examination of the labour market surrounding the rapidly growing 
automobile industry, the backgrounds of workers, skill levels, methods 
of recruitment, daily, weekly and seasonal cycles in production all 
provide the framework within which foremen were to continue to exert 
influence over work and the workforce. Foremen were to continue by 
various means to control hiring, firing and allocation of tasks, pay 
levels, and disciplinary functions. To some extent they were also to 
continue to control output levels and quality, and play an important 
role in either suppressing or promoting informal work regulation on 
the shop f loor. Through their position of power into the 1920s and 
1930s the automobile industry foremen were able to continue a regime 
manifested by favour and privilege, often forced from a reluctant 
workforce, and were to become the conduit through which patterns of 
race, gender and ethnicity were reproduced in the factory. 
"There are no more complex machines to be found in the world than 
at the Ford plant, but a schoolboy with average intelligence can 
operate many of them. "(1) The implication in this statement is that 
someone from a non-industrial background -a schoolboy - could readily 
fit into the form of production which typified the industry by the 
1920s. In reality the new factories were to be staffed not with 
schoolboys but with successive waves of unskilled migrant workers, 
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often from a rural background. Production methods, as we have seen, 
had become designed to operate with minimal worker discretion and 
traditional skill levels, by the 1920s, had been rendered obsolete in 
many stages of the labour process. The new industrial worker to 
compliment these changes, needed none of the baggage of craft based 
work methods, and the immigrant was often regarded as ideal in this 
respect. As early as 1915, Arnold and Faurote, in their study of Ford 
recorded that, "The foundry superintendent asserts that if an 
immigrant who has never seen the inside of a foundry before cannot be 
made into a first class moulder in only three days, he can never be of 
any use on the floor.. . As to machinists, old time, all round men, 
perish the thought. The Ford Company has no use for experience, in the 
working ranks anyway. It desires and prefers machine tool operators 
who have nothing to unlearn ... "(2) 
The first decade of the industry had drawn wagon builders, 
lumberjacks, gas engine workers and other groups from within the 
immediate radius around Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota into 
the Detroit region. By 1910 there was still a substantial demand for 
skilled workers who were drafted in from all parts of the USA. 
( 3) 
After 1910 however there was a large influx of rural American and 
European workers whose low levels of industrial skill and common 
agricultural background led Ford's Max Wollering to christen his 
machinery "farmer tools". 
Ethnic diversity was soon established as one of the 
characteristic features of the labour market in the Detroit region. By 
1917 Ford listed 58 nationalities in their plants. Besides the 
amorphous 'American' category containing 16,457 workers there were 
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listed 7,525 Poles, 1,954 Italians, 1,819 Canadians, 1,750 Rumanians, 
1,360 Germans, 1,160 Russians, and around 2,000 other workers from a 
cluster of southern European countries. By 1920 the 'American' 
category had doubled in relation to other classifications, partly due 
to the vagueness of the term 'American' and partly due to the large 
influx during World War One of southern farm workers - both black and 
white. 
(4) 
By the 1930s the neighbourhoods of Detroit had themselves taken 
on pronounced ethnic and racial characteristics. Rankin's survey found 
27,000 Hungarians, 67,000 Italians, 20,000 Yugoslavs, and 50,000 
Russians among other distinct groupings. The Polish community, centred 
around Hamtramck, a separate town within Detroit, numbered 300,000. 
(5) 
The depression drew in yet another wave of migrants from southern 
rural areas, driven by the collapse of agriculture and envisaged 
opportunities in the automobile industry. There was also a continuing 
ebb and flow of "hillbillies" into the area throughout the 1930s. 
(6) 
The whole inter-war period was also characterised by extremely 
volatile labour market in the region of Detroit. Tent villages sprang 
up periodically in the 1920s and during the depression. The 
"suitcase 
brigade" became a notable feature of Detroit life as the percentage of 
young, single, male workers there became the highest of any North 
American city. 
One of the earliest consequences of the concentration in the 
Detroit area of a pool of low skilled labour and a relatively mobile 
workforce was that of labour turnover and absenteeism. 
A large body of 
workers was assembled whose ability to move 
from job to job was 
greatly enhanced by the proximity of competing 
firms and the short 
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training periods involved in most jobs. Allied to this was the fact 
that many workers from rural backgrounds were unwilling or unable to 
conform to 'normal' industrial behaviour patterns, often displaying a 
stubborn resistance to cash incentives for extra work. Some rural 
workers re-migrated seasonally to farms around the mid-west. There was 
also a significant level of re-migration to Europe. 
(7) The conditions 
of work, mostly harsh, repetitious, unhealthy and often unsafe, also 
provided a major disincentive for any permanent company loyalty. 
In what Slichter was to term "a continuous, unorganised strike" 
workers began to sign on and off the payroll in vast numbers. 
(8) In 
1914 for example, while general unemployment remained at around 6%, 
Detroit factories were turning over labour at between 100% and 300% 
per annum. In 1913 Ford had hired 52,442 men to maintain a workforce 
of between 13,000 and 14,000. 
(9) Employer responses to this phenomenon 
are important in that they were to create the conditions which were to 
foster the increased power of shop floor foremen in the labour market. 
Many accounts of this period concentrate on Ford and the 
seemingly immediate success of the 1913 introduction of the '$5 day' 
in eradicating turnover problems. The $5 day briefly comprised a near 
doubling of wages contingent upon a minimum of six months continual 
service. This was paralleled by the introduction of an extensive 
personnel department - the Sociological Department - one of whose most 
important functions was to cut down the power of shop floor foremen to 
arbitrarily fire workers. The Sociological Department also conducted 
intensive surveys into employees private lives to ensure their 
domestic moral and behavioural suitability to be Ford workers. Reports 
claim success for Ford's strategy in reducing labour turnover to less 
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than 12% by 1915. (10) 
The perceived need to strip foremen of their power to fire 
workers, as a corollary to the $5 day, reflected contemporary theories 
that the foremen were responsible for high turnover levels. Boyd 
Fisher, for example, echoing the views of Slichter, stated in 1916 
that, "The first cause of the too hasty discharge of workmen is 
ignorance on the part of the foreman... In the first instance, blame 
the shop foreman. "(") Arnold and Faurote, noting the improvements in 
turnover following the initiatives of 1913, had no doubt that the 
curbing of the power of the foreman was a major factor. "(S)ure of the 
finality of his discharge (the foreman) became a malevolent despot, 
but at once came to his senses when he was forced to show good grounds 
for discharge. "(12) Although in reality the majority of workers left 
voluntarily rather than being sacked by the foreman(13), he remained 
the culprit in many accounts. 
Although turnover clearly dropped during this initial period, 
doubt must be cast on the notion that, as part of the process, the 
power of foremen was seriously curtailed, in the long term at least. 
Ford's own records do indicate that certain foremen were themselves 
fired for "laying off too much"(14), and the statutory powers of the 
Sociological Department seemed to seriously compromise the Ford 
foreman's discretion, nevertheless, as noted in the previous chapter, 
foremen very soon found ways to circumvent the efforts of the new 
department. Foremen at Ford continued to have the final say in hiring 
and, though for a brief period they had to submit discharges for the 
approval of the Sociological Department, these were seldom rejected. 
Other long term strategies were to have a greater impact on the 
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control of labour flows in the industry in general. 
Turnover persisted beyond the initiatives linked to the $5 day, 
into the early 1920s. The cash incentive of the $5 day proved short 
lived as other major manufacturers increased their wage levels to 
match and wartime inflation began to erode the value of the wage rise 
in real terms. By the end of the war turnover was again increasing to 
unacceptable levels. In 1918 and 1919,24,349 and 30,125 left Ford. 
Prevalent reasons were given as "claiming a better position elsewhere" 
and "dissatisfaction with job". 
(15) Chalmers indicates a continuance 
of high turnover into the 1920s among many Detroit factories with some 
experiencing rates in excess of 200%. A parts factory studied by 
Chalmers between 1924 and 1930 hired over 65,000 workers over the six 
year period to maintain a workforce averaging between 3,800 and 
4,300. (16) 
The employer strategy most widely applied in attempts to combat 
high turnover rates during this period was not to build a professional 
personnel system, as had briefly been attempted at Ford, but rather to 
manipulate the labour market on a broad front. In addition to offering 
relatively high wages the strategy adopted also involved flooding the 
Detroit area with labour and thus increasing the competition for jobs. 
Automobile companies had traditionally relied on widespread 
advertising to attract workers. Advertisements for jobs in the 
industry had appeared in over 190 newspapers across the country in 
1911 for example. 
(17) In 1915 advertisements appealing for workers in 
the industry appeared in the New York World, the Chicago Tribune and 
the Cincinnatti Enquirer. 
(18) Advertisements in the small town papers 
of Missouri, Mississippi, Georgia and Alabama were also numerous, 
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of ten supplemented by spurious stories about plentiful and lucrative 
employment opportunities. Attempts to flood the labour market 
continued throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s. The Works Progress 
Administration (WPA) was later to admonish GM and Ford in the early 
1930s for placing advertisements for a total of 60,000 vacancies, none 
of which were found to exist. In support of these advertising 
campaigns companies employed numerous labour agents to canvass 
prospective employees, particularly in the rural southern areas. 
(19) 
In tandem with these attempts to attract a growing number of 
workers to the Detroit region and create a large pool of unemployment, 
the automobile industry employers engaged in concerted efforts to 
regularise wages and competition for labour. The Detroit Employers 
Association (DEA) placed a ban on competitive advertising in the 
Detroit immediate area in 1912, in an attempt to eliminate the 
poaching of workers between companies. Associations like the Pontiac 
Manufacturers Association (PMA) were candid in their admission that 
their primary intention was, "eliminating shop raiding and equalising 
the scale of wages". While Ford, whose $5 day had effectively upset 
local prevailing wage rates in 1913, continued to stand aloof from 
formal involvement in such associations, Chalmers found widespread 
evidence of collaboration among the majority of other employers in 
this respect. 
(20) 
In the increasing pool of labour several methods of securing 
employment began to emerge. Labour agencies proliferated, Detroit 
having over 30 by 1920. These agencies charged a fee, usually around 
$5, for placing the applicant with one of the local factories. Jobs 
obtained in this way proved difficult to keep however and the Michigan 
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Department of Labour and Industry estimated that over 80% lasted less 
than two weeks. Agencies such as these had it in their interest to 
keep the turnover of jobs high as the agency, their local agent and a 
contact inside the plant - often the foreman - shared in what was 
estimated to be an annual profit of over $900,000. (21) 
An alternative route to employment in the industry, which 
continued to attract prospective workers with high prevailing wage 
rates, was through an extensive black market based on influence, 
kinship or hard cash - significantly more than the $5 charged by the 
agencies. The going rate for a job throughout the 1920s and 1930s 
varied between $35 and $100. 
(22) A market in employment cards, issued 
by employment departments to successful applicants, developed with 
workers applying under bogus names, then selling the job obtained. 
Jobs could be exchanged for straightforward gifts or bribes, usually 
to the foreman. (23) A more indirect method was to undertake the 
purchase of goods once wages were paid. Car purchase was notorious in 
this respect. Car dealers would supply a job, and thus the means of 
payment, to prospective car purchasers. Many of these dealers had 
agents inside the factory who often worked in collusion with the 
foreman. Many workers were not unreasonably convinced that failure to 
keep up payments would result in dismissal. Real estate deals were 
also undertaken in similar fashion with brokers selling houses or land 
with the provision of a job to ensure payment. 
(24) In all of these 
cases involving cash incentives the foreman or inside agent stood to 
gain from every new employee engaged using these methods. It was thus 
in their interest to ensure that sufficient vacancies were created on 
a regular basis. 
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Patronage was another route to employment in the industry. Black 
workers represent an interesting case in this respect. Ford was the 
major employer of black workers throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, 
and an informal network of contacts and influence was established 
between the Ford factories and the black community. The church was to 
become the prominent institution in this process representing the 
agency for Ford's continued patronage of this sector. D. L. Lewis 
maintained that after 1918 it was virtually impossible to get a job at 
Ford without a letter of recommendation from an official of the black 
church. Reverend R. L. Bradby, Father Everard W. Daniel and Donald 
Marshall feature in many accounts, the latter being officially in 
charge of hiring black workers at Ford. As with the jobs market in 
general it was widely stated that corruption was was endemic in this 
process. Hints of "kickbacks through the collection plate" and 
assertions of the open sale of letters of recommendation are common. 
When Canon Malcolm Dade took over the St. Cyprian parish in Detroit he 
found many black hiring officials involved in the "cars for jobs" 
racket. He also recalled, "I had a man offer me $50 for a letter and 
all I had to say was "I recommend the bearer of this letter for 
employment at the Ford Motor Company" - and I had never seen this man 
before! "(25) 
Jobs could also be obtained through wider 'political' 
associations. Links between certain fraternal orders and employment 
were often alleged. More will be said on this topic in a later 
section, here it is enough to note that for many observers local lodge 
membership was an important currency in the trade for employment 
passes. 
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In this complex network of job acquisition and conversely the 
constant threat of unemployment dependent on bribery and influence the 
ordinary worker stood virtually without protection. Legal protection 
governing security of employment throughout the pre-New Deal period 
was ineffective or non-existent. Union organisation was 
correspondingly weak. The early automobile industry presented 
insurmountable obstacles for unions attempting recruitment. 
Technological change meant that traditional machinists unions for 
example, unions for "all round men" had proportionally fewer and fewer 
of the workforce to attract. The AFL local organisation, the Detroit 
Federation of Labour, never recruited more than a minority of workers. 
By 1935 only 5.4% of the 421,000 workers in the industry had signed 
UP- 
(26) In part the problem lay in organising what rapidly developed 
into an extremely heterogeneous workforce divided on religion, 
ethnicity, gender, skill levels, degrees of "Americanisation" etc., 
but also the AFL lacked the will to organise on an industrial basis, 
ignoring non craft based workers at least until the CIO split of the 
1930s. (27) 
Employers were also quick to nip any incipient union organisation 
in the bud, and the Detroit "open shop" drive of the 1920s and early 
1930s was one of the most highly coordinated in an American city of 
the period. Following the general lead of the American Association of 
Manufacturers, organisations such as the Detroit Fmployers Association 
(DEA), the Detroit Manufacturers Association and the Detroit Citizens 
Committee coordinated efforts to resist union influence. In addition 
General Motors representatives were prominent in the Special 
Conference Committee between 1919 and 1933, formed by the largest 11 
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US manufacturers to coordinate anti-union strategy. 
(28) Extensive 
lists of workers denoting union sympathies were compiled by the DEA 
and other associations and circulated among member firms, many of whom 
had specialist personnel staff to combat unionisation. 
(29) The DEA 
also organised strike breaking activities, recruited blackleg labour 
and administered a network of information gathering from inside 
factories. Individual employers engaged their own anti-union agencies 
including Pinkerton at GM, the Corporations Auxiliary at Chrysler and 
Ford's home grown servicemen, in line with the widespread anti-union 
activity later exposed in the Lafollette Committee hearings. (30) In 
the resultant atmosphere of suspicion workers could seldom be sure of 
who was a "stooge" and who was not. At GM for example the elevator 
operator was regularly supplying reports of the conversations of 
"radical" passengers. 
(31) 
The insecurity of employment which was generated around the above 
factors - threats of dismissal to make way for new workers or because 
of suspected union involvement etc. - was intensified into the 1930s 
and the onset of depression. The automobile industry had already 
become typified by an annual unemployment threat however in terms of 
the seasonal lay-off. The annual model change, pioneered by GM in the 
1920s, had exaggerated existing purchasing patterns which saw certain 
months generating most of the industry's annual sales. As cars became 
stockpiled during periods of low sales large sections of the workforce 
would be temporarily laid off. Peaks of employment would be between 
March and August, with September to December being the months of least 
work. Some workers might only get between three and four months steady 
work each year. Even in 1929, a peak year for production, Chalmers 
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found that over 40% of workers in the industry experienced some period 
of lay off. 
(32) Retooling for the model change also usually signalled 
periodic lay offs. Occasionally, major model changes such as that from 
the Ford Model T to the Model A in 1927 could result in virtually the 
whole production staff being laid off, in this case involving between 
40,000 and 60,000 workers. Again the depression compounded the 
problem. By 1933-34 40% of workers at GM were employed for only 29 
weeks, only 15% of the workforce working the full year. 
(33) Skilled 
workers seasonal employment tended to work to reverse patterns. Tool 
and die men for example might work 15 hours a day including weekends 
throughout the period during which the model change was being set up, 
then be laid off as production settled down. Reports estimate that 
over 50% of tool and die workers in the 1930s averaged less than six 
months work annually(34) In a non-union environment these seasonal and 
depression lay offs were not governed by any formal rules. Workers 
would be informed of lay offs at the last minute, often at the end of 
their final shift or upon their arrival at the factory gates. 
(35) 
Seniority provisions were non-existent. The majority of unskilled 
workers were deemed to have no specific right to retain a job purely 
on the basis of longevity of service and the criteria for deciding the 
order of dismissal devolved entirely on the personal preference of the 
shop floor foreman. 
Seniority or longevity of service was in many respects a 
liability rather than an asset for many workers in the industry during 
this period, since age was another factor which generated insecurity. 
The pace and pressure of many jobs meant that the industry was widely 
characterised as young man's work calling for stamina, speed and 
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agility. It was held to be common knowledge around Detroit that 
workers over 40 years old had diminishing chances of being recalled 
after the lay off. 
(36) A GM vice-president was summed up the attitude 
of his company to the fate of 40-plus unemployed automobile workers 
when he told the National Labour Relations Board in 1936, "I don't 
give a goddamn what becomes of them. We are not not running an old 
men's home - we are making automobiles. "(37) Some accounts refute this 
notion of age prejudice. Fine for example asserts that older workers 
tended on the whole to be more secure. 
(38) Ford's own figures for the 
River Rouge plant in the 1930s show 20% of workers over 45 and 10% 
over 50, while GM claimed 24% over 40, seemingly high proportions. 
Nevertheless the NRA's Henderson Committee report of 1935 found 
extensive prejudice against the continued employment of workers over 
40. The UAW's study of the relief rolls in Hamtramck show 45% of 
applicants to be in the 41-50 age group, compared to only 11% in the 
30-40 age group. 
(39) More important perhaps is the fact that the 
sacking of older workers was widely believed to be a fact by those 
employed in the industry at the time and therefore acted as a further 
element in the aura of insecurity which surrounded them. 
Obtaining a job and keeping it for any length of time were not 
the only uncertain elements in the factory life of the period. There 
were a series of indeterminacies surrounding the contents of the 
working day which affected most workers. Which job a worker would be 
assigned to was dependent on the whim of the foreman. With the degrees 
of interchangeability of jobs and general deskilling there remained 
'good' jobs and 'bad' jobs involving greater or lesser degrees of 
hazardousness, boredom or fatigue. A worker had no official claim to 
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any particular job and might find himself transferred to a harsh work 
environment without consultation, often as a method of punishment by 
supervision. 
(40) 
Yet another uncertainty lay in the number of hours to worked in 
the day. During peaks of production the worker might be expected to 
put in up to 15 hours a day, often with no notice of impending 
overtime. It was widely held to be unwise to refuse the offer of 
overtime. 
(41) Alternately "dead time" was a feature of slack periods 
or hold ups in production. Workers would report for work only to be 
kept waiting, without pay, for many hours, all the while expected to 
stay within the factory premises. 
(42) These gaps in production could 
occur at any point during the day and were often due to banking up of 
production by supervision. 
( 43) Workers might also arrive in the 
morning, often after travelling considerable distances, only to be 
told to report back in afternoon. Others might be laid of without 
warning at lunchtime or in the middle of a nightshift, when no 
transport was available. 
(44) There was no compensation on these 
occasions. If production stopped, wages stopped. One GM worker 
recalled working between 7 a. m. and 1 a. m. the following morning on 
and off and still not receiving 8 hours pay. 
( 45) Morris Marcus, 
employed at Chrysler in 1928 reported a typical week; "The "50" line 
worked about 12 hours Monday, 3 hours Tuesday, 2 hours Wednesday, 4 
hours Thursday and we were laid off until Monday... they say that the 
"50" line will be running overtime as soon as the cars hit the 
market. "(46) As with longer term lay offs the decisions as to who 
would be laid off for short periods during the course of the day were 
entirely arbitrary, and lay with shop floor supervision. 
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In the volatile labour market surrounding the automobile industry 
typified by a highly fluid workforce, increasing competition for jobs, 
and the uncertainties of long or short term employment, mediated 
through a series of formal and informal agencies including patronage, 
influence, kinship and bribery, the shop floor foreman was a central 
figure. 
To begin with hiring, the foreman played an important role in 
both official and unofficial procedures. Where skilled workers 
continued to be recruited the foreman remained an indispensable judge 
of aptitude. Employment department staff had difficulty ascertaining 
skill levels which would be immediately obvious to experienced skilled 
foremen. In the early years of the industry when skill was a more 
dominant factor in production the foreman would of ten have personal 
knowledge of the skilled workers in the district and would send out 
letters and telegrams or visit other factories in recruitment efforts. 
When foremen switched factories they were often followed by workers 
from their old department. Foremen were also often sent on recruiting 
drives to other areas. 
(47) As the need for skill diminished these type 
of activities were reduced but foremen remained the final arbiter in 
the selection process. The employment office assumed the role of 
processing candidates for skilled work in response to labour 
requisitions from foremen but it was well known among workers that one 
of the best methods of securing employment was that of deception, 
about names, backgrounds, capabilities etc., and the employment office 
was the most easily fooled in this respect. As one employment official 
recalled, "There were many times when we thought we 
had secured a good 
man, as on theory he talked very good, but when 
he started working at 
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the bench he was an absolute disappointment. " Fmployment departments 
were thus forced to continue to solicit the final opinion of the shop 
foreman. Interviews by the foreman at the factory were conducted in 
the presence of an employment clerk but the latter's function was 
solely to record names, clock numbers and agreed rates of pay. 
(48) 
For the increasing majority of unskilled jobs a less rigorous 
formal selection procedure was set in train. Advertisements or 
information passed on by friends or relatives might bring prospective 
employees to the factory but more often than not workers turned up at 
the factory gates or employment office with no prior information, just 
the hope that hiring would take place that day. As the labour pool 
grew the queues for jobs outside factories became an endemic feature, 
even before the depression years. Because of the uneven levels of 
production this process could mean the sudden appearance of the 
foreman, rapidly selecting a group of workers, or a slow monotonous 
filing past a disinterested and unsympathetic employment clerk. 
Apocryphal stories abound, such as the foremen throwing apples into 
the crowd - whoever caught one being employed for the day. Skilled 
workers were not totally exempt from this experience and often foremen 
would walk down the line selecting particular workers, 
"hollering for 
electricians" for example. 
(49) The notion of favouritism in this 
process was, perhaps not surprisingly, all pervasive. 
Where workers were selected from the line by the employment 
department they would, as with skilled workers, be sent to the shop 
floor floor for the approval of the foreman. Assessments of aptitude 
might then be based on a brief practical 
demonstration, or more 
usually on a summary physical appraisal, given that most 
jobs called 
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for little intrinsic job knowledge. Stanley Gregory described one such 
interview by the foreman at Fisher Body; "He asked several questions, 
but he mainly seemed to be interested in my physical stature. He felt 
the muscles in my arms, shoulders, back and legs. In fact, I felt as 
though I was a horse on the auction block. "(50) An analogy to a cattle 
market features in many accounts of the hiring procedure of the inter- 
war period. 
This selection procedure was very often a foregone conclusion as 
it was the foreman who had recommended the worker to the employment 
department in the first instance. Recommendation could be a result of 
of personal knowledge on behalf of the foreman or part of the process 
of securing a job via one of the clandestine methods outlined above. 
There was nothing clandestine about the foreman's ability to recommend 
workers to the employment office. GM for example stressed the right of 
their foremen "to refuse any prospect sent by the Fmployment 
Department, and also bring to the employment office any prospective 
applicant who has his personal approval. " To this end many foremen 
carried a wad of employment passes with them. 
(51) "Personal approval" 
could be obtained via a number of routes. Many foremen were intimately 
involved in the sale of jobs in the inter-war period. Employment 
agencies, successful in securing short lived jobs, relied on contacts 
inside the factory. This might be the employment clerk, but more often 
it was the foreman who received a fee for provision of employment 
passes. 
(52) Foremen were also frequently involved in the car sales 
racket, again acting as the guarantor of a job which the car dealer 
then passed on as part of the car purchase package. 
(53) 
The foreman was also the conduit through which kinship networks 
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operated in the factory. In the gaining of employment for a friend or 
relative the foreman's personal approval had always to be sought as a 
prerequisite. The foreman's own relatives were a celebrated feature of 
the employment process. Clayton Fountain for example was hired at GM 
in 1932 on the strength of his wife's distant relative being a 
foreman. ( ) Workers frequently complained of being laid off to make 
room for relatives of the foreman, a problem especially visible during 
high school vacations when student relatives would be given work. 
(55) 
Workers could also possess assets besides money or kinship. Sporting 
ability was of ten held at a premium. Many baseball players, 
footballers and boxers were hired at Ford into the ranks of the 
servicemen on the basis of their sporting achievements, but ordinary 
workers with talent were also often sought to man departmental teams. 
Norman Bully for example was hired at Buick because the foreman needed 
a catcher in the departmental baseball team. 
(56) 
The corollary to the power of the shop floor foreman in the 
hiring process is that of his continued ability to fire workers, often 
to make way for newly favoured workers. Again the personnel department 
was involved in the process in the formal sense, usually to ratify the 
foreman's decision. A general survey of Michigan firms in the 1920s 
found 56 out of 59 firms where a foreman could discharge a worker from 
a gang or department and 21 firms where foremen could fire workers 
absolutely, without reference to any other authority. Briggs and 
Hudson were among the factories where foremen held absolute power. 
(57) 
Elsewhere the formal procedure involved submission of some form of 
"termination slip" to the employment office. These were seldom refuted 
and the employment office represented only a token appeal procedure. 
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More usual was the experience described by Bert Foster, at Fisher Body 
in the 1920s; "We had no such thing as being taken to the employment 
office to be fired. The foreman would fire you right on the 
floor. "(58) 
The ability to transfer workers between jobs or to other 
departments would often suffice as a indirect way of dismissing a 
worker. Transfer was often a euphemism for punishment of some sort and 
for many workers this meant that the end of their employment was 
merely delayed until they had had enough. In the early years of the 
industry many simply refused to be transferred and quit. Records at 
Ford show that in 1918 over 2,300 men left because they "refused the 
job assigned". 
(59) Later on, as unemployment rose. workers were unable 
to exhibit such resolve. Onerous or particularly unpleasant jobs were 
reserved by many foremen as punishment. In 1919 jobs in the hot and 
dirty Ford "cable department" for example were reserved for workers 
who had incurred the displeasure of the foreman. 
(60) 
The foreman's continued power over hire, fire and transfer of 
workers was overshadowed during this period by his undisputed control 
of the lay off and rehiring procedure. Sooner or later almost all 
workers would be subject to lay offs and their order of departure and 
re-entry into the factory was entirely in the hands of the shop-floor 
foreman. Seasonal and short term fluctuations in employment, the 
absence of any formal procedure for determining seniority, and the 
lack of protection for workers from government or unions meant that 
any worker could be laid off without notice and had no subsequent 
rights to re-employment. As one foreman put it, 
"seniority or anything 
like that never entered our minds: we just kept who we thought were 
Chapter Three -103- 
the best men. " The employment office would be notified by foremen of 
those being laid off. If the list provided had "do not rehire" or 
"agitator" indicated next to the name of an employee then he would 
simply never be recalled, or would be refused employment on his 
return. The criteria for deciding who were the "best men" was 
dependent on influences outlined above. 
(61) Likewise the order of 
return to work was in the hands of the foremen, who generally kept 
lists of workers and badge numbers and informed the employment office 
when and who to recall. The same procedure applied to short lay offs 
or "dead time" periods during the working day. Again the foreman had 
total discretion. Favoured workers could avoid lay off periods 
altogether if the foreman chose to transfer them to non-seasonal jobs 
in maintenance or materials departments on a temporary basis. 
(62) 
Pay levels were another area where the foreman continued to exert 
control. Although formal pay scales were in existence before the 
advent of negotiated union agreements they usually involved a wide 
band of differing rates. A worker's initial position on the pay scale 
and subsequent movements up or down were decided by the foreman 
exclusively. As the Dodge management outlined, "It is the policy of 
the company that the employees shall always take up directly with 
their foremen all matters that concern their work. One of the most 
frequent of these is the adjustment of individual rates. "(63) In most 
cases the foreman had considerable leeway to work with within the 
general pay bands. At Chrysler for example workers doing identical 
jobs in the early 1930s could earn anything between 54c and 96c an 
hour. (64) At Ford in the period before the 5$ day there were over 69 
different pay scales and foremen, in the words of J. R. Lee, "fixed a 
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weird variety of payment scales. "(65) Even after the much vaunted 
rationalisation of the 5$ day in 1913 there were seven general 
divisions into which workers were to be reclassified and again it was 
the foreman who decided which division a worker went into. The same 
thing occurred at Ford in 1927 when the tool and die workers pay rates 
were compressed into three general rates, and also at Studebaker in 
the same year. At Chrysler in 1934 when a new series of rates replaced 
the bonus system it was again the foreman who allocated workers 
positions on the new scale. 
(66) 
The foreman's power to move workers up and down the wage scale 
was facilitated by the endemic lay off periods in the industry. 
Workers throughout the 1920s and 1930s had no rights to a certain wage 
level and were frequently laid off at one rate only to be re-hired at 
a much lower one. The WPA investigation highlighted the example of a 
worker laid off when earning $13 a day in 1927 only to be re-hired on 
the same job at $6. Similarly the UAW reported workers wages regularly 
reduced by this method. Ford , GM, Fisher Bodies and Chrysler all 
feature in accounts of this process. 
(67) The usual rate set for re- 
hiring was that of a beginner i. e. at the bottom of the pay scale. The 
lay off mechanism facilitated the foreman's manipulation of wage rates 
but was not necessarily essential. Foremen could and did periodically 
reduce individual or group rates without recourse to any excuse. In 
1932 at Chrysler for example there was a general trend of wage 
reduction "with unwarranted discrimination on the part of 
foremen. "(68) For new workers the foreman also decided when a worker 
could move off probationary wage rates which were correspondingly 
lower than normal scales. 
(69) In setting wages the foreman usually 
Chapter Three -105- 
responded to periodically supplied cost data, but the unwritten 
assumption was that foremen should continually reduce the wage bill as 
far as possible whether by laying off and rehiring at lower rates or 
by straightforward reduction. 
(70) 
Where group bonus or incentive related schemes were in operation 
the foreman's role in the rate fixing or, from the workers point of 
view, rate cutting procedure was also a central one. The Chrysler 54c 
- 96c pay band referred to above stretched to 65c and $1.85 after 
bonuses. With the notable exception of Ford, all the major 
manufacturers operated some form of bonus system during the 1920s and 
1930s. These may in principle have operated on a fixed or graduated 
reward per unit of output basis, with rates set "scientifically" by 
rate fixers within the department or supplied by specialist agencies, 
but in reality rates were arrived at by a process of informal 
negotiation between rate f ixers, the veto of the foreman and workers 
own abilities to regulate output. The foreman's continued power in 
basic rate fixing and general bonus level manipulation is revealed in 
the testimony of many automobile workers that bonus payments could 
never be accurately calculated by workers and that the whole process 
lay shrouded in mystery. Art Vega, at Briggs in the 1930s, recalled 
that he, "never understood (the group bonus), I have not found any 
employee who did. " Similarly Hoffman, in his study of GM in the 1930s, 
"never talked to a worker, even a group leader, who could figure a pay 
from the available data. " Adam Poplawski, at the Budd Wheel Company in 
1928 was aware that "some sort of bonus system existed, but it seemed 
that no one understood it. "(71) Even if workers could calculate 
accurately the levels of bonus due from a certain level of production 
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the foreman could, and often did, insist that a proportion of output 
was scrap and therefore did not qualify, even though the said 
production might subsequently be used. There was no appeal to this 
procedure, and its effects could be multiplied since the rejection of 
output as scrap at one stage of production would usually mean the 
cancelling of bonus rates for all previous operations on a particular 
component or process. 
(72) Arthur Rohan summed up the general situation 
with regard to bonus levels in 1927; "They don't know, at the end of 
the week, what they are going to be paid, they haven't any idea, it is 
a matter of chance. "(73) 
All of the above aspects of the foreman's continued power - 
control of hiring, firing, job allocation, number of hours worked and 
wage levels were intensified as the depression deepened into the 1930s 
and the queues for jobs lengthened. Anyone who complained about the 
unfairness of any aspect of the job, wage cutting or lay offs for 
example, was met by by a response from the foreman which is recurrent 
in virtually all accounts of working conditions in the period; 
"Look 
out of the window and see the men waiting in line for your job. 
"(74) A 
similar situation had developed at Ford in 1915 when the introduction 
of the $5 day had drawn large crowds of workers to the Ford factory 
gates. Arnold and Faurote noted then that 
"every man knows the door to 
the street stands open for any man who objects in any way shape or 
manner to instant and unquestioning obedience.. 
,, (75) In 1915 the 
relatively high rates of pay at Ford were enough to ensure compliance, 
in the short term at least, in the 1930s the mere 
fact of having a job 
was enough. Wages fell constantly as output 
levels increased during 
this period. Some workers at Briggs in the mid 
1930s were earning as 
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little as 80c - 90c per day and workers in the supply industries, 
including many women workers, were earning as little as $3 per week. 
Ford's overall wage bill fell from $181.5 million in 1929 to $32.5 
million in 1933. The average wage for automobile work fell from over 
$1600 per annum in 1929 to between $700 and $1,000 for those still in 
work in 1933. Skilled workers were not immune to this process - tool 
and die men at Ford for example saw their wage rates fall from $1 to 
43c per hour during this period. 
(76) 
In the general atmosphere of insecurity surrounding employment in 
the industry the foreman's continued influence ensured that many 
workers were compelled to take part in a range of activities in order 
to "keep in" with their supervisor. For those workers who had not the 
protection of kinship ties or influence of the type outlined above, 
staying in the foreman's good books could be attempted in a number of 
ways. Evidence around the relationships between foremen and workers in 
this respect is clearly subjective and oral testimony plays a large 
part in the reconstruction of ways in which foremen elicited favour by 
the use of their position, nevertheless the frequency of accusations 
of the following type in the oral record lends significant credence to 
their being an accurate representation of conditions on the shop floor 
at the time. At a simple level it was common practice to stand the 
foreman drinks and cigars at a local beer garden after work. During 
prohibition this would take place at the nearest "blind pig" or 
illegal bar. In Ed Lee's case the foreman at Murray Bodies actually 
owned the blind pig and patronisation of this bar was seen as 
compulsory among workers from the department. 
(77) Periodically, gifts 
might also be offered. During the hunting season the foreman might be 
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given game. Garden produce was also a popular gift. During Ford's 
garden project period when all workers were encouraged to keep small, 
company provided, plots of land under cultivation, foremen allegedly 
received a large share of the benefits. 
(78) Various other gifts of 
wine or foodstuffs feature in accounts, as do semi-compulsory 
Christmas presents of a more substantial nature, wristwatches for 
example. 
(79) Workers who engaged in this practice of softening up the 
foreman were known among their workmates as "red apple polishers", 
"red apple boys" or "fair-haired boys". 
(80) 
More serious "apple polishing" might involve working on 
"foreigners" or personal jobs for the foreman, or putting in time on 
the foreman's domestic projects. This latter practice seems to have 
been extremely common. Dan Gallagher, at Timken Axel in the 1930s, for 
example painted and decorated his foreman's house twice and was 
subsequently recommended to the superintendent for decoration of an 
apartment. No payment was involved in either case, merely the security 
of continued employment in the factory. 
(81) House painting and 
gardening are among the most common domestic tasks recalled in this 
respect but projects of greater scope were also periodically 
undertaken. Building garages, laying driveways, digging basements, and 
other renovation work, often on houses purchased by foremen for 
investment, renting out etc., would usually take place over the 
weekend. Again no payment was expected or given, the foreman's sole 
outlay being the purchase of materials. Workers who failed to turn up 
for weekend work on the foreman's property would simply find their 
clock card missing from the rack on Monday morning. 
(82) Resentful as 
some workers were they often saw that they had no choice in the matter 
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if they wished to remain employed. As Martin Jensen, at Briggs in the 
1930s put it, "By gosh you had to (work on the foreman's house and 
garden) to protect yourself. Actually what it was - it was dog eat 
dog"(83) 
Sexual harassment was another charge frequently levelled against 
foremen. This is a particularly difficult area to assess in terms of 
the evidence nevertheless it seems clear that for many women in the 
factory, married or single, the rejection of an advance by the foreman 
could result in the loss of a job. As Morris Field noted, "many of the 
girls were told that if they did not step out occasionally with the 
foreman they would not have jobs. "(84) As with the enforced extra- 
factory labour of male workers, the general attitude to this behaviour 
seems to have been one of grudging resignation. As Dan Gallagher put 
it, " they put out or they get out, that's all. "(85 
) Relief and 
protection from the unwanted attentions of predatory foremen was to 
form one of the major appeals of unionisation amongst women workers in 
the later 1930s. 
(86) 
Alongside this ad hoc system of gifts and favours existed a range 
of more systematic "kick backs" designed to ensure job security. 
Regular, straightforward cash payments were one method and numerous 
references can be found to foremen receiving a portion of a worker's 
paypacket each pay day. Amounts could be substantial. Harvey Kitzman 
cites workers handing over two dollars each week for example. The 
NRA's Henderson Committee found these "direct financial demands" 
common during its enquiry in the early 1930s. 
(87) Enforced loans were 
another feature of the period. Ford foremen were often sacked if 
caught borrowing money from their workers, sums involved often 
being 
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as much as $50 and $100, nevertheless many foremen continued the 
practice undetected at least until the late 1930s. (88) Foremen also 
of ten used their position to run a series of "concessions" on the shop 
floor. Lottery tickets were sold and raffles were common, ticket sales 
usually exceeding the value of prizes many times over. Purchase of 
tickets, often as costly as $1 each, was seen as compulsory by many 
workers. 
(89) Foremen were also reported to turn a blind eye to workers 
circulating on the shop floor to run the numbers rackets, in return 
for a percentage of the profits. 
(90) By the 1930s the management at 
Dodge felt constrained to issue their foremen with a number of 
warnings that the continued sale or distribution of "punch boards, 
raffle tickets, baseball pools or benefit tickets" would result in 
their dismissal. (91) 
Larger items might also be sold to workers through pressure 
exerted by foremen. Car sales have already be touched upon above. Real 
estate was another popular commodity among foremen. Ford records 
indicate a number of foremen sacked for selling real estate throughout 
the period. 
(92) Some foremen also acted as brokers in the oil share 
boom during the 1920s, often peddling counterfeit shares. Sales could 
be quite extensive. Around 1920 several Ford foremen were found to be 
among those involved in the sale of bogus drilling rights to between 
600 and 800 employees at prices up to $200 each. 
(93) Foremen were also 
known to run insurance agencies such as that found by Edward Hachtel 
at Studebaker in 1927, where foremen circulated their own prospectuses 
as well as those officially sponsored by the company. Again workers 
were under the impression that refusal to comply would result in 
victimisation. 
(94) 
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Employers often frowned upon the obvious abuse of privilege by 
foremen engaged in such activities, to the extent of sacking those 
found guilty of transgression. They were however quite aware of the 
power which rested in position of foreman in terms of labour market 
manipulation and were content to devolve responsibility within the 
parameters outlined above. In addition they were not above using the 
foreman's position and its innate powers of persuasion to solicit 
support for what were deemed to be legitimate causes. During the First 
World War for example foremen had been trusted with the circulation of 
liberty bonds and thrift stamps, and employers supported the sacking 
of workers refusing to buy. Foremen regularly circulated with various 
petitions of a political nature which the company wished to compile, 
especially during the early 1930s when popular support against the 
spread of unionisation was being sought. Again many workers viewed 
this process as one of intimidation, condoned by the company. 
(95) 
Using the above examples it can be seen that many foremen used 
their position of strength in the labour market and on the shop floor 
to promote personal gain. Clearly not all foreman were involved in 
such activities, but a significant number were, certainly enough to 
foster a general atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust among the 
workforce. 
The continued power of the foreman was also exerted, not solely 
in terms of tangible material reward. As we have seen kinship or 
personal favour was a major factor in influencing the actions of 
foremen. Such favour might be based on wider factors of group 
identification. In the diverse ethnic and racial configurations of the 
automobile industry workforce the actions of the 
foreman in 
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manipulating jobs and job content was mediated through the prism of a 
range of social prejudices. In many ways the foreman's activities in 
this sphere merely reflect the trends generated in society in general, 
reinforced in factory life. Employers, workers and later unions were 
to reproduce wider social divisions within the factory so that 
inequality of opportunity in education, housing, work etc. were all 
enmeshed in the same process. Foremen, by virtue of their power were a 
central agency in the way in which these processes were worked out on 
the shop floor. The following section will turn to an examination of 
various groupings on the factory floor in an attempt to highlight the 
way in which foremen interacted with workers in terms of race, gender, 
ethnicity and religion. 
The experience of black workers forms a particularly visible 
example of the ways in which prejudices were worked out on the shop 
floor. Blacks were sectionalised in the industry from the earliest 
years both between and within different factories. Some employers 
resisted hiring any blacks at all, GM and Fisher Body for example 
refused to hire black workers until compelled by the state in World 
War 'rwo. (96) Ford stands out as the major employer of black workers 
during the inter war period. By 1925 Ford employed over 10,000 blacks 
- 10% of the total workforce - 12 times as many as employed by 
nearest rivals Dodge and over three times as many as the next twelve 
employers put together. These ratios remained roughly static in 1935 
and 1941. 
(97) Ford adopted a particular form of paternalism with 
regard to blacks in terms of welfare, housing and support of religious 
institutions. This paternalism did not extend to equal opportunity 
within the factory however. Black workers were typically restricted to 
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jobs which were dirty, unhealthy or judged to be demeaning to white 
labour. This was true in all factories where blacks were employed. In 
the bodymaking plants of Briggs, Murray and Fisher for example they 
worked on the wet sanding processes which involved cold, damp 
conditions. At Hudson they were employed only as floor sweepers or 
icemen. At Packard they were janitors. 
(98) 
The foundry became synonymous with black workers early on in the 
industry and remained so throughout the period, crude racial 
stereotyping deeming black workers better able to cope with hot 
conditions. 
( 99) Chrysler and, later on, GM were notorious for 
restriction of black labour to the foundry and, although Ford's black 
workers were spread over a wider range of jobs than at most employers, 
here too they predominated in foundry type work, usually in those jobs 
requiring low skill levels. Statistics for blacks employed at Ford in 
1935 for example show that 408 were core room workers, 282 were 
involved in iron melting, 331 worked in the moulding shop, but only 
one worked in the tool room. 
(100) 
What were the relationships between black workers and 
supervision? Black workers did themselves become foremen. They did so 
however under a number of highly specific conditions. They could only 
hope to rise to foremanship in departments where black workers 
predominated, usually the foundry. The early years of the industry 
also favoured the promotion of blacks, before higher levels of black 
migration generated racial tensions in the Detroit region. 
(101) 
Generally though the percentage of black workers employed in 
supervisory jobs was well below the average for white workers. Two 
surveys highlighted this imbalance. The results are shown below: 
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1926 Survey of 118 Detroit companies; 
No black foremen 
One black foreman 
Two black foremen 
'Several' black foremen 
No. of Companies 
92 
23 
2 
1 
Total Black Workforce 
6437 
8016 
968 
6000 
1929 survey of 67 Detroit companies; 
No black foremen 
One black foreman 
Two black foremen 
Three black foremen 
'Several' black foremen 
In charge of 
janitor groups only 
No. of Companies 
53 
6 
3 
1 
2 
2 
Total Black Workforce 
6899 
404 
698 
174 
10,417 
622 (102) 
The aberrant figures in the 'several' category are caused by the 
presence of the large Ford plants in the statistics. Just as Ford 
offered greater employment opportunities to blacks so too promotion 
prospects were greater there than at other factories. Eugene Collins, 
a black worker, was in charge of the die casting department in 1924 
for example. Throughout the 1930s there were more black foremen at 
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Ford than all other automobile plants put together and by 1939 Ford 
had promoted its first black general foreman, supervising six foremen 
and over 400 workers. 
(103) Ford still came in for criticism however. 
Outside the River Rouge complex at Ford's smaller plants 
proportionally fewer blacks were promoted. 
(104) The UAW was to later 
accuse Ford of tokenism in it promotion of black foremen when claiming 
the company had "elevated a selected few to positions of minor 
responsibility so that the company can say to the thousands of other 
negro toilers, underpaid and underprivileged: "Look what we have done 
for you! ""(105) 
Whether these accusations against Ford bear any weight or not the 
racial prejudice in other factories in terms of promotion prospects 
was fairly unambiguous. Official figures disguise the actual 
functioning of supervision in many cases however since many black 
workers were expected to act as foremen without any official 
recognition. Carlson cites the case of a black worker in charge of a 
large department at one car factory who was paid a mere 1c. per hour 
above the prevailing rate. He was also excluded from taking part in 
foremen's meetings. 
(106) George Robertson's experience at Chevrolet is 
probably typical, recounted in an interview with Roberta McBride: 
"ROBERTSON: Their reason for giving the promotions to the whites 
was - well, they qualified, and the negroes didn't qualify. 
McBRIDE: Did you have anything to prove that wasn't true? 
ROBERTSON: Yes my merits and my seniority on the job and the fact 
they asked me to break in the individual they promoted to the job. 
This was proof positive he didn't know the job and I did know the job. 
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McBRIDE: You mean that you broke them in, but then you stayed at 
the same classification, and they moved up ahead of you? 
ROBERTSON: They moved up ahead, right. "(107) 
Where blacks were promoted it was almost always to be in charge 
of other black workers. For the majority of black workers however 
white supervision was the norm. Black supervision of white workers was 
universally avoided in line with the racism among white workers which 
was a constant theme running throughout the period. This was revealed 
in a number of ways, from the black workers' deep suspicion of unions 
like the UAW, only overcome after strenuous efforts by union 
leadership, to the more manifest occasions such as the hate strikes at 
Packard and elsewhere in 1943 when white workers refused to work next 
to black workers. 
(108) In this atmosphere Carlson canvassed white 
workers about the prospect of working under a black foreman. "With but 
one exception... this caused such a wordy explosion and such looks of 
scorn that it was discontinued. "(109) In Widick's words the request 
for a black foreman in charge of white workers before the war was 
simply "absurd". 
(110) On the rare occasions when foremen were 
recruited from the ranks of black workers they were likely to meet 
with prejudicial treatment from their fellow white foremen. Willis 
Ward, in charge of black personnel at Ford in the 1930s for example, 
had to threaten white foremen with the sack to get them even to talk 
to him. 
(111) 
Employers and white supervisors were content to reinforce, or at 
least capitulate before the general racism of the workforce. To put a 
black worker in charge of whites was dismissed as too risky or 
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provocative. As one superintendent put it, "We can't have negro 
foremen. We brought the negro into this plant to do the dirty, hard, 
unskilled work... we can't try any experiments here... we've got to keep 
our men satisfied... Personally I'd like to help them, but what can I 
do? " Supervision was simply "a white man's job". 
(112) For other 
employers the choice required no agonising, a white foreman over black 
workers was simple logic. When southern blacks came north, who better 
to control them than southern whites? Employers often subscribed to 
the notion that a certain kind of white worker "understands negroes". 
This myth was readily accepted by many of the foremen who saw the key 
to supervision in either brutality or patronisation. An example of the 
latter is revealed in the remarks of one white foreman; "I control my 
negroes by psychology. I kid them along, keep them jolly and happy and 
you ought to see them work for me. "(113) Other white foremen continued 
to use their position to exert a more potent form of racism. The WPA 
acknowledged reports in the early 1930s that many members of the Ku 
Klux Klan were moving into Detroit with the influx of southern labour, 
and members of such organisations promoted to the rank of foreman were 
seen to be using their position in recruitment efforts. 
(114) Ford was 
to have particular problems with the racism of its foremen in the 
Willow Run plant built during the war. The racism of many white 
foremen was brought to bear through their everyday power over job 
content, wages etc. outlined above as many black workers were given 
low consideration in terms of basic rates, overtime, bonuses 
etc., 
(115) 
Distinct ethnic or nationalistic patterns of foremanship were 
also a feature of the automobile industry. Waves of migration, 
kinship 
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networks, processes of group exclusion and foremen's recruitment 
preferences generated a workforce characterised by distinct groups 
dominating particular sections or shops within the factory. In the 
early years of the industry it was common practice to place foremen 
with a common ethnic background over specific groups of workers often 
because of language considerations. This was most important where 
skill levels remained high and communication needed to be of a complex 
nature. Skilled Finnish bodymakers working at Ford's Highland Park 
factory before World War One for example were overseen by Finnish 
foremen. Language variations among the general workforce were 
considerable. Among the 58 nationalities at Ford in 1917 for example 
there were 32 general language divisions and many more dialect 
variations. 
(116) The dominance of German workers and foremen in 
another department at Ford was highlighted in 1917 when superintendent 
Carl Finde was accused of promoting only german workers in an attempt 
to retard war production of the Liberty motor. The ensuing Hughes 
Committee inquiry exonerated Emde in finding that this department had 
an established pattern of german worker - german foreman 
recruitment. 
(117) 
In many cases the presence of foremen with a common ethnic 
background to the the predominant workforce was a result of internal 
promotion ladders which meant almost all foremen in the industry were 
recruited from the ranks. General trends developed following World War 
One however which were to undermine these patterns. As immigrants 
became Americanised, language receded as a primary consideration in 
the choice of foremen. As an added stimulus many employers actively 
promoted Americanisation programmes. The Ford programme initiated in 
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1914 involved compulsory attendance at english lessons, while Packard 
went further in refusing to hire workers who were unable to 
demonstrate a proficiency in the language. (118) The Americanisation 
programme at Ford had an important element of moral instruction but 
its main effect was in terms of linguistics. Between 1914 and 1917 the 
proportion of non-English speaking workers at Ford was reduced by two- 
thirds. (119) With this development English speaking foremen began to 
replace ethnic foremen as part of the overall programme. Foremen were 
seen to be ideally placed to carry on tuition as "practical teachers 
from the shop floor". 
(120) 
The deskilling of the labour process was also a factor in the 
demise of the ethnic foreman. The complexity involved in skilled work 
often called for complex instruction or information, as noted in the 
case of Ford's Finnish bodymakers above, but where rationalisation and 
division became advanced communications were accordingly reduced to 
the bare minimum. Information on production matters could often be 
encompassed within a few hand signals or chosen phrases. As Bill 
Klann, a foreman at Ford, recalled; "One word every foreman had to 
learn in English, German, Polish and Italian was "hurry up". It was 
putch putch prenko in Polish, mach schnell in German and presto presto 
in Italian. "(121) 
An increasing dominance of WASP foremen began to develop in the 
industry around this time which was reflected in a growth of 
nationalistic, religious and racist discrimination. Dodge was widely 
reputed to favour only christian foremen for example while Ford, in 
addition to a popularly accepted anti-semitism, was accused of 
fostering "a persistent movement of Protestant foremen and 
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superintendentst. 
(122) 
Just as black workers suffered under prevailing inequalities so 
too more recent immigrants from Europe became the subject of abusive 
and discriminatory activity from many foremen. In some cases this was 
condoned by employers. Official policy at Chevrolet's Gear and Axle 
and Drop Forge plants in the 1920s was to "treat foreigners rough" for 
example. The disdain felt for these workers is revealed in comments of 
one foreman that "only niggers, wops and dagos" would do the kind of 
work that most minorities were assigned to. 
(123) Arnold and Faurote as 
observers of the Ford labour process confirm a wider acceptance of 
prevailing assumptions about this sector of the workforce in their 
assertion that supervisors which they refer to as "malevolent despots" 
were nevertheless "indispensable where the immigrant is the principle 
worker". 
(124) 
Quasi-religious organisations also begin to feature in claims 
surrounding prejudicial and discriminatory activity among foremen 
during this period. In addition to the participation in the Ku Klux 
Klan mentioned above, many foremen were alleged to be involved in 
Freemasonry and similar fraternal organisations. One contemporary 
observer claimed that foremen "strut around with lodge pins stuck in 
their coat or dangling from a watch chain. They know all the secret 
pass words and trick hand-shakes. .. "(125) Another account noted that 
workers were laid off while foremen "go around among their 
friends and 
lodge members... and tell them to work the rest of the week on our 
jobs. "(126) Harry Bennett, head of the servicemen's regime at Ford, 
was a freemason, an undoubted factor 
in the advancement of this 
popular rumour of clandestine routes to advancement and 
favour on the 
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shop floor. 
(127) 
Another major division among the workforce was that between men 
and women workers. Although only a minor sector of the workforce in 
the period up to World War Two, women tended to be concentrated in 
particular areas, most notably small parts manufacture and trim shops. 
Gabin identifies four major categories of work seen to be "women's 
jobs" - sewing machine operators, trim bench hands, inspection and 
assembly of small parts. 
(128) Prior to the greater influx of women 
workers in the Second World War there was some employment of women on 
larger machines such as drill presses during the 1930s, when they were 
widely exploited as cheap labour. 
(129) 
Some companies saw women as needing special supervisory 
considerations. At the Maxwell Motors in Detroit for example at the 
time of World War One, where about 12% of the workforce was composed 
of women, separate restrooms and cafeterias were provided and a matron 
appointed to take special interest in them. On the shop floor however 
men were placed in charge and under strict instruction to discourage 
"visiting" among workers -a habit to which women workers were 
allegedly prone. 
(130) Men were also placed in charge when women 
workers were concentrated in Ford's battery department in the 
1920s. (131) 
There were departments where women were promoted to supervision, 
although their pay levels did not correspond to that of men 
supervising equivalent work. It was company policy at Briggs for 
example for women supervisors to be paid around $30 per month less 
than men. 
(132) Women supervisors had little prospect of advancement 
beyond shop floor supervision and as such they were generally 
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restricted to departments entirely staffed by other women. As with 
with the exclusion of blacks from supervision of whites the dynamics 
of this restriction can largely be traced to the predominant 
prejudices of the workforce itself. This is supported by the testimony 
of John Eldon: "In promotions the men hated to see a woman getting 
promoted ... I remember one plant where they promoted a woman to straw 
boss. I thought there was going to be a revolution. This was something 
the men could not understand - take orders from a woman? ... I of ten 
think that woman was lucky to have escaped with her life in that 
plant. "(133) 
Forewomen, where appointed, did possess powers which mirrored 
those of their male colleagues. Forewomen at Ford for example retained 
control of the hiring process in similar ways to foremen there. 
(134) 
Disciplinary powers were also similar, the forewoman in the bindery at 
Chrysler's Highland Park plant was notorious for deducting 30 minutes 
pay if a worker was one or two minutes late for work. Use of their 
position for corrupt purposes was also not limited to male 
supervision. There are reports of forewomen at Fisher Body accepting 
regular payments and various gifts in return for continued employment 
and at least one forewoman was involved in real estate sales rackets 
uncovered at Ford in the early 1920s. 
(135) 
In summary, this chapter has examined aspects of the continuing 
power and influence of shop floor foremen in mass production. 
Rationalised production had brought a shift in the level of skill 
needed among the general workforce and as such had both capitalised 
upon and stimulated a large influx of migrant labour from both the 
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rural areas of the USA and also southern and eastern Europe. Early 
problems generated in the labour market, particularly those of 
turnover and absenteeism among the highly mobile, low skilled 
workforce, had been briefly confronted by the high wage/social 
intrusion of Ford's $5 day period but had been addressed in the long 
term by continuing attempts by most employers to manipulate the local 
labour market and restrict competition for workers. The result of an 
increasing pool of labour, added to the continued attraction of 
relatively high wages, meant that an extensive and elaborate jobs 
market developed in the Detroit region, coupled with the emergence of 
a number of mechanisms to secure employment. In tandem with "official" 
labour agencies which provided many short lived jobs for a modest fee, 
there emerged a thriving black market in job procurement based on 
cash, purchase of goods, patronage or influence. 
The jobs market in the industry during the inter-war period was 
typified by insecurity. Protection of workers rights either through 
collective action or through legislative intervention was minimal. In 
addition the developing cyclical nature of car production 
characterised by both seasonal and short term fluctuations, meant that 
jobs had to be continually re-secured by workers regularly laid off 
and rehired in a process with no formal regulations. Seniority meant 
very little in these circumstances, indeed longevity of service could 
in many cases prove a liability as discrimination against older 
workers was practised. In addition to the overall problems in getting 
a job and keeping it for any length of time, workers also faced an 
uncertain content to the day's work. The type of job allocated, length 
of the working day, level of pay etc. were all subject to short term 
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fluctuations. 
In the process of securing and keeping a job, and maintaining a 
level of quality in employment, the shop floor foreman was a crucial 
figure. Foremen continued to hire workers, albeit with official 
ratification from aa growing employment department bureaucracy. 
Foremen had the ultimate power of veto over selection and often 
initiated employment application, either by group selection from the 
factory gate or by pre-arranged means via the payment or influence 
mechanisms of the informal jobs market. Foremen also retained 
unreserved power to dismiss workers. In the few cases where reference 
to the employment department was required this was normally a simple 
formality. Transfer, often used as a means of punishment, was also at 
the sole discretion of the foreman on the shop floor. These powers 
were constantly in use in the regular lay off procedure, whether for 
part of the day or for more lengthy periods, over which the foreman 
was the sole arbiter. Pay levels were also under the control of the 
foreman who decided starting rates and positions on the wage scale, 
frequently readjusting these via the lay off procedure. Where bonus 
systems were in operation foremen also dominated the eventual outcome, 
so much so that many workers were unable to calculate their wages 
accurately from one one week to the next. 
The result of the continued power of shop floor supervision in 
these areas meant that to ensure continued steady employment it was 
imperative to stay on the right side of the foreman. Skill in the job 
was an increasingly discountable factor and as the pool of unskilled 
labour increased, especially during the depression years, influence of 
some sort was increasingly necessary. Accepting the difficulties 
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presented by subjective nature of much testimony on this topic, it is 
nevertheless clear that a substantial degree of favouritism was 
generated via gifts and favours to the foreman. In particular many 
foremen benefited from the ability to obtain free labour for domestic 
and minor commercial projects, exploit women workers, solicit regular 
payments or substantial loans from workers paypackets, or use their 
position to promote the sale of goods or investments for which they 
held agency, whether legal or otherwise. 
Another aspect of the continued power of the foreman was the part 
played in continuing ethnic, racial, gender and religious divisions in 
the workforce, in perpetuation of which the foreman played a central 
part. The relationship between black workers and supervision for 
example was notable in a number of ways. Restricted to ghettoes on the 
shop floor, black workers were given limited opportunities of 
advancement to the ranks of foreman, often in spite of extensive job 
knowledge, and where they achieved promotion this was almost 
exclusively in departments with a totally black workforce. White 
supervisors were the norm for many black workers as employers 
reflected the racism of much of the workforce, and acquiesced in the 
practice of discriminatory and degrading foremanship, often by white 
foremen of southern origin. Ethnic and nationalist groupings formed by 
migration also generated distinct patterns of supervision typified in 
the early years by foreman-worker communality of background. This was 
rapidly superseded however by a growing predominance of white, english 
speaking foremen as programmes aimed at 'americanising' the immigrant 
workforce were implemented, and as language and skill barriers receded 
with the onset of rationalised production. Foremanship styles 
began to 
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reflect a developing disdain for the immigrant worker, who was 
increasing the subject of driving forms of supervision. 
Women workers form a small but important sector of the workforce 
during the inter-war period, especially in certain sectors, and here 
again distinct patterns of foremanship emerge. Women were generally 
overseen by male supervision, and styles of supervision again 
reflected the predominant inequalities of society in general, but 
there were significant numbers of forewomen, and although 
comparatively badly treated in comparison with their male 
counterparts, these forewomen possessed a range of power in the labour 
market which mirrored that of their foremen. 
Through an assessment of this nature, which highlights the 
residual power of the shop floor supervisor in the face of the 
structural reshaping of supervision inherent in rationalised, Fordist 
production methods and also the encroachments and subdivision caused 
by increasing bureaucratisation, a more accurate image of the power of 
the foreman in the inter-war period can be brought into focus. Just as 
gaps in methods of control of production by rationalised means leave 
space for the discretionary work activity of both worker and foreman, 
so too supervisory relationships in the factory are not dominated by a 
systematised or codified set of rules or constraints but are rather a 
series of social processes worked out through the intervention of 
kinship, ethnic, racial and religious, and gender factors in a 
workforce undergoing a period of high fluidity and change. The rhythms 
of production, generated in marketplace and in the specific strategy 
of employers, and the ensuing patterns of short term or seasonal 
employment, ensured a platform for the continuing exercise of power by 
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foremen, manifested in a range of favours, exploitation and 
preferment. Specialist employment and personnel departments are a 
feature of the inter-war period, but their advance as a symbol of the 
bureaucratisation of the labour market must be placed in the context 
of the continuing forms of foreman power outlined above, a power which 
was to continue largely unchallenged until the advent of industrial 
unionisation. 
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Chapter Four: The Foreman's Job; Definition, Responsibility and 
Division 
This chapter will continue to outline aspects of the foreman's 
job in the inter-war years in terms of power and control. Themes 
explored in this chapter will attempt to define the boundaries of 
supervision on the shop floor, as seen from a number of perspectives. 
In a formal sense the chapter will map out the precise job undertaken 
by the shop floor foreman in terms of content and responsibility. 
Explaining the paradoxical increase in human supervision which 
accompanied the technological rationalisation outlined in chapter two, 
and the style of foremanship which came to typify mass production 
during this period, the chapter will go on to examine a range of 
relationships between the foreman and specialist production functions 
and departments. Finally the chapter will explore the general division 
in the workforce between supervisor and supervised as a complex 
construction consisting not only of objective elements of status and 
material reward but also of elements of power, control and ideology, 
as outlined in this and the previous two chapters, to provide an image 
of foremanship on the eve of unionisation of the general workforce in 
automobiles, and the later unionisation of foremen themselves. 
What was left to the foreman on the shop floor after the intense 
period of rationalisation of production culminating in the early 
1920s? We have seen in the previous chapter that in terms of personnel 
related functions the foreman was not bypassed or superseded but 
retained effective control over most aspects of shop floor life 
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including hiring, firing, job allocation and pay levels. We have 
already touched upon the way in which developments of specialist 
departments reduced the role of the foreman in production terms, 
especially in terms of overall control - design, production planning, 
materials f low etc. - and clearly there was a major reduction in the 
scope of the foreman's role. Yet within the subdivided, 
departmentalised mass production factory there remained an important 
production role for shop floor supervision, and beyond the formal 
delineation of responsibility, as with all aspects of rationalised 
production there remained areas where shop floor methods defied 
'official' systems, with the intricate involvement of foremen. 
Shop floor foreman were still necessary, indeed their numbers 
increased in ratio to the workforce throughout the inter-war period. 
This trend would seem to be paradoxical. The devolution of supervision 
implicit within the technological change to mass, standardised 
production techniques would seem to call for less human supervisory 
intervention, as machinery and systems became divided and automated 
reducing worker discretion and skill levels - "... the interlocking 
feature requires the operator always to do the correct thing at the 
correct time - he cannot do otherwise". Similarly the pace of work, as 
it became controlled within preset machine cycles, or tuned to overall 
line speeds would also seem to point to a reduced supervisory 
presence. Yet there was a discernible increase in numbers of shop 
floor foremen. 
Data on the foreman-worker ratio is not straightforward. Overall 
industry figures disguise differences between factories and pose 
definitional problems over precisely who is listed as supervision. 
(1) 
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Also within individual factories ratios vary from department to 
department, often dependent on the nature of specific labour 
processes. Nevertheless, with these reservations in mind, distinct 
trends can be discerned. 
Late 19th century Michigan census data puts the ratio of foremen 
to workers in engineering at about 50: 1. Ford's payroll figures 
correspond to these figures as late as 1909 and 1910, often exceeding 
60: 1. (2) By 1913 and 1914, the years immediately surrounding 
introduction of the machine pacing of production, two ex-Ford foremen 
put the ratio at 30: 1 on the assembly lines, and once moving assembly 
was established, supervision intensified to a ratio of 15: 1. 
(3) Ford 
factory statistics confirm this trend recording total of 2523 foremen 
in a workforce of 41,200, a ratio of approximately 16: 1 in 1915. 
(4) 
This ratio seems to hold good throughout the 1920s and 1930s, although 
variations by individual departments can be considerable. The 1923 
departmental ratios at Ford for example vary between 9: 1 and 36: 1. In 
the Chrysler press shop in the late 1930s foremen in different 
sections were variously in charge of 30,33,10,6,21 and 16 workers. 
Definitions also continue to obscure comparisons, the 1935 factory 
count at Ford for example shows a ratio of 29: 1 for foremen, but 
inclusion of the category of "leader" - not listed in previous counts 
- brings the ratio back to 15: 1. In addition this latter example does 
not include the 'serviceman' category of workers, who could be said to 
fulfil a supervisory function and were present on the shop floor in 
considerable numbers. 
(s) Other factory ratios besides Ford are only 
available episodically and provide difficult comparative analysis. 
Figures for GM in the 1930s vary between 15: 1 and 30: 1, Packard and 
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Briggs remain higher at 25: 1 and 31: 1 respectively. Hudson, Chrysler's 
Dodge Main and Murray Body ratios were at 18: 1 in the late 1930s, with 
Plymouth and DeSoto slightly higher at 19: 1. An NICB suvey of the 
early 1940s found the number of workers per "manufacturing foreman" in 
a range of plants varying between 8: 1 and 23: 1. 
(6) Nevertheless these 
figures confirm an overall trend of increase, and certainly no 
reduction, in the levels of shop floor supervisory staffing throughout 
the period. This is more remarkable when account is taken of the staff 
engaged in aspects of supervision now remote from the shop floor, 
involved in tasks which were once the official preserve of the foreman 
- personnel, production and quality control, time study etc. - who do 
not appear in these statistics. 
While it is true that the overall numbers of those involved in 
supervision, local and remote, when calculated against overall 
production levels, can be seen to decline i. e. there are progressively 
less foremen and specialist staff per car produced, in the context of 
the experience of those at work on the shop floor, it remains true 
that there was a significant intensification. For the automobile 
industry worker of the 1920s there were more foremen about. 
(7) 
Several factors explain this increase in the intensity of shop 
floor supervision. Firstly the new phase of integration of the 
production process brought with it a heightened degree of 
vulnerability to to delays or stoppages. One of the major stimulants 
to adopting Fordist production methods was the consequent reduction of 
inventory levels that came with a rapid turnover of materials. 
Stockpiles of parts and materials waiting to be processed were to be 
eliminated as far as possible as the sequential arrangement of 
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processes, close grouping of machinery and steady overall flow of 
production "put a harness on time" as Norwood put it. 
(8) Aspects of 
supervision were made easier by these developments. Paced lines, 
whether by machine, slide or sequential layout, ensured that 
relatively slow spots were easily visible. Close grouping of machinery 
also aided surveillance. Against this however there was the risk that 
a slow down or stoppage in production could have a knock on effect, 
stalling production through all linked phases. Increased numbers of 
foremen were needed therefore to monitor each phase of production and 
to rapidly relocate workers, cover for absentees or relief, and 
arrange speedy repairs in case of breakdowns. 
The nature of work on the new production lines also compounded 
their vulnerability as conditions on the factory floor militated 
against voluntary participation in increased output. Safety standards 
were often appalling. Foundries and paint shops were the among the 
most notorious, the latter particularly so when the introduction of 
Duco or pyroxylene spray paint came into use bringing the problems 
associated with air born solvents and lead poisoning. 
(99) The 
bodymaking plants were also hazardous. Commonly referred to in the 
Detroit region as "slaughterhouses", the harshness of the work 
environment there was reflected in their high labour turnover. 
(10) 
Presses frequently removed fingers and when streamlined bodies came 
into production, sanding down soldered seams released lead dust to 
poison many workers. 
(11) In machine shops oil on machined castings was 
for many years the breeding ground for bacteria which, entering 
through unavoidable cuts and abrasions, led to widespread incidence of 
dermatitis and related skin problems. 
(12) In 1916 "192 severed 
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fingers, 168,000 lacerations, 5,400 burns and 26,000 puncture wounds" 
were reported in the industry. By 1931 the Ford medical department was 
recording over 100,000 visits each month for first aid or 
hospitalisation. (13) 
In addition to the physical hazards involved in automobile 
production of this nature, fatigue could also affect workers. When 
production was running at full strength the working day could be long 
and arduous, seven day weeks of 12 hours each day being not 
uncommon. 
(14) Workers might also spend many extra hours at the factory 
on "dead time", idle and unpaid while production was stalled. Workers 
on many jobs were forbidden to sit down, not just those involved in 
final assembly, but also many machine operators. Those at Packard for 
example in the 1920s could be fired for sitting on their tool boxes 
while the machine was running. 
(15) The image of automobile workers 
asleep on buses and totally exhausted at home is one that permeates 
accounts of the period. 
Where the job itself was not physically onerous it often involved 
an extremely tedious small cycle of operation, sometimes repeated many 
hundreds or thousands of times each day, in an atmosphere of petty 
work rules which often included bans on talking, singing, whistling or 
smoking. The debate around the precise effects of this type of work, 
in terms of alienation, anomie and related concepts, has by now a long 
history. (16) What is clear is that conditions of this sort did little 
to engender enthusiasm for life on the shop floor, beyond the wage 
payment bargain. Lack of enthusiasm could be manifested in many forms 
ranging from sabotage of production to slowing down output to more 
tolerable levels. The foreman's increased presence was designed to 
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offset these effects. 
In this atmosphere of hazardous or physically and mentally 
debilitating work in the industry there developed a constant conflict 
around levels of production. Foremen, who controlled line speeds and 
job allocation, had a range of methods available to increase output. 
Integrated production lines meant that the pace of work could be 
accelerated for whole groups of workers simultaneously. The "speed up" 
could be applied to machine paced production by simply turning up the 
line speed. Non-machine paced sequential lines could be speeded up by 
placing a fast worker at the start of the sequence. Such a worker, 
usually a relief worker or potential straw boss, could then push the 
pace of work. The "stretch out" - simultaneous operation of more than 
one machine by a single operator - was another method of increasing 
the intensity of work. Foremen could also withdraw workers from the 
line, or fail to provide adequate relief while the pace of output 
remained constant. Groups of workers might also be set up to compete 
against each other, often on and inter shift or racial basis, and 
foremen were known to falsify output figures from previous shifts' 
production to act as bogus targets. 
(17) 
Evidence on a general policy of speed up throughout the industry 
is widespread. The Ford 5$ day is a good example of the increased 
effort which foremen were expected to secure. 
"They called us (the 
foremen) in and said since they were getting twice the wages they 
wanted twice as much work. "(18) Some departments were worse than 
others. Department 30A at Dodge for example was 
known as the "race 
track" and was generally viewed as a punishment sector. Overall 
statistics frequently show a sharp 
increase in production levels where 
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no significant change in organisation or technology had taken place. 
The Ford radiator department for example increased its soldering 
requirements in 1927 from 35 to 80 per man per hour. 
(19) Speed up 
could also be a short term phenomenon. It was a frequent complaint hat 
foremen tried to catch up on lost production due to some unforeseen 
stoppage during the shift. 
(20) 
Efforts to speed up production, which the foremen were expected 
to make, were constantly met by countervailing pressure from workers 
to reduce the intensity of work or at least maintain effort norms. The 
general control of work by informal means, often at the group level, 
has been well documented. Jobs which are formally defined are in 
actual practice often carried out in different ways, designed by their 
participants. 
(21) Donald Roy's work provides one of the earliest 
accounts of this in identifying a "web" or "horizontal sub- 
organisation" of worker controls. 
(22) This could affect both the way 
in which work is done and the speed of output. Methods of work were 
established by custom and passed on to new workers by workmates as 
Whiting found out. "The instruction I got when I worked with the gangs 
was not from my foreman, but underground instruction from my fellow 
workmen. "(23) Such practices could be put into effect against even the 
most highly rationalised production systems and as Olin Wright has 
noted "most workers, most of the time have been able to maintain at 
least some residual control over their immediate labour process. "24) 
Care must be taken not to misjudge the nature of such control. Many 
workers, in Friedman's terms do not have "creative" control of work, 
rather they more usually react to initiatives taken beyond the 
immediate workplace. 
(25) The scope of resistance is also largely 
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determined by the nature of the labour process itself, of which there 
were many in the automobile industry, nevertheless there were ways in 
which workers did retain significant discretion over output. 
Many workers sought simply to limit output to a fixed level at 
which the minimum wage could be assured, since high output levels 
would bring short term gain only and provoke rate cutting. Bonus 
levels were either seen as unattainable or not worth the extra effort 
involved. Manipulations could involve "goldbricking", or what Ulrich 
termed a "get by" attitude or more sophisticated system of "banking" 
production. 
(26) An example of the later, whereby production is stored 
up from periods of peak activity to either offset lost production 
through breakdowns or simply to ease the pace of work for a portion of 
the working day, can be found at Chevrolet in the 1930s. At the Flint 
No. 4 shaft grinding department the men generally completed 124 shafts 
per shift. Up to 74 of these were completed in the first half of the 
shif t and those in excess of the target were concealed as output was 
occasionally checked at the half shift point. By banking production in 
this way workers could take an unofficial 45 minute break late in the 
shift. Intrinsic to the ability to undertake such activity was either 
the concealment of the rate at which workers were able to produce or 
concealment of a method by which work could be done at a faster 
rate. 
(27) 
Machine paced lines were not immune to group regulation of 
output. Workers regularly attempted to "go into the hole" - taking 
longer than their allotted time cycle to complete a task and 
consequently moving progressively off their work station. As James 
O'Connor, a foreman at Ford in the 1930s, recalled, "The biggest 
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trouble was the men. Everybody would get everybody's way and they 
would all be in a bunch. Then they would have to stop the line whether 
they wanted to or not. "(28) Alternatively, individuals could work 
their way up the line by working with a burst of speed and thus create 
small rest periods. 
Two factors were important in the regulation of work by the above 
means. Firstly all members of a work group, i. e. all those affected by 
regulation, must comply with output norms and methods. "Rate busters" 
were always a threat, especially in jobs requiring little expertise to 
achieve the required proficiency. New workers, especially those with a 
non factory background were a constant problem in this respect. The 
second crucial factor was the ability to "fool" the rate fixer or time 
study department. This was also a constant process. Various covert 
signals would usually telegraph the approach of a time study official, 
banging metal trays for example, and work rates would be 
correspondingly adjusted. 
(29) William Chalmers worked at Packard in 
the late 1920s; "When the time study men came to the department and 
observed one team and one operation after another, the whole group 
found themselves in the hole, that is their jobs carried off the line 
before they had completed them. "(30) For their part, time study 
personnel usually incorporated an allowance in their calculations to 
take account of such activity reducing the "scientific" measurement of 
output to a process of arbitrary estimates and informally negotiated 
rates. 
Informal methods of output regulation could lead to a variety of 
responses from supervision ranging from what Gouldner termed 
"indulgency patterns" whereby formalised job descriptions were 
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largely ignored in tacit acceptance of informal methods, or 
alternatively viewed in hostile fashion such as by Taylor in his quest 
to eliminate what he saw as "systematic soldiering". Friedman has 
highlighted the ways in which different sets of workers can be subject 
to differing levels of intervention, dependent on skill and spatial 
differentials, in terms of enforcing formal job controls in his 
responsible autonomy/direct control typology. (31) The adoption of 
Fordist methods of production, which dominate the industry, are of 
course themselves aimed at limiting the scope for such discretionary 
activity as far as possible and represent a preeminence of the direct 
control end of the spectrum, yet as noted, there remained areas of 
inertia and possibilities for intervention by workers in even the most 
sophisticated control systems. It was here that the need for a 
continued supervisory presence was at its keenest. 
Individual foremen's reactions to this aspect of their job, i. e. 
seeking out and eliminating informal regulation and pushing production 
along at it optimum speed, could vary on an individual basis. Some 
foremen took an active part in systems of informal regulation or at 
least turned a blind eye. For example "Operator 15", an informant 
posing as a Ford worker in 1919, reported that one foreman had told 
him, "you see when the men haven't any generators for us and when my 
men haven't anything to do, I let them stall around and give them 
credit for the day for the generators that was left on the bench from 
the day before-it(32) Foremen might advise new workers on informal 
practices, Chalmers' foreman for example told him to rest on the 
inside of a car body to avoid being spotted. Similarly Operator 15's 
foreman would advise workers on the approach of other officials-(33) 
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Some foremen also took an active part in efforts to outwit time study 
officials. Chalmers' foreman again informed new workers on the average 
they should produce "so as not to draw down a cut in the piece 
rate". 
(34) A Pinkerton labour spy report of the 1930s reveals foremen 
"fixing" production production cards in order that workers who were 
behind schedule could make up their quotas. 
(35) Mattewson's 1931 study 
confirms that foremen often attempted to make time study inaccurate. 
Even if they made no active intervention some foremen could chose 
simply to ignore such activity. Donald Roy maintained that most 
foremen preferred the role of "silent accessory after the fact" when 
it came to manipulating time study. 
(35) After all, low time rates were 
often to the foreman's advantage, making departmental production 
targets easier to achieve. 
It is unlikely that many foremen were unaware of the wide range 
of informal work practices which were a feature of most areas of the 
shop floor since almost all foremen were recruited from the ranks and 
had first hand knowledge of such activities. How they chose to use 
this knowledge depended on the individual to some extent, and some 
foremen, as noted, aided or at least acquiesced in the process. Many 
more however took a different stance, rooting out informal practices 
wherever possible and driving production and men unrelentingly. 
Contemporary descriptions of many foremen's behaviour leave 
little room for doubt: "The worst brutes and slavedrivers in 
existence", "Whipcracking, browbeating, bulldozing attitude", "people 
with a bullwhip... they treated us like a bunch of coolies" and so 
on. 
(36) Interaction between workers and this type of foreman was of a 
straightforward confrontational nature. Robert Headrick, at Ford in 
Chapter Four -158- 
the 1920s had one such foreman. "If he ever knew a civil word of 
courtesy he had forgotten it... not once did he treat me as if I were a 
human being. " "A good old fashioned bawling out" was the extent of 
many foremen's personnel skills, and many went beyond this, using 
physical threats to supplement verbal abuse, often kicking or throwing 
things at workers. 
(37) 
Workers only defence against this type of 
activity was to walk off the job, a choice which many took in the 
early years of the industry. For many others, particularly as the jobs 
market tightened, this was not an option. Instead, workers became 
resigned to such treatment. A polisher, at Packard in the 1920s, 
summed up the reaction of many workers: "You've got to lose your 
confidence when you come in here. You've got to stand for a lot of 
things... You just have to see that the (foreman) get's nothing on you, 
and if he does just let him bawl you out. There you have the 
philosophy of the auto workers - just let him bawl you out. "(38) 
Such foremen would attempt to secure maximum production, often in 
excess of time study rates. Individuals were cited in the workers' 
press at the time as "a man without reason, a maniac for more 
production" and "trying to beat the efficiency man on penny pinching 
for the company". 
(39) Where production lines were machine paced their 
method was simple. At Chrysler for example "the foreman at that time - 
they had a conveyor and they had a wheel - would stand down at the end 
of the line and he would turn that and speed it up or slow down and no 
one could keep up. "(40) The speed of the line was supplemented by a 
continuous stream of orders to "snap to it" or "speed it up". Ford 
foremen, as noted earlier, had, by the early 1920s, learnt to say 
"hurry up" in at least four different languages. On non-driven 
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production lines the foreman might simply increase the quota expected. 
Taking advantage of the fact that piece work rates and bonus systems 
were often not fully understood such foremen often manipulated output 
figures to the detriment of workers. Foremen at Dodge for example were 
in the habit of booking the first batch of cars, often as many as 30, 
to the previous day's production figures to disguise a speed up of 
current output. 
(41) Relief times were also vigorously controlled by 
such foremen who, in addition to close scrutiny of production 
activity, scrutinised washrooms and timed workers in their absence 
from the line. (42) 
The growing dominance of this driving method of supervision was 
compounded with the deepening of the depression into the early 1930s 
which reduced still further the possibility of workers taking the 
"exit" option of protest. 
( ) Constraints imposed in this respect are 
revealed in the reduction of turnover figures to between 1% and 3% in 
1931 and 1933 as unemployment in Michigan soared to over 40%. 
(44) 
Output per worker was greatly increased during this period, with no 
commensurate change in organisation or technology. As Frank Marquart 
asserted, "Every auto worker remembers how much harder he worked in 
1934 than than he did in 1929. "(45) Foremen began to disregard 
manufacturers recommended speed settings on machinery and were 
reported to be intimidating time study workers into increasing 
standards. 
(46) Production rates for workers involved in the 
manufacture of radiators at Chrysler for example were doubled during 
this period. 
(47) 
Safety constraints were also ignored by foremen in search of high 
output levels. There had been attempts in some factories to involve 
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foremen in initiatives aimed at reducing the number of accidents in 
factories. Monthly safety reports, accident reports, bonuses for 
foremen with good safety records, and special training courses for 
foremen were attempted at many factories including Ford, Fisher Body, 
Dodge and Buick. 
(48) Despite this the shop floor remained an extremely 
hazardous environment. Workers often felt intimidated into not 
reporting accidents for fear of showing the foreman in a bad light and 
risking consequent lay off without compensation. 
(49) In many cases 
unsafe working practices were actively encouraged by foremen to secure 
faster production. Press operators for example were often not allowed 
to wear gloves when handling sheet steel since this supposedly 
impaired their dexterity. Kenneth Bannon, at Ford's River Rouge plant 
in the 1930s recalled workers wrapping bandages around their hands to 
avoid cuts, but speedily disposing of these whenever the foreman came 
into sight. 
(50) 
The ability of foremen to manipulate output levels and the 
intensity of work, and to effectively exert control over the 
conditions of work, was contingent on their continuing power over what 
can be seen as competing groups of specialised staff, which had now 
the potential at least to take on certain of the roles of supervision. 
Just as in the previous chapter we examined the ways in which the 
foreman retained real power over personnel and disciplinary functions, 
despite the establishment of employment and personnel offices, so too 
in the administration of production foremen were to continue to wield 
an effective veto over functional departments and their staff. This is 
not true of all aspects of production. Product design, overall 
materials control and planning of production for example 
had left the 
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shop floor and the intervention of shop floor supervisors in these 
areas was now minimal. In terms of immediate, short term production 
decisions concerning speeds, priorities, manning levels and so on the 
foreman could still make significant decisions however. 
One group of workers which seemingly encroach across the 
boundaries of the shop floor supervisors power were those involved in 
time study. Much was made of the recourse to neutrality of 
"scientific" measurement of output by precise measurement of 
production methods by post Taylor theorists. Applied systems such as 
that promoted by Bedaux for example set great store in the ability to 
combine the fixed performance capabilities of machinery with 
ergonometric measurements to arrive at indisputable optimum 
workloads. 
(51) Given the accepted neutrality of rate fixing and the 
inherent incentive of group bonuses, supervision was ideally to be 
devolved among what was to become a self regulatory gang. Subsequent 
accounts of gang systems in operation have claimed this to be a 
reality in certain British situations. Melman for example maintained 
that under Standard Motor's gang system the foreman's role was reduced 
since "it was not necessary for the management to police directly the 
performance of the production workers. "(52) By contrast, in the inter- 
war American automobile industry, even in work situations where 
fully 
rationalised incentive based systems were attempted, measurement 
processes continued to be an ad hoc series of negotiation and 
compromise and the shop floor foreman remained a central part of 
the 
control process. 
In spite of the rationalisation of technology 
during the period 
most automobile companies, with the notable exception of 
Ford, 
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continued to run bonus schemes related to productivity and therefore 
requiring rates to be set. Such schemes were in part a recognition 
that even highly rationalised labour processes left room for worker 
control at some level and also reflected the problems in fixing work 
methods absolutely with the onset of product cycles and the design 
changes inherent in "Sloanism". 
(53) Gang systems were in operation 
during the 1920s at Nash, Studebaker, Chrysler, Fisher Body and GM. 
The WPA report of 1934 found over 70% of Michigan factories using some 
form of bonus system at this time. 
( 54). The size of work groups varied 
considerably, at Chevrolet gangs ranged between 60 and 400, at Packard 
the range was 125 to 600. Gangs could be subdivided into different 
earnings groups and it was usually the foreman who carried this 
out. 
(ss) These systems were generally ineffective however and instead 
of devolving regulation to a partnership between time study engineers 
and gang members, they were widely distrusted, encouraged low levels 
of participation and were ruthlessly manipulated by foremen. Time 
study specialists were held in low esteem by both workers and foremen. 
The inaccuracy of rate fixing was seen to be merely masquerading 
behind precise measurements. 
(56) As time study men often talked of 
1000ths of a second foremen arbitrarily intervened to retime jobs or 
simply readjust rates. 
(57) At Ford, where job times were not formally 
tied in to bonus schemes the time study department acted as a general 
support for foremen, laying down guidelines on production speeds. 
(58) 
Foremen were free to do their own time study however and were known to 
carry stopwatches for this purpose. 
(59) A more usual method of setting 
standards was that described by Ford worker Percy Lwellyn. 
"The 
foreman comes along and works at the job like mad for five minutes - 
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works just as fast as he can stand it. That way he sets the production 
and we're supposed to keep it up at this rate for eight hours. "(60) 
Foremen retained power to set rates and determine bonus levels, 
overriding time study officials, until the widespread decline of 
incentive related schemes during the mid 1930s. By 1934 GM had moved 
away from incentive packages, closely followed by Chrysler and 
Packard, due to a mixture of revealed failure, and the current ability 
to push production by other means during the deepening depression. 
When unions were established one of the early features of most 
agreements was the scrapping of any remaining schemes of this 
type. 
(61) 
A more serious intrusion on the power of foremen to control both 
the speed of output and general shop floor disciplinary activity was 
to be found at Ford in the inter-war years. The servicemen's 
department, unique to Ford, was to develop a range of authority on the 
shop floor which affected foreman and worker alike, and as such 
represents an interesting example of the specificity of a particular 
managerial regime during the period. Ford did not attempt to implement 
incentive related schemes, relying instead on a straightforward 
philosophy that in return for relatively high wages workers would 
submit to the compulsion of machine pacing and/or robust, driving 
supervision. In tandem with the formal supervisory hierarchy which 
included usual grades of shop floor foremanship, Ford established a 
group of workers in the mid 1920s, known as Servicemen, which was to 
grow in numbers and power until by the mid 1930s, at the major 
River 
Rouge complex, this department had virtual total control of shop 
floor 
life. 
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It is difficult to put an exact figure on the number of 
servicemen employed throughout the period, but it seems likely there 
was a substantial increase with the move from the Highland Park 
factory to the River Rouge in 1926 and 1927 in line with splits in 
higher management. By the mid 1930s estimates put the number as high 
as 10% of the entire workforce. 
(62) One factor which makes calculation 
difficult is the inexact definition of the post of serviceman. Nevins 
for example estimated that there were 800 "underworld characters" in 
addition to 8,000 to 9,000 "spies and stoolpigeons" out of a total of 
100,000 workers during this period, again roughly one in ten. 
(63) 
Official figures reveal only 250 to 260 servicemen employed between 
1929 and 1933, but these figures are highly misleading since many 
servicemen were on the books as machine operators, labourers, security 
guards etc. 
(64) 
The post of serviceman was by its nature a clandestine 
occupation. The department operated under the aegis of Harry Bennett, 
who was renowned for recruiting celebrated criminals and underworld 
figures, "ex pugs and thugs", or retired athletes, and used his 
position on the state prison board to obtain the use of 
"tied" 
services of many parolees. Official basic pay for servicemen was quite 
low, around 90c. and hour in 1929 and falling to 65c. in 1933, but was 
undoubtedly supplemented by unofficial means and by the endemic system 
of bribes, kickbacks and rackets which accompanied the system. 
(65) 
Official duties, where they were acknowledged, were to "patrol the 
aisles, watch for leaks in equipment, keep fire aisles open, watch 
for 
violations of safety rules, man the gates, park cars and stand guard 
in the grocery. " 
(66) In practice they often patrolled the factory in 
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pairs, distinguished by the wearing of "civilian clothes" - often 
leather jackets, and a badge with a "A" prefix instead of the normal 
"F". (67) 
The shop floor codes of behaviour which servicemen were to impose 
included a series of petty rules which went beyond safety 
considerations. Leaning on rails or machinery, sitting down, whistling 
singing, spitting, chewing tobacco or smoking were all forbidden in 
various degrees and infringement of these minor rules could mean 
instant dismissal. The ban on talking, imposed partly as an attempt to 
offset the spread of unionisation, led to bizarre accounts of workers 
with "Ford face" caused by talking out of the side of the mouth too 
much, workers conversing in morse code and, when allowed to talk in 
the lunchbreak, shouting out baseball conversations to avoid 
suspicions of "talking union". 
(68) 
One of the main preoccupations of the servicemen's department was 
to arrest the spread of union membership. Individual servicemen often 
searched workers clothing, patrolled washrooms and interrogated and 
forced the sacking of individual workers suspected of union activity. 
Following the passage of legislation protecting workers' rights to 
organise, in the 1930s, servicemen were known to pick fights with 
workers suspected of union activity as a pretext for dismissal. 
(69) 
Servicemen also featured in the more overt anti-union activity of the 
1930s involving beatings of union organisers or those distributing 
literature at the factory gates. At the infamous "battle of the 
overpass" in 1937 when Walter Reuther, Richard Frankensteen and other 
senior UAW organisers were severely beaten outside the River Rouge 
factory, the employer's ranks were largely composed of servicemen. 
(70) 
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Servicemen could intervene over production decisions, chiefly in 
terms of speed, but their major activity remained in the disciplinary 
sphere. They were invested with the power to dismiss or transfer 
workers without reference to any other authority than their own 
superiors and certainly without consideration of foremen. 
(71) 
What was the developing relationship between this specialist 
group of workers, who can in many ways be seen to fulfil a parallel 
role to "ordinary" shop floor foremen, and those foremen with more 
orthodox duties? Following the move from Highland Park to the River 
Rouge in 1927 Charles Sorenson and Ernest Liebold had emerged in 
overall control of production at the new plant. The conflict over 
control had filtered down to the ranks of shop floor supervision and 
many of the old Highland Park foremen had not been rehired to work at 
the Rouge. Those who made the transfer tended to conform more closely 
to Sorenson's ideal of driving foremanship and thus, at the outset, 
many foremen whose methods might be antipathetic to the activities of 
the serviceman had been eliminated. 
(72) Nevertheless there were a 
significant number of foremen who made the transfer or were promoted 
following the move, who were uncomfortable with the conflicting power 
structure. Rauschenbush commented at the time that "the workers of 
course both fear and hate the servicemen, and some of the foremen 
share their feelings. Foremen are watched as much as anyone and Ford 
is said to have the highest known rate of turnover among foremen. "(73) 
More moderate foremen might on occasion attempt to intervene on behalf 
of workers facing disciplinary action from servicemen, or attempt to 
override their decisions. This was usually ineffective. James 
O'Connor, foreman at the Rouge in the 1930s recalled being told by a 
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serviceman to fire a worker: ""He's the best man I've got. " I would 
tell him. "It makes no difference. You've got to get rid of him. "" was 
the reply. 
(74) Mutual fear of the serviceman might force foremen into 
conspiratorial alliances with workers. Laurence Yost witnessed such 
activity: "it was a minute before quitting time and the pusher came up 
to you, the foreman, he said "Serviceman is coming, grab a towel, do 
anything, look busy. " Immediately people would spring to whatever it 
was with great alacrity. "(75) 
The Servicemen's department at Ford represented a significant 
incursion across the boundaries of foremanship. Unlike the time study 
department however such an intrusion was not to replace or subvert the 
power of the foreman but rather to introduce a group of workers 
concentrating on one aspect of what had become the accepted task of 
foremanship. In their way the servicemen can be seen as merely a 
deviant form of foreman, although not tied to a specific area, and not 
concerned as closely with production related matters. In many resects 
the serviceman might be seen to fulfil Taylor's criteria for the 
disciplinary foremen as part of the functional foremanship typology. 
For many foremen the pressure of work overseen by the servicemen's 
regime was particularly onerous, and many may have left Ford to work 
in other factories during the early 1930s. 
(76) Still more were 
undoubtedly content with such activity, their own behaviour being 
virtually indistinguishable from that of the servicemen in driving 
production, arbitrarily dismissing or disciplining workers and joining 
in the more overt anti-union activity. 
(77) For many foremen however, 
robust as their style of foremanship undoubtedly was, the added 
imposition of control by the servicemen may have been a factor in 
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building a resentment which was later to be a stimulus in the call for 
a foreman's union which was to find its strongest constituency at Ford 
in 1941. 
Supervisor and supervised: elements in division on the shop floor. 
Having established the extent of the power of foremen both in 
terms of their control over the labour market, control of shop floor 
life, control of production and control of workers, we now turn to an 
examination of the manifestation of this continued power in terms of 
the essential division on the shop floor between those who supervise - 
the foreman - and those who are supervised - production workers. Class 
is of course a problematic concept, yet it is fair to say that shop 
floor foremen represented a group, or class of workers whose outlook 
and ideology, whose self image of status and prestige, was different 
from that of of the production workers around them. The divide between 
the job of foreman and that of ordinary worker was, and remains, one 
of the basic divisions perceived by those involved in industrial 
activity at the level of the shop floor. In this section we shall 
build on the notions of difference manifested in the power outlined 
above and explore occupational, material and ideological elements in 
the construction of divisions on the shop floor during the inter war 
period. 
The first point to consider in establishing the genesis and 
nature of the divisions between foremen and worker is that of origins. 
Throughout the period foremen continued to be predominantly recruited 
internally from the ranks of ordinary production workers. Selection 
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was usually made by the foreman or superintendent and followed an 
established route of advancement through the offices of utility or 
relief man, assistant foreman and so on. 
(78) The criteria involved was 
related to mechanical or technical skills in the early years of the 
industry when such knowledge was essential in the control of work and 
recruitment of workers, but as production became rationalised job 
skills came to be seen as less important. There were attempts at 
various times to recruit externally, usually from the ranks of college 
graduates. A 1927 survey published by the Federal Board for Vocational 
Education found widespread recruitment of college graduates to 
supervision in US industry but the A. M. A. estimated that, by 1930, 
only 20% of foremen in the USA had some form of college training. 
(79) 
Figures for the automobile industry were lower than average. The 
chairman of Dodge for example outlined their policy in 1930s: "The 
company follows the promotional system among its employees; that is, 
it promotes from the lower to the higher brackets wherever possible, 
rather than hiring outsiders for the better positions. "(80) At Packard 
"practically 100%" of assistant foremen, foremen and general foremen 
had been recruited from "the hourly rate ranks in the factory" before 
the Second World War. 
(81) Ford also recruited internally, although 
many foremen received some college equivalent training at the Ford 
Trade School which was established in 1916. 
(82) 
As with general access to jobs, the route to foremanship was 
viewed with suspicion by most workers. There was a pervasive 
understanding that a worker needed "pull" to achieve promotion. 
(83) In 
this way a worker was often viewed as standing apart from from the 
ordinary rank and file before stepping into a supervisory job. When 
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unionisation was gaining momentum the promotion of shop floor 
representatives in works councils was similarly viewed with suspicion 
as the "kick upstairs". 
(84) Later, when a formal union presence was 
established the shop steward to foreman ladder of promotion became a 
celebrated feature of shop floor life. Anderson, at GM in the 1930s, 
recalled that at least three early union local presidents were 
promoted to foremanship. 
(85) 
The foreman's origins were firmly rooted amongst the ranks of 
ordinary production workers. On the assumption of the foreman's role, 
how much did the job itself, in terms of content and skills acquired, 
mark the foreman of as a visibly separate class of worker? Specialist 
training was not a precursor for most of those promoted. Foremen did 
receive specialist training once appointed although the duration and 
content of the courses provided was limited. During the 1920s there 
was a general upsurge in the level of training in foremanship in 
industry in general and the automobile industry was well represented 
in this field. The main emphasis of this training movement, led by 
government, educational institutions and specialist consultancies, was 
towards personnel skills, aimed at the dissemination of human 
relations managerial practice. The full extent and impact of this 
training will assessed below in chapter nine, it is enough to note 
here that in general its effects in imparting an intrinsically unique 
framework of knowledge to foremen were limited. Foremen remained in 
possession of the same range of formal job skills, restricted by 
rationalisation, as the production workers under them. 
In the early years of the industry job skills were important, and 
when foremen were chosen significant consideration was given to their 
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technical abilities. Foremen during this period needed to judge 
accurately the technical expertise of new recruits, could take an 
active part in product development, and generally control complex 
production. 
(86) Boyd Fisher found machine shop foremen before the 
First World War were expected to "set speeds and feeds and depth of 
cut, decide on best angles and shapes of tools, the best cooling 
agent, the kind of steel to use. They are expected to set piece rates, 
plan to keep all machines busy, but not congested, to order work 
through the department in relative importance, keep data on idle 
equipment time, break in new men, adjust differences as to wages, keep 
up discipline, keep down rejections and act as stock chasers... and 
must furthermore hire men. "(87) As rationalisation advanced the 
technical aspect of the foreman's job began to recede. Only in the 
pockets where skilled work remained such as the tool room and 
maintenance departments did the foreman's technical knowledge continue 
in demand. (88) Formal job descriptions for the foreman continued to 
stress the need for technical skill but the reality of their everyday 
job content began to bear little resemblance to such outlines. 
(89) By 
the 1930s Speier noted that the relationship between technical and 
non-technical work of the foreman had "practically been reversed" and 
that the foreman now spent 80% of his time on non-technical 
activities. 
(90) Evidence presented before the NWLB later confirmed 
this trend. By 1945 less than one third of the 555 foremen at the 
Murray Corporation held jobs which were not interchangeable i. e. over 
two thirds of foremen's jobs could readily be undertaken by any other 
foreman with minimal specialist training. 
(91) Among foremen who were 
specialists in a particular skill there had been a notable 
decline in 
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the need for "all round men". Technical expertise was often limited to 
one particular machine or operation rather than involving a broad 
range of skills. 
(92) 
In the majority of cases then foremen had become deskilled in 
line with ordinary production workers. On the job specialist knowledge 
was retained in most areas of work but such knowledge was common to 
both worker and supervisor, and often narrowly confined. The intrinsic 
technical skill which had in previous years marked the foreman off as 
a different class of worker was, by the 1920s, largely diluted. A 
typical foreman's day now involved a range of duties, different from 
those of production workers, but in no way involving the need for 
specialist technical knowledge. 
A typical foreman's day was now occupied in maintaining supplies 
of stock and material flows in compliance with supplied production 
schedules, distribution of labour at the beginning of the day and 
during changes in production, allocation of overtime, breaks etc., 
authorising various requisitions for tools, parts etc. and organising 
repairs to breakdowns or eliminating stoppages in production. 
(93) A 
large portion of the day was often taken up with the progress of "hot 
parts" or pressing problems unforeseen due to breakdowns or 
rescheduling of production programmes. 
(94) Foremen were also required 
to take control of training programmes for new workers and evaluate 
their competence, decide on probationary periods etc., but given the 
reduced training cycles which now typified the car industry this 
responsibility had also progressively diminished. 
(95) 
The move to foremanship thus involved no lengthy training period 
or accumulation of specialised knowledge, nor was it any longer 
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founded on the display of a particular aptitude in terms of technical 
capabilities. Confrontational personnel skills, in terms of ability to 
drive production, were now seen as more important. 
Power then, and not intrinsic job skill, marked the inter-war 
foreman off from those who worked under him. We have seen how this 
power was manifested in the foreman's frequent intimidation of workers 
for personal gain, or through foremen's control of jobs and shop floor 
life. 
The divide between foreman and worker was also reinforced through 
formal material reward, status and prestige. The most straightforward 
measures in this respect are pay differentials. In the 1890s a foreman 
in Michigan would earn around half as much again as a skilled 
mechanic. 
(96) On the eve of the doubling of operatives pay to $5 a day 
at Ford in 1913 foremen were already receiving between $6 and $7. The 
reduction in differential caused by the general industry wide rise for 
workers which followed the pattern set by the $5-day was the source of 
some acrimony among foremen. 
(97) Differentials were reestablished 
somewhat following World War One. At Ford for example, by the 1930s 
the differential on the assembly line was nearing the 50% mark at 70c 
and $1.00 per hour for worker and foreman respectively, and with 
foremen guaranteed more hours work annually the true difference was 
much greater. During the depression years this difference was 
accentuated even more as the customary lay off periods were extended. 
Ford foremen averaged over twice the salaries of assemblers between 
1929 and 1933. 
(98) Like their operatives foremens wages in general 
were on no fixed scale. Ford foremen in 1927 for example could earn 
anything between $300 and $800 dependent on pay levels set by their 
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superintendents. 
( 99) This variance makes calculation of precise 
differentials difficult but on average the figure by the mid to late 
1930s began to fall to around 25-30%. Many firms had a specific 
formula for differentials incorporating a percentage below which 
foremen were not allowed to fall. GM for example paid their foremen at 
least 25% above the average of the five highest paid workers in the 
department. (100) 
Although foremen usually benefited from a lower level of 
unemployment there were negative effects to their salary structure. 
Foremen generally were not expected to clock in to work but usually 
were required to sign a timesheet. Many were still paid on an hourly 
basis although there was a general shift towards putting foremen on a 
salaried basis during the 1930s, partly to avoid the hours of work 
regulations of the NRA codes. 
(101) Salary payment was also encouraged 
by employers in the early 1940s as a means of separating off foremen 
from general workers following the first signs of interest in 
supervisory unions. A bigger problem for foremen in receipt of fixed 
wages was that they were ineligible for overtime payments. Foremen 
were usually expected to put in a significant number of extra hours 
during peaks in production or problem periods, often working long 
hours or over weekends. For this they received no extra pay beyond a 
minimal allowance for expenses. 
(102) Foremen also lost out on bonus 
schemes where they were in operation. Since foremen were expected to 
administer such schemes, set basic rates, oversee the quality of 
production and control output levels, obvious difficulties of self 
interest would arise if foremen were themselves in receipt of payments 
linked to decisions over which they had control. Foremen might set low 
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production or quality standards in order to achieve greater 
bonuses. (103) Some schemes made provisions for the inclusion of 
foremen on an average departmental basis, but in general the foreman 
did not receive bonus payments of the type given to ordinary 
production workers. An NICB survey of 2,700 US companies in 1939 found 
only 18% operating schemes which included foremen. 
(103) Foremen were 
more likely to receive some form of general bonus, paid annually, than 
one which was directly tied to production levels. 
(104) 
Exclusion from bonus plans and overtime payments was not too much 
of a problem for foremen during the inter war period since they 
continued to enjoy greater regularity and security of employment than 
workers in general. 
(105) This security was another factor which marked 
off the rank of foreman from those below. During periods of seasonal 
lay offs the foreman was usually the last to be laid off, if at all. 
Foremen could prove harder to replace when rehiring took place so it 
was often deemed too risky to lay them off. 
(106) Foremen were also 
needed since they administered the rehiring of production workers. 
Occasionally foremen's hours were reduced, but they were more likely 
to be kept on full time. Foremen were frequently called upon to 
undertake some production work during slack periods or may have had to 
undertake some maintenance tasks, but they remained in virtual full 
employment, unlike the majority of production workers. 
(107) In extreme 
cases involving long lay offs foremen might eventually be laid off but 
they were always the last ones out and the first back, often working 
on production jobs until output levels were back up to scratch. 
(108) 
Generally foremen during the inter war years enjoyed a 
significantly higher level of real wages, in spite of their exclusion 
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from bonus systems and overtime considerations, and also had much 
greater job security. These were tangible factors which continued to 
add status in terms of rewards. Such monetary related differentials 
cannot be said to form the basis for any real class divide however. 
The difference in wage levels did not put the foreman into an 
equivalent position with the professional middle classes. He remained 
a factory floor worker, albeit a relatively highly paid one, but a 
factory worker none the less. Within the realm of the shop floor 
however there were residual trappings of status and prestige which 
went with the job of foreman and which were to contribute to the 
enduring notion that, from the vantage point of ordinary production 
workers, the foreman did indeed belong to a separate 'class'. 
Foremen had traditionally been distinguished by their appearance 
on the shop floor. The 19th century engineering foreman on both sides 
of the Atlantic wore a uniform consisting of superior clothing, 
particularly headgear, intented to signify the need for respect, and 
symbolic of their non participation in manual labour. The bowler hat 
came to be the archetypal symbol of traditional foremanship in 
Britain, while in America foremen were reported to have 
"deporting 
themselves with great dignity and... customarily reported for work 
attired in silk hats, cutaway coats and attendant accessories . 
11(109) 
The wearing of distinctive clothing endured into twentieth century 
mass production, although on a somewhat reduced scale. 
American 
foremen generally worked in their "street clothes" as opposed to 
changing into overalls or working clothes. 
(110) This usually meant 
working in suits with a collar and tie and continued wearing of 
the 
ubiquitous foreman's hat, by now a trilby or 
derby. (lll) Photographs 
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of the foremen who were to picket Ford for the FAA in the late 1940s 
show men uniformly smart in appearance and it was noted that at the 
Foreman's Association of America (FAA) annual conferences foreman 
delegates more closely resembled businessmen than workers. Foremen 
often wore distinctive badges although those at Hudson refused even 
this token of shop floor identity. 
(112) 
Foremen were generally equipped with a desk, even if at Ford it 
was a stand up version in the middle of the shop floor, and some had 
separate offices complete with filing cabinets, phones, clerical 
facilities and so on. Some had desks on raised podiums to enhance 
prestige and to facilitate observation of production. 
(113) Separate 
washrooms and catering facilities were often provided, while some 
ordinary workers had no washrooms at all. 
(114) Foremen could also take 
longer breaks and at Packard they were afforded special "talking 
privileges" in contrast to workers who were expected to be silently 
about their work. 
(115) 
Outside the factory foremen are difficult to trace as a distinct 
social group. Their salary levels, though often greater than that of 
their workers did not mean that they lived in exclusive areas. During 
strike activity by the embryo UAW during the mid 1930s anti-union 
foremen and their families were reported to be ostracised by their 
production worker neighbours. 
(116) Some foremen owned several 
properties and were minor landlords. James O'Connor, a foreman at Ford 
in the 1920s, supplemented his income in this way for example. This 
was fairly widespread among foremen, facilitated by the availability 
of inexpensive or free labour from the ranks of production workers to 
effect repairs or renovations to property. 
(117) 
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The transition to foremanship often meant the enforced dropping 
of familiarities like first name terms and accusations of the 
assumption of an air of superiority. The initial step was seen to be 
the decisive in this respect. Straw bosses, or working foremen, as 
Meyer notes, were singled out as having, "an inflated sense 
of... importance and authority". 
(118) Evidence on this aspect is 
extremely subjective and difficult to assess. It may be significant 
that when the foremen formed their own union they were to shun the use 
of the term "shop steward" or "committeeman" in favour of the more 
prestigious title of "building chairman" and were to equip their union 
with a fairly lavish "country club". One foreman summed up the 
position in explaining foremen's reluctance to join the union of the 
production workers: "... they are considered, you know, a little below 
us. We are foremen. "(119) 
Foremen - Class, Status and Ideology 
In what ways can foremen be seen to constitute a separate class 
of workers from those involved in direct production. This is a complex 
question since the term "class" itself can be defined in many ways, 
each of which involves the inclusion of a new set of criteria for 
membership. Objective measures such as economic position, relationship 
to the means of production or control over the labour process can be 
added to an overdetermination by subjective ideological frameworks 
formed within and beyond the factory floor to define class positions. 
The term "class" itself may be unnecessarily misleading since it 
implies fixed groups within a class based schema, whereas a more 
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heterogeneous typology involving a multiple of distinct groupings and 
complex interconnections might be more useful. The following section 
will examine some of these definitional problems in terms of foremen 
and class and by drawing on the foregoing analysis of the foreman's 
position in terms of income, power, control and relationship to the 
ethno-religious and gender configurations of the workforce, will 
attempt to delineate the factors which marked off foremen of the 
inter-war period as a separate group of workers. 
It is necessary to establish the elements of the separateness of 
the foremen from the ranks of production workers precisely in view of 
the subsequent developments in unionisation in the industry. The 
following chapters will trace the effects of unionisation on the ranks 
of supervision, both in terms of transfers of power and control and 
the erosion of the foreman's economic position, and also the spread of 
unionisation among foremen themselves. In order to fully understand 
these developments it is necessary to outline the ways in which mass 
production and attendant labour markets, deskilling, and control 
structures had driven the foremen as a class closer, or further away 
from, the ordinary worker on the shop floor. 
In purely economistic terms the differential in wages and related 
rewards put foremen in a bracket above ordinary workers, but only 
marginally so. As noted wage differentials towards the end of the 
1930s varied between 25% and 30% in weekly terms but could vary more 
widely in real terms annually. Such a difference was enough for Sufrin 
at least, who, by analysis of wage levels, savings accounts, charge 
accounts in shops etc. put foremen into "what is normally considered a 
"middle class" financial and social definition". 
(120) Even if foremen 
Chapter Four -180- 
can be seen to form a distinct group in these terms such an analysis, 
based solely on income related criteria does little to inform debates 
around ideology, attitudes and political power which divide the 
workforce. In many ways this problem parallels that surrounding the 
definition of a "labour aristocracy" in 19th century industry and the 
inherent difficulty in extrapolating political and ideological stances 
from empirical measures such as pay levels. 
(121) Notions of class, as 
they exist among the workforce, are a complex construction, not based 
in such objective measures. As the Coxon and Jones study of 
occupational prestige pointed out "members of the working class come 
to hold a conception of the class structure which is not in accord 
with external reality, or with their objective class interest. " In 
addition divisions between supervisor and worker may be only one of 
the many cleavages that exist in the modern factory - skilled versus 
unskilled, shop floor versus office worker and so on - each of which 
may overlay the worker-supervisor division. 
(122) 
One solution to this problem of a class position too narrowly 
defined is to attempt to incorporate wider aspects into the analysis. 
Olin Wright makes such an attempt when incorporating levels of control 
and ownership of the means of production in determining class 
positions. In such a schema the "traditional" foreman of the pre mass 
production factory, by virtue of his control over investment and 
resources and full control over the physical means of production and 
labour power of others, and legal status as employer, is closely tied 
to the bourgeoisie. The mass production foreman, by contrast, now 
occupies a "contradictory class location" by virtue of his retention 
of partial control of the labour power of others. 
"The development of 
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the capitalist enterprise has pushed foremen in two opposing 
directions: they have moved further from workers by becoming less 
involved in direct production, and they have moved closer to workers 
by having their personal power bureaucratised. "(123) Olin Wright is 
correct in broadening the analysis and yet if we take the example of 
the automobile industry foreman up to the 1930s the latter assertion - 
that of the bureaucratisation of personal power - can be seen to be 
inaccurate given the retention of power by foremen as outlined above. 
In addition there is the problem of individual and spatially based 
difference in class perceptions. Where do those foremen fit for 
example who readily identified with workers rather than any other 
group? The Operator 15 reports at Ford highlighted several such 
relationships for example: "This department is run like a 
kindergarten. The foreman shows no foremanship and lets his men do as 
they please.. . he is looked upon by his men as a swell guy. Personal he 
is to the men, but for the company he is not. "(124) The workers press 
was also quick to highlight what they saw as particularly cooperative 
and friendly foremen. 
(125) There were also foremen who actively 
promoted, or a least indulged, the regulation of work by informal 
means as noted above. Such examples further complicate any project 
which attempts to delineate a class basis for foremanship, even when a 
wider criteria is taken into account. Despite these reservations, 
there was a general cleavage between workers and foremen and in 
summarising this chapter and the previous one the elements 
constituting this overall division can be reconstructed. 
Foremen had power in the workplace. The labour markets which 
typified inter war automobile production, the skill levels and methods 
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of securing and maintaining work, the location, intensity and 
remuneration involved in that work continued in the hands of foremen. 
This also enabled foremen to exert racial ethnic and gender 
preferences and pressures on the general workforce. In terms of 
control of production the recognition that Fordist production methods 
themselves ushered in new imperatives in terms of vulnerability, 
increased capital losses in the event of stoppages, and the continuing 
space for worker intervention in even the most highly rationalised 
production systems, saw an increase in the supervisory presence and 
intensity both in absolute terms and in increased ratios of foremen to 
workers. The attendant problems of low levels of voluntary commitment 
on behalf of workers due to the arduous, repetitious and often 
hazardous nature of many jobs also led employers to foster a style and 
intensity of supervision - driving supervision - which workers were to 
grudgingly accept as a trade off against relatively high wages. As the 
depression deepened, competition for jobs increased and wages fell, 
this became a trade off against unemployment. The net result was a 
group of foremen with absolute control over the experience and quality 
of work for those on the shop floor. There were varying responses to 
this power from individual foremen. Some acquiesced or aided in 
aspects of workers control of production for example, but the 
majority, whether by choice or through the compulsion of production 
imperatives, readily adopted a confrontational and uncompromising 
style of supervision. Many also exploited their position for personal 
gain. The bureaucratisation which was to have replaced the foreman's 
despotism in the 20th century factory was either ineffective - as in 
the continued secondary role played by personnel and employment 
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departments - or left sufficient gaps in which foremen could manoeuvre 
- as in the continued manipulation of rates of output, wage levels 
etc. by foremen. 
There were limits to the foremen's power. Clearly the general 
control of production decisions was now in specialist hands, remote 
from the shop floor. There were also specific factory settings where 
competing power structures were in place on the factory floor. Ford's 
servicemen are a particularly visible example of an alternative power 
hierarchy coexisting with and often overriding the imperatives of the 
ordinary foreman. Throughout the industry in general however the 
characterisation of the relatively powerful foreman in terms of 
control of workers and the labour process holds good. 
The step up to foremanship, predominantly via internal promotion 
ladders, and the assumption of this range of power, represented a 
major transition for those who chose it. For the majority it was not 
to be the first step of the ladder to management, since most foremen 
never progressed beyond the shop floor, but rather it represented a 
step across the divide between those who worked on production and 
those who did not. This transition did not involve a significant need 
to acquire new skills. What it did involve was a different style of 
work altogether, and an accompanying set of prestige and status 
related aspects which reinforced the idea of difference. Higher pay 
levels, regularity of work and security of employment were tangible 
wage related gains. Only in abnormal work periods of high productivity 
or during temporary incentive schemes could foremen's differentials be 
threatened. In addition foremen were afforded the privilege of a 
series of status indicators ranging from not having to clock in to the 
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wearing of non-work clothes. The accoutrements of management were also 
provided in the form of offices and desks etc. which also served to 
delineate the boundaries between foreman and worker. Again this was 
not an even process and in some situations the foreman's status was 
less well enhanced. At Ford, just as the servicemen compromised the 
foreman's power, so to the trappings of status were somewhat less 
visible. Bans on foremen's record keeping, the insistence on stand up 
desks out on the shop floor and the general pressure foremen 
themselves were put under to secure production targets stands in 
contrast to the experience of foremen at other automobile 
factories. (126) 
Bearing in mind these reservations at Ford, there remained at 
significant level of perceived prestige for shop floor foremen, the 
product of a combination of power, control and status. There were 
limits on that power imposed by the changing control structure of mass 
production, nevertheless from the vantage point of the shop floor 
foremen stood out as a separate and important group. Production 
workers viewed the power of this group with a mixture of grudging 
resentment and resignation. Developments were to take place in the 
later 1930s and during World War Two however which were to 
fundamentally change this relationship. 
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Chapter Five: The Impact of Unionisation 
This chapter will examine the impact of unionisation among 
production workers in the automobile industry on the structures of 
shop-floor power outlined in the previous chapters. Tracing the 
development of unionisation from the early state supported efforts of 
the New Deal period and resultant company union movement, to the 
establishment of unionisation proper through such unions as the United 
Automobile Workers Union, it will be shown how the resultant 
codification and proceduralisation of such aspects as wage levels, 
seniority provisions, grievance procedures and negotiated effort norms 
resulted in the major restructuring of the shape of shop-floor 
supervision and consequently the job, and working experience of the 
foreman. 
The first area pertaining to the eventual rise of unionisation 
among car workers must be an examination of the early New Deal 
initiatives of the Roosevelt administration from 1933 onwards. An 
extensive analysis of the dynamics of state intervention in the 
economy, of which the New Deal forms a seminal example, lies beyond 
the scope of this work. 
(1) We can however assess the ramifications of 
the legislative initiatives of this period and government attempts to 
influence, regulate and control industrial production. In common with 
most other branches of industry the automobile industry was issued 
with codes of fair competition by the National Recovery Administration 
(NRA) in August 1933. These codes laid down minimum wage levels, 
maximum average hours to be worked, provisions covering child labour 
and general support of employees rights to organise and bargain 
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collectively. 
(2) The codes covering wages and hours were aimed at 
regularising employment and ironing out seasonal variations in 
numbers hired. Pegging wages to a minimum was aimed at reducing 
competition for jobs, and hence reducing turnover, while maximum 
average hours codes were aimed at regularising work patterns. A 35 
hour week (increased to 40 hours in September 1934) with a peak of 48 
hours, meant increased employment on a regular basis eliminating peaks 
and troughs which had previously seen work opportunities fluctuating 
between six and seven day weeks or no work at all. 
The automobile industry codes did not contain "unfair practice" 
provisions as did other industry codes however and codes governing 
seniority in the event of reduction or increase in the labour force 
were specified separately in a settlement announced by Roosevelt in 
March 1934. This marked out the automobile industry as one of the 
first to receive special treatment from the NRA and coincided with the 
setting up of the Automobile Labour Board (ALB). 
(3) The codes were 
generally a failure, in particular those covering seniority. The key 
to an understanding of the failure of the codes in this respect was 
the inclusion of a "merit clause". This particular clause had been 
advocated by the National Association of Manufacturers in June 1933 
and was aimed at nullifying any attempt to erode the arbitrary power 
of employers, or in practice foremen, in deciding who worked and who 
did not. 
The government's primary concern in setting up seniority codes 
was to minimise the social impact of lay-off periods. By ensuring that 
married men with families were kept at work as long as possible, with 
"seniority, individual skill and efficient service" being given 
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secondary consideration, the codes enshrined a moral commitment to the 
protection of family welfare. When the ALB's recommendations were 
issued however they contained a clause exempting from the codes those 
whose work "in the judgement of management is essential to the 
operation of the plant and production or who have received special 
training or have exceptional ability. "(4) This clause, outlined in 
section 1(d) of the board's statement gave rise to the term 'D' lists 
- lists of "exceptional" employees which were to persist in the 
frustration of efforts to establish meaningful seniority provisions 
throughout the 1930s and ensured that no fixed criteria would supplant 
managerial prerogatives over hiring and lay-offs. 
In addition the ALB codes contained the proviso that employees 
hired after September 1st 1933 should be the first to be laid off 
irrespective of marital status, unless they fell into the 1(d) 
category. Also, the period of lay-off which could be construed as a 
break in service, and thus put workers into the post-September 1933 
category, was not specified, the ALB preferring to leave this factor 
to company discretion. In practice the period varied between six 
months at Chrysler and Dodge, 12 months at GM and 14 months at 
Fisher. (5) 
The ALB itself and the automobile employers were in reality to 
exhibit only a lukewarm response to initiatives aimed at establishing 
some formal regulation on the labour market and working conditions. 
Leo Wolman, chairman of the ALB, and holding a casting vote over 
employer representative Nicholas Kelly and labour representative 
Richard Byrd, was in truth unsympathetic to the problems of labour. He 
preferred at best only gradual change. "Here we come along to an 
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industry that has formerly been accustomed to pick anybody they like 
and suddenly we shut the doors on the whole thing and you get no 
option. That is bad for the men and for the industry. I(6) For their 
part employers exhibited a mixed reaction even to the diluted codes 
eventually published by the ALB. Ford had ignored the NRA from the 
start and continued to do so despite government pressure in the form 
of withdrawal of contracts for the supply of trucks to New Deal 
projects such as the C. C. C.. 
(7) The two other major manufacturers, 
Chrysler and GM nominally accepted the codes and instructed their 
foremen accordingly. 
(8) 
The codes, had they been administered in the spirit originally 
intended, would have struck directly at some of the major sources of 
power of shop-floor supervisors. Seniority and regulation of wages and 
hours by formal, codified criteria would have undermined the foreman's 
control over hiring, firing, job allocation, overtime or deadtime and 
all other factors outlined in previous chapters and which supported 
the foreman's social position on the shop-floor. In reality the codes, 
even in their watered down ALB form, were largely ignored at this 
level. Foremen placed as many as 30% of their men on the now 
ubiquitous 'D' lists. Discriminatory and arbitrary firing of workers, 
especially those suspected of union activity, continued apace while 
foremen used the upper hour limit of 48 hours as a means to lay off 
more workers and hire in new unprotected labour. 
(9) Workers knew that 
foremen still held sway over job security and the ALB's own report, 
published ten months after the implementation of the codes, conceded 
that "favouritism, usually charged to the foreman" formed the major 
part of complaints received. 
(10) The Henderson Committee report of 
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1935 also outlined the failure of the codes, adding that workers often 
did not fully understand their meaning, a fact which foremen often 
exploited; "Upon complaint they (the foremen) give answers such as 
"there is nothing we can do under the code" or "It's the regulations 
of the NRA... ". "(11) 
By the time the NRA was declared unconstitutional in 1935 the 
codes had been revealed, in the automobile industry at least, to be 
largely ineffective in regularising employment. 61,000 families in 
Detroit had remained on the relief rolls throughout 1934, and 1935 saw 
little improvement. (12) 
Another aspect of the early initiatives surrounding the NRA was 
the attempt to foster union representation among the workforce which, 
had it been successful, would have represented a further constraint 
upon the role of foremen. This is important not in terms of its 
success - meaningful unionisation was to come later - but rather in 
terms of the company union movement fostered by major employers in an 
attempt to offset unionisation proper. 
Company unions, i. e. employee representation schemes overseen by 
the active involvement of factory management, were not new to American 
industry in the 1930s. Introduced in significant numbers after the 
1914-18 war they rose in number from 145 in 1919 to a peak of 399 in 
1928. (13) In the automobile industry there were none in existence 
before the enactment of NRA legislation in 1933. Almost immediately 
following this legislation however almost all automobile companies set 
up some form of representation plan. 
(14) Given various names such as 
the Chrysler Employee Representation Plan, the Hudson Industrial 
Association or the Chevrolet Association and Works Council, they were 
Chapter Five -206- 
all to assume similar forms. 
(15) The temporary expediency of these 
organisations as a bastion against the threat of unionisation was 
obvious to most of those involved. As one contemporary commentary 
noted, "... employers, in private, are quite frank in their expectation 
that, with the passage of the more acute phases of the present labour 
situation their plans will be allowed to die a natural death. "(16) 
In this holding operation the foreman was to continue to play a 
central role. In the formal worker-management balanced structure of 
the councils foremen usually attended as representatives of 
management. The Dodge Main Works Council for example was composed of 
53 employee representatives and 53 members of supervision with issues 
to be decided by a two-thirds majority. The smaller Chrysler Jefferson 
Plant Joint Council had 24 members - 12 management and 12 employee 
representatives. Seven of the management representatives were shop- 
floor supervisors. At Buick in 1933 a foreman was appointed president 
of the council. 
(17) 
If not actually sitting on works councils foremen often exerted 
considerable pressure firstly to ensure that workers voted in favour 
of initiating such plans and subsequently that the 'right' candidate 
was elected to office as employee representative. Campaigning by 
foremen on behalf of preferred workers might involve straightforward 
'advice', simple bribes such as cigars, or thinly veiled threats. 
(18) 
Underpinning this process was the commonly held belief that foremen 
were monitoring the ballots cast in elections. "No employee was sure 
that the ballot he voted was not secretly marked. In some instances 
the foremen deliberately circulated this rumour". 
(19) It took 
considerable courage even to cast a blank ballot or write the name of 
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a movie star or comic strip character as many voters did. 
When the councils were set up the first step in grievance 
procedures was always to report to the foreman, a process which often 
intimidated workers who were reluctant to set themselves up for 
possible victimisation, despite assurances issued by management. 
(20) 
Besides, foremen were often seen to simply ignore requests and 
official procedures, continuing to act without reference to higher 
authority. 
(21) At Dodge for example the foremen repeatedly canvassed 
individual workers on issues such as hours and overtime. Works council 
protests over this matter came to nothing. 
(22) 
Where employees managed to vote representatives into power who 
were not favoured by foremen these were often assigned permanent 
security men to report back to the foreman on their every move. 
(23) 
Where the chosen candidate was that favoured by foremen there was 
often extensive collusion. Interesting examples of this can be found 
in papers seized by the UAW in the 1930s and subsequently filed under 
"Stool Pigeon" reports. At Chrysler in 1936 foremen filed a "Daily 
Report of Interview with Employee Representative". These reports 
clearly show that foremen and employee representatives acted in accord 
to frustrate the spread of genuine unionism. Entries such as "Claims 
he (the employee representative) is having a tough time keeping men in 
line in his district as they are getting after him to join the union" 
and "... constantly being bothered to join the union and that there is 
a great deal of activity in his district. Spoke of nothing else" are 
typical of the reports indicating a general consensus of anti-unionism 
among foremen and their selected representatives. 
(24) It must be 
noted that many genuine union activists managed to get elected and 
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attempted to work through the company union movement towards real 
gains for workers, although with limited success beyond exposing the 
limits of the system. Nevertheless for a large number of foremen and 
tame representatives the movement represented merely an opportunity to 
legitimise their anti-union efforts. 
Ford remained the only major automobile manufacturer not to set 
up a company union, although the Brotherhood of America established at 
the River Rouge plant functioned as a surrogate in many ways, 
especially as an anti-union organisation. Foremen at Ford openly 
recruited members for the brotherhood frequently paying dues on their 
behalf. They also circulated petitions in support of Ford's anti-NM 
stance. 
(25) 
If the major rationale behind the company union movement was to 
offset workers needs for independent representation, how far did this 
process go in granting concessions which might detract from the power 
of the foreman? Discussion of such topics as seniority, grievance 
procedures, wages and hours of work was potentially a way of bypassing 
the unilateral control of the foreman, but if we examine the record of 
companies while company unions were operating we can see that in the 
case of each of these issues little progress was made. 
At the Dodge Main plant requests for seniority lists by the works 
council were repeatedly turned down while foremen continued to run an 
unofficial handicap system. When lists were eventually published they 
contained only the names of those with over 12 months unbroken 
service. This slight concession was to last only a few months 
however 
until by October 1936 the system had reverted to what employee 
representatives described as, 
"the malicious, vicious and unfair 
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application of seniority" by foremen. 
(26) At Chrysler's Highland Park 
plant the employee representatives did not achieve even temporary 
success. As early as December 1933 seniority and lay-off procedures 
were matters "not discussed further by the council and were considered 
as closed". 
(27) 
Similarly wages were considered to be an area beyond the 
influence of works councils. Wage claims were put forward on numerous 
occasions by the councils and were invariably rejected by 
management. 
(28) Again individual determination by the foreman remained 
the norm. As the Dodge Main council was told, "... it is the policy of 
the company that employees shall always be free to take up directly 
with their foreman all matters that concern them in their work. One of 
the most frequent of these is the adjustment of individual rates. "(29) 
While the foreman's arbitrary behaviour was never seriously 
challenged at meetings of works councils the main business tended 
towards discussion concerning minor aspects of physical plant and 
safety. Items such as the provision of gloves, repair of windows and 
car parks, ventilation improvements, speed limits, sweeping of floors 
and the provision of lunch wagons and drinking fountains usually 
dominated the agenda. 
(30) A member of higher management would put in 
an occasional appearance to deliver a lengthy peroration concerning 
the good works the council was undertaking and to elaborate the need 
for management to retain control of wage and output determination. 
(31) 
The failure of these councils to address the real needs of 
workers was undoubtedly a major stimulus to the bona fide union 
movement which was eventually to replace them as Jeffreys 
has 
noted. 
(32) The employer's alternative had been tested and revealed to 
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be unequal to the task of bolstering workers insecurity at the hands 
of their foremen. Richard Frankensteen, later to emerge as one of the 
leading figures at the head of the eventually successful UAW, had 
attempted, in common with many other UAW activists to work from within 
the works council at Dodge. By October 1936 he had had enough. He told 
fellow representatives, "This system is the rottenest damn sham 
anybody was ever forced to go under... if we want to be docile mild and 
humble and bow down to the foreman I believe perhaps we could, as 
individuals, we might be able to do more for the men, but are we going 
to subject ourselves to that in a free country? "(33) 
The eventual success of the C. I. O. unions in the mid to late 
1930s saw the automobile industry at the forefront of efforts to 
establish industrial unionism. Following the failure of strikes at 
Briggs in 1933 and Chevrolet in Toledo in 1935 the United Automobile 
Workers eventually emerged to secure a series of victories at 
virtually all major automobile factories. Most notorious were the sit- 
down strikes at GM's Cleveland and Flint factories - widely seen as a 
turning point in the general unionisation drive of the period. 
(34) The 
UAW signed agreements with Chrysler and GM in 1937 with Ford holding 
out until wartime government pressure prevailed in 1941. 
The dynamics behind this wave of unionisation are many and 
complex. The state's reaffirmation of NRA principle's through the 
Wagner Act combined with political developments within the labour 
movement, notably the AFL - CIO fracture and the incorporation of 
communist party organisers into mainstream union agitation within the 
CI0. (35) Workers' backgrounds had also changed as a large number of 
second generation immigrants brought new forms of radicalism to shop- 
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floor struggles. 
(36) Against this general background factors intrinsic 
to shop-floor life also stimulated the demand for unionisation. The 
general deskilled, unfulfilling and often dangerous nature of work 
outlined previous chapters had been exacerbated by the general speed 
up of the depression years which provided a catalyst for the sit down 
strike wave. 
(37) 
As we have seen the foreman was intricately involved in the 
nature and conditions of work undertaken and a central character in 
the latest phase of speed-up and this was reflected in the immediate 
demands of the union. As Russell Leach, at Murray Body in the 1930s 
recalled, "... the problem that we had in practically all of the 
automobile plants was getting dignity on the job... while we did ask 
for increased benefits as far as economics was concerned, our primary 
reason was to get (the foreman) off our backs... "(38) Dignity also 
meant no longer being subject to the whim of the foreman in the 
determination of job security. This security was to be enshrined in 
protection against arbitrary dismissal or favouritism through the 
setting up of grievance procedures and seniority rights. Seniority 
demands were particularly popular, most contemporary organisers 
putting this at the top of the list of requirements called for by 
members joining the UAW. 
(39) 
Clearly such demands, and their eventual fulfilment engendered a 
radical redefinition of the limits of power open to shop-floor 
supervision and an introduction of new levels of accountability for 
their activities. Before turning to a full examination of these 
changes however it is necessary, in order to understand the immediate 
reaction of workers and in view of later developments in foremen's 
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unionisation, to look at the actions of foremen in the transitionary 
phase as the UAW became established. 
Since the early years of the industry foremen had been looked 
upon by employers as the first line of defence against unionisation. 
Early advocates of training foremen in industrial relations techniques 
could be found(40) but the main thrust of applied employer strategy 
was to use the office of foreman as a spearhead in the constant 
guerilla war against union activists. Foremen were normally under 
unambiguous instruction to root out and sack any worker suspected of 
organising for the union. They received information via a number of 
routes. Black lists compiled by employers, such as the one used by the 
Chrysler employment office, were circulated among foremen. 
(41) 
Informants supplied names of union members to foremen. 
(42) Even 
employee representatives on works councils were later to inform on 
suspected union activists as noted above. Foremen themselves might act 
as spies, working in departments where the were not known in order to 
obtain information. 
(43) There were also widespread allegations of 
foremen searching workers clothing in attempts to find proof of union 
membership. 
(44) 
In the years before the UAW secured agreements a union worker, 
once detected was simply dismissed or laid off and not recalled. In 
such cases such a ban could extend across a number of employers. One 
group of workers, fired from the Graham Paige factory in the 1920s 
found work in another factory only to be picked out by a visiting 
Graham Paige foreman and sacked again. 
(45) With the advent of NRA 
protection in 1933 this process became marginally more difficult for 
foremen. Legally at least foremen's activities were restrained by the 
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mid-1930s, especially following the passage of the Wagner Act. 
Greenman, in his book "The Worker, The Foreman and the Wagner Act" 
pointed out that foremen, as employers representatives, should be 
particularly cautious over union discrimination. "The Wagner Act makes 
the foreman hold his tongue about union affairs, even if he is asked 
for advice. " With chapter titles such as "Hands Off the Union Or Else" 
Greenman outlined no-go areas for foremen including no interference, 
restraint or coercion away from unions, no promotion of company 
unions, no hiring, firing or laying off on the basis of union 
membership, and no discrimination against employees who complained to 
the NLRB. (46) Reality was to prove somewhat different. 
The mechanism of the permanent lay-off was still available to 
avoid accusations of outright discriminatory sacking of union members. 
If a group of men approached management for a pay rise they could find 
themselves at the top of the foreman's list when the next round of 
lay-offs came along. 
(47) Foremen at Dodge during this period were 
given special forms to record the names of "undesirable" workers not 
to be rehired. If a pretext for sacking a worker was needed this could 
usually be arranged. Some foremen were known to deliberately sabotage 
production in order to incriminate suspected union activists. 
(48) 
More overt activity against unionisation carried on unrelentingly 
taking the form of circulation of various petitions and votes of 
confidence for the company and against the NRA. Foremen were 
invariably chosen to take these around the shop-floor for signature. 
When foremen at the Oldsmobile plant took loyalty petitions round the 
shop floor in 1937 workers refusing to sign were told that they would 
be ineligible for employee loans during the lay-off period. 
(49) 
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Workers knew that refusal to sign what they termed "I love my boss" 
petitions was perceived as a virtual admission of union 
membership. 
(50) When Ford foremen circulated with their "vote of 
confidence" petitions they openly recorded the badge numbers of those 
refusing to sign as a method of intimidation. 
(51) As the early NRA 
initiatives failed foremen generally returned to more open anti-union 
activity. This atmosphere is reflected in a telegram sent to its 
headquarters by one union local, "... undergoing abuses from employers 
South Bend Woods Parts Co., since NRA was declared unconstitutional, 
through fear and intimidation through their foremen... "(52) 
Foremen also featured prominently in direct action against unions 
during strike activity. In addition to their expected willingness to 
recruit and organise blackleg labour or work at the tools themselves, 
foremen could also be found in violent confrontations with strikers. 
Foremen at Ford during periods of unrest were openly involved in the 
ýS3ý During the GM strikes formation of anti-union vigilante groups. 
e 
foremen were seen to lead anti-union gangs in picket line clashes. 
Foremen at Guide Lamp in Anderson carried on this type of activity 
even of ter the UAW had secured an agreement. In an appeal for calm 
Victor Reuther advised union members, "Do your work well in the shop. 
Treat non-union members with friendliness. Our fight is not with them. 
The foremen who lead the vigilantes and General Motors who tolerate 
such actions are the people who oppose us. "(54) 
Thus we can see foremen into the 1930s in general and specific 
opposition to the spread of unionisation. It would of course be 
inaccurate to typify all foremen as engaged in this activity. No doubt 
some foremen took little part, and of those who did many probably 
did 
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so under duress, or through fear of their own jobs. Examples can be 
found of foremen who stood out against the anti-union trend such as 
Clifford Shelden, foreman in the trimming section of Ford's River 
Rouge plant who objected to orders to form a vigilante group and was 
fired as a union sympathiser. 
(55) Pretexts for such action might be 
even more slender. Another Ford foremen was fired for shaking the hand 
of union lawyer Maurice Sugar at the funeral of the foreman's 
father. (56) The union press carried numerous references to "friendly" 
foremen during the 1930s. The 'Pontiac Auto Worker' for example 
referred to, "... the familiar tale of foremen urging their workers to 
pin on the (union) button. Being part of management can't spoil them 
all. " Similarly the 'Cadillac Steward' reassured workers that, 
"Speaking of the Foreman (sotto voice (sic))... more of them are with 
you than you think. "(57) 
While it is difficult to quantify evidence revealing the 
foremen's general anti-union activity it seems clear that these latter 
pro-union foremen were in a minority, at least while organising drives 
were under way. Perhaps an insight into the depth of foremen's anti- 
union activity can be gauged by the reaction of workers when they 
gained the security of formal union protection following the signing 
of agreements. If we turn to an examination of the immediate 
circumstances surrounding the establishment of union representation we 
can see that workers new found security created real problems for 
foremen with a history of repressive activity. 
Quite understandably workers of ten reacted in extreme ways when 
first given the protection of an agreed union contract. James 
O'Connor, foreman at Ford during the union settlement recalled, 
"The 
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men were very resentful to anything after this. They didn't want to 
recognise the foreman. They tore up stuff and threw it all over the 
place... They were just a bunch of wild men. "(58) Workers put forward a 
flood of grievances which the new shop-stewards or committeemen were 
only too pleased to press. "They simply had that new feeling of being 
able to run to the foreman and say "this is wrong, that is wrong, get 
something done about it! ""(59) 
GONNA' 
Ti 
Q 
The Pontiac Auto Worker 
August 3rd 1937 
The union press continued a campaign of vilification aimed at 
what they perceived to be recalcitrant foremen. Stewards would forward 
details of "tough" foremen to the papers' editors who would feature 
them in specialised columns such as the "Ihe Fisher Pan", 
"Socket 
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Socks", "Yellow Yarn" and "The Pontiac Griddle". 
(60) Foremen at GM's 
A. C. plant might be given the "Cat-o-nine-tails" award for brutal 
treatment to workers. Straightforward warnings were also popular such 
as, "Ted Anderson - 966 - Cut out the driving or we'll burn you sure - 
on the Griddle. "(61) 
The union press could also dish out praise for those foremen who 
were seen to be adapting to the new unions. The Packard Union News for 
example carried a message from "the boys in Dept. 305" who "appreciate 
the cooperation they are receiving from their foreman Charley Howard, 
in regard to having better ventilation and also having their hot boxes 
fixed... "(62) Other items might defend reasonable foremen against the 
incursions of others - for example the message to a replacement 
foreman in the Pontiac Auto Worker of October 1937; "Now that a good 
(foreman) is on his vacation, why try to upset the work he has built 
up. That hood line has been running very smoothly". 
(63) 
Some foremen could now be seen to be settling grievances rapidly 
simply to avoid confrontations with committeemen. 
(64) Other accounts 
recall some foremen taking on a new attitude of politeness towards 
workers. 
(65) This was at least partly dependent upon the reciprocal 
attitude of the new committeemen. If they adopted what was deemed by 
foremen to be a reasonable posture this could often achieve results. 
Indeed some foremen expressed a feeling of relief with the 
regularisation of relations between union and employers, and welcomed 
the chance to dodge the animosity inherent in the old systems of 
unregulated grievances and more especially, lay-off procedures. 
(66) 
Many foremen remained intransigent however as they attempted to 
carry on their old style off autocratic rule and continued 
"bawling 
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out" workers. Some persisted in active campaigns to discourage men 
from joining the union or keeping their dues up to date. (67) As Joe 
Pagano recalled, "There were a lot of foremen who just could not 
conceive that their absolute power of life and death so to speak, no 
longer existed. They created quite a problem and each one had to be 
treated in his own particular way. t(68) Older foremen in particular 
found the adjustment difficult, some never accepting that a major 
change had taken place. 
(69) 
Employers agreed to transfer some problem foremen and dismissed 
others. Ford in particular had great difficulties with their foremen 
who, up until 1941, had operated from a particularly strong power base 
and had for many years been selected on the basis of the intransigence 
of their character and their ability to drive production. Many had to 
be fired. "They had been trained so well in the viciousness of the 
Ford Motor Company. Even with the union they still had to be just as 
vicious. Even the Ford Motor Company officials could not break it 
down. "(70) At Chrysler the management reinstated workers who had quit 
under pressure from driving foremen and made pledges to the union that 
they would "clean up (their) house" as far as foremen's behaviour was 
concerned. The remarks of the plant manager at GM Chevrolet are 
indicative of the frustration which was felt by higher management over 
the refusal of many foremen to adjust to the new situation. When told 
that a foreman had acknowledged an error he exclaimed, "Jesus Christ! 
We finally have a supervisor who admits he made a mistake. "(71) 
For their part the UAW leadership made some attempts to diffuse 
the situation. They had turned early on to a strategy of suppressing 
the use of sit-down strikes as they attempted to consolidate their 
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position. Sit-downs and wild-cat strikes were a manifestation of a 
level of rank and file militancy against which the union leadership, 
despite the cloak of the apparent radicalism of the CIO, sought to 
establish a controlled, top-down hierarchy of command. 
(72) 
"Irresponsible supervision" were seen by the union to be deliberately 
provoking wild-cat strikes in an effort to discredit the UAW, seen at 
the local level to be ignoring grievance procedures and unauthorised 
strike clauses. 
(73) Increasingly stewards and committeemen were 
finding that they themselves were expected to discipline workers and 
enforce production standards. 
(74) As one committeeman summarised the 
situation, 'bur job was putting out fires... You would be in with the 
superintendent trying to work out a problem and the plant would go 
down... It was hard to get discipline because once we got a contract 
they did not have too much patience... our real job was to educate 
them not to walk off the job... "(75) 
Following the general release of antagonism between newly 
unionised workers and supervision there also developed the need to 
establish some sort of long-term working relationship between union 
representatives and foremen. With regard to this nascent foreman-shop 
steward relationship most union handbooks stressed the need for a 
softly-softly approach or at least a degree of give and take. Ford 
shop stewards were advised, "When the foreman is right, give him his 
due... but... If a foreman doesn't negotiate in good faith don't cast 
reflections on his parentage. Write up a grievance against him. "(76) 
In the UAW shop stewards' guidelines "How To Win for the Union" a 
section was reserved for "The Care and Feeding of Foremen". This 
recognised the problem of educating foremen as "one of the toughest 
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the union has to face", and advocated the use of psychology in the 
finest 'human relations' style; "... (the foreman) is also a human 
being. Approach him like one. Find out what he is interested in. If he 
is a baseball fan, a little talk about batting averages won't hurt 
anything. Or if he likes fishing ... "(77) In many cases of course the 
foreman-shop steward relationship remained unresolved and 
confrontational well after the UAW had become an established part of 
shop-floor life. 
The initial chaotic period of foreman-shop steward conflict threw 
into sharp relief the lack of training available on both sides. In 
many ways it was the shop steward who was better equipped. The 
employers and their foremen had spent most of their effort over 
previous years in simple intimidation against union activity and very 
little time considering how they should handle the situation should 
the UAW prevail. The stewards for their part had a better idea of the 
kind of bargaining structures likely to emerge if, as they hoped, the 
union came out on top. To be sure, some union representatives were 
very inexperienced(78) but on balance the foreman had the worst of the 
situation. This problem was compounded by the fact that, as we have 
seen, many foremen were selected purely on the basis of their 
domineering presence on the shop-floor. Cases emerged of foremen who 
were unable to read or write to any great extent. 
(79) Such men were at 
a loss to deal with the new complexity of written grievance 
procedures. Shop steward Bernard Hoffman recounts in his diary 
receiving an unfavourable ruling on the eligibility of one worker for 
backpay. By judicious underlining of selected parts of the transcript 
he was able to fool the foreman into authorising the payment. 
(80) 
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The problem of inarticulate or illiterate foremen was especially 
acute in areas where ethnic or racial prejudice had governed 
promotion. In the Ford foundry where black workers were concentrated 
and overseen by white foremen, the latter ran into immediate problems. 
Willis Ward recalled that, "... the smart coloured fellow was elected 
steward, head of shop. He could read and write, could keep facts and 
records, and we found that the foreman, because they were selected on 
a prejudicial basis, couldn't come in and answer their intelligent 
complaints. i(81) 
Shop stewards often compounded the problems which foremen had in 
adjusting to unionisation by deliberately bypassing early grievance 
procedures. They openly encouraged workers to talk to their union 
representative first, without reference to the foreman and thus giving 
the shop-steward the edge in opening negotiations. Indeed the official 
UAW guidelines advised such an approach in advising stewards to "Guard 
against the foreman who encourages workers to settle grievances 
individually... "(82) Evidence also suggests that foremen were 
initially intimidated by the level of their responsibility in the new 
procedures. Often they would refuse to sign grievance slips in the 
mistaken impression that they were committing themselves to some 
decision, being unaware that this action merely signified acceptance 
of the first step of the grievance procedure. Others were fearful of 
making any decision and thus many simple grievances, which would 
normally be easily settled, were "kicked upstairs". 
(83) 
These problems of unease with the new procedures were in part 
due 
to the slow response of many managements in terms of equipping their 
foremen with training or documentation. In many cases the 
foreman was 
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simply left to his own devices. As one foreman testified, "... we were 
trained to oppose the development of the union. You can imagine what 
we as individual foremen faced after the union had won the 
election.. . we had to learn overnight, without any help from the 
company, how to handle the situation. "(84) Fmployers did slowly turn 
towards some form of formal industrial relations training for foremen. 
Outlines of the foreman's position and responsibilities under the 
Wagner Act were distributed to some supervisors for example. 
(85) 
Commentators such as Donald Lescohier had urged early on that foremen 
should be equipped to deal uninterrupted with grievances, stressing 
that, "... no one should come between (the foreman) and his men. " 
(86) 
He went on to advocate an adoption of the standard human relations 
conference and role play methods of training in an industrial 
relations context. Goodrich, Socony-Vacuum and Eastman Kodak were 
among those who went on to use these methods. 
(87) The "schooling" of 
foremen was supplemented in some cases by a loose-leaf foreman's 
manual where updated union agreements could be filed. 
(88) 
In general however the major automobile companies remained remiss 
in the training of foremen or even keeping them informed of 
developments. Ford for example did not bother to issue their foremen 
with copies of the UAW agreement signed in 1941. 
(89) G. M. simply 
issued bulletins advising their supervisors to adopt a stone wall 
position on certain issues. Production standards were one such issue; 
"avoid personal or individual conflict. The rate of production has now 
been fixed... If you are questioned there is but one answer; "the union 
has agreed... ""(90) Chrysler had no fixed written guide to procedures 
for their foremen to follow until 1944, seven years after the signing 
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of the first agreements. 
(91) Similarly Hudson did not make any attempt 
to train their foremen in industrial relations until November 1943 
when the strains of wartime production began to compound already 
difficult conditions. 
(92) In many cases foremen had to resort to 
asking shop stewards to furnish them with copies of grievance 
procedures etc.. 
(93) 
The National War Labour Board (NWLB) enquiry of 1944 into the 
foreman's position in the automobile industry was struck by this lack 
of attention to the training and informing of foremen. As one member 
of the board noted, "... the thing that surprises me... in discussing 
this is the lack of knowledge of the contractual relationship between 
the union of the rank and file worker and the employer by the 
foremen. "(94) Early training programmes, where they had been applied 
had been proved to be largely ineffective and were not maintained. 
Again at the NWLB, an illuminating exchange took place: - 
"ELLIOT (Chrysler foreman): ... at one time we 
had a school to 
explain (the union contract), but I haven't been for several years. 
ISERMAN (Chrysler's lawyer): Do you know that there have been 
many changes in the contract since you were there? 
ELLIOT: No. 
ISERMAN: You know there was a contract entered into in 1939? 
ELLIOT: I believe we went to school on that. 
ISERMAN: Do you know when the last contract was signed? 
ELLIOT: No. "(95) 
During this initial phase of confrontation and eventual 
accommodation with the establishment of unionisation, and as 
foremen 
Chapter Five -224- 
began slowly to learn by their mistakes, 
(96) 
the boundaries of shop- 
floor power were being redrawn. Whole areas, previously the under sole 
determination of the foreman were now becoming enshrined in fixed 
procedures. Formal agreements with unions and the procedures they 
incorporated must not of course be taken as first hand evidence of 
what actually occurred on the shop-floor. Agreements made between 
management and union leaders had in effect to be constantly 
renegotiated informally between workers, shop-stewards and foremen. 
Written rules did not guarantee adherence by those who put them into 
practice. With this in mind it is worth examining, section by section, 
some of the major areas covered by agreements to see firstly, to what 
extent they proposed to circumscribe foremen's control and secondly, 
how far these new procedures actually succeeded in achieving this 
circumscription. 
Firstly the issue of seniority - always a major facet of 
foremen's power and one of the primary areas of concern to workers 
involved in the unionisation drive. 
(97) Early attempts at seniority 
through the NRA codes had proved largely ineffective as we have noted. 
UAW measures were to be more effective. The earlier NRA schemes 
had 
been set up in an attempt to give priority in employment to workers 
with family commitments. Union schedules had no such wider social 
aspect, advocating a strict chronology as far as possible 
i. e. last in 
- first out. 
(98) In fact the UAW national leadership fixed no 
definitive, universal rule regarding seniority clauses, 
leaving this 
instead to the discretion of plant level bargaining committees. 
Most 
agreements followed a common pattern however. A probationary period, 
usually six months, was stipulated wherein new employees 
had no 
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protection and thereafter seniority was determined either plant-wide 
or departmentally and within occupational groups. Individual contracts 
did vary considerably in this latter respect. One GM agreement for 
example had 76 separate non-interchangeable occupational definitions 
i. e. each defined job having its own seniority table. Another Ford 
agreement had only 21 such groups. 
(99) Many agreements also stipulated 
an overall reduction of hours throughout the plant, usually to a 32 
hour week, before lay-offs began to be implemented. (100) Rehires were 
simply applied in reverse order to lay-offs. 
The administration of these seniority rules continued to cause 
numerous problems however. Foremen and committeemen had to get used to 
some quite complex group definitions and again there appears to have 
been a period of conflict while the procedures were broken in. An 
examination of the 1937-38 minutes of the GM Chevrolet UAW local 
reveals that, in this particular lay-off season (the first in which 
the new procedures came to be applied) there was a great amount of 
confusion and disagreement. Workers were brought back to work while 
their specific jobs were not yet in production, seniority lists were 
not distributed to committeemen and demoted workers were accused of 
'bumping off' other employees i. e. in the process of being downgraded 
they forced the lay-off of a lower grade worker. Management and unions 
also had great difficulty agreeing the levels of production necessary 
to require lay-offs and recalls. 
(101) 
Within these levels of flexibility regarding the interpretation 
of procedures foremen still held some vestigial degree of power. Most 
controversial was their position in respect of 'exceptional employee' 
lists. All union agreements carried a clause concerning the lay-off of 
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certain workers deemed to be more indispensable than others. The UAW- 
Chrysler agreement definition is somewhat typical; "Exceptional 
employees are employees whose work in the judgement of the management 
is of exceptional value to the department.,, (102) Just as the 'D' lists 
under the NRA codes had provided a loophole for employers to bypass 
seniority so too did this exceptional employee clause. In this issue 
foremen are important in two ways. Firstly they controlled who went on 
the lists and, secondly they were expected to be on it themselves. 
Foremen's power to decide who was and who was not an exceptional 
employee ensured a resumption of the allegations of abuses of 
privilege common in pre-union days. Since the list might encompass 30 
or 35 percent of the total workforce accusations of favouritism, 
perhaps not surprisingly, mirrored the levels of the early 1930s. 
Workers at Fisher Body in 1938 with over 20 years service found 
themselves laid off in advance of workers with many years less 
service. 
(103) When challenged about bias in selection for the lists 
foremen might react by threatening not to retain anyone. 
(104) The 
situation was exacerbated by the degree of secrecy surrounding the 
lists which were not made available to many committeemen in the early 
stages. 
(105) Foremen were also accused of transferring workers to safe 
jobs in the event of forthcoming lay-offs. 
(106) In addition foremen 
could always lay workers off before they became entitled to a place on 
the seniority list i. e. before the probationary period was completed. 
At GM'S Ternstedt plant foremen openly signed release forms writing 
"to avoid attaining seniority" in the explanation section. 
(107) 
That foremen themselves automatically went on the exceptional 
employee list, regardless of seniority was also a cause of continuing 
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friction. Foremen retained during the lay-off period were often 
accused of working at production jobs. 
(108) Management quite openly 
claimed the right to put their foremen to work. As the manager of GM 
Chevrolet put it when confronted, "Listen Mr., if I want to go out 
there and run a machine myself I am going to do it. "(109) Attempts by 
the union to stop foremen doing the work of those laid off seem to 
have been largely unsuccessful well into the 1940s. The grievance 
records of Chrysler UAW Local 7 for example contain repeated 
references to foremen setting up jobs, running production and doing 
their own inspection. 
(110) 
Not only current foremen but also demoted foremen were often 
protected from lay-off s on the basis that they might be repromoted 
when work picked up. Moreover these demoted foremen could be placed in 
work in any department in the plant. Relief men could also be granted 
privileged status. Even workers deemed to be "potential" relief men 
and supervisors were designated exceptional employees. This practice 
if left unchallenged meant that virtually any employee could 
legitimately be protected from lay-offs. 
(lll) 
The UAW experienced uneven success in enforcing the application 
of a fair system of seniority. The foregoing abuses were a constant 
source of friction. By 1944 however the Bureau of Labour Statistics 
was reporting that their series of management interviews had revealed 
that seniority administration was entirely the prerogative of the 
union. The UAW however continued to rebut this as "more theory than 
practice. "(112) It must be noted that some foremen adhered to the new 
rules and were glad to be relieved of the burden of deciding who 
should work and who should not. As one foreman put it, 
"Seniority is a 
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fine thing for a foreman. It used to be that ... I was subjected to 
harrowing stories of wives in hospitals, sickness in the family 
etc... I am not a callous son of a bitch but what could I do?... Now 
that we have seniority I have no choice in who is to be laid 
off... Seniority has made my job much easier and pleasant. 11 
(113) 
Generally the conflict persisted, at least until the more rigorously 
enforced regulation of the labour market which came with state 
intervention in wartime. 
Other major areas of the foreman's power threatened by the onset 
of unionisation included hiring, firing, transfer, promotion and wage 
determination. Some of these aspects overlap into seniority procedures 
but all were essentially a separate concern and will be dealt with in 
turn. 
Hiring of new employees continued much as before although the 
advent of unionisation caused a significant expansion in the role of 
employment departments and thus affected the ad hoc way in which 
hiring had been undertaken in previous years. Foremen continued to 
file requisitions for labour to employment offices and retained the 
right of final decision, usually after a shop-floor interview, as to a 
candidate's suitability. 
(114) Informal labour market connections also 
carried on as before in this sense, with the foreman remaining in a 
pivotal position. 
(115) Once hired a new worker's continued employment 
was at the almost complete discretion of the foreman for the 
probationary three or six month period. Following that new levels of 
security for employees were to be derived from union negotiated 
employment protections, manning levels, formal grievance procedures 
etc.. 
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Wage determination was one area where foremen were almost 
entirely stripped of discretionary powers. Union negotiated rates and 
scales, becoming automatic following probationary periods, replaced 
the broad bands within which foremen had previously operated. All 
workers on the same operation were now to receive equitable rates of 
pay-(116) Foremen could still exert some pressure where piecework 
systems were in operation, for example by authorising payment for work 
ultimately rejected due to faulty tools or materials. 
(117) The days of 
individual pay rises or reductions dished out in arbitrary fashion 
were now gone however. As the employment manager of GM Chevrolet 
insisted in response to a worker's appeal for a pay rise, "(The 
foreman) never promised that man a rise and he never will promise a 
man a rise nor will any other foreman because it must first pass this 
office. "(118) "Dead Time" - the practice of keeping workers waiting 
unpaid around the factory while production was delayed was also 
abolished, thus removing another method by which foremen had 
previously been able to manipulate wages. Overtime working also became 
controlled and distributed evenly by the establishment of rotas. Union 
officials kept their own overtime rotas to ensure even allocation and 
to dispute allegations of favouritism. 
(119) 
Unions achieved less success in gaining control over decisions 
pertaining to transfers and upgrading. With regard to transfers union- 
management contracts were usually phrased so that seniority applied 
only when "ability, merit and capacity" were equal in the unilateral 
opinion of management. This ensured that in effect no seniority 
principle could apply. 
(120) Foremen could thus still arbitrarily 
transfer workers and often did so as an indirect means of punishment. 
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This also led to overlapping problems where seniority was determined 
on a departmental basis, a newly transferred worker losing his 
seniority rating. 
(121) 
Moving workers into a higher job classification also remained the 
prerogative of foremen. Again managements inserted qualifying phrases 
in clauses governing upgrading such as, "if, in the opinion of 
management, they are qualified" and "based primarily on merit and 
ability. "(122) Foremen usually put recommendations for better jobs 
through on special reports. This practice caused continued friction 
with union representatives who continued to press for seniority in 
upgrading. Stewards at Chrysler for example complained that, "the 
supervision in Department 73 have a long record of promoting men to a 
higher classification without any regard to seniority, claiming that 
they will promote anyone they please. t(123) Foremen also decided on 
candidates for any training courses which might periodically 
arise. 124) 
Promotion to the foreman's job itself also continued as before, 
with management retaining absolute rights. Promotion ladders tended to 
be fixed - utility or relief man to assistant foreman to foreman and 
so on - usually decided by those on the rung of the ladder immediately 
above. 
(125) Union pressure usually applied to the job at the bottom of 
the ladder, the relief man in the case of GM. Success was limited 
since managements were reluctant to give way on even this modest 
promotion. GM's plant manager stressed that the relief man was 
"a 
stepping stone to supervision... Just because a man has seniority does 
not mean a thing concerning promotion ,, 
(126) The relief man's job was 
also controversial in that it assured a place on the 
'preferred 
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employee' list when lay offs came around, and again, as with promotion 
in general, widespread accusations of favouritism are to be 
found. (127) 
The control of discipline and the ultimate sanction of dismissal 
was clearly one area where unionisation should have had a major 
influence over the powers of foremen. Again a complex rearrangement of 
practices emerges. Dismissal on grounds such as union activity, to 
create room for another worker or by some act of caprice on behalf of 
foremen was abruptly curtailed. Dismissals continued but now a set of 
procedures was laid down and termination offences clearly categorised. 
Procedure now usually involved the foreman completing a dismissal 
report and forwarding this to the employment department, reminiscent 
of the scheme temporarily in force at Ford in 1913. The union was 
often successful in the early years in obtaining a reversal of 
decisions and the knowledge that a grievance might result clearly 
coloured the foreman's decision in any marginal cases or those which 
might be open to accusations of discrimination against union 
representatives. Nevertheless foremen were still involved in a great 
many dismissal cases and evidence suggests that the role of the 
employment department, though expanded, remained one of rubber 
stamping the foreman's decision in cases not directly involving union 
pressure. 
(128) 
The new reliance upon "procedure" accounts for the many claims 
put forward by foremen of this period that their powers of 
dismissal 
had in fact been seriously curtailed. The findings of two contemporary 
surveys chart the decline in the number of foremen who considered 
themselves to have absolute right of dismissal. Figures fell 
from 55% 
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in 1940 to 13% in 1944. (129) At least part of this change is 
attributable to wartime labour market regulations in addition to union 
procedures, nevertheless many foremen were to view the latter as the 
primary cause as evidenced by numerous statements before the NWLB 
hearings in 1944. (130) 
It is clear that foremen could, after unionisation, no longer 
administer the ultimate sanction of dismissal in the same random 
fashion as previously. In the case of lesser disciplinary activity the 
presence of union protection also made a major difference. Foremen did 
retain a range of penalties which they could administer. Workers could 
be sent home for a number of days - one to three at Packard for the 
first offence, five at Chrysler. Examples of offences incurring this 
penalty include fighting, "loafing", drinking, gambling, smoking, 
unofficial absence, "not working correctly" or abusing the 
foreman. (131) The latter would be certainly worth a discharge in pre- 
union days. Other forms of punishment included the downgrading of 
workers to a lower class of work, and putting workers on special 
reports equivalent to three months probation. These reports were 
commonly referred to as "death warrants", any subsequent indiscipline 
resulting in the sack. 
(132) 
The "death warrant", as with forms in support of other 
disciplinary action, needed the countersignature of the union 
representative however. Certainly the need to obtain this tacit 
support was bound to limit the likelihood of spurious punishments 
being inflicted. Also many disciplinary actions were doubtless 
rejected successfully by union representatives. Quantifiable evidence 
on this point is difficult to find since disputed cases went 
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unrecorded. Stewards were likely to acquiesce in obvious cases but 
foremen frequently complained before the NWLB hearings that union 
representatives held too much power of veto and frequently forced the 
abandonment of disciplinary action through the threat of invoking full 
grievance procedures. 
(133) 
A final aspect of foremen's power to be affected by unionisation 
was that of control over the pace and direction of production. As 
outlined in previous chapters the power of the foreman in this respect 
had been significantly reshaped during the phase of acute 
technological and organisational change up to the 1920s. Significant 
areas of worker discretion, and hence foremen's discretion had been 
left however and this situation was left largely unaltered by the 
advent of unionisation. Codification of procedures could not impinge 
too closely on activities relating to production levels and methods 
which existed in the informal sphere. Group regulation of output was 
equally likely to occur around the contest to fix rates for payment 
within a universally agreed pay scale as it was when pay levels were 
uneven. This is confirmed by the U. S. Senate enquiry of 1945 into 
Detroit factory practices which was to uncover widespread informal 
production quotas in operation. 
(134) 
Official union activity in production regulation differed at 
local and national level. The international leadership of the UAW 
abandoned at an early stage any pretensions about controlling 
production and concentrated instead on bargaining around pay and 
conditions related issues. Local initiatives did attempt to exert some 
controls over production however, if only in terms of the pace of 
output. 
(135) Control mechanisms on paced lines were normally locked up 
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by union agreement thus line speeds could now theoretically only be 
altered under the scrutiny of a shop steward. 
(136) 
Piece work rates were another area in which unions attempted 
intervention. At GM the UAW locals' first priority was to abolish 
piece work altogether and replace it with fixed day rates. Once 
established, using the average of the previous three months output, 
foremen were instructed to have no truck with disputes involving 
speeds or rates as these were now fixed. 
(137) Elsewhere the process of 
setting rates and speeds under various remaining piecework related 
systems could now be overseen by union representatives and where this 
was not done an appeals machinery involving subsequent retiming could 
usually be resorted to. Such appeals were not necessarily binding and 
in the event inexperienced stewards lost many appeals in the early 
stages, forcing many locals to train their officials in time study. 
Despite such early problems this new system of monitoring and appeals 
represented a significant shift away from the days when foreman could 
increase output quotas without reference to anyone. 
Some foremen were still prone to push production by various means 
however. Manning levels might be reduced while output remained 
constant, workers might be expected to increase the number of tasks in 
their cycle for a given line speed, or another shift's production held 
up as a target, with workers unable to dispute output figures. 
(138) 
Foremen were still widely accused of "bumping up" production figures 
in an attempt to force subsequent shifts to produce faster-(139) Using 
this method foremen then had recourse to the locked line speed 
controls to fend off complaints by stewards. In one such altercation 
at GM the foreman insisted that, "the job was set by the day shift and 
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was locked, and that he would not unlock it if he had to shut the 
whole plant. "(140) Still more foremen simply stuck to their old 
tactics of standing over workers and constantly urging faster 
production, although now they were as likely as not to find themselves 
the subject of a formal grievance. 
(141) 
In summary, some major aspects of the foreman's power underwent 
substantial change in the early years of unionisation. Seniority 
provisions meant a hitherto unknown sense of security for most workers 
and clearly reduced the foreman's propensity to exert pressure or 
practice favouritism. Wage determination also moved substantially 
beyond the foreman's grasp. Dismissal and discipline were now mediated 
at least partially through the offices of union and the labour 
relations department. If hiring and promotion remained much as before 
and production control continued under the same process of informal 
negotiations and confrontations between foremen and workers this was 
overlaid with the shift in levels of security and discipline. Foremen 
now had to deal with a new set of relationships on the shop floor as 
they found themselves in this tripartite arrangement with union 
representatives and an expanded industrial relations department. The 
precise nature of this new relationship is of crucial importance. Much 
was to be written following the unionisation of workers, and later 
during the attempted unionisation of foremen, of the "marginalisation" 
of foremen in industry. Epithets such as "forgotten men", "cinderella 
of industry" and assertions that foremen were now "inhabiting a 
twilight zone" became commonplace in industrial relations related 
literature. (142) To assess the validity of this assumption of the 
bypassing of foremen in the new proceduralised industrial relations 
it 
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is necessary to examine the precise position of the foreman, 
particularly in the newly installed grievance procedures, and also to 
examine the relationships which developed between foremen and shop 
stewards. 
Formal grievance procedures varied from plant to plant but all 
tended to conform to the same basic pattern of five or six steps 
leading ultimately to some form of arbitration. Only the initial two 
or three steps need concern us here i. e. those involving the 
participation of foreman or shop steward. Under the individual 
bargaining system which preceded unions, workers were supposedly free 
to approach the foreman directly with any query or complaint. Formal 
union-company agreements usually sought to retain this arrangement as 
a first step in grievance procedures. 
(143) Virtually all such 
agreements were written in ambiguous terms however. Phrases such as 
"Workers should first take the grievance up with the foreman... " or 
"mom take the matter up with the foreman" characterise the non- 
mandatory nature of this first step. 
(144) Many procedures gave the 
worker a choice of consulting the foreman or union representative 
first. A worker need only consult the foreman to request a 
consultation with his or her union official. 
(145) At some plants even 
this cursory consultation with the foreman was not necessary. At 
Chrysler's Desoto plant for example workers could simply place a 
grievance in a box and await the union representative on his 
round. 
(146) At this stage of the procedure grievances were discussed 
orally. No records were kept of the amount of grievances reaching this 
first step, or of how many were subsequently settled either by the 
foreman or union representative alone, or by consultation between the 
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two. Estimates proffered of settlement at this stage vary widely - 
between 40% and 90% - but must remain the subject of conjecture. 
(147) 
Where agreement could not be reached at the initial oral level, 
the grievance procedure then moved on to the first written stage as 
formal submissions were passed on to the labour relations office to be 
dealt with at committee level. This marked the passing of the 
grievance out of the control of foremen and into the hands separate, 
remote, employment department workers. It thus became a major area of 
concern to foremen that the first step should at least involve them, 
that they should be properly consulted and adequately informed before 
the grievance went 'upstairs' to the office. Linked to this concern 
was the amount of time and freedom allowed to union representatives in 
consultation of workers and investigation of grievances. 
A union representative roaming the shop-floor at will and 
consulting privately with workers was clearly anathema to many 
foremen, especially those with a background of untrammelled power and 
anti-union activity. Yet in many cases the union representative was 
allowed a fairly loose rein. At Hudson for example the stewards were 
required to work only the first and last hours of each day. Although 
an official pass was needed in order to leave the job these were being 
issued at an average of twelve per day for each steward in the early 
years of unionisation. The chagrin brought about by this arrangement 
is evident in the remarks of Hudson foreman Joe Hornet. 
"Well, Hudson, 
in their contract with the UAW-CIO have been very generous. In 
fact so 
generous that we have found it almost impossible... to make a chief 
steward do a days work or job. "(148) A survey over a one week period 
at Chrysler in November 1944 found that none of the stewards on any of 
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the three shifts did any production work at all. 
(149) Management and 
foremen did attempt to enforce some restrictions on the free movement 
of stewards but these were largely ineffective. 
(150) Many foremen 
remained sceptical of the true nature of much alleged union business, 
accusing stewards of taking up their time discussing "the weather or 
baseball scores" and then subsequently informing foremen they had 
settled some non-existent grievance. 
(151) There was no strictly 
logistic reason why foremen could not keep track of stewards movements 
and activities since foremen and stewards were often in the same ratio 
to workers. 
(152) 
Perhaps more serious were concerns by foremen that they were 
being systematically excluded from grievance procedures as part of 
deliberate strategy by union representatives. At Chrysler for example 
the anxiety was fuelled by the practice of shop committeemen bringing 
in chief stewards before consulting foremen and often refusing to 
discuss the grievance in question with the foreman, even if it had 
been settled. 
(153) At Chevrolet the union representatives objected to 
the foreman even discussing a grievance with any worker who might be 
involved. (154) Many foremen complained that they were further 
eliminated from the procedure as stewards and chief stewards took 
complaints directly to superintendents or the labour relations office 
without recourse to the foreman on the spot. 
(155) Foremen at Packard 
claimed there was no point in them keeping informed of union 
agreements and procedures since they were never consulted. 
(156) 
The union representatives began to exclude foremen 
from grievance 
procedures from a number of motives. Firstly they often maintained 
that foremen had not the authority or were reluctant to 
deal with any 
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but the most basic complaints - those usually settled at the oral 
level. 
(157) This opinion was reinforced in many ways by the visible 
exclusion of foremen from subsequent steps in the procedure. Whereas 
union shop-floor representatives often had a place on the committee 
which met with the company labour relations teams to discuss 
grievances foremen very rarely attended - even where grievances 
directly concerned actions taken by particular foremen. 
(158) For their 
part company officials maintained that if it was one man's word 
against the that of the foreman then they would assume the foreman to 
be correct. 
(159) Many foremen remained unconvinced. One Chrysler 
foreman summed up the general situation. "If a man comes to me and 
there is a door open and a draf t blowing in, and he wants it closed, 
okay, but regular grievances, they are not bringing them to me at all. 
They are taking them up with the general meeting. You go back there to 
Desoto, you will find that I haven't had a grievance, a written 
grievance with any name signed, unless maybe a few years ago, in a 
long time. "(160) 
In many ways this circumventing of the foreman was a 
logical 
outcome of plant-wide bargaining. Individual foremen were 
bound to be 
left out of negotiations which now took on the scale of official 
company policy. Grievances which could be said to effect or set 
precedents for "company policy" were deemed to 
be most expeditiously 
settled between trained industrial relations personnel or 
higher 
(161) 
management and shop committees, rather than 
individual foremen. 
Some companies were more stringent than others 
in allowing their 
foremen a certain degree of leeway in settling 
disputes. GM for 
example, as we shall see later in chapter nine, were 
to adopt a more 
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enlightened approach to the general training and bestowal of 
industrial relations responsibilities upon the foreman than Ford or 
Chrysler. Although GM did more to protect their foremen's position at 
the first step of grievance procedures, and made attempts to involve 
them in subsequent proceedings these were only differences by 
degree. (162) (It must be noted however that the subsequent 
unreceptiveness of GM foremen to the recruiting efforts of the 
Foremen's Association of America (FAA) - the major foreman's union of 
the 1940s - was no doubt due in part to this particular company 
strategy. ) Foremen in general felt themselves becoming increasingly 
remote and ill-informed of company policy. Robert Keyes, foreman at 
Ford and subsequently head of the FAA, summed up the situation as many 
foremen saw it, "... today the average foreman is not part of 
management in any sense. He is hired to supervise the work of certain 
people. He does not participate in the formulation of any policy. 
Generally speaking he learns about company policy from the shop 
stewards ... u(163) 
The foreman's dissatisfaction with the reshaping of power 
inherent in the restructuring of industrial relations seems not to 
have been reflected in any overt hostility to the nascent power of 
industrial relations or personnel departments. Foremen's attitudes 
generally seem to be one of grudging acceptance. This may be partly so 
because the two seldom came into direct contact. Union 
representatives, as we have seen, tended to liaise with office 
personnel as written grievances were processed or through contact at 
weekly meetings, from which foremen were generally excluded. The 
perception of many foremen was that it was not so much the usurpation 
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of areas of their power by another grade of worker as the absorption 
of that power into the structure of bureaucracy which had taken place. 
Employment and labour relations departments were merely the 
administrators of that bureaucracy. 
(164) For example, in response to 
questioning about the authority which the labour relations department 
at Chrysler exerted over supervision its director claimed power "only 
in enforcing the terms of the contract. In other words, the labour 
relations man enforces the terms of the contract on management as well 
as labour. "(165) 
In addition to arbitrating over the stages of grievance 
procedures labour relations departments expanded their activities in 
the provision of administrative back-up for certain supervisory 
functions, compiling seniority lists, keeping attendance and 
timekeeping records, compiling information relating to workers 
suitability for promotion and so on. It could be argued that these 
tasks represented a service to foremen as much as an erosion of their 
responsibility, but there is no doubt that the official compilation of 
such material, be it accessible to the union or merely for company 
use, curbed many of the possibilities which foremen had previously had 
for manipulation of jobs, wages and promotion. 
The most important change brought about by unionisation, at least 
in its initial phases, remained that of the effect of foremen having 
to deal with the nascent power of the shop-floor union representative 
rather than the remote offices enhanced by increasing levels of 
bureaucracy. To be sure not all foremen were content to surrender 
power or accept marginalisation. As noted above, some intractable 
foremen were relocated or fired following their inability to adjust. 
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There were certainly many others who continued to openly treat union 
representatives with contempt, conducting negotiations in terms of a 
stream of profanities and abuse and assertions that they were the boss 
in their own department. Foreman Ed Freeman at Chevrolet for example 
told stewards, "You'll never get any place writing a grievance out 
against me, I never give you anything. I just love grievances like 
this, you are wasting your time. "(166) Some foremen continued to take 
every opportunity to undermine the union, especially during the war 
when stewards could be accused of working against the war effort. 
(167) 
Some continued the tactic of attempting to provoke wildcat strikes, 
bringing local union officials into conflict with both the company and 
their own international. 
(168) Stewards were sometimes locked out of 
the foreman's office while workers were being disciplined, others were 
constantly harassed on their jobs and frequently moved from one 
department to another. 
(169) Shop stewards who subsequently lost their 
union office had to be particularly careful as anti-union foremen saw 
their opportunity to exact what they saw as some form of revenge. Such 
workers could often expect transfers to the worst jobs or general 
provocations in the hope that they might react and be liable to 
suspension or dismissal. 
(170) Some foremen continued in their attempts 
to divide workers or use their office to influence stewards. Bernard 
Hoffman's foreman for example said he was "going to take care of" the 
steward if he dropped an attempt to get a departmental pay rise. "He 
said individual rises was the stuff and if we held out for a general 
increase we would never get it. "(171) 
The overall picture of the foreman's reaction to the power of the 
union once established, and his attitude to the union's shop 
floor 
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representative, is thus a complex one. Certain aspects of their power 
now gone, some foremen did indeed claim to have been "forgotten", to 
be mere men in the middle in a situation of conflict now entirely 
beyond their control. Others as we have seen bucked against the new 
system of industrial relations and the powers of shop stewards. Many 
simply became resigned their new position, passively accepting their 
changed role and doing their best to accommodate, or at least come to 
some working arrangement with shop stewards. Bernard Hoffman himself 
noted that, by 1942, his foreman was "cooperating very well now. "(172) 
The testimony presented before the Senate hearings on manpower 
problems in Detroit in 1945 illuminates this latter trend: - 
"Mr. BONE (foreman at Packard): ... There is never a move I make 
in the department that (the shop steward) doesn't know it... If the 
night shift is short a man he even allows me to put an extra man in 
there... 
Mr. MEADER (Senate Committee): You say "he allows you to"! 
Mr. BONE: Well, he says it is alright, and he could say 
"No". ' (173) 
In summary, this chapter has traced the impact upon the foreman 
of the evolution of unionisation among production workers. From an 
initial position of general anti-union activity and uncompromised 
power over most aspects of shop floor life the foreman had now to 
recognise that unions were an established fact and that certain 
aspects of supervisory power had been taken from the foremen's realm, 
or at least were now mediated through the intervention of a growing 
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formal industrial relations bureaucracy. To be sure, unions did not 
wrest control over all aspects of production. Many elements of 
control, as we saw in chapters one and two, had essentially left the 
shop floor in the organisational and technological restructuring which 
accompanied the shift to mass production. Informal control - 
especially the regulation of the pace of production - continued as a 
process of covert negotiation between workers, foremen and production 
departments, individual foremen deciding on their particular 
allegiance. 
The extent to which unions in general aim to exert control over 
all aspects of production or the general direction of corporate life 
is the subject of a major debate. 
(174) In the sense of shop floor 
life, which is our primary concern here, we can see that, in spite of 
the compromises on union control imposed in the macro sphere, the 
implementation of union procedures codified and routinised important 
controls which had remained with the foreman into the 1930s. Seniority 
provisions in particular meant that once the probationary period was 
complete, it became increasingly difficult for foremen to manipulate 
the jobs market for their own ends. Preferred employee lists did mean 
that foremen retained significant controls in this field, but for the 
majority of workers there is no doubt that seniority rules engendered 
a new level of security over keeping a job, and new levels of 
protection from daily, weekly and seasonal fluctuations in employment. 
Wages levels were now fixed at a general rate and if the conflict 
around that rate continued it was no longer a personal conflict 
between foreman and worker, but one between union and management. 
Grievance procedures had shackled many foremen in their arbitrary 
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dispensing of rough discipline and provided a new route by which 
complaints could be transmitted. Indeed the formal grievance structure 
had effectively done away with the need to inform foremen of 
complaints in many cases and, as we have seen, led to their bypassing 
and alleged marginalisation. 
Foremen as a group had reacted in different ways to this 
restructuring of control. Some had vigorously resisted the change, 
clinging to their old methods of autocratic rule. Of these some had 
been dismissed or transferred, more had continued in frustrated 
opposition, attempting to subvert union influence or compromising and 
hampering the work of union representatives as much as possible. Still 
others had accepted change, albeit grudgingly, and attempted to modify 
their work patterns to take account of their new responsibilities. 
This in spite of the general unpreparedness and lack of managerial 
foresight in training foremen in formal industrial relations. Other 
foremen, certainly in the minority, had welcomed the change which 
unionisation ushered in, glad to be rid of the invidious 
responsibility of decisions affecting workers livelihoods in a period 
of general depression. 
The advent of industrial unionisation was to have further 
ramifications for supervision beyond redrawing the boundaries of 
foreman's power however. The spread of unionisation into the ranks of 
supervision itself was to follow in the wake of the success of the 
UAW, and it is to the complex dynamics of that movement, in particular 
the foundation of the Foreman's Association of America, that we must 
now turn. This union, the product of a combination of a new phase of 
wartime restructuring of production, the influence of production 
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workers unions, protective state legislation and labour market 
changes, was to exert an influence on the shape of post war 
supervision and industrial relations far in excess of its numerical 
impact, and reveal the essentially contradictory and problematic 
position of industrial supervision in a unionised and increasingly 
bureaucratised environment to a wide audience of employers, 
legislators and others in the business of shaping industrial 
relations. 
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The Origins of Foremen's Unionisation 
The Foreman's Association of America (FAA) was formed in 1941 in 
Detroit. Essentially a phenomenon of the automobile industry, this 
union was by far the most important supervisory union in US history 
both in terms of its size and strength, and its ultimate and lasting 
influence on American industrial relations. Before examining the 
causes and impact of this union it is worthwhile looking at the long 
term history of foremen's unionisation, since this was not a new 
phenomenon in 1941, and also outlining briefly the trajectory of the 
FAA from its rise in the wartime factories of the Ford Motor Co. to 
its demise in the post-war world of Taft-Hartley and business 
unionism. 
In several industries the unionisation of foremen already had 
long history by 1941, either in separate unions exclusively for 
foremen, or in the unions of production workers themselves. Building 
and printing trades are notable examples of the former. In printing, 
unions such as the International Typographical Union had closed shop 
agreements which included the membership of foremen from as early as 
1889. In the building trades carpenters, plumbers, elevator 
constructors and other related unions affiliated to the AFL had 
recruited foremen since 1886. 
(1) In both cases foremen usually worked 
at the tools alongside those they were supervising. In addition some 
unions in the metal trades also insisted that working foremen maintain 
membership, as did some packinghouse unions. 
(2) In this way unions 
could exert considerable control over immediate shop floor supervision 
by the threat of withdrawal of membership. 
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Some transport industry foremen were also organised, notably 
those in railway and maritime related occupations. The Railroad 
Brotherhoods had organised some foremen since 1890 but many foremen in 
this sector belonged to separate unions for supervisors only. Separate 
unions for foremen were generally the norm in the maritime industry 
such as the National Organisation of Masters, Mates and Pilots or the 
National Marine Engineers Beneficial Association. ( ) There were also 
some government departments where supervisors were members of separate 
unions, notably in the postal services. 
( 4) 
These union configurations usually existed where craft based work 
was the norm, and they had by the 1930s, a well established 
relationship with employers. In the more recently established mass 
production industries such as automobiles both a general craft 
tradition and indeed any form of unionism had been eliminated at an 
early date. Production workers themselves had only succeeded in 
organising in significant numbers after 1937. 
Some foremen had enrolled in the automobile workers' unions, such 
as the various AFL affiliated locals, which were struggling for 
recognition in the early 1930s. The majority of these foremen were 
those who attempted to maintain membership in the union following 
their initial promotion. At AC Spark, Flint a foreman was elected 
president of UAW-AFL local 18444 in 1933. He was subsequently forced 
to resign however, due to company pressure in objection to someone 
"with the right to hire and fire" being a union member. 
( 5) Other 
foremen held membership of the CIO unions when they first formed, 
being careful to conceal this a effectively as possible. 
(6) Foremen at 
Ford for example were recruited by the UAW as early as 1937, although 
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this recruitment usually took place in clandestine surroundings, such 
as a baseball game - well away from the gaze of the ubiquitous 
servicemen. Detection at this time simply meant dismissal-( 7) 
These foremen clearly represented only a small minority however. 
As the production workers unions, notably the CIO affiliates, gained 
official recognition so areas of legitimate recruitment became rigidly 
defined, almost always to the exclusion of foremen. Some workers at 
the bottom of the supervisory ladder such as the utility men and 
leading hands at Chrysler or the material supervisors at Packard, did 
remain in the UAW by virtue of their continued work at the tools. 
(8) 
Generally though, the foreman and those newly promoted were excluded. 
Definitional criteria varied little. The Chrysler-UAW agreement of 
April 1937 is typical; "... the term "employee" for the purpose of this 
agreement shall not include foremen, assistant foremen, timekeepers, 
plant protection employees or confidential salaried employees. "(9) 
Even temporary supervision jobs involved compulsory cessation of union 
membership. A National Industrial Conference Board (NICB) survey 
conducted in 1941 found this to be the case in 15 out of 17 companies 
surveyed. 
(10 The best that UAW locals could do was to negotiate 
agreements whereby foremen ex-members could continue to accumulate 
seniority after they were promoted thus enabling them to resume their 
place on the seniority list without penalty in the event of demotion. 
Such agreements were made at Hudson, Briggs, Murray and Chrysler in 
the early 1940s for example. 
(") This applied to internal promotions 
however, outsiders could expect no such protection. Other firms 
maintained a system whereby promoted foremen lost all seniority. If a 
foreman at Ford, Packard or Gar Wood returned to production work he 
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could expect to be back on the seniority list with the rating he held 
on the date of his promotion. 
(12) 
There were some attempts to get foremen into the same union 
movement as production workers during the late 1930s. The most notable 
of these was the short lived United Foremen and Supervisors Local 
Industrial Union No. 918 (CIO). First formed at Kelsey Hayes Wheel 
Company in December 1937, it spread through Universal Cooler and then 
to Chrysler. (13) The CIO granted a charter to the union in 1939 by 
which time it could claim around 900 members. Meanwhile the appeal of 
the union had spread to Murray, Hudson, Briggs and GM Chevrolet and 
had even recruited isolated members as far afield as California, New 
York and Georgia. 
(14) Clarence Bolds, president of Local 918 talked of 
spreading foreman's unionisation "from coast to coast" and made clear 
his union's allegiance to the production workers cause - "(Foremen's) 
organisation closes the last door through which the company ushers 
militant union men onto the street under the guise of promotions. "(15) 
Local 918 remained primarily concentrated around Kelsey Hayes and 
Chrysler and it was involvement in the 1939 strike by UAW workers at 
the latter which was to give the foremen's union its notoriety, and 
ultimately lead to its demise. The strike itself was instigated over 
general pay and conditions for production workers. After some weeks of 
the strike, and in an unrelated incident, Chrysler management sacked 
nearly 50 foremen at the Dodge truck plant for membership of Local 
918. (16) The union appealed to the National Labour Relations Board 
(NLRB) on the grounds of unfair dismissal only to be told that they 
must first approach the company for to demand a certification election 
i. e. ask for and be refused as a bargaining agent before the NLRB 
Chapter Six -272- 
could act. 
(17) A telegram demanding recognition was duly sent in 
November 1939. This was promptly seized by the Chrysler management as 
an opportunity to inject a new stream of propaganda into what had now 
become after about 50 days, a deadlocked strike. 
(18) The resultant 
conflict which erupted around the question of foremen's rights to 
organise in CIO affiliated unions became the precursor of, and set the 
pattern for, major debates which followed the later emergence of the 
FAA. 
The attitude of the UAW leadership was a tentative approval of 
Local 918 in the initial stages. (Rank and file members were less 
equivocal, even refusing to cross Local 918 picket lines during a 
strike in Lacrosse. 
(19)) The CIO and the AFL had made informal 
agreements that neither would attempt to organise foremen. 
(20) Despite 
this, UAW president R. J. Thomas had welcomed the organisation of 
foremen stating that, "Their assistance and fraternal relations to our 
members either in time of strike or in routine work in the plants will 
be of inestimable value. In return we pledge our complete solidarity 
with the new union. "(21) This was soon revealed to be rhetorical 
solidarity only. Chrysler took out full page advertisements in the 
local press under the headline "CIO Now Demands Right to Sit on Both 
Sides of Collective Bargaining", and began to stress the foreman's 
role as part of management. 
(22) Talks between the UAW and Chrysler now 
became dominated by the issue of the foreman. Dick Frankensteen of the 
UAW rapidly disclaimed connections with Local 918 when called before 
the State Labour Mediations Board which had been called in to attempt 
to resolve the strike. 
(23) The foreman's local was persuaded by the 
UAW to withdraw its demands and the UAW took out its own advertisments 
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claiming that the unionisation of foremen was only a marginal 
issue. (24) Company propaganda continued apace however, reflected in a 
leader in the Detroit Free Press asserting that the idea of foremen in 
CIO unions was "a scheme that might well have been thought up in 
Moscow; and probably was... beyond it would lie, as a logical step, an 
attempt by the CIO actually to seize the plants as their own... there 
would be slavery and eventual terrorism. i(25) Implausible as were 
accusations and general propaganda of this type put out by the 
company, it did cause anxiety among the UAW leadership. Support for 
the foreman's local was rapidly withdrawn, their charter being 
rescinded completely in January 1940. 
(26) Following suit the NLRB 
refused to have any dealings with Local 918 and it was disbanded early 
in 1940. (27 
This brief moment in the history of foremen's unionisation had 
revealed a number of trends which were to characterise subsequent, 
more vigorous attempts by foremen to bargain collectively. Firstly the 
refusal of the leadership of the major industrial unions to, as they 
saw it, jeopardise the progress of their own cause by actively 
supporting foremen in unions. When it appeared that the foremen could 
provide a bargaining counter the UAW leadership was all too ready to 
proffer friendship, but they were equally ready to withdraw support to 
further the aims of the UAW. The UAW leadership had no ambitions 
beyond what they saw as a clearly defined boundary between workers and 
management. Matters would be simpler if the foreman remained within 
the ambit of the latter. From the UAW point of view this line was 
drawn by a general definition that those who held power to hire and 
fire should be excluded from the union. Thus some materials handlers 
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or production planners might be eligible for membership but any rank 
of foreman would not. 
(28) The readiness to jettison union minded 
foremen in order to preserve a responsible, non-predatory image for 
the UAW was to be a recurrent theme in later periods of industrial 
unrest. 
The second trend to emerge was the greater amount of support 
among the rank and file members and local leadership of the UAW for 
foremen's unions, which contrasted with the lukewarm response 
displayed by the leadership of the international. Foremen's picket 
lines had been respected and a significant number of messages of 
encouragement had begun to appear in the local press and in leaf lets 
circulated on the factory floor. 'Local 235 News' of October 1939 
advised foremen, "Get wise you guys and organise, " pointing to the 
growing insecurity in foremen' s jobs. 
(29) Local 662 at Delco-Remy 
issued a circular to foremen following the Chrysler strike noting that 
"some very definite understandings were arrived at" between foremen 
and UAW members during the dispute. 
(30) In many ways this rift between 
the rank and file and the higher leadership of the UAW mirrored the 
general development which saw, even as early as 1937, the increasing 
imposition of control from above on the new union. 
(31) 
The third notable trend was the way in which employers reacted to 
the issue of foremen's unions. Although there had clearly been a shift 
in the structure of power on the shop f loor with both technological 
and organisational change and the advent of workers unionisation, 
employers refused to concede that foremen had in any way ceased to be 
an integral and central part of management. They had also 
demonstrated, after taking account of the rhetorical content of public 
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statements, a real fear that unionisation would extend beyond the shop 
floor and into the hierarchy of management. They had shown a readiness 
to respond in no uncertain terms to threats to unionise foremen, 
believing more ardently than the UAW that a line had been drawn at the 
point of shop floor supervision, across which unionisation should not 
pass. 
Finally, the brief and limited success of Local 918 had also 
demonstrated that there were significant numbers of foremen in the 
automobile industry of the late 1930s who were ready to embrace the 
idea of union representation. Nearly all the foremen at Kelsey Hayes 
had signed up following the granting of the CIO charter. Once the 
union was seemingly legitimate, given CIO credibility and the 
seemingly sympathetic support of the NLRB, foremen had demonstrated 
their need to protect their position via collective means. 
Local 918 represented a short lived small scale precursor to what 
was to become the major event in the history of foremen's 
unionisation, an event which was to have a significant impact on the 
union movement in general, - the formation of the Foreman's 
Association of America (FAA). The FAA was formed at the end of 1941. 
Initially a social or "fellowship" club it became the FAA proper in 
November of that year and, at a meeting of 1200 foremen at Dearborn, 
near the Ford River Rouge complex, officers were elected and a 
constitution drafted. Robert H. Keys, a Ford foreman, was elected as 
the union's first president. 
(32) By the end of 1941 the FAA had around 
4000 members at the Ford complex. In February 1942 a second chapter 
was established at Briggs in Detroit, followed in the autumn of that 
year by chapters at Chrysler, Detroit Lubricator, Packard, Hudson, Gar 
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Wood Industries and US Rubber. 
( 33) By the time of the FAA annual 
convention in late 1942 the union had over 10,000 members. By the 
following year this number had risen to nearly 19,000 members in 68 
chapters. 
(34) Membership rose steadily through 25,000 in 1945, to 
32,000 in 1945 by which time the union had over 300 chapters. By 1946 
the FAA reached its zenith and was claiming a membership of over 
50,000. (35) 
Primarily a Detroit based phenomenon the FAA had nominally spread 
over 28 states. The first 37 chapters had all been in the immediate 
Detroit region and all in automobile production or closely related 
industries. Subsequent recruitment further afield was also mostly 
through connected industries such as steel and rubber, or through 
plants in the same company network such as the chapter established in 
the Ford plant at Ontario in Canada. 
Where chapters were set up recruitment density was often 
impressive, especially in the core chapters in Detroit. NLRB 
certification elections often returned over 80% in each plant in 
favour of the FAA as sole bargaining agent. At Chrysler in 1943 over 
1700 of the 2200 foremen in the plant were FAA members. In the NLRB 
election at Packard in February 1943 only 2 out of nearly 700 foremen 
actually opposed the FAA, while in March 1943 651 out of 675 foremen 
at Hudson chose to join. The Ford chapter based at River Rouge alone 
was eventually to number over 9000 members. 
(36) 
The FAA achieved formal agreements at a number of major firms. 
The prize in this respect was the FAA - Ford agreement signed in May 
1944. Hudson and Kaiser-Frazer also signed formal agreements. Overall 
though the FAA had limited success in securing official recognition 
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and by 1947 formal agreements were in operation at only 13 
companies. 
(37) Nevertheless the union had a major presence in a 
significant number of large automobile plants, with only the larger GM 
factories proving impervious to recruitment. 
Agreements at Ford laid down eligibility criteria for membership, 
set up a hierarchy of representation (in a note of status preservation 
the FAA spurned the usual titles of committeeman or shop steward in 
favour of the pretentious title of "building chairman"), and 
established facilities of the functioning of the union - offices, full 
time staff etc.. 
(38) Minimum wage rates were fixed in so far as a set 
differential was agreed i. e. that in a six stage hierarchy consisting 
of job foreman, division shift foreman, division foreman, assistant 
general foreman and general foreman, the job foreman at the bottom of 
the ladder was guaranteed 25c above the average wage of the top 25% of 
employees under him, and each subsequent step in the hierarchy then 
received fixed differentials in relation to the job foreman, varying 
between 30c and 60c. Overtime, call out pay, bonuses and vacations 
were also fixed. Seniority provisions were also laid down, although 
these were chiefly to be administered in the case of demotions to 
avoid "bumping" foremen lower down the scale. Seniority in promotion 
remained the prerogative of employers. The clause, "When ability is 
considered to be equal - seniority shall govern promotions and 
demotions" echoed the notorious merit clauses which had been a feature 
of the company union movement and in effect nullified any temporal 
consideration in making promotion decisions. 
(39) 
In addition to limited employer sanction the FAA enjoyed a 
chequered career of legality. Vacillating state support for foremen's 
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unionisation was a feature of the period. The NLRB which, under the 
aegis of the Wagner Act had given legislative sanction to production 
workers to organise in collective bargaining units of their own 
choosing and compelled employer recognition, was called upon to 
determine whether the provisions of the act should extend to 
supervisors. Were they "employees" and thus, under the wording of the 
act, entitled to protection, or were they "employers" and deemed to be 
outside the act's provisions? Foremen were of course "employees" in 
that they were wage labour and did not own or control in any formal 
sense the means of production. The separation of ownership from 
control in the large corporation which now typified automobile 
production meant however that this argument could equally well be 
applied in varying degrees to practically all levels of management. 
Some form of ruling needed to be made in terms of a dividing line. In 
the event the NLRB fluctuated between extremes in attempts to 
interpret the vague terminology of the act-(40) They ruled in favour 
of foremen's unionisation in the Skinner and Kennedy case in 1939, 
against in the Marshall Field and GM Sales cases of 1941, reversed 
this decision in Godchaux Sugar and Union Collieries cases of 1942 
when foremen were deemed eligible to be members of unions affiliated 
to those of production workers, and reversed their ruling again in the 
Maryland Drydock case of 1943 when only those foremen in industries 
which had "traditionally" organised foremen were allowed to remain in 
unions. In the Soss and Republic Steel case, resolved in May 1944, the 
NLRB settled upon a particularly confused compromise maintaining that 
the law protected foremen against discriminatory employer practice but 
still withheld the right to organise i. e. hold certification elections 
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or compel employers to bargain. Thus foremen were "employees" under 
sections 8(1) and 8(3) of the Wagner Act, but "employers" under 
section 9. 
(41) In 1944 the NLRB passed jurisdiction of the problem 
over to the National War Labour Board (NWLB) who in turn made no firm 
recommendations despite extensive hearings and public inquiries. 
Finally, in the Packard case of March 1945 the NLRB gave the go ahead 
for foremen to organise under the protection of the act. This decision 
was only ratified by the supreme court a matter of months before the 
passage of the Taf t-Hartley Act in 1947 unequivocally excluded 
supervisors from any legal protection in pursuit of unionisation. 
Allied to this erratic pattern of state activity the FAA also had 
to contend with concerted resistance from employers, organised into a 
powerful pressure group which published widespread anti-FAA 
propaganda, lobbied state representatives and generally harassed or 
attempted to divert the union. Indeed the architecture of the Taf t- 
Hartley Act represented the final drafting of a whole series of less 
successful bills designed under the sponsorship of the automobile 
manufacturers. 
Support from the production workers unions and their 
organisations also came at fluctuating levels, variously depending on 
leadership tactics, self interest or degrees of rank and file 
activism. 
Despite these problems the FAA showed itself to be composed of a 
membership quite determined to push for recognition, even to the 
extent of strike activity. Perhaps more surprisingly, strikes were 
staged at the height of war production, in the face of a great deal of 
general hostility and at a time when production workers were operating 
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under wartime no-strike agreements. 
In the event the union was to have short lived success despite 
its "meteoric" rise. Following the failure of a major strike at Ford 
after the company had refused to renew their agreement in 1947, and 
the coincidental passage of the disabling Taft-Hartley Act, the union 
went into a gradual, and eventually terminal decline. Membership loss 
was not overtly dramatic - the union could still number 20,000 members 
in 1953 - but 1947 represented the watershed at which numbers fell for 
the first time, important when set against the rate of growth of the 
years immediately preceding and the anticipated recruitment levels 
among the several million potential members employed in supervision in 
American industry. 
Clearly the advent of a union such as the FAA among what had been 
few years previously a predominantly conservative and reactionary 
sector of the industrial workforce poses many interesting questions in 
terms of dynamics, aims, influence and so on. Many of the available 
historical accounts of the rise and fall of this union tend to revolve 
around a central causal framework dictated by the legal structures of 
the period. 
(42) The FAA is seen to rise as a consequence of the 
actions of the NLRB, gaining in support with favourable decisions, and 
finally declining following the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. While 
it is true that 1947 marks the beginnings of the decline of the union, 
an adequate explanation of this decline, and the preceding years of 
success, must go beyond the narrow strictures of this form of 
institutional explanation and examine a number of interconnected and 
complex factors, both immediate and long term, and at individual and 
organisational level, in order to fully understand the origins and 
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fate of the FAA. In addition to the long term restructuring of the 
foreman's job outlined in previous chapters, the effects and influence 
of production workers unions, the precise constituency and appeal of 
the FAA to its members, its aims, the specific historical 
circumstances in which it came into being i. e. the period of wartime 
restructuring of production and labour markets, and consequent post- 
war reconstruction, and the range and influence of employer strategies 
must all be taken into account in addition to the role of the state in 
fostering or prohibiting supervisory unions. 
The first field of enquiry is that of the influence of production 
workers unionisation on supervision in terms of the stimulation of 
foremen's unionisation. This is perhaps the most obvious area to start 
with since the FAA followed hot on the heels of the success of the UAW 
and general industrial union movement. Certainly it is difficult to 
imagine circumstances where supervision might unionise while those 
workers under them had not. At a general level an atmosphere amenable 
to unionism - the Wagner Act, newly pragmatic sectors of management, 
"responsible" union leadership and so on - might be seen to provide 
ample explanation. The establishment of unions such as the UAW created 
a complex set of influences and pressures on foremen which must also 
be examined however. Pay and conditions concessions won by the UAW 
both demonstrated the efficacy of collective action and created new 
strains on individual foremen in terms of the restructuring of power 
and the proceduralisation of shop floor control. UAW members began to 
move into supervision jobs in large numbers during the wartime 
expansion of production, bringing their expectations of union 
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representation with them. UAW leaders and rank and file members 
support for or opposition to the FAA must also be charted. These and 
other union movement related factors must be taken into account in 
order to unravel the means by which the appeal of unionisation spilled 
over to encompass the lower levels of the management hierarchy. 
First, the general influence provided by the example of the UAW 
in gains for production workers. Foremen had seen only too well the 
power which could be wielded by workers representatives as they faced 
up to shop floor supervision or went directly to higher management, 
but what of the concrete gains won by the UAW. As a report of an early 
meeting of the FAA at Ford recorded, "... the foremen all agreed that 
they should secure the advantages which the rank and file had 
gotten. "(43) What were these advantages? 
Better pay and conditions are an obvious starting point, and it 
is necessary to map out accurately the components of the foremen's 
dissatisfaction with their position vis a vis their newly unionised 
workers in some detail. To begin with pay levels, foremen at Ford had 
observed production workers securing overall pay rises in the region 
of 28% after the first round of UAW bargaining. In contrast foremen 
claimed to have been neglected. Statistics on supervisory pay levels 
are notoriously difficult to obtain given the reluctance of firms to 
release information on what remained individually negotiated 
rates. 
(44) The claims and counter claims of the FAA-NWLB hearings 
provoked an unusual level of candidness however. Rates for supervision 
varied contingent on a number of factors in addition to the general 
chaos of individually determined scales. Skilled trades foremen in the 
tool room, electrical and maintenance departments at Packard for 
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example received between $278 and $383 per month compared with a $220 
to $315 wage band for foremen in the production departments. Assistant 
foremen in the same departments received $252 to $335 and $236 to $278 
respectively. Thus an assistant foreman in charge of skilled workers 
would usually earn more than a foreman in charge of semi-skilled or 
unskilled workers. 
( ) It can generally be said that pay fell in a 
band between $220 and $350 for foremen in the early 1940s, the 
majority of whom were now being paid on an hourly basis. 
(46) 
Production workers' pay was equally complex, but good data is 
available on general differential levels between them and supervisors. 
This reveals that in terms of basic pay the foreman generally 
maintained his position relative to production workers during the run 
up to, and early phases of foremen's unionisation. Evidence does 
indicate an erosion of basic pay differentials in some companies to 
around 15% between 1942 and 1943. 
(47) Most companies retained a fixed 
formula however. GM for example held to a 125% plan throughout, i. e. 
that foremen should be paid 25% more than the average of the top five 
highest paid production workers in the highest class in the department 
under supervision. 
(48) Others were still more generous. In 1944, at 
the height of the FAA campaign, Hudson claimed an average differential 
of over 42%, with some foremen getting as much as 57%. Murray claimed 
47% for section supervisors and 72% for department supervisors. 
Briggs' supervisory differential ranged between 44% and 66% and 
foremen at Packard were pegged at 26% above the highest individual 
hourly paid worker, resulting in an average of over 60% above all 
production workers. During this period Chrysler claimed average wage 
differentials of over 40%. 
(49) These findings are in line with surveys 
Chapter Six -284- 
of industry in general during this period which if anything show 
supervisors in the automobile industry, especially at the level of 
assistant foreman and foreman, to have slightly above average 
differential basic pay rates. 
(50) In terms of general pay levels an 
NICB survey of foremen's pay rates in 1940 found an average increase 
of around 20% over the rates of pay of 1929 in real terms-(51) 
All the above differential computations are based on the basic 
working week however. A different picture emerges when examining 
actual earnings - after overtime and bonus payments have been 
calculated. Foremen had been traditionally excluded from any overtime 
payment. Before unionisation, production workers would have seen their 
own pay modified during periods of increased production by 
compensatory rate-cutting. With generally negotiated agreements 
however, periods of intense production, especially that which came 
with the beginnings of war production, saw dramatic increases in 
levels of production workers take-home pay. Differentials narrowed 
significantly and of ten became reversed. Stock chasers at Packard in 
1942 for example averaged nearly $1000 per year more than their own 
foremen. A similar pattern emerges at Chrysler's DeSoto plant where 
real differentials of between $600 and $1000 per annum in favour of 
production workers were common. 
(52) Harry Palmer, a foreman at one of 
the automobile plants was paid $1300 less than one production worker 
in his department in 1943, while everyone out-earned him to some 
degree, with the sole exception of the sweeper. 
(53) A survey by the 
Automotive Council for War Production (ACWP) in 1944 quoted one of the 
major automobile companies where a 69% differential in favour of 
foremen over a standard 40 hour working week turned into a 22% deficit 
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over 60 hours, the normal length of time worked per week at that 
time. ( 54) The case was usually at its worst where foremen were in 
charge of individual workers of a particular skill level such as a 
tool setter among a department of production workers. Antagonism which 
reflected the new levels of security of unionised production workers 
was never far below the surface, with workers only too ready to rub in 
their pecuniary superiority. Foremen saw their prestige eroded along 
with differentials. As one foreman put it, "Now, you know, we do not 
like to be over the men and to have them throw their pay check in our 
face ... ", 
(55) 
The problem for foremen was exacerbated by the regularity of long 
working weeks from 1941 onwards as the industry geared up to meet the 
needs of America's allies and subsequently its own military needs. 
Some foremen were expected to work from seven in the morning to one 
o'clock the following morning, receiving nothing beyond basic pay and 
a 60c lunch allowance in compensation. 
(56) Some firms paid overtime up 
to two and a half hours per day, stating that a foreman was expected 
to remain unpaid after work and take part in production conferences or 
take care of paper work. As Packard management insisted, "These duties 
are considered as part of the job and never were paid extra for. "(57) 
Production workers meanwhile were paid for every hour in the plant, 
and at increased rates for overtime, thanks to their union membership. 
Weekend working was a particularly sore point for many foremen. 
Where production workers would be universally earning double time for 
Sunday work for example, only a minority of foremen would be able to 
claim time and a half. 
(58) In some cases foremen would be told to take 
a day off in lieu of weekend work. This merely created pressure on 
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weekly supervision when foremen were expected to supervise extra men. 
Also if foremen were absent due to illness this would cancel out their 
overtime, being counted as their time off. 
(59) Sunday work in the war 
period was a normal occurrence. One foreman at Gar Wood worked 26 
consecutive Sundays with no pay at all. 
(60) Again the comparison with 
the treatment of UAW members was the element that rankled most. 
Foreman William Saunders, in reference to the practice of foremen 
simply receiving 75c lunch allowance for Sunday work, told the Senate 
inquiry of 1943, "I do not kick about my wages. I do kick about the 
fact that on Sunday when I go to work the company insults me by giving 
me 75c to buy my dinner ... They give my job setter, if he works 
10 
hours which I have to work, they give him $27! "(61) 
Night shift premiums were also a point of contention. Murray 
Briggs and Hudson, all companies where the FAA had a strong 
constituency, did not pay any such premiums to their foremen. Other 
companies might pay 5%. 
(62) Of the 11 major automobile manufacturers 
surveyed by the ACWP five paid no night shift premium or bonus of any 
kind to foremen. Only two paid as much as 10%, below the average for 
production workers at this time. 
(63) Hudson justified their policy by 
insisting that foremen on nights held less responsibility than those 
on the day shift -a point which was lost on their foremen. 
(64) 
Some firms did push through better overtime arrangements for 
foremen, especially as the growing threat of the FAA became apparent, 
and to be fair, some employers had paid overtime or compensatory 
amounts as soon as the problem arose. Many employers were 
intransigent 
however. Those presenting evidence before the NWLB special inquiry 
in 
1944 maintained, with the use of statistical 
data based on wage 
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payments, that foremen only averaged between 40 and 48 hours per week. 
Production workers might get more money but they had to work longer 
hours to get it. The FAA's answer was to point out that since foremen 
generally did not clock in or out or record their hours of unpaid 
overtime then these statistics were extremely unreliable. 
(65) 
Another problem area for foremen was their exclusion from 
participation in bonus schemes. Where the UAW locals had agreed to the 
continuation of such schemes they usually followed the time honoured 
pattern of pertaining to production workers only. Foremen, as we have 
seen in chapter four were generally deemed to be best placed outside 
such schemes in view of the perceived dangers of linking foremen's pay 
too directly to quantity rather than quality of output, and the fact 
that foremen were expected to arbitrate over setting of rates. Also 
the calculation of bonuses for foremen, since they did not produce 
directly had to be on a complex or group basis and not reflective of 
individual effort. The ACWP survey of 1944 reported that in the 
automobile industry incentive payment plans for foremen were "the 
exception rather than the rule" having been able to find only one 
example. 
(66) This followed the general trend in industry. The NICB 
survey of 1939 of 2,700 companies had found only 18.3% with bonus 
plans for foremen. 
(67) Annual bonus payments for foremen were more 
popular although these tended to be calculated by management in an 
arbitrary fashion - usually a lump sum between $100 and $175 in the 
automobile industry - and foremen had little notion of how these were 
calculated. 
(68) Merit pay for foremen was a similar means of boosting 
wages although, like annual bonuses, there was no fixed scheme of 
operation and many foremen were excluded. At Murray Bodies 
for example 
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only 6% of foremen received merit bonuses. 
(69) Foremen were even 
disqualified from suggestion schemes, since it was "expected that the 
supervisory personnel will develop new labour-saving methods as a 
regular part of their jobs. 
(70) 
The phenomenon of wartime erosion of real pay differential 
supervisory pay rates was not unique to US industry. In Britain during 
the First World War a similar trend in the engineering and munitions 
sectors had preceded the formation of the National Foreman's 
Association (NFA) in 1919. British foremen had seen their own wages 
exceeded by unionised production workers, the majority of whom were 
unskilled. 
(71) British employers, like their later American 
counterparts, were adamant that foremen should be paid an "upstanding 
wage" and not put on the same basis as production workers. There is a 
further interesting parallel worth noting between the experience of 
employers and the issue of foremen's pay in Britain during World War 
One and America in World War Two - that of the part played by 
government restrictions in exacerbating the problem. As such it is an 
interesting example of the way in which capitalist states can, in the 
short term at least, act in disconcert with the wishes of capital and 
promote activity which might promote unionisation. At the very least 
it is a demonstration of the bureaucratic inertia inherent in most 
state structures. Just as the government in Britain during World War 
One stepped in to put a blanket ban on overall wage rises, in an 
attempt to offset inflation and in line with a general policy of 
control of wages, prices and labour markets, 
(72) 
so too the US 
government imposed a similar set of controls in World War Two. 
The US Treasury's Salary Stabilisation Unit (SSU) pegged any 
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rises in pay to a rate in line with the frequency of such rises before 
1942. In other words foremen who were paid on a salary basis could not 
have their rates of pay adjusted to match the sudden UAW negotiated 
increases in basic rates secured before 1942, or the increases 
achieved by UAW members due to the rise in overtime and shift 
working. 
(73) Where companies attempted to push through rises for 
foremen the SSU appeals procedure was notoriously slow in processing 
claims and often rejected them. Briggs, Hudson and Packard all had 
foremen's pay increase requests refused. Even requests to increase 
foremen's sick leave was refused. 
( 74) 60% of the employers in the ACWP 
survey felt that the SSU's rules had made it impossible to maintain 
their usual supervisory differentials. 
( 75) Being told that government 
intransigence was to blame did little to placate disgruntled foremen 
who saw the wages of their unionised production workers continue to 
rise. 
Employers tried to get round the problem of foremen's claims of 
loss of status by pointing to the number of perks and hidden bonuses 
to which foremen were entitled. It was factors such as paid vacations, 
sick pay and retirement schemes that marked the foreman's job off from 
production jobs in managements opinion. Foremen usually received two 
full weeks holiday entitlement in this period whereas production 
workers could expect only one. 
(76) Sick leave for foremen was 
officially set around two weeks followed by longer periods at 
managerial discretion. Foremen at Hudson for example could get their 
sick leave extended by up to four months-(77) In some cases graduated 
increases went with length of service. At Packard for example a 
foreman with 10 years service was entitled to 48 days sick leave per 
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year. Government regulations again intervened in 1943 to restrict sick 
leave to two weeks however, besides many foremen claimed they were 
ignorant of any fixed entitlement. 
(78) Company retirement plans for 
foremen were also widespread. The scheme at Chrysler, for which all 
foremen earning over $250 p. a. were eligible involved a payment of 20% 
by the employee, with the company making up the balance of 
contributions. 
(79) 
In general foremen, certainly those appearing before the NWLB 
panel in 1944, tended to disregard these perks as any kind of 
equitable redress for the growing imbalance of pay levels between them 
and production workers. The NWLB noted that "these advantages were 
criticised or even belittled by the foremen. t(80) who were far more 
interested in real incomes and restoring their advantage over UAW 
negotiated rates. Although the automobile industry paid well in terms 
of general wage levels prevailing in the Detroit area, most foremen 
chose to measure their income with those they supervised. 
(81) 
In addition to rates of pay the FAA also actively pursued some 
form of general structure of collective bargaining, again echoing the 
achievements of the UAW. Foremen in general were coming to see that 
the system of individual bargaining, which they themselves had 
administered not too long before, had the effect of dividing and 
controlling the workforce. This method was unequal to the task of 
correcting the their own earnings deficit and moreover the uniform pay 
and conditions structures, neutral seniority provisions and grievance 
procedures secured by the UAW seemed a demonstrably better system. 
The irregular nature in which foremen's pay was determined had 
been a notable feature of the pre-war period but with the expansion of 
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production and rapid promotion of many workers, added to the growing 
shortage of foremen in certain skilled sectors bidding up the price of 
their labour, a chaotic situation had developed where individual 
foremen's rates fluctuated widely. Of the 11 automobile companies in 
the ACWP survey four had no definite wage schedule for any given 
supervisory job description. The remaining seven had a variance of up 
to 45% for any given job. Only one company allowed their foremen 
access to these schedules. 
(82) In this situation many foremen found 
themselves alongside others doing similar jobs but earning markedly 
different pay. In one department at Briggs in 1944 for example two 
foremen received $260 per month, six received $250 and two received 
$225. (83) Another foreman complained of a variance between $285 and 
$400 per month for identical supervisory work. 
(84) Foremen involved in 
such disparities, especially those newly recruited, looked to the FAA 
to substitute some form of regularised pay structure. 
The FAA response in demanding fixed payment scales also extended 
to women supervisors. It is a measure of the unions radical stance 
that it was to argue vigorously for equal pay for women supervisors 
deemed to be doing the same work as their male counterparts. Unequal 
treatment in this respect had long been a feature in the limited areas 
where women had attained supervisory jobs. Marie McCann for example, 
an assembly line forewoman at Briggs, complained of only receiving 
$260 per month whereas men in the same job were paid $289. Other 
forewomen in identical jobs were paid even less - one receiving only 
$147 per month. Forewoman McCann was frequently paid less than the new 
foremen see was called upon to train. 
(85) 
In the war period, in a reverse of the previous situation, newly 
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promoted foremen of ten found themselves better off than those who had 
been in the job for a number of years. Shortages of supervisory labour 
were the result of an increasing reluctance on the part of production 
workers to step up to the foreman's job given that they could probably 
earn more in non-supervisory jobs, and that in so doing they would 
retain the security of union membership. Pay levels for newly promoted 
foremen were thus driven upwards. At the Chrysler Tank Arsenal plant 
for example the six new foremen promoted in 1942 were paid an average 
of $15 per month more than the eight foremen already working in the 
department. (86) Foremen during this period would often find that their 
own assistants were in receipt of higher wages. 
(87) The difficulty of 
government restrictions continued to apply to newly promoted foremen, 
creating yet another area of discontent. Of ten workers were promoted 
from production jobs or foremen were given greater responsibility with 
a promise of more pay, only to be seemingly forgotten. Foremen could 
often wait up to a year for rises to be ratified. 
(88) 
The employers argument to explain the irregularities and 
fluctuations in foremen's pay was that in reality no two foremen's 
jobs were alike. Skill levels might vary, production and non- 
production jobs might carry differing levels of responsibility, some 
foremen might supervise more workers than other foremen - these were 
among the general diversity arguments put forward. 
(89) There was some 
merit in this, although most foremen's jobs, as we have seen, had 
become more closely aligned with the general deskilling of production 
jobs in the industry. The real reason for employers hostility to a 
regularisation of rates was however their determination to cling to an 
individual bargaining strategy, the 'open-door' system of securing 
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wage rises. The FAA was equally determined that collective bargaining 
should prevail, collective bargaining which would echo the success of 
the UAW contracts and introduce wage levels, hours and conditions of 
employment which applied equally to all foremen. Collective bargaining 
which would moreover mirror that of the UAW in exact terms. By 1946 
the FAA negotiators at Ford, where the union had secured its most 
important agreement, were putting in wage claims exactly parallel with 
those demanded by the UAW in the same plants. 
(90) 
Another demand of the FAA, again closely mirroring the gains of 
the UAW, was for a system of seniority to obtain in the event of lay- 
offs, transfers, promotions etc.. Seniority for foremen was a more 
complex issue however, especially since the FAA particularly wanted 
this to cover promotions and demotions -a traditional stronghold of 
management freedom of arbitrary choice. 
(91) The call for seniority by 
some form of fixed, negotiated criteria - basically longevity of 
service - had a wide appeal among most sectors of the supervisory 
workforce. Ironically in view of their previous record, many foremen 
put forward their fear of favouritism as a major reason for wanting 
regularisation. 
(92) Another specific, and perhaps more important 
reason was the knowledge that the reconversion to peacetime would mean 
many foremen being being laid off or returned to work on production, a 
fear compounded by the fact that many locals of the UAW had provisions 
that foremen, upon promotion, no longer accumulated seniority in 
standing with the union. 
(93) The fear was especially rife among older 
foremen who had a seen great many new and younger 
foremen promoted 
during the war years. Many of these younger men had proved more 
adaptable to new production methods 
introduced in armaments 
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manufacture, and had shown a greater willingness to take part in 
various wartime training programmes . 
(94) For many younger foremen who 
would seemingly lose out, seniority was probably simply one facet of a 
general support for unionisation given their UAW backgrounds. This was 
certainly the view supported by the NWLB inquiry of 1944. 
(95) 
The FAA did not ask for total control of selection procedures or 
for selection rigidly by length of service alone. Rather they asked 
for a "voice" in the process and that, where possible, any vacancy 
arising should be filled by an FAA member. They proposed a joint 
management-union committee to agree appointments before 
implementation. (96) At Ford, where such an agreement was secured, the 
system ran reasonably well. Demotions were likely to be the major 
problem area but in 1944 approximately five sixths of these were 
decided purely on seniority. Out of 1000 demotions between July and 
October of that year only 40 became the subject of grievance 
procedures. 
(97) 
Ford was the exception however and managements in general 
continued to oppose this particular section of FAA demands. Arguing 
that foremen could not readily be allocated promotions between 
departments on the basis of seniority since the jobs involved would 
require different skills, and, perhaps more forcefully, that "ability" 
- to be determined solely by management - must be the overriding 
consideration in the selection or rejection of the lower levels of the 
management hierarchy. 
(98) 
Other areas of negotiation proposed by the FAA which echoed the 
the contracts secured by the UAW included demands for closed shop 
agreements and dues check offs 
(deduction of union contributions 
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direct from members paypackets). In these demands the FAA was largely 
unsuccessful, especially in the closed shop demand which employers saw 
as a means by which the union could exert indirect control over 
promotion etc. by threats of withdrawal of membership. 
(99) The best 
the FAA could hope for in this respect was exclusive bargaining rights 
to encompass members and non-members. The FAA also attempted to 
negotiate uniform work loads in the form of agreed ratios of foremen 
to workers, 1: 30 in the case of Ford, although in practice these 
guidelines proved impractical given the size variations between 
departments. (100) 
The FAA also mirrored the UAW in its demands for a formal 
machinery to be set up to deal with foremens grievances. At Ford this 
was a five stage process. the second of which involved a newly set up 
foreman's personnel office, the third a joint committee of three 
members of the FAA and three members of Ford management, and 
terminated in the involvement of an impartial umpire. 
(101) Such a 
grievance process reflects that which is common to most union 
agreements although in the FAA's case the final stage, that of 
recourse to neutral umpire, was a particularly contentious issue. The 
NWLB panel reflected the feelings of most employers in rejecting the 
notion of external interference in disputes involving foremen. "When 
cases involve such intangible questions of personal judgement as the 
relative competence of several foremen... their relative promise of 
growth, the potentialities for higher positions, their reliability in 
emergencies, there is no good reason to require that the judgement of 
a more or less adequately informed outsider... be substituted for the 
judgement of manager who knows the foreman... "(102) In reality the 
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foreman had little faith in any existing complaints procedures or that 
management "knows the foreman". When challenged on exactly how 
foremen's grievances came to be known by management the Chrysler 
labour relations director insisted that they "filter up" or that "We 
had a feeling". Slichter called this process "some sort of dribbling 
up through the superintendents ,, 
(103) That foremen were only too 
willing to turn their backs on this type of system in favour of a 
formal grievance procedure is evidenced in the levels of support 
achieved by the FAA. 
In summary we can see that the establishment of production 
workers unions, notably the UAW, had created a series of pressures and 
examples which contribute to the dynamic behind the formation of the 
FAA. In addition to the problems of marginalisation outlined in the 
previous chapter, in real terms the foreman had seen his rates of pay 
fall compared to unionised workers. That wartime conditions were 
partly responsible, especially in terms of overtime working and 
government restrictions, probably did not matter to many foremen who 
saw their immediate position of powerlessness under a system of 
individual bargaining in stark contrast to the new found security and 
increasing comparative wages of the UAW members. The rigidity of 
foremen's pay systems and their exclusion from overtime, bonus and 
similar adjuncts to hourly paid work, because of their supposed status 
as part of management bore no relation to the foreman's objective 
position as he now saw it. The UAW offered a model for foremen seeking 
a reestablishment of differentials and uniformity among wage rates, 
some form of equitable seniority procedure in lay-offs, promotions and 
transfers, and a formalised grievance procedure whereby foremen, who 
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by now had come to realise how far adrift they were from the formal 
management structure, could succeed in getting complaints heard and 
dealt with. 
If the UAW had an indirect role in stimulating the formation of 
the FAA in terms of pressures created and examples set, how much 
direct influence did it have? This question can be broken down into 
two parts. Firstly at the level of membership, how many FAA members 
had, previous to being foremen, some experience of union membership in 
production workers unions? Secondly, how much support did production 
worker's unions like the UAW give to foremen in their efforts to 
unionise, either at the level of individual UAW members, or though 
local and national offices? 
In order to answer the first question - the spilling over of 
union consciousness through promotions - it is important to take into 
account the changes in the labour market and structure of the 
workforce during wartime. The war and the switch to armaments 
production brought a great expansion of the automobile industry 
factory system in terms of sheer size of the workforce. Since the 
major producers were unionised in 1937 or, in the case of Ford, in 
1941 then all foremen promoted during wartime - the period of the 
initial growth of the FAA - had some experience of union membership 
and representation. 
Many factories went through a phase of massive expansion on 
existing sites. The Packard payroll for example rose from 8,200 
peacetime workers to over 39,000 in 1944. 
(104) Other factories were 
entirely new. The Ford Willow Run factory, built in 1941 and 1942 to 
manufacture B24 bombers, employed over 42,000 workers at the height of 
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production. 
(105) 
Supervision of this vastly increased workforce 
created many problems in itself, about which more will be said below, 
but in numerical terms alone it called for large increases to the 
ranks of foremen. At Briggs the number of foremen rose from 715 in 
June 1941 to 1,410 in July 1944, at Chrysler's DeSoto-Wyoming plant 
the number rose from 35 in April 1938 to 225 in June 1944, at Murray 
from 137 in June 1940 to 562 in June 1944, and at Packard from 250 in 
1938 to 900 in 1944. (106) In addition to this absolute increase the 
number of older experienced foremen in individual plants became 
depleted as some joined the armed forces or moved to the new 
factories. Of the foremen at Packard who were in the job in 1940 for 
example, only 91 were still foremen there in 1944, representing only 
around 11% of the total supervisory workforce. At the Chrysler DeSoto 
plant only 27 (around 12%) of the 225 foremen had held the post 
continuously since 1940. 
(107) Many foremen were promoted and then 
demoted again quite soon afterwards during this period as they proved 
unsuitable for the task. When this is taken into account the numbers 
of production workers with experience of supervisory roles is even 
greater. The peak years of supervisory recruitment were 1942 and 1943, 
well after the establishment of the UAW. At GM for example in 1944 
over 50% of foremen had only 18 months experience of the job in plants 
which had been unionised for seven years. 
(108) 
Virtually all new foremen were recruited internally from the 
ranks of production workers. Between 1941 and 1944 at the Chrysler 
DeSoto plant for example all except four promotions came from the 
ranks of Chrysler production workers or from supervisors in other 
plants within the corporation, in 1943 77 out of 80 promotions came 
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solely from the shop floor. (109) In response to a question about the 
number of his fellow foremen taken from the ranks during wartime GM 
foreman W. Allen Nelson told a Senate inquiry, "All of us, all of us, 
I would say practically all of us. "(110) 
It is not surprising therefore that, given this preponderance, 
and in most cases majority, of foremen recruited since production 
workers unions achieved recognition, and the likelihood therefore that 
most would have been members of unions such as the UAW, that a great 
many of these new foremen were, in the words of one observer, 
"somewhat union minded. "(111) The fact that a high percentage of 
foremen had at least been members of of a union prior to their 
promotion is of course no guarantee that those foremen would be avidly 
pro-union, but it is fair to say that given the general response among 
workers to the unions such as the UAW - reflected in the level of 
votes achieved in certification elections, and general membership 
growth - and taking into account the concrete benefits obtained by 
unions for production workers, that a good many would be more likely 
to view unionisation in an advantageous light than otherwise. 
The second aspect of the relationship between the growth of 
production workers unions and the rise of the FAA concerns the level 
of direct support provided both in terms of strategic organisational 
aid from the locals or internationals of production workers unions, 
and the level of tactical support provided as the FAA engaged in 
various political and economic struggles with employers and the state. 
In examining inter-union support at a number of levels it will be seen 
that responses to the FAA varied quite markedly between ordinary shop 
floor members of unions such as the UAW and their local and 
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international offices, and also that these responses varied 
considerably over time contingent upon a number of factors. 
In beginning with reactions to the FAA among production workers, 
periods of industrial action are a useful starting point since strike 
activity provides moments at which allegiances and support become 
momentarily clarified. There were many occasions during FAA strikes 
when production workers refused to cross picket lines, thus halting 
production completely. In October 1943 90,000 workers at Republic 
Steel refused to violate FAA Chapter 34 picket lines, causing a three 
day total shutdown. 
(112) At Briggs in 1944 over 700 workers, including 
some UAW-CIO shop stewards, refused to cross FAA pickets causing the 
loss of two days production. In this case UAW stewards became actively 
involved in the picket. 
(113) Other unions, not directly concerned with 
automobile production also supported the FAA on occasion. The 
Teamsters for example were notoriously reluctant to cross FAA picket 
lines, even when most other production workers had done so. 
(114) 
Respect for picket lines could fluctuate however and was not by 
any means universal. At Goodrich for example members of the United 
Rubber Workers union supported the FAA for 23 days, the longest strike 
in the company's history, but eventually forced the FAA to abandon the 
same strike by threatening to cross picket lines and work under any 
supervision - action dictated by a combination of economic pressure 
and the direction of local leadership. 
(115) 
For their part the FAA members occasionally reciprocated and 
refused to cross production workers picket lines - the Young Spring 
and Wire strike in 1946 is an example of this - but such events were 
exceptions to the general pattern. 
(116) In the majority of cases FAA 
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members agreed to cross picket lines but to refrain from doing any 
production work. If pickets were adamant however the foremen often 
stayed outside. Official FAA policy was dictated by individual 
circumstance. Members were to, "go into shops and protect employers 
property and even perform certain work of the rank and file workers, 
temporarily in an emergency. However... we are not going to get our 
blocks knocked off doing it! "(117) Whether foremen crossed pickets 
with the approval of production workers often depended on the type of 
work involved. Ford foremen in the foundry for example were allowed 
into the plant to tap the furnaces and generally avert catastrophic 
damage through lack of maintenance. 
(118) 
The general question of the unionised foreman's place during 
industrial disputes - the definition of his "neutrality" between 
employers on one hand and organised labour on the other - was to prove 
universally problematic since the foreman was held by employers to 
have an obligation to continue work, of whatever sort, as part of the 
managerial hierarchy. This problem also emerged in Britain, where the 
NFA settled upon a general principle that, in the event of strike, 
"such service (should be) rendered to an employer that would enable 
his business to be kept in such a condition that on a settlement of 
the dispute, a minimum loss would be entailed by employer and 
employed, so as to enable full earning capacity to be regained as soon 
as possible. "(119) In the event, both for the FAA in America and the 
NFA in Britain, fixed definitions of neutrality were always rendered 
unworkable by the level of local pressure either from employers or 
production workers unions, about which more will be said below. 
To return to the theme of levels of grass roots support from 
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production workers for the FAA, while it is probably the case that 
workers crossed FAA pickets more often than not, support for foremen's 
industrial action could take other forms. In many cases workers 
refused to cooperate with non-striking foremen. 
(120) Such foremen were 
of ten given a rough ride if they crossed FAA picket lines. Those doing 
so at Chrysler in 1944 during an FAA dispute, "were booed and jeered 
and it was made very difficult for them to stay in. "(121) Some foremen 
alleged that they were physically abused by production workers. 
(122) 
Production workers also refused to take over any aspect of supervisory 
duties, even leading hands at Hudson in 1944 refused to carry on in 
this capacity and reverted to normal production work for the duration 
of the dispute. 
(123) "Normal" production work while the FAA was on 
strike became a mixture of induced chaos, deliberate go-slows or 
unofficial complete stoppages. At Packard in 1944 for example it was 
reported that, "Workers sat around doing nothing - even singing or 
dancing during working hours ... They hammered on benches, creating a 
general pandemonium, which (UAW) plant comitteemen made no attempt to 
control. "(124) Loafing, playing cards and crap games, and general 
abuses of quality criteria were all alleged to have taken place. In 
one department at Chrysler drill fixtures were hidden and, since no- 
one was available to sign requisitions for replacements, no production 
took place. 
(125) At Ford in 1947, despite nominal refusal of support 
for the FAA strike by UAW members, 150 were sent home from the pressed 
steel department for "slowdown" and "sabotage". 
(126) 
Production figures during FAA disputes are a good indicator of 
the level of support given by production workers, since, given the 
nature of the foreman's role in a rationalised mass production 
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factory, in the short term at least workers should be able to carry 
out production with minimal interruption without the presence of the 
foreman. Some account must be taken of the confusion which is bound to 
arise with the withdrawal of the residual coordinatory function of 
foremen, and the natural tendency of workers to take advantage of the 
situation to ease the pace of work. Even so, production shortfalls 
were often dramatic, suggesting a more deliberate strategy on behalf 
of unionised workers. The FAA strike at Chrysler in 1944 cost 400,000 
man hours in lost production over 21 days. 
(127) Some departments at 
Briggs went down to only 35% production in the strike of the same 
period when over 216,000 man hours were lost. Ford Willow Run 
production fell below 50% in the 1942 FAA strikes, with some 
departments falling to only 10% of normal output levels. Both Packard 
and Hudson suffered eventual total shutdown in the 1944 strikes, 
Packard alone laying off 30,000 workers and losing 1,800,000 man 
hours. (128) When naval officials visited Briggs in 1944 to see the 
effects of the FAA strike they were so dismayed at the level of 
quality of production that they ordered an immediate complete shutdown 
of the entire plant. 
(129) 
In addition to these general explicit or indirect levels of 
support for the FAA from production workers there are also indications 
that a significant degree of aid was forthcoming from local officials 
of the productions workers unions, in particular the UAW. Circulation 
of FAA information, copies of "The Supervisor" and membership forms 
was often carried out by UAW stewards. Evidence presented before the 
NLRB in 1944, consisting of 1200 items of FAA correspondence, 
indicated strong "collusion" between the FAA and UAW at the local 
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level. (130) The president of UAW local 409 offered to organise 
educational meetings for foremen, another UAW local official wrote of 
having "close to 200 stewards in the plant... if you could send us 
about that many papers, we are certain of a good distribution of them 
- right on the foremens desks... Material can be left on the foreman's 
desk without anyone knowing who left it there. "(131) The last phrase 
is indicative of the general caginess surrounding any disclosure of a 
close relationship between the two unions. Yet in many cases the UAW, 
at the local level at least was fairly open in its support. The local 
union press, as we saw in the previous chapter, had run a campaign 
designed to pillory particular foremen accused of driving production 
or harsh treatment, but had also been ready to praise those judged to 
be cooperative foremen. In a similar vein local UAW papers were 
equally willing to extol the virtues of a union for foremen. Several 
UAW local papers carried news of FAA events and dates of future 
meetings. 
(132) Some articles feigned a low level of knowledge. The 
'Highland Park Herald' for example, referring to the FAA, noted, "This 
is not a CIO organisation but they deserve our support. We don't know 
much about them but if we did we couldn't say much for fear of putting 
someone on the spot. "(133) The 'DeSoto Searchlight' was more 
forthright. "We hope that they few foremen who were taken in by the 
management's baloney will now snap out of the dope and realise that in 
the union there is strength... So join the FAA boys. "(134) Others took 
on a confrontational posture. The GM Chevrolet local's 'Searchlight' 
asserted that pressure will be required to convince the more timid 
foremen that they will need protection in post war days... Better think 
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it over any of you foremen who still nourish scabby ideas. In other 
words, "You better get in, before we begin". "(135) 
Other union locals were prepared to elaborate a fairly radical 
overall schema of recruitment of which unions such as the FAA were to 
be only the first stage. The Mechanics Education Society of America's 
'MESA Educator' of May 1944 for example contained an editorial 
destined to alarm employers. "Organisation of any part of industry 
management means that bargaining must eventually take place between 
those who work for a living, whether it be by hand or brain, and those 
who clip for a living. (A reference to shareholders "clipping" 
dividends) It draws the line not between one group of workers who work 
at machines and another group who direct them, but between all the 
workers and all those who live off their efforts... "(136) It was this 
style of comment, which went on to refer to supervisory unionism as a 
precursor to a "socialized economy", which was seized upon by 
employers in their own publicity campaigns against the FAA. The 
leadership of both the FAA and most production workers unions were 
acutely aware of how damaging such statements could be in providing 
ammunition to anti-union employers in their efforts, not only against 
the FAA but also against the production workers union movement in 
general. 
The strongest line of objection that employers raised against the 
FAA in certification hearings before the NLRB was that foremen's union 
was bound to become enmeshed in the production workers union 
organisations and thus lose any independent control. Foremen at best 
would have dual loyalties and at worst would become hostile to 
employers. Employers arguments usually involved the FAA either 
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affiliating to the CIO or being absorbed by the UAW and losing 
independence entirely. The CIO or UAW would thus "sit on both sides of 
the bargaining table. " Given a lack of formal evidence for such links 
employers often simply asserted that the presence of the FAA made 
foremen "union minded" and thus antipathetic to management or 
unwilling to carry out disciplinary functions involving fellow union 
members on the shop floor. Much of this line of argument was spurious 
of course and delivered through the medium of extremist rhetoric, 
nevertheless both the UAW and FAA leadership, broadly sympathetic to 
each other's ideals and aims as they might be, found it necessary to 
exercise extreme caution in their public activities in order to avoid 
giving substance to the above allegations. This must be borne in mind 
as we turn to an examination of the levels of support given by the 
leadership of the production workers unions and their organisations to 
the FAA. 
The situation was made more difficult for the FAA and UAW by 
developments in the mining industry. In December 1940 a group of 
foremen in the Ford Collieries company formed the Mine Officials Union 
of America (MOUA). The NLRB granted certification to this union in 
June 1942. When faced with supreme court action by the mining 
companies the MOUA promptly applied for affiliation to John Lewis's 
Union of Mine Workers (UMW), itself a CIO affiliate. 
(137) Formally 
affiliated in April 1943 the union changed its name to the United 
Clerical, Technical, and Supervisory Employees of District 50, U. M. W. 
(UCTSE). The union's membership rose to over 60,000 by 1945 aided by 
the fact that the UMW had closed shop agreements in many 
collieries. 
(138) During 1944, in tandem with the activities of the 
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FAA, the UCTSE was engaged in strike activity in a number of 
collieries, with quite effective results. 200,000 workers were laid 
off at the mines of Jones and Laughlin Steel for example and 70 other 
pits were affected. In many cases ordinary UMW members refused to 
cross UCTSE picket lines. Such concerted activity, when added to the 
inclusion of the UCTSE in Lewis's general UMW bargaining strategy, 
seemed to confirm what employers had been saying all along - that a 
foremen's union could not remain independent for any length of 
time. (139) In the event Lewis was to abandon the foremen's union as 
part of a pay deal for UMW members and affiliation was withdrawn 
following the passage of the Taf t-Hartley Act in 1947. These events 
formed the backdrop to the progress of the FAA and the image of the 
openly supportive relationship between production workers' and 
supervisors' unions in mining was to be constantly reinvoked by 
automobile industry employers as proof of the inevitability of 
ultimate control of the FAA by the UAW. 
The overall stance of the major organisations of labour - the AFL 
and CIO - was openly supportive of foremen's rights to unionise under 
the provisions of existing laws i. e. freedom to bargain collectively 
through agents of their own choosing. William Green, president of the 
AFL called it "not only unfair but absurd to exclude supervisory 
employees from the benefits and protections of the Wagner Act. "(140) 
The Michigan state CIO Councils annual convention of June 1943 passed 
a resolution "supporting the fight of the foremen to establish 
collective bargaining rights and other rights guaranteed by the Wagner 
Act. "(141) The CIO General Counsel, Lee Pressman, testifying before a 
Congressional committee, outlined the organisation's position when he 
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stated that only employees who did significant work at the tools 
should be eligible to join the CIO production workers affiliates, but 
that a separate organisation for foremen would be perfectly feasible, 
as was more than bargaining unit per plant. Thus the UAW and the FAA 
could, in the opinion of the CIO, coexist perfectly happily in the 
same plant. Pressman went on to deny any intention of the CIO to "take 
over" the FAA, and if the FAA did chose to affiliate to the CIO this 
would in no way mean control by the UAW simply because that union was 
also affiliated. 
(142) 
Beyond this rhetorical stance neither the CIO nor the AFL made 
any serious attempt to actively recruit foremen's unions. Instead they 
arrived at a tacit understanding that both organisations should stay 
clear of this strata of the workforce. The president of the CIO went 
on record to say that the CIO was content to do without foremen's 
unions, although he warned that if the AFL became overtly interested 
then the CIO would also "move in. "(143) In the event both 
organisations did make limited attempts to affiliate foremen's unions 
after the war, but on modest scale only, and to be abandoned in 1947. 
The FAA was to maintain its formal independence throughout its 
history, although there were times as we shall see, when FAA leaders 
became less enthusiastic about its non-affiliation to the CIO, AFL or 
the production worker's unions. Other unions for foremen did 
affiliate, or become established as locals of union internationals. 
The UCTSE, as we have seen was one example of the latter as it became 
a UMW local. The MESA also organised some foremen into locals from 
1944 onwards. 
(144) By 1947 at least ten CIO and AFL affiliated unions 
were applying to the NLRB for certification to bargain for foremen. 
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These included the International Union of Operating Engineers (AFL), 
the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (AFL), the 
International Association of Machinists, the Textile Workers Union of 
America (CIO) and the United Electrical Workers (CIO). (145) Several 
other unions exclusively for foremen also affiliated to the major 
organisations. The United Foremen of America became an affiliate of 
the CIO's United Steel Workers in 1946, the Supervisory Employees 
Federal Union set up county jurisdiction in Milwaukee under the AFL in 
1946 as did the Foremen's Federal Labour Union in Granite City. (146) 
Other foremen's unions followed the FAA pattern and remained 
independent. Examples of this include the Electric Utility Foreman's 
Association, the Wright Aircraft Supervisory Association, the American 
Smelting and Refining Foreman's Association and the Boeing Aircraft 
Foremen's Association. (147) 
Most of these unions were small by comparison to the FAA, and 
were to remain in its shadow, owing their existence at least partly to 
the FAA's efforts to secure the right for foremen to organise. Given 
that the FAA was by far the most prominent of supervisory unions, it 
is proposed, for economy of space, to limit analysis to the specific 
relationship of that union with the production workers organisations 
in the automobile industry, notably the UAW. 
The official policy of the UAW towards foremen's unionisation was 
similar to that adopted by the CIO, at least at leadership level. 
Walter Reuther defended the FAA in broad terms; "If they want to 
organise they have that right of the American Citizen"(148) As far as 
the UAW was concerned though they were not interested in adding the 
foremen to their ranks. On this point Reuther was unequivocal; "We 
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could have had the foremen. We directly said we wouldn't take them 
because we know the kind of fuzzy problems you get into ... I don't 
think you can represent labour and management at the same time. "(149) 
This stance highlights the precise nature of UAW strategy at this time 
and its ambitions for the union movement at large i. e. Reuther's 
jettisoning of any broad socialist ideology with the UAW as a 
springboard and instead adopting a pragmatic nationally organised but 
essentially accorwnodationist policy which was to result in a 
domination by the leadership and the pattern bargaining/C. O. L. A. 
agreements of the post war period. 
(150) Richard Frankensteen, vice- 
president of the UAW was quite candid about keeping the foremen out of 
his union; " first of all I would not trust them to speak for the 
interests of the people I represent. "(151) Frankensteen also used a 
different criteria for the definition of a supervisor from that used 
by the CIO. He emphasised the power of hire and fire as the crucial 
divide rather than work at the tools. He did not rule out the 
possibility that the FAA might affiliate to the CIO, but was emphatic 
in restressing Reuther's assertions that the UAW did not want 
them. 
(152) 
In spite of such sentiments unions like the UAW were not above 
using the foremen's union and its disputes in their tactical campaigns 
against employers. There was greater picket line cooperation, readily 
sanctioned by the UAW leadership, during the 
'reconversion' strikes of 
1945 for example, when the UAW itself was pressing for new agreements, 
than in the 1944 FAA strike wave and more so in the 1947 FAA-Ford 
strike, when the UAW leadership proved reluctant to give more 
than 
token support. The rank and file of the UAW, as we 
have seen, was 
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often more willing to give substance to pledges of support for the FAA 
and on numerous occasions the union leadership was forced to intervene 
to impose "discipline" and instruct their members to work 
normally. 
(153) In this posture the UAW was not alone. The Teamsters' 
leadership also stepped in at Ford in 1947 for example to instruct 
their drivers to refrain from honouring FAA picket lines. 
(154) 
The UAW generally adhered their vague pledge of support for the 
foremen's right to some form of representative organisation and, 
during strike periods members were instructed to perform only their 
normal jobs and "not to assume the functions or performance of duties 
normally carried out by foremen. "(155) Beyond this it was clear that 
the UAW had no strong commitment to aiding the FAA. Reuther had no 
ambitions to complicate what was becoming a clear line of demarcation 
between union and employer by recruiting or aiding intermediary ranks. 
There was little to gain in establishing close links with the FAA 
since the UAW already had a substantial power base by 1941, having 
organised all three of the major producers. Given the virulent 
employer and state reaction to the FAA, support for that union might 
easily mean more trouble than it was worth. This was especially true 
of the post-war period around 1947 when reaction to unionism in 
general was building and the extension of unionisation to foremen 
provided an easy target to those accusing the union movement of 
coveting a "socialised economy". Earlier reluctance on the part of the 
UAW leadership to give full support to the FAA might also be linked to 
the no-strike pledges of wartime production. Partly to aid the Soviet 
war effort and partly to demonstrate the responsibility and patriotism 
of unions like the UAW, these pledges were quite rigidly adhered to. 
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Thus the FAA's insistence on strike action, which precipitated some of 
the most costly stoppages during the war period, was unlikely to 
elicit much sympathy from leaders of the UAW. 
(156) 
Many FAA members were no doubt glad of their independence. 
Unionisation itself involved a major rethink of their position without 
the added complexity of finding themselves embroiled in the same 
organisation as their subordinates. For some foremen close association 
with unions such as the UAW could diminish their status and prestige. 
As one foreman put it, "If we belonged to the same organisation as the 
men, I do not think that would be right because they are considered, 
you know, a little below us. We are foremen. 1(157) Many other FAA 
members, particularly those newly promoted and with experience of UAW 
membership, may have held a different opinion although the step to 
foremanship with its continued appeals to status should not be 
underestimated in its power to generate a desire to stay aloof from 
the organisations of the production workers. 
Whether or not foremen of this period developed a general "union 
consciousness" or any sense of solidarity with a broad labour movement 
is a difficult question, since the definition of the concepts involved 
are problematic. There are many examples in the history of 
unionisation in Britain and the US where unions have shown themselves 
to be essentially divisive and as much about defending their position 
against each other as against employers - craft versus general or 
industrial unions, the jurisdictional disputes of the AFL and CIO and 
so on. At the level of ordinary membership some level of affinity is 
bound to exist, certainly in times of high union visibility such as in 
the automobile industry in the 1940s, but in general the ordinary 
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foreman's interest in unionisation extended only as far as an 
instrumental desire to preserve or enhance his position in terms of 
tangible economic or job related benefits. 
The leadership of the FAA operated under a different set of 
imperatives. For them there were pragmatic considerations to be taken 
into account in assessing their relationship to the wider union 
movement. The union was still comparatively small in number, faced 
with a concerted employer campaign and wavering state support, and 
reliant to a large extent on the conduct of production workers to make 
any industrial action effective. 
The FAA leadership continued to mirror that of the UAW in their 
official pronouncements, espousing a claim to their legal rights to 
organise but strongly protesting their desire to remain 
independent. (158) President Robert Keys outlined the FAA strategy - 
"the (UAW) union men feel that they want to set up a unit to bargain 
for the workmen and in doing so exclude the foremen. Therefore we 
start our own organisation and just as they excluded us, we are going 
to exclude higher ups... We want the workers to have their unions and 
get for their people what they can... We ask them to allow us to do the 
same thing.. . We should be separate. 
"(159) Keys thought there would be 
"considerable danger" if foremen belonged to the same union as 
production workers or affiliated to the CIO. "We all want a square 
deal in this industrial picture, the men, the foremen and management. 
It would be pretty hard to maintain this balance if the rank and 
file 
were members of the same parent organisation as the 
foremen. "(160) It 
is interesting that Keys set up this tripartite distinction - men, 
foremen and management - in contrast to the simply dichotomy proposed 
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by employers, i. e. workers and management, with foremen in the latter 
category. 
Beneath the outward appearance of a desire for independence, from 
either the union movement or the strictures of being bracketed as part 
of management, the FAA would probably have liked closer links with the 
UAW or CIO. Early on the FAA organisational director, Elmer Ross, had 
let it be known that in his opinion the CIO and AFL had left foremen 
"out on a limb" and they had been more or less forced to stay 
independent. (161) 
At the formal level then the FAA maintained or was forced to 
maintain its independence. Both the NLRB and NWLB failed to find any 
direct links between the FAA and the UAW. The NWLB's Slichter panel, 
though holding some misgivings about developments in the coal industry 
and the absorption of the UCTSE by the UMW, were nevertheless 
convinced that such an outcome in the automobile industry was unlikely 
given no concrete indication that the FAA and UAW were working in 
accord. 
(162) The NLRB echoed these findings despite the evidence of 
subpoenaed FAA correspondence and proclaimed, "There is not a 
scintilla of evidence in the record to suggest that the CIO or any 
other labour organisation has any voice in the politics or control 
over the actions of the Association. " The board chose only to note "a 
common purpose". 
(163) 
Despite these findings and public assurances by the FAA 
leadership of a continued desire to remain independent, there were 
intermittent appeals for support. Keys went to Cleveland in May 1943 
to negotiate with UAW president Thomas. The result - what employers 
were to call the "Thomas - Keys peace pact" - was simply a re- 
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stressing of "support in principle but not in practice" and repeated 
assurances that UAW members would not engage in supervisory 
tasks. (164) There was some interchange of information between the FAA 
and UAW connected with mutual aid in setting up wage claims etc.. The 
UAW used FAA research on job learning times to further claims before 
the NWLB over rates in 1944 for example. 
(165) Aid in the form of 
concerted official industrial action was not a feature of the 
relationship however, in spite of the periodic appeals by the FAA. 
The strongest of these appeals were to come in 1947 when the FAA 
was faced with the newly confrontational Ford management and the 
impending disabling legislation of Taft-Hartley. A victory in the 
strike at Ford at that time would have given the FAA an important 
boost. Keys sent out an official plea to the UAW's Walter Reuther 
asking him to instruct UAW members not to cross FAA picket lines at 
Ford, and also sent telegrams urging a national labour boycott of Ford 
products. Towards the end of the strike Keys sent appeals to the UAW 
for financial assistance and urged them to set up a strike fund to aid 
the FAA. The UAW international executive response was limited to 
offering to mediate in the dispute by acting as a go-between. 
(166) 
Workers crossed the FAA picket lines, and in spite of falling 
production levels the strike was terminated by the FAA after 72 days 
representing a comprehensive defeat for the union. 
(167) 
On a number of occasions it was within the UAW's power to give 
substantial aid to, and possibly to save the FAA from defeat at Ford 
and from eventual collapse. In common with Reuther's remarks that the 
UAW "could have had the foremen" if they had chosen so to do, the 
attitude of the UAW leadership was a mixture of political expediency 
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in the face of gathering employer hostility and the result of a 
strictly limited set of jurisdictional goals for the union movement. 
In the long term without the official support of the UAW or the wider 
union movement the failure of the FAA was hastened. There were other 
major elements involved in the decline, which will be explored in 
subsequent chapters, but the independence of the FAA, forced or 
otherwise, left it unprotected in the face of employers' counter- 
measures which were eventually to prevail. 
In summary, this chapter has briefly outlined the history of 
foremen's unionisation in industry in general and in the automobile 
industry in particular. The early attempts to unionise foremen at 
Chrysler in UAW Local 918 in 1938 can be seen as a important precursor 
to the emergence of the FAA, which went on to become the most 
important 20th century attempt to unionise supervision in American 
industry. The Chrysler experience was to highlight the foreman's 
proclivity to organise in modern industry given the right environment, 
the virulence of employer opposition to such organisation, and also 
the eventual reluctance of the union movement in general, and the UAW 
in particular, to provide support at anything more than token levels. 
The foundation of the FAA in 1941 was based on a number of 
factors and explanations concentrating on a central dynamic located in 
the sphere of state and legislative support need to be modified 
accordingly. The influence of production workers unions had an 
important effect at a number of levels. The securing of real wage 
rises and fixed, uniform, pay structures, albeit greatly enhanced by 
the immediate circumstances of war production, led to the consequent 
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erosion and obliteration of foremen's pay differentials. Government 
pay restrictions only perpetuated this growing disparity, as did an 
ideological stance on the part of many employers which ruled out the 
inclusion of foremen in overtime, bonus or similar cash based 
incentives. Management chose instead to emphasise the prestige aspects 
of the foremen's job. Many foremen, overworked in the turmoil and 
intensity of war production, not surprisingly rejected this supposed 
status as adequate recompense, turning instead to the FAA for redress. 
Beyond purely financial gains foremen saw, in the systems of 
collective bargaining operated by unions such as the UAW, the 
advantages to be gained in conditions of work and security of 
employment. The need for seniority provisions had a wide appeal for 
many foremen who sought job protection in the envisaged return to 
depression production levels with the cessation of armaments 
manufacture. The manifest failure and inadequacy of the "open door" 
system of individual representation also saw many foremen wishing to 
emulate the fixed grievance procedures which seemed to work so 
effectively for their workers. 
At a more direct level the influence of production workers' 
unions can be seen to operate at two levels. In terms of the general 
membership it has been seen that, with the increased output of 
wartime, large numbers of production workers, most with many years of 
experience of union representation, were promoted to the ranks of 
foreman. Receptivity to the notion of a union for foremen was thus 
bound to high among these workers. Rank and file members of the 
production workers unions and their local officials can also be seen 
to display support for the FAA in terms of overt support such as 
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respecting picket lines, distributing FAA promotional literature and 
so on, or tacit support in the form of ensuring the maximum disruption 
of production during FAA disputes. 
In terms of the leadership of the production workers union 
movement, both the CIO and AFL and individual internationals like the 
UAW were to espouse the rights of foremen to protection under the 
tenets of the Wagner Act but to refrain from advocating any formal 
links. Officially the FAA was to keep its independence from the 
general union movement, a difficult enough task given managerial 
proclivity for outlining unionisation in black and white terms, and 
the resulting elusiveness of a working definition of "neutrality" for 
unionised foremen. For employers, as we shall see in more detail 
below, foremen were either with management or against them. Wary of 
this attitude and the outcome of foremen's attempts to unionise in the 
coal industry which had resulted in the ultimate lapse into formal 
domination of the UCTSE by the Lewis's UMW, both the UAW and FAA 
leadership were at pains to stress that the were not acting in concert 
or affiliated to any common organisation. The UAW leadership was 
undoubtedly more fastidious in adherence to this principle and it was 
eventually their reluctance to afford the FAA the protection and 
resources of the wider union movement which hastened the decline of 
the foremens union movement. Support for foremen's unionisation can be 
seen as a good example of the growing contrast between the perceived 
pragmatism of the UAW leadership and the more radical aspirations of 
local officers and rank and file members. 
(168) 
There were other important influences behind the formation of the 
FAA beyond the pressures, examples and indirect support of the 
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production workers movement. In order to fully understand these it is 
necessary to examine the FAA in more detail - its membership profile 
and the general aims and ideology of both its members and leadership. 
The next chapter will do this and in addition look more closely at the 
specific phase of wartime restructuring of the labour market and 
methods of production and control from which the union emerged. 
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Chapter Seven: FAA - Aims and Environment 
Having established some of the influences and pressures upon 
foremanship which production workers unionisation had generated, this 
chapter will turn to an examination of two further aspects of the 
morphology of the FAA. Firstly it will examine the precise 
constituency of the union - to which sectors of supervision did it 
appeal. What profiles, if any, can be said to typify the leaders or 
ordinary membership? Secondly, what were the union's aims and general 
ideology, and how can the surprising degrees of radicalism exhibited 
by the FAA be explained in terms of short and long term objectives? 
Thirdly, to what extent did changes in the immediate environment of 
production - particularly during wartime - create an atmosphere 
conducive to, or indeed forcing foremen's collective action. 
To whom did the FAA appeal? In terms of formal eligibility the 
union generally limited membership to those involved in direct 
supervision on the shop floor. Definitional criteria did often vary 
from firm to firm however, dependent upon the peculiar complexities of 
individual supervisory jobs or simple inconsistency in titles. At the 
lower end of the scale the FAA had this definitional problem solved 
for them by the production workers unions' which had established their 
own working membership qualifications and usually excluded workers who 
did not spend a given percentage of their time at work directly on 
production. Thus leading hands, utility men and relief men might be 
considered as eligible by the UAW for example, but anyone of the rank 
of assistant foreman or above was out of bounds in terms of 
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recruitment. 
The upper limit of eligibility was to cause the FAA most 
problems. The union itself chose a broad distinction between those who 
were "administrative management" and those defined as "policy 
formulating management", the latter to be excluded. 
(') Not 
surprisingly employers refused to recognise such a distinction, 
insisting instead that all foremen had some role in formulating 
policy. Other definitions were also promulgated by the FAA including 
even more subjective limits e. g. "those whose duties require the 
supervision of other employees or who direct work". 
(2) In the event 
each company or plant had to be negotiated individually in this 
respect. At Packard for example assistant foremen, foremen and general 
foremen were eligible, division managers were not. At Ford, agreements 
excluded assistant superintendents, superintendents, building 
superintendents and "administrative supervisors". The latter 
definition was taken to mean non-shop floor based supervision. 
( 3) 
Disputes around the issue of eligibility were common, 
particularly around the upper limit. Titles often meant different 
things to different companies. Ford for example protested that their 
general foremen's job content would lead them to be classified as 
departmental superintendents in other companies. Similarly one general 
foreman at Hudson was in charge of nearly 400 workers, the company 
arguing that many superintendents in other plants would carry less 
responsibility. 
(4) The definitional problem was compounded by the use 
by many employers of the tactic of artificially upgrading workers 
explicitly to place them beyond the reach of the FAA. This happened at 
Briggs in 1944 for example when many foremen were promoted to 
Chapter Seven -340- 
assistant superintendent and superintendent. The FAA response in this 
case was to extend its definitional criteria to encompass both these 
ranks-(5) The NLRB response when called upon to arbitrate in such 
cases was to hold two separate certification elections, one 
exclusively for superintendents. The FAA often overreached its appeal 
in attempting to encompass this latter group. This was clearly 
illustrated at Hudson in 1946 when superintendents rejected the FAA as 
a bargaining agent by a ratio of ten to one whereas the rest of 
supervision were in favour of the union by a margin of 294 to 4. 
(6) 
Jurisdictional definitions for the purposes of formal agreements 
are perhaps of less interest here than the attempt to outline which 
sector of foremanship, defined by age, background, ideology and so on, 
the FAA appealed most strongly to. A division of foremen into two 
basic groupings - conservative, traditional, reactionary etc. on one 
hand and ambitious, radical, responsive to innovation etc. on the 
other - has formed the basis of a number of more recent arguments. 
Nichols and Beynon for example distinguished between "traditional 
foremen" and "management men" in their study of a large British 
chemical plant. The latter group was more receptive to change, ready 
to assimilate rather than resist knowledge of new technology and new 
methods and identified itself with managerial prerogatives. 
(7) 
Fletcher's study highlighted similar general divisions, this time with 
a third, intermediary strata. Conservatives - older, with lower levels 
of formal education and longer serving - and revolutionaries - young, 
better educated, more recently promoted and critical of managerial 
inertia were separated by a third category of radical foremen. 
(8) 
Other studies have noted the resistance by older, more established 
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foremen to change in the form of rationalisation of the labour 
process. Littler's study of the Bedaux system showed that older 
foremen were regarded as a "major source of resistance" to the 
system's implementation. Similarly Henry Gantt, designer of a popular 
group incentive system, observed that resistance among older foremen 
was "perhaps the hardest obstacle to overcome" in the entire process 
of installation. 
(9) Mass Observation's 1942 survey of British industry 
noted the wide variety of types of foremen but again drew attention to 
the distinct divide between younger foremen and their older, "strongly 
conservative" counterparts. 
(10) The University of Michigan Studebaker 
study carried out in 1943 also found older foremen to be more 
conservative and less willing to undertake or adopt new training 
methods. 
(11) 
The importance of these studies and observations is their 
refutation of the notion of a monolithic group of formen generally 
represented as "men in the middle". Foremen can more accurately seen 
to occupy a broad band in the heirarchy of the workforce, their 
position relating to managerial ideology being overdetermined by a 
composite of factors intrinsic and extrinsic to the factory - 
ethnicity, gender, education, training, and in particular, age and 
experience. The importance of these factors are in turn shaped by the 
levels of change of markets, production methods etc. in any specific 
period. 
Accepting these complexities and resultant inadequacy of too 
rigid a categorisation of foremen into fixed groups we can 
nevertheless see that during the early 1940s, with the introduction of 
new, highly unstable wartime production methods, and the influx of a 
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great many new foremen, a broad cleavage might be proposed between 
older, more established foremen, versed in the now traditional methods 
of production established from the 1920s onwards on one hand, and a 
newly promoted, union conscious, younger group, keen for advancement 
and ready to embrace the wealth of wartime training opportunities and 
unorthodox production methods, on the other. 
It seems probable that supervisory unionisation along the lines 
proposed by the FAA should appeal most strongly to the younger, more 
recently promoted group of foremen. As we have seen they came from a 
background of unionisation, could be reasonably expected to embrace 
change in working practices more readily and, given their more tenuous 
position on the promotional ladder, have more to gain from formalised 
union negotiations concerning manning levels etc. in the expected 
post-war contraction of production. Against this it must be noted that 
younger men, following Nichols' and Beynon's typology, might align 
themselves more closely with innovative aspects of management. They 
may also have not been totally compliant with membership of the 
production workers union, their acceptance of promotion itself marking 
them off from the aspirations of the union colleagues. This may be 
particularly true in the case of promoted union officials -a frequent 
occurrence throughout this and subsequent periods. Generally however, 
after taking these caveats into account, it seems not unreasonable to 
assume that the foregoing group of essentially younger foremen might 
still stand in contrast to their older, more established counterparts, 
given the latter's widespread participation in anti-union activity 
during the 1930s, and their role in working methods now viewed as 
traditional. The evidence presents a different picture however. 
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It is clear from the percentages of foremen voting in FAA 
certification elections that the union had a wide appeal across all 
sectors of foremen. Pro-FAA votes often exceeded 90% of all foremen in 
the automobile industry plants where the union experienced its period 
of rapid growth from 1941 onwards. At Packard in 1943 631 out of a 
total of 675 foremen turned out to vote at a hired booth outside 
company premises. Many lost pay to queue in driving rain for over 30 
minutes, only two voting against the FAA. 
(12) In the Hudson election 
of 1946 only four foremen rejected the FAA as bargaining agent. 
(13) 
The FAA clearly had a strong appeal across a range of ages and 
experiences. Many foremen with over 40 years service with the company 
had joined the FAA at Packard. 
(14) Contrast for example FAA member 
J. R. Wilkins, over 60 years of age and a foreman at Packard for 33 
years, with fellow FAA member Julius Smith, a foreman for several 
months only in 1943. 
(15) 
More surprising perhaps is the profile of those actively involved 
in the organisation of the FAA. Under normal circumstances it would 
seem that an accumulation of experience would be little impediment to 
union involvement, indeed this may be considered an attribute to the 
leadership of workers organisations. These factors in terms of 
foremanship should, given the notions of the correlation age and 
conservatism outlined above, work in reverse however. Again this is 
not the case and evidence points to a high level of involvement on the 
part of older foremen in FAA activity. At Gar Wood for example, 18 
foremen sacked for in 1947 for union activity averaged over 18 years 
service each with the company. Of the foremen sacked at Ford for 
alleged "violence and terrorism" in the FAA strike of the same year 
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over one third had been with the company for over 20 years, some for 
over 30. 
(16) 
Older foremen also proliferated in the leadership of the union, 
even if they did attempt an air of respectability which denied their 
radical stance and continued to display a posture of respectability. 
One observer at the FAA conference in 1944 gave an apt description of 
FAA officialdom. "(They) looked like businessmen rather than labour 
representatives ... The delegates were middle aged men for the most part 
in contrast to the youngsters who predominate in the CIO 
gatherings... ". 
(17) The average age of the FAA executive board was 
45. (18) Mike Quatro, president of the Briggs chapter had been a 
foreman since 1932. William Elliot Ford chapter president had over 26 
years service with the company. William Stafford, Timken Detroit Axle 
chapter president had 22 years service. Carl Brown worked at Ford for 
24 years before taking over the Ford FAA chapter presidency. 
(19) Some 
of these older foremen did have a history of union activity in the 
years preceding the FAA. Walter McNally, an organiser of the FAA at 
Murray, had been a committee member of the short lived UAW-CIO Local 
918 foremen's union at Chrysler in 1938 and had subsequently become 
president of the Murray-Ecorse Supervisors Association which was later 
to merge with the FAA. 
(2O) Omar Martineau, sacked in 1938 for union 
activity, was later to become president of one of the Ford FAA 
chapters. 
(21) Other FAA leaders had a longer history of union 
activity. W. M. Nelson, a foremen at Ford for over 20 years and 
prominent in the FAA leadership, had been a miner and active member of 
the UMW in his early life. 
(22) 
The leadership of the FAA was by no means the sole preserve of 
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older or more experienced foremen. Robert Keys, the first president of 
the FAA in 1941 was only 29 at the time. A product of the Ford Trade 
School he had moved rapidly from machine operator in 1935 to 
divisional foreman by 1940. (23) (It is interesting to note that Keys 
father had been a foreman at Ford for many years. 
(24)) Joseph Hornet, 
Hudson chapter president in 1944, and Frank Elliot, president of the 
Chrysler chapter at the same time, had been foremen for only four 
years each. Kenneth Diller, president of the GM Diesel Engine chapter 
in 1943 had taken up the post after being a foreman for less than one 
year. 
(25) 
It is clear that no typical profile of FAA members or leadership 
emerges in terms of either age or length of service in the foreman's 
job. Older foremen were active alongside their younger, more recently 
promoted colleagues at all levels of the union. This is somewhat 
surprising given the traditional image of reaction and conservatism 
among the former group - more so given the nature of FAA activity and 
the degree of radicalism exhibited by the union. 
Assessments of the evidence of radicalism must be tempered with 
the recognition that much propaganda of an alarmist nature was 
promulgated by employers during the FAA's lifetime. Accusations of the 
FAA being part of a grand conspiracy to socialise the American economy 
were rife throughout the period. These statements were of a calculated 
rhetorical nature designed to intimidate the FAA and were in keeping 
with the building anti-communist movement of the post war period. 
There was little or no substance in most of these accusations. Great 
play was made of the fact that Walter Nelson, the FAA's attorney, had 
once been a professed marxist and had acted as one of the Soviet 
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Union's US attorneys while Lenin was in power for example, although in 
reality Nelson had mellowed considerably by the 1940s. (26) Employers 
did have one tangible piece of evidence available for use in trying to 
prove the extremism of the FAA, that of the union's strike record. 
Indeed when we examine the FAA's proclivity to undertake direct 
industrial action of this nature it does seem that the union did 
exhibit an extraordinary degree of radicalism. 
Strike statistics are normally subject to certain reservations as 
an indicator of radicalism and no simple correlation can be 
necessarily put forward. 
(27) They are useful in the case of the FAA 
however in demonstrating the unusual lengths to which organised 
foremen were prepared to go to achieve recognition, especially so when 
viewed in the context of the wider union movement. During the war 
period for example the wave of FAA strikes which hit armaments 
production marked participating foremen off from production workers 
whose unions were prepared to pledge themselves to no-strike 
guarantees. 
FAA strikes came in identifiable waves which clearly indicate 
strategic patterns orchestrated by the union's leadership. These fall 
roughly into four phases or categories. Firstly 'establishment' 
strikes such as those at Ford in 1942 in response to Ford management 
moves to oust FAA leaders. 
(28) Similar employer-provoked strikes took 
place at Chrysler, Murray, Republic Steel, Packard and Briggs 
throughout 1942 and 1943. All resulted in some form of government 
intervention - usually through the agency of the War Labour Board - 
and all were resolved in favour of the union, although inconclusively 
in terms of permanent recognition. 
(29) 
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The second phase of strike activity comprised the wave of 
'showdown' strikes, centred around 1944. These strikes were ostensibly 
called for minor infractions - such as the refusal by foremen at 
Briggs in April 1944 to speed up production, which eventually resulted 
in a walk out by 1300 foremen. There were in reality part of a wider, 
coordinated campaign to force recognition of the FAA by the War Labour 
Board, to whom the NLRB had passed jurisdiction. By May 1944 Briggs, 
Hudson, Murray, Packard, Gar Wood and Aeronautical Products were all 
involved in the strike wave and some plants, notably Packard, were 
shut down completely. 
(30) 
The third phase of strikes - the 'reconversion' strikes of 1945 - 
coincided with the scaling down of war production. These were 
principally aimed at consolidating FAA-company agreements to ensure 
the guarantee of clauses on demotion, transfer, discharges, pay 
reductions and other factors which might affect foremen directly in 
the ensuing transfer from armaments to peacetime production. Foremen 
were understandably worried that the resulting contraction in output 
would cause serious depletion in their ranks. Few observers at the 
time foresaw anything but a return to the depression levels of 
production which had characterised the pre-war period. These fears 
were fuelled further by management statements on the uncertainty of 
returning to automobile production at all. 
The final major phase of strike activity called by the FAA 
involved the Ford River Rouge complex in 1947. This strike, involving 
over 3,800 foremen, came at a time when Ford had over a million car 
orders to fill, when the management there was emerging from the 
chaotic leadership of Henry Ford and Harry Bennett to the new regime 
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headed by Henry Ford II, and when government anti-FAA legislation in 
the form of the Taft-Hartley Act was imminent. 
(31) 
In all four phases of strike activity the hand of the leadership 
of the FAA can clearly be seen. Indeed the leaders of the union were 
quite candid about their promotion of strike activity for strategic 
purposes. As the Hudson FAA president admitted during the 'showdown' 
strikes, "We always felt that recognition was a fight between us and 
the NLRB, not between us and the company. "(32) Certainly the companies 
involved were convinced that many of the strikes in their plants were 
part of a wider concerted campaign and the minor incidents which 
usually sparked them off were merely used as pretexts by the FAA 
leadership. ( ) This readiness on the part of the leadership of the 
FAA to use the strike weapon in order to gain recognition must be 
viewed in the context of the impact of such decisions. It is difficult 
to underestimate the seriousness of the strikes called during the war 
period for example. Between July 1943 and November 1944 there were 
over 20 FAA strikes, resulting over 660,000 man days of lost 
production. 
(34) Aero engine production was particularly badly hit 
during the 1944 strikes which General Arnold was to refer to as "one 
of the most serious setbacks that the army airforce programme has had 
since its inception". Production of over 250 planes was lost. 
(35) 
Press reaction, scarcely in favour of the union movement at the best 
of times, was particularly hostile over the FAA's wartime strikes. The 
Detroit Free Press of April 5th 1944 for example carried a leader 
entitled "Betraying our soldiers for "rights"" which went on to 
recommend that striking foremen's names be "writ large on the scroll 
of national infamy. " FAA leaders were to repeatedly protest their 
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patriotism in response to such charges, nevertheless these strikes 
were genuinely unpopular and promotion of them must be seen as 
indicative of the conviction of the FAA leadership to pursue the 
establishment of the union with a degree of radicalism which at times 
marked them off from the mainstream of the union movement. 
This radicalism or determination should not be viewed as solely 
leadership driven. The FAA was a popular union among foremen in the 
core of automobile plants which formed its organisational base, as 
reflected in membership density figures. While it is largely the case 
that strikes were called at the behest of the union's central 
leadership, the levels of participation and the conduct of those 
involved reveals a surprising degree of militancy. 
FAA strikes were characterised by well supported picket lines. 
Violent confrontation, whether direct or indirect, was also a regular 
feature, and seems to have been aimed not at production workers, who, 
as we have seen of ten informally aided the cause of the foremen, but 
rather at members of supervision, especially higher supervision, whose 
refusal to support the FAA could be most damaging. During the Briggs 
FAA strike of 1944 for example police were called in to stop fighting 
on the picket lines among striking and non-striking foremen. Some 
superintendents were beaten or molested and prevented from entering 
the plant. Others superintendents chose to stay in the plant, day and 
night, for up to ten days rather than run the gauntlet of the 24 hour 
FAA picket. In the end the company applied to the courts to serve 
injunctions restraining foremen from interfering with superintendents, 
although it seems these had little effect. 
(36) Attempts to coerce 
superintendents extended in some cases to kidnapping, damage to homes 
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and threats to family members. 
(37) At another plant non striking 
foremen's cars were pelted with bricks, and groups of striking foremen 
intercepted non-striking foremen and superintendents, on their way to 
work or at home, with threats of beatings. 
(38) At Aeronautical 
Products FAA members chased the company president who had been filming 
their picket line, smashing his car windows and his camera. 
(39) 
Similar scenes occurred at Ford in 1947. In this major 
confrontational strike less than 100 of the 1,800 foremen on the first 
shift stayed at work. The rest formed a mass picket at the main gate 
or helped to block the railway tracks into the plant. 
(40) Again 
reports of beatings and damage to property were widely reported as 
were accounts of foremen forming themselves into "goon squads" armed 
with clubs, knives and guns. 
(41) Ford management made an issue of this 
conduct when sacking 32 alleged ringleaders after the strike for acts 
of "violence and terrorism". 
(42) 
Violent confrontation, although a feature of many FAA strikes, 
was not the dominant means of protest. More peaceful methods were used 
by striking FAA foremen. At Ford 50 car convoys were organised to move 
slowly round the plant disrupting traffic. Some older foremen took to 
riding wheelchairs around the main gate area, carrying placards 
protesting about Ford's poor pension provisions. 
(43) Photographic 
records of the FAA pickets show a generally well turned out set of 
men, reluctant to abandon the ubiquitous suit, tie and trilby for the 
rigours of the picket line. 
(44) 
In spite of the generally peaceful nature of FAA strikes there 
was a significant level of violent confrontation, and levels of 
support in general indicate the general willingness of FAA members to 
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take the militant step, for supervision, of engaging in direct action 
against the company. This militancy is also reflected in the fact that 
many FAA strikes were of considerable duration, some lasting many 
months. The FAA strike at Bohn Aluminium and Brass in 1946 lasted 190 
days and was, at that time, the longest running strike in Michigan's 
history. (45) 
This readiness of the FAA leadership and members to engage in 
strike activity did not have any adverse effect on membership. 
Recruiting levels usually showed a net increase during stoppages. 
There were foremen who rejected the use of the strike weapon and 
withdrew from FAA membership because of this, but these were more than 
counterbalanced by the numbers joining in response to the higher 
profile attained by the union during strike periods. During the Briggs 
strike of 1944, nearly 200 new members were recruited at the company's 
plants. 
(46) 
Having established that the FAA appealed to a wide spectrum of 
foremen and that the general membership were prepared to follow their 
leadership in engaging in direct confrontations with both employers 
and non-FAA colleagues, we now turn to an examination of the general 
aims of the union. What was it that foremen were seeking in engaging 
in such activity? Beyond the immediate concern of building up 
membership and establishing legal sanction and company recognition, 
what were the ambitions, and what general demands were characteristic 
of the FAA? Where did the leadership see their union fitting into the 
industrial relations landscape and what did ordinary foremen think was 
in it for them when they signed up with the FAA? 
In institutional terms the FAA had both limited and wide 
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ambitions. Aims to expand or establish links either upward into the 
managerial hierarchy or downward into the ranks of production workers 
were limited and not central to FAA leaders' aspirations. As far as 
expansion downwards through the ranks of production workers or 
affiliation with unions and organisations such as the UAW or CIO, this 
had been rejected as a strategy as much by the production workers 
organisations as the FAA, although as we have seen above there were 
occasions when the FAA would have liked closer links. With regard to 
expansion upwards through the ranks of superintendents, this had been 
largely rejected by workers at that level when given opportunity to 
vote, and is reflected in low recruitment levels among higher strata 
of supervision. 
(47) In contrast to these limited ambitions, whether 
the result of pragmatic or ideological considerations, the leadership 
of the FAA saw great opportunities in terms of horizontal expansion. 
Union president Robert Keys estimated that there were over two million 
foremen eligible for FAA membership in the 1940s. Extensive plans were 
laid to broaden the appeal of the union via education programmes and 
radio broadcasts. Regional offices were set up in the drive to move 
beyond the automobile related industries clustered around the Detroit 
area. 
(48) The FAA also had ambitions towards other extant foremen's 
organisations. Independents such as the Hudson Foreman's Association, 
the Supervisors Association of the Murray Corporation and the 
Studebaker Salaried Employees Association were all absorbed as 
chapters of the FAA. The Union also took over several foremen's social 
clubs initially set up by employers. 
(49) 
In the long term the union leadership envisaged itself as a major 
constituent in the formation of a responsible third party in 
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industrial relations. Behind a cultivated image of respectability and 
status which ranged from the commissioning of lavish country clubs to 
the use of the title of "building chairman" or "chapel chairman" for 
its minor officials, the FAA idealised a world of industrial 
cooperation with itself in the centre of a tripartite system. 
(50) 
Although part of this vision was undoubtedly a rhetorical defence 
designed to counter employer claims that the FAA was a device to 
deliver up American management to total union control, the FAA's 
general aspiration was the formation of a permanent intermediary 
organisation reshaping industrial relations in the USA. 
At a more practical level, and of more immediate concern to the 
ordinary foreman who signed up, were the specific, short term aims of 
the FAA as revealed in bargaining issues. Demands presented to 
companies by chapters of the FAA address a range of concerns. 
Recognition and bargaining rights are obvious inclusions, and pay 
levels, overtime and shift working arrangements, and general welfare 
related issues were given a high priority. The FAA often went beyond 
this to demand a "voice" in promotion, transfer and demotion, and 
perhaps most important the establishment of some form of seniority 
provision. 
(51) Some FAA chapters also demanded that foremen's 
representatives should be allowed to negotiate on any company policy 
which might affect foremen and also that FAA representatives take an 
active part in negotiations between employers and production workers 
unions. 
(52) 
Pay and related issues were bound to be important for most FAA 
members, especially in the light of the erosion of differentials 
brought about by the establishment of production workers unions and 
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the exigencies of war production. Nevertheless contemporary 
commentators noted the equal if not greater stress placed by many 
foremen on the need for security of employment to be enhanced through 
fixed grievance procedures and seniority provisions. Indeed by 1947 
when the list of demands at Ford was drawn up pay related issues were 
largely in the background having been eclipsed by promotion, 
classification and demotion related issues. 
(53) The origins of this 
trend lie in the periods of war production and the growing uncertainty 
of reconversion. 
The NWLB panel found that by 1944, "(t)he greatest fear of 
foremen today is that they will be laid off or demoted when cutbacks 
and cancellations of any war orders occur. "(54) Numbers of foremen had 
been rapidly inflated as the war had progressed and contractions to 
employment levels characteristic of the late 1930s would therefore 
bring mass reductions in the levels of supervisory staff. Events 
seemed to provide a foundation for these fears. Ford for example was 
set to shed over 50% of foremen's by the end of the war. In 1944 alone 
over 2500 foremen were demoted at Willow Run - 900 in a single 
month. 
(SS) For some companies reconversion to peacetime production 
meant that whole sectors of production might be replaced. Foremen at 
Chrysler's Wyoming plant -a pre-war body stamping plant - had been 
promoted and trained in machining parts for Bofors gun production. 
After the war, with the return to body production, these jobs and the 
particular skills involved were to disappear entirely. Briggs 
management threatened to go one stage further and insisted that they 
might not even return to bodymaking at their plants, but seek instead 
other, new lines of production. 
(56) Some companies did offer a form of 
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security to demoted foremen. Briggs for example promised to put 
foremen on an "indispensable" list for twelve months and guarantee 
them a production job. 
(57) Many foremen's anxieties were unallayed. 
They remained convinced that they had burned their bridges upon 
acceptance of promotion. As one foreman put it, "(t)he talk around the 
shop was that the foreman had only two moves to make, that is, either 
up or out. If a man did not make out as a foreman he was not taken 
back and put on the job - he was fired. "(58) In some cases the route 
back to the ranks of production work was blocked by union agreements, 
and seniority rankings had been forfeited on promotion. 
(59) Some 
unions had suggested secondary seniority lists for demoted 
supervisors. Others had agreements whereby seniority for promoted 
workers was retained. In general however demotion to the ranks was 
viewed as an alarming prospect by a great many foremen. This was 
especially true in the case of foremen deemed to be over-zealous in 
their duties. The UAW actually amended its constitution to allow 
charges to be levelled at members for "conduct unbecoming union 
members" while holding supervisory positions, even though at the time 
of their alleged misconduct their membership of the UAW was suspended 
through the issuance of withdrawal cards. 
(60) 
Fear of the consequences of reconversion and resultant insecurity 
had thus put seniority provisions and negotiated demotion levels high 
on the agenda for many FAA members, and clearly the FAA leadership 
retained an interest in keeping supervisory staffing levels high in 
order to maintain their base of support. There are other aspects in 
addition to the foregoing and directly relating to war production 
which may hold a further key to understanding the appeal of the FAA. 
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We have already seen how expanded production brought a large increase 
in numbers of foremen, many of them with backgrounds of union 
membership, and how wartime pressures on pay levels had adversely 
affected supervisory jobs. Wartime created another set of pressures on 
foremanship in the form of changing the job content and working 
environment of supervision, pressures which may have found a release 
in the demand for collective action. Unacclimatised and untrained 
workers, higher supervision ratios and new work patterns and products 
are among the wartime problems which faced both experienced and newly 
promoted foremen. 
The rapid wartime expansion of production in existing and newly 
constructed plants brought with it a massive increase in the demand 
for factory labour. This problem was exacerbated by the loss to the 
armed forces of many experienced factory workers. The demography of 
the workforce underwent rapid change in the early period of the war 
and by 1943 one out every two workers was new to the industry. 
(61) 
Women workers posed a particular problem for the predominantly male 
supervisory workforce as the number of women in the automobile 
industry rose from around 46,000 in 1939 to over 200,000 by 1943. 
(62) 
Many of these women workers experienced problems fitting in to factory 
life, and foremen often bemoaned their new role in supervising the 
adjustment. As one foreman, referring to women workers, complained, 
"It isn't like the good old automobile days when you hired 
people. . . and they knew how a tool crib was and where to go 
for this 
and that. "(63) Other foremen complained of a lack of discipline among 
the newer women employees, especially with regard to timekeeping. 
(64) 
Lack of skill in certain aspects of production did put addition 
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pressure on foremen, although it must be noted that the majority of 
women workers went to jobs requiring short training periods. 
(65) 
Prejudicial treatment of women workers by foremen needs to be 
placed in the context of a general chauvinism in the factory. Women 
workers often had to contend with both foremen and union 
representatives to ensure their rights at work. The UAW officials for 
example reflected many of the attitudes of its predominantly male 
membership in refusing seniority provisions for women, granting 
instead only temporary wartime status, and that on separate lists from 
the men. 
(66) 
In addition to being effectively ghettoised into low skill 
sectors of the workplace women continued to be effectively excluded 
from the majority of supervisory posts. Employers were partly aware of 
the animosity of male workers towards supervision by women, but also 
undoubtedly adhered to the belief, widely disseminated in management 
literature of the period, that women were temperamentally unsuited to 
this kind of responsibility. Where women did become supervisors, it 
continued to be in those areas where the workforce was almost 
exclusively composed of other women. These women supervisors continued 
as before to get less pay than their male counterparts. 
(67) 
Where women were employed in departments which had previously had 
a mainly male workforce men continued to dominate supervision. A 
problem of attitudes frequently arose in this situation which 
reflected a paradoxical view held by many foremen. Women were seen on 
one hand as new workers, with unequal rights to established workers or 
to new male workers, and thus open to abuse. On the other hand women 
workers were seen as somehow weaker, less robust than their male 
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counterparts and in need of delicate treatment. Training literature 
for foremen often stressed the different way in which women were to be 
treated. Glen Gardiner, the period's most popular writer of manuals 
and tracts on shop floor supervision, frequently advised on the 
correct way for foremen to deal with women workers. In one chapter 
entitled, 'Starting a Woman on her First Job: Why New Women Workers 
Need Special Consideration', Gardiner elaborated a full range of 
popular gender stereotyping including, "She is more emotional, she has 
less self confidence, she is more susceptible to praise, she dislikes 
responsibility, she is better suited to repetitive work. " He closed by 
advising foremen, "In your dealings with women workers always remember 
that they are women and must not be given the same matter of fact 
treatment you afford to men employees. "(68) Many foremen did feel 
constrained to moderate their language in front of women workers. 
(69) 
Many others probably did not. In one incident at Chrysler in 1944 for 
example a conflict emerged over one foreman's brusque treatment of the 
women workers in his department who objected to being told to "get 
back to your god-damn benches and get the damn work out. " The women on 
this occasion, in contrast to Gardiner's image, responded by 
threatening to punch the foreman on the nose. 
(70) 
The problems in adjusting to supervision of women workers which 
American foremen perceived were in many ways similar to those 
experienced by their British counterparts during this period. Women 
factory workers responded to the discomfiture of foremen in a variety 
of ways. Those interviewed by Mass Observation during the war railed 
against the "silly, semi-military" discipline adopted by some foremen. 
Others tried a tactical approach. Mrs. W. Burgess, working at Morris, 
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recalled that the foreman would always help out - if the women workers 
did not bully him. (71) Evidence in a report compiled by the Medical 
Research Council suggests that many foremen simply allowed women 
workers considerable autonomy, withdrawing to become a remote figure 
on the shop floor. 
(72) 
The response to the influx of women workers in both countries 
obviously varied dependent on individual foremen and ratios of new 
workers involved, but it seems clear that a new dimension of pressure 
was brought to bear on many foremen by this new sector of the 
workforce. The post-war remarks of the Ford Labour Relations Director 
are illuminating on this point. "From foremen all over the 
place... there was a sigh of relief when they could let women go... The 
general expression was "Thank god that's over! And we'll pray that it 
never has to happen again. ""(73) Foremen had been trapped between the 
twin pressures of their own hostile response to the idea of women 
performing on a par with men, especially in the areas of skilled work 
reintroduced by armaments production( 74), and their unease with the 
persistent method of pushing out production by robust verbal 
encouragement which women, from a traditional male point of view, were 
too delicate to be subjected to. 
Another major demographic change in the structure of the 
workforce during the war years was the migration of many rural workers 
to industrial areas like Detroit. Black workers from the south arrived 
in the area in unprecedented numbers. Many factories were compelled to 
end their informal discriminatory hiring policies during this period. 
Chrysler for example had no black employees in 1941. By 1944 they 
employed over 4,000, forced into a change of policy by interventionary 
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recruitment by the Government Employment Agency. 
(75) Inside the 
factory the discriminatory processes of the pre-war period continued 
unabated. Black workers were still primarily confined to the jobs 
considered to be unsuitable for white labour. The Ford foundries, much 
expanded by 1943, were still comprised of over 95% black workers. 
Black women found it difficult to secure any work at all - even Ford 
proving reluctant to hire them. 
(76)Racial 
tensions among the workforce 
were heightened by an accompanying influx of southern white workers. 
Where labour shortages made it inevitable that black workers moved 
into previously all white departments a number of "hate strikes" among 
white workers occurred. Hudson, Packard and Ford all experienced this 
phenomenon as a precursor to the city-wide race riots in Detroit which 
erupted in 1943. 
(77) 
Foremen were often accused of fostering racist or discriminatory 
attitudes towards the expanding black workforce. The personnel 
department at Ford, in attempting to shift these attitudes, complained 
of the inertia of foremen at Willow run, and their reluctance to 
tackle either their own or their workers' prejudices. 
(78) At Chrysler 
foremen were known to keep seniority lists with a letter 'c' next to 
the names of black workers and there were frequent complaints that 
penalties for minor infractions were comparatively more harsh for 
black workers. Promotions were also regulated much as before the war 
and despite the increase in the number of foremen, proportionally 
fewer black workers were promoted. Movement to better jobs or even 
minor supervisory posts were still arbitrarily decided upon, often to 
the exclusion of more competent or longer serving black employees. 
(79) 
In addition to generating an atmosphere of unrest on the shop 
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floor, albeit fuelled by the racism of many foremen, the influx of 
rural workers, black and white, created the same kind of pressures on 
foremanship that women workers had, i. e. they were unaccustomed both 
to the rhythms and pace of factory life and specifically untrained for 
most jobs. That it was the foreman's job to oversee training 
programmes only added to the increased burden of his wartime task. 
Older workers were also kept on in the workforce as the war 
progressed. An industry that had been typified as a young man's 
environment, where only the fittest could stand the pace, became one 
where the over-40s no longer feared imminent dismissal. This was 
partly due to union agreements and partly due to the need to shorten 
expanding vacancy lists. By 1943 at Willow Run the median age of 
employees was 37,21% of men employed being over 50,44% over 40. 
(80) 
Foremen who were expected to push production along were thus 
confronted by a workforce unable to respond, even if they felt 
inclined to, at the levels of the more easily intimidated "suitcase 
brigade" of predominantly younger workers of the pre-war years. In 
addition many of the remaining skilled jobs in the factory were 
increasingly filled by dilutees or "upgraders" - workers trained in 
limited aspects only of skilled work, again creating training and 
supervision difficulties for foremen. 
(81) 
If the above problems generated by demographic change in the 
workforce - the introduction of a new wave of women, blacks and rural 
workers, the aging of the workforce, diluted skill levels etc. - 
created new pressures on foremanship in terms of supervision of 
production and training and generated tensions in the social 
atmosphere of the shop floor, then the situation was exacerbated by 
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the inexperience of many of the wartime foremen. The same trends which 
forced the introduction of new groups of unacclimatised workers also 
forced the rapid promotion and training of many new foremen. Many 
experienced foremen had joined the armed forces at the onset of war, 
deferred draft status being tardily imposed. This left the already 
depleted ranks of experienced supervision to be spread even thinner 
among the expanded or new factories. Thus foremen in established 
plants such as those at the Ford River Rouge complex lost many of 
their colleagues to the new Willow Run bomber plant, while those who 
were transferred were often overwhelmed by the size of their new 
task. 
(82) We noted in the previous chapter the high ratio of newly 
promoted foremen during the war period. A further indication of the 
level of new recruitment is given by statistics from the Chrysler 
DeSoto plant where 198 out of a total of 225 foremen in 1946 had been 
promoted since the outbreak of war. 
(83) 
Even figures as high as those above mask the true rates of 
promotion as a large percentage of new supervisory recruits failed to 
make the grade, pushing up turnover rates among foremen. At the Willow 
Run plant in the winter of 1943 demotions were running at the rate of 
200 per month despite high production levels. 
(84) As one contemporary 
noted, "... most of those individuals were crackerjack workmen or they 
never would have been picked in the first place, but they were not 
supervisors. tt(85) In many ways the new foremen were given little 
chance to succeed. Expected to cope with the training and supervision 
of new, inexperienced workers in an atmosphere of intense production 
expectations, where everything was urgent and quality expected to be 
exemplary, the new foreman himself received little or no formal 
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training either in supervisory skills or technical aspects of the 
job. (86) 
Even with the increased numbers of foremen, untrained as many of 
them were, they still failed to keep pace with the growth in the size 
of the general workforce. Foreman-worker ratios widened throughout the 
war years. At Packard for example each foreman averaged 26 workers in 
a workforce of over 8,200. By 1944 the average had risen to 32 workers 
each in a workforce of 39,000. Similarly at Ford the ratio of foremen 
and leading hands to production workers increased from 10: 1 to 18: 1 
between early 1943 and 1944. 
(87) 
In summary, the factory of the war years was typified by a large 
contingent of new, unacclimatised and often unskilled workers 
supervised by experienced foremen who found their depleted numbers 
spread progressively thinner. The urgency of production schedules and 
long hours of work compounded these problems. Newly promoted foremen 
faced identical pressures, made worse by their general lack of 
training and experience. All these trends took place against a 
background of reorganisation of the labour process, brought about by 
the shif t from automobile to armaments production, which was to add 
yet another dimension to the difficulties of the foreman's position. 
We have already touched upon the increased size of many of the 
existing automobile factories and the establishment of many new ones. 
Older factories generally modified and expanded existing plant and 
machinery to build a new product range, some of which was radically 
different from previous output. Ford began to build torpedo boats at 
the River Rouge plant. Hudson switched to the production of B29 bomber 
parts. Chrysler became involved in the manufacture of a diverse range 
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of products including 40mm. anti-aircraft guns, ammunition, gyroscopic 
compasses and wings and engines for the B29. Packard began to produce 
Rolls Royce designed aero and marine engines. 
(88) To facilitate the 
increased capacity manufacturers expanded into new, purpose built 
factories such as Ford's Willow Run, or alternatively took over and 
converted existing premises. Packard for example expanded into the 
Bundy Tubing and Hupp Motors plants to accommodate a workforce which 
more than quadrupled in size during the war period. 
(89) 
Setting up new production lines created huge logistical problems 
and the shortening of product evolution and obsolescence cycles 
brought on by the exigencies of war meant that in many cases 
production methods could not be rationalised for any length of 
time. (90) New design imperatives, revealed by the field application of 
armaments, constantly intruded on shop floor production. The fact that 
almost all production was on government cost-plus contracts which 
guaranteed manufacturers a fixed profit over actual costs incurred 
meant that employers had little incentive to avoid normally costly 
interruptions as machinery was retooled. 
Armaments manufacture also brought a significant amount of 
reskilling to the workforce. Many parts now needed to be machined to 
much closer tolerances for example. Tank transmission gears required 
greater precision in filing and gauging than automobile gears. 
Grinding operations on the Bofors gun involved tolerances accurate to 
within one two-thousandth of an inch, twice the degree of accuracy 
required in automobile production. 
(91) Assembly work also became more 
complex in terms of coordination and dexterity. Whereas the average 
automobile comprised around 4,000 parts, a tank averaged around 
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11,000, aircraft sections as many as 25,000. 
(92) Many new materials 
were also introduced, particularly alloys used in aircraft production, 
posing new problems of fabrication and assembly. 
(93) 
Many established methods of working had to be abandoned to 
facilitate the new products and materials. In particular many of the 
machine-paced production lines typical of automobile manufacture had 
to be dismantled. Aircraft and aircraft sections were generally 
assembled at fixed stations being larger and more complex. The bigger 
and more intricate aero engines, such as the Pratt and Whitneys at 
Ford, also needed to be assembled in a stationary position. 
(94) There 
also occurred a shift in the balance of occupations from assembly to 
machining. Whereas in automobile production the majority of workers 
were involved in assembly of some kind, in armaments production, 
particularly tanks and guns, the majority were involved in machining 
parts. 
(95) 
Both the restructuring of skill levels and the changing balance 
of jobs introduced problems of retraining both for supervisors and 
workers. 
(96) Older foremen, in addition to their younger colleagues, 
experienced dislocations in the continuity of their job. Some were 
taken from departments which had completely 
duration, such as the trim shop (appointments 
being primarily of a utilitarian nature) or 
expected to undergo retraining in completely 
Harry Harms for example, foreman at Hudson for 
taken off sheet metal work to train on delicate 
disappeared for the 
for military equipment 
the paint shops, and 
different fields. (97) 
16 years by 1944, was 
soldering work on mine 
production. He was rapidly placed on production, in charge of a group 
of women workers, themselves with little training. Harms struggled to 
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keep up production but was eventually fired. 
(98) 
As Fay Taylor, 
personnel manager at Briggs summed up the situation, "We had no 
trimming. We had very little painting. We had very little metal 
finishing. The business we were in was of a mechanical nature, where 
it required considerable mechanical knowledge, a business where 
micrometers, callipers and verniers are used, and a number of 
foremen... in the automobile days didn't know what micrometers were. 
They didn't have to know. They dealt in inches not thousandths. "(99) 
Equipment was often damaged or written off by inept operation. As new 
and unfamiliar machinery was introduced to established shops foremen 
were often as ignorant as their workers on how to operate it. 
(100) 
The above changes in the labour process meant that the job of 
supervision, even for experienced foremen, underwent commensurate 
fundamental change. As we have seen in earlier chapters the 
rationalisation of work through paced or routinised work flows caused 
the role of supervision to become at least partially embedded within 
the labour process itself as the way in which tasks were performed 
imposed inherent limits on levels of worker discretion. As the 
formalised automobile production lines were broken down to be replaced 
by more fluid processes and product developments, staffed by a high 
percentage of new workers, the job of foreman reverted in part to a 
pre-Fordist conception. The foreman, whose job had been to push 
production along as an adjunct to the highly rationalised processes of 
the 1930s and who was chosen with an emphasis on the ability to coerce 
or cajole, was now faced with a new type of worker, often engaged in 
work with which the foreman himself was unfamiliar and, with the 
devolution of machine pacing in many areas, was to be regulated by a 
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means which older foremen had long forgotten and newer ones never 
known. To be sure, organised appeals to patriotism counted for a great 
deal in stimulating workers to produce at optimum levels. In spite of 
this the pressures of wartime production targets and the constant 
urgency of many products, and the problems of controlling a workforce, 
now largely unionised and protected by government interventions in the 
labour market, and generally unwilling to respond to established 
confrontational supervisory methods, placed great stress on many 
foremen. 
Bernard Hoffman's diaries paint a picture of the resultant 
general confusion of the period with a slow degeneration of the 
foremen's spirit, and supervision "desperate and trying anything that 
comes to anyone's mind". 
(101) The pressures were compounded by the 
expectation that foremen should put in long hours as six or seven day 
working weeks became the norm in most factories. Chrysler for example 
adopted a six day week as standard, Briggs worked seven day weeks from 
1942 onward and at Packard a 63 hour minimum week was established 
following Pearl Harbour. 
(102) The situation was at its worst where 
urgent or "hot parts" were prevalent. In the Packard connecting rod 
and crank case departments for example foremen usually put in a 
77 
hour week with little relief from production pressures. 
(103) Many 
foremen had the added burden of attendance at after-work conferences 
to discuss production. 
(104) We have already noted the dissatisfaction 
this extended working created among foremen in terms of 
inadequate 
wage levels and erosion of differentials as a major stimulus to 
the 
seeking of formal representation. The obvious 
fatigue induced by 
working under such conditions must also have added another 
dimension 
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to the general unrest and resentment felt by many foremen during this 
period. 
Wartime also brought an increase in the bureaucratic 
constrictions placed on the role of foreman. State regulation of the 
labour market for example imposed a new framework of strictures 
further affecting the now limited power of the foreman to control 
labour mobility. Just as in the First World War in Britain "leaving 
certificates" had been introduced in order to ensure that workers 
could not move around freely and take advantage of the general 
shortage of labour, so too in the US in World War Two wage and labour 
stabilisation orders, issued by the government, meant that foremen, 
in addition to the restrictions already imposed by union procedures, 
had to contend with official documentation before hiring, transferring 
or attempting to dismiss workers. The Walsh-Healey Act for example 
laid down exacting conditions of employment covering hiring, 
dismissal, wage levels and working conditions for all employees 
working on government contracts, and insisted on full and accurate 
records of employment being kept for each worker. 
(105) This situation 
led in part to an expanded role for personnel and labour relations 
departments to handle extra documentation, but also to an increased 
burden on shop floor supervision and a reluctance on the part of many 
foremen to exercise whatever limited authority they had left. 
(106) 
There was also a degree of direct intrusion on the factory floor 
by government officials. Stringent government quality inspection 
standards had already put extra pressure on foremen, who now found 
themselves under the scrutiny of external inspectors. One foreman at 
Packard for example was sacked for incorrectly marking the weight of a 
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consignment of parts. 
(107) FBI investigators were frequently called 
into the factory to investigate a wide range of issues. These usually 
pertained to allegations of sabotage or hiring irregularities but 
investigations were often made into the conduct of foremen, especially 
where sidelines such as "foreigners" or "kick-backs" might be in 
operation. 
(108) 
In certain circumstances government regulation worked in the 
foreman's favour. Workers at Chrysler for example complained that 
whenever there was a dispute over rate classification or wages the 
foremen's rejoinder was "why don't you quit? ", knowing full well that 
in order to secure alternative employment workers had to remain out of 
work for at least 60 days unless a release form had been issued. 
(109) 
This was against the general trend however, and foremen overall 
found themselves increasingly constrained by new regulations and 
expected to devote more and more of their time to administrative 
tasks. Hudson's industrial relations director summarised the position. 
"The foremen had to be retrained; there were war manpower directives, 
new War Labour Boards, all the other regulations, edicts and 
directives and governmental situations from the top, and union 
pressure from below... We have to tell (the foremen) how your uncle Sam 
wants it done and how Mr. Union wants it done. "(110) 
As far as pressure from "Mr. Union" the foreman in the US war 
industries was spared the extra intrusion of joint production 
initiatives. Constraints on the foreman in the US from the shop floor 
continued in the form of procedures imposed through union agreements 
rather than the extra dimension of control presented through 
structures like the Joint Industrial Committees and Joint Production 
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Committees which had emerged in Britain during the two wars. These had 
had the effect of partially excluding foremen on matters concerning 
production. 
("') There were attempts to introduce such cooperative 
structures in the US, such as that outlined in Walter Reuther's "500 
Planes a Day" plan where by production controls would be strongly 
influenced by a committee composed of skilled shop floor workers. The 
scheme, which GM president C. E. Wilson typified as a "Russian style" of 
management, was rejected along with similar initiatives, as control 
of production in the formal sense was left in the hands of American 
management. 
(112) For the shop floor foreman to be spared the extra 
intrusion of such joint initiatives was only a partial relief. He 
remained under the increased administrative and regulatory pressure 
which governmental controls added to the already restricting union 
procedures. 
In summary, this chapter has explored aspects of the appeal and 
aims of foremen's unionisation through an examination of the profile 
of those involved and an understanding of the changing environment, 
particularly during wartime, in which the FAA took root. 
The leadership of the FAA, faced with rejection and hostility 
from supervision of the rank of superintendent and above, and the 
established jurisdiction of the production workers below the rank of 
assistant foreman, had nevertheless been confident of a high level of 
nationwide recruitment in the broad strata encompassing those with 
supervisory roles based on the shop floor. Definitional difficulties 
apart, this broad band comprised variations not only in 
formal job 
description but, perhaps more importantly in age, experience and 
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attitudes. Several typologies have outlined distinct groupings or 
dichotomies within supervision from reactionary to radical, management 
oriented to insular etc. and, through an examination of enrolment 
figures and activist profiles, the above notions were tested to see if 
any specific group of foremen, as defined by age, experience or 
background, was prevalent in the FAA. In fact the union seemed to have 
an appeal to a wide range of foremen, as revealed in the high 
percentages in favour of certification in the NLRB elections in the 
central organised areas of Detroit. The leadership of the FAA 
comprised a mixture of older, more experienced foremen in addition to 
their more recently promoted colleagues 
The union adopted a fairly militant stance. This was surprising 
given the background of conservatism and traditionalism associated 
with this group of workers, at least partly reflected in the status 
imagery of the FAA with its "building chairmen" representatives and 
country clubs. The union leadership, with popular support from its 
members, was prepared to embark on a series of strategic and tactical 
strikes, some undertaken at the height of war production and in the 
face of widespread hostility from employers, government and the media. 
The aim of such militancy was both to secure individual agreements and 
elicit government support in terms of legislative definition. 
In the long term, leaders of the FAA claimed a desire to secure a 
position as some form of third, intermediary party in industrial 
relations, although at a more pragmatic level the union bargained on a 
range of issues of immediate concern to members. Prominent among 
these, and in addition to expected issues of recognition, pay and 
conditions, were provisions relating to security of employment. Calls 
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for protection against lay offs and demotion, and for formal seniority 
criteria were a reflection of the widespread concern among foremen of 
the period that the post-war reconversion to automobile production 
would bring about the wholesale demotion or dismissal of many of their 
number. Older more conservative foremen saw their position under 
threat from younger, more adaptive recruits, while those more recently 
promoted were conscious of the difficulties in returning to the ranks 
of the production workers. 
The aims and appeal of the FAA can only be adequately understood 
when examined against the background of upheavals in the labour market 
and changes in production methods which characterise the years of its 
formation and growth. The massive increase in production during the 
war years brought with it a major influx of new recruits including 
many women and rural workers, most from a non-industrial background, 
unacclimatised to factory life and with little formal training. As the 
ranks of experienced foremen were depleted, those remaining, along 
with their newly promoted counterparts, found themselves in charge of 
these new workers, expected to undertake training programmes and 
achieve production levels dictated by the urgent imperatives of war. 
This was to be achieved against a background of fundamental change in 
both the type of goods being manufactured and the methods of 
production. More complex and intricate parts were called for, 
reintroducing higher skill levels to certain manufacturing and 
assembly jobs, and many of the processes and work flows typical of 
automobile manufacture were replaced by fixed, group oriented 
production, or systems more responsive to the rapid innovations 
necessary in wartime production. Many foremen found themselves in 
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strange departments or unable to practice the now established methods 
of foremanship of the inter-war period. Unable to push production 
along through the mechanism of the paced line, or verbal admonishment 
there seemed to many foremen to be no available alternative to control 
the workforce -a workforce now comprised of the confidence of union 
representation or the recalcitrance of being unaccustomed to 
established work methods. In this atmosphere foremen were expected to 
work long and onerous shifts, with the added insult of relatively poor 
pay, and operate under an increasing administrative burden, brought 
about by the bureaucracy of increased government intervention. 
Thus we can see that the immediate environment in which the 
foreman of the early 1940s was expected to operate contributed, in the 
short term, to the stimulus towards unionisation. Older foremen felt 
the need for support, some means of easing their burden as well as 
guaranteeing their security with the switch to peacetime production. 
Younger foremen for their part experienced the same job pressures as 
older foremen, and although seniority provisions would be less in 
their favour, the security of union representation over manning levels 
and conditions of employment, allied to their background of union 
membership, meant that they completed the full spectrum of foremen to 
which the FAA appealed. 
In ideological terms, although the union leadership may have 
formulated a general vision of the FAA as a member of a tripartite 
industrial order, for the ordinary member and local official the 
overriding attraction of the FAA was essentially of an instrumental 
nature. The pressures created by unionisation of production workers 
and the exigencies of wartime production, and the demonstration and 
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influence carried over by example or promotion of workers with a union 
background, marked collective action out as the route by which 
foremen, newly recruited or experienced, could redress their fading 
differentials and protect their position in the turmoil of wartime 
production and reconversion. Thus in spite of a lukewarm or negative 
reaction from the institutions of organised labour, but with some 
degree of informal support from the rank and file of workers' unions, 
the membership of the FAA was prepared to support their leadership in 
embarking on a vigorous campaign for recognition. 
The following chapter will examine reactions to that campaign by 
employers and the state, and in doing so will further elaborate the 
contours of the growth of the FAA and, ultimately, its decline. 
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Chapter Eight: Foreman's Unionisation - Resistance and Decline 
This chapter will examine the growth and ultimate decline of 
unionisation among foremen from two further aspects. Firstly from the 
perspective of the actions and attitudes of employers. In what ways 
were they aware of the problems which had generated the call for union 
representation among foremen? What was their general reaction to 
unionisation of this strata of the workforce, and what action did they 
take either to modify the position of foremen, adjust to a unionised 
supervision or resist and frustrate the efforts of the FAA? In 
examining employer's reactions to the FAA we will also confront the 
definitional problems posed by foremanship in mass production 
industries when outlining arguments over the delineation of the 
foreman's "managerial" role. The second aspect to be focussed upon has 
many close links to the activity of employers. The response of the 
state to foremen's unionisation, through the legislative and judicial 
process, in many ways reflects the employers increasing definitional 
problems in terms of supervision. More important perhaps is the fact 
that the state becomes an arena, or at least an agency through which 
employers come to pursue what becomes the major focus of their anti- 
FAA activity - the quest for unequivocal withdrawal of legal 
protection for the foreman's right to organise. 
In looking at these two factors - the activity of employers and 
the state - in respect of this single issue, and in doing so revealing 
the complex and often contradictory relationship which exists between 
the two, some light may be shed on the wider debate surrounding the 
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precise nature of the interaction between state and capital in 
industrial societies. 
Employer Responses 
Employers were virtually unanimous in their opposition to the 
idea of unions for foremen. This opposition was articulated at two 
levels. Firstly employers argued against the need for unions per se. 
They maintained that unions were unnecessary for ordinary workers or 
members of supervision. Individualism - the "open door" policy - was 
always the route through which grievances or inquiries could be 
processed, especially in the case of lower management, of which 
foremen were deemed to be a part. No collective activity was therefore 
necessary. As a second line of defence employers, when faced with the 
reality of a union presence following the success of the CIO and AFL 
organising drives of the mid and late 1930s, argued that although 
unions for production workers might be acceptable, albeit grudgingly 
in many cases, the foremen stood beyond a line which marked off those 
workers who were to be excluded from organisation. The foreman's job 
was quantifiably different. He was part of management and as such 
ineligible for union membership of any sort. 
Employers were to conduct their anti-FAA campaign in a number of 
fields. At the level of individual foremen some attempts were to be 
made restructure the role of foremen with a view to enhancing status 
and prestige and thus reintroducing or widening the perceived 
differences between foremen and 'workers'. A second, broader campaign, 
often involving the concerted activity of a number of employers, was 
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designed to weaken the appeal of the FAA by direct attacks on the 
union or its activists in what might be termed the standard anti-union 
practices of discrimination and intimidation. The third level of 
opposition formed around the legislative system. Employers, faced with 
the imprecision of the law as it existed after the passage of the 
Wagner Act, attacked the FAA on the basis of interpretation of that 
law. To do this they sought to demonstrate that the foreman was not an 
employee but rather an employer by virtue of his range of powers and 
was therefore placed beyond the provisions of the existing laws which 
specifically protected "employees" rights to organise. In the long 
term employers sought to modify the law itself to specifically 
delineate the limits of union protection to the exclusion of 
supervisors, clearly defined. 
The depth of employers antipathy to the unionisation of foremen 
in the American automobile industry is perhaps surprising, even after 
taking account of the hostility to unionisation in general which 
typified this sector. Management spokesmen were not reticent in 
expressing fears that this latest phase of unionisation marked a new 
intensity in their struggle to stave off union control. GM management 
described the foremen's unionisation movement as "a problem which many 
responsible people in industry believe to be the gravest threat to the 
entire structure of industrial management that industry has yet 
faced", and "... American industry's number one problem. "M Neil 
Chamberlain confirmed the breadth of these sentiments deeming it 
"impossible to overstate the concern with which most company officials 
view these organising efforts and their prevalent fear that managerial 
authority is being undermined... by the union's technique of "raiding" 
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their rank for members. "(2) 
The problem here is to gauge correctly how much the outpourings 
of management on the topic of the FAA reflect real fears and attitudes 
and how much they are constructed of rhetoric designed to influence 
public opinion or the legislature. Opinions differ in this respect. 
Seitz for example, in his examination of the conflict surrounding 
legislation relating to supervisory unionisation, identifies "a chasm 
between discourse and reality. "(3) Harris on the other hand, in his 
study of US managerial strategy in the 1940s, takes many employers' 
statements at face value, indicative of the way "flesh and blood" 
managers reacted at that time. 
(4) 
There is no doubt that some employers' statements were issued in 
order to elicit maximum propaganda effect and bore scant if any 
resemblance to reality. The "sovietization of industry" was one such 
frequently recurring theme; "This communist crowd are here to wreck 
American industry... the way they get control of production is to get 
control of your foreman. " The FAA's goal was "the socialisation of 
industry all the way through to the top of management", it was 
"thought up in Moscow" and so on. 
(5) From a populist standpoint such 
statements could have a significant impact in the proto-McCarthyist 
USA of the later 1940s. 
These extreme postures, easily dismissed as cynical publicity 
measures, should not disguise the fact that many managers were 
genuinely concerned that unions such as the FAA, if allowed to 
prosper, might mark the beginning of a trend which would make 
significant inroads into the lower echelons of management, spreading 
outwards from the shop floor to encompass all white collar sectors. 
Chapter Eight -391- 
Employers in the early 1940s had suffered a string of reversals in 
their efforts to remain union free and the rolling effect of union 
growth to encompass lower levels of supervision, despite the 
protestations of formal independence by the F_AA, must have looked at 
the time like a distinct possibility. We have already examined the 
contours of cooperation and non-cooperation between the FAA and the 
wider union movement and seen how tenuous employer allegations of 
complicity were. Public statements alleging collusion continued to be 
widely disseminated however and various government hearings and 
enquiries such as those held by the Congress Military Affairs 
Committee and the Mead Committee on manpower problems in Detroit were 
regaled with lengthy testimony from individual management 
representatives or employers' organisations such as the Automotive 
Council for War Production (ACWP) to the effect that the FAA was 
purely a stepping stone to the further spread of unionisation to all 
strata of American industry. 
(6) The precedents set by the absorption 
of UCTSE supervisors union in the mining industry, and the affiliation 
of independents like the United Plant Protection Workers, United 
Office and Professional Workers of America and branches of the 
Federation of Architects, Engineers and Technicians by the UAW-CIO 
were readily invoked to point to the inevitable consolidation and 
spread of concerted unionisation. 
(7) 
Formal affiliation between union organisations did not matter to 
many employer spokesmen. Unionisation bought with it a communality of 
organisational structure and goals. Chrysler's Vice President Herman 
Weckler held views typical of many managers of the time. Although the 
FAA claimed to be independent, what was important was that it was "a 
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labour union, that its policies and principles are those of other 
labour unions, that its members are brothers of the rank and file in 
the union movement. " 
(8) The FAA was bound to imbue its membership with 
a degree of "union consciousness" or "collective philosophy" which 
would place the foreman in a compromised position with regard to 
carrying out his supervisory duties. 
(9) Predicated on the underlying 
assumption that managerial shop floor control and the interests of 
union members were irreconcilable, employers insisted that foremen 
"could not serve two masters". 
(10) Military metaphors were frequently 
used, underlining their basic assumption of bipolarity between the 
union movement and employers. "Production battles" could not be won if 
supervisors were "required to obey the commands of their union as well 
as the commands of management. "(11) GM President C. E. Wilson, very 
much in the vanguard of the anti-FAA movement, referred to foremen as 
"first-line officers" and went on to tell a congressional committee 
that in the event of unionisation, "management cannot continue to give 
them such authority any more than the army can risk granting a 
commission to a man who holds partial allegiance to another 
country. i(12) 
Ironically perhaps, in view of such provocative and defamatory 
statements with regard to unions, i. e. that they represented the 
"enemy", employer spokesmen went on to assert that unions were 
divisive in that they constantly promoted a negative image of 
management, and foremen would be, upon joining the FAA, subject to 
extensive anti-company propaganda. Chrysler's Herman Weckler for 
example maintained that, "the first objective of union leaders 
is to 
engender and foster in the employees a feeling of unavoidable 
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hostility against the employer" by "slandering, vilifying and abusing 
the company". 
(13) 
Employers went on to elaborate a range of specific consequences, 
as they saw them, of the foreman's new "allegiance" to the union 
movement. Foremen could no longer be trusted with "confidential" 
information concerning company business. They would be bound to agree 
with virtually all grievances at the first stage of the grievance 
procedure. They would at best do little to stop strike activity, 
becoming "strike minded" themselves. Union members would get 
preferential consideration in any aspect of hiring, transfer, 
promotion, or lay-off over which the foreman had control. 
(14) Finally, 
workplace discipline would irretrievably break down. Loafing, smoking 
in the washrooms, poor timekeeping etc. would result as unionised 
foremen found themselves "victims of a creeping paralysis" or 
unwilling to be seen as a "company stooge" by their fellow union 
members. 
(15) 
Implicit in the general stance against the unionisation of 
foremen was the notion of individualism taking precedence over 
collectivism of any form. The collective negotiations covering rates 
of pay, conditions of work and seniority and grievance procedures 
which unionisation of production workers had ushered in took on a new 
dimension when applied to supervision. Promotion for example from the 
lowest level of the managerial hierarchy would, employers feared, 
become regulated by seniority provisions. Progress up the management 
ladder would thus be controlled by procedure rather than by arbitrary 
management decisions. Employers preferred to define their own 
criteria, usually enshrined in subjective measures of merit or 
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ability, relying upon fixed indicators such as length of service only 
in the final instance and if all other factors were considered to be 
equal -a situation seldom likely to occur. Hudson's Director of 
Industrial Relations was in no doubt as to who would be in favour of 
seniority as the deciding factor in promotions. "There is one 
particular foreman that would like it, a great big fat fellow... but I 
notice the young fellows with a lot of zip and pep, they probably 
wouldn't want seniority. "(16) In fact many younger foremen in the FAA 
were clearly in favour of promotion by seniority. 
(17) Managements 
preferred to ignore this however and continued to elaborate 
alternative qualifications. Briggs' Fay Taylor outlined criteria 
including initiative, ability to plan, decision making ability, 
responsibility, personality, leadership qualities, positive 
disposition, self control and only finally, experience in the work to 
be supervised, to be taken into account in promotion decisions. 
(18) 
Union proposals based purely on temporal considerations could not 
possibly measure up to this exacting set of standards. 
(19) 
Some foremen, especially those who had made sufficient progress, 
were evidently persuaded by management tenets concerning individual 
merit. Otis Prendergast for example, foreman in one of the GM assembly 
departments, where he had worked since he was 17 and had been a 
foreman for 14 years, spoke out against the FAA; "I believe the system 
under which I have worked is the American way. If you have initiative, 
the will to do, the know how... There is no limit as to how far you can 
go. "(20) Ford after all boasted two company vice-presidents who had 
come via the shop floor foreman's job. 
(21) The majority of foremen 
however probably knew only to well that they could only hope to scale 
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the bottom one or two rungs of the managerial ladder. Very few could 
hope to bridge the gulf between shop floor supervision and management 
proper. There was also a persistent and widespread belief among 
foremen themselves, ironic perhaps in view of their own past record, 
that merit and ability in reality was often overridden by favouritism 
of some sort. 
(22) FAA enrolment figures alone indicate a widespread 
rejection by foremen of the notion that the concept of individual 
representation would best serve their interests. 
Fnlployers maintained that the "open door" policy also gave the 
foreman direct access to higher management in regard to grievances 
over pay or conditions thus eliminating the need for union 
representation. If not satisfied with the initial response foremen 
could, in theory, pursue any enquiry to a higher office in the 
managerial hierarchy. 
(23) The employers' argument on this issue was 
simple and straightforward. If a foreman was unable or reluctant to 
stick up for himself or needed the representation of an outside agency 
then he was clearly not fit to be in a position of authority. 
Chrysler's Director of Industrial Relations, Robert Conder, summed up 
this attitude; "We expect our foremen to be articulate... they really 
aren't the kind of people we want for foremen unless they have the 
ability to speak for themselves and state what their complaints 
are. "(24) In reality the "open door" was seldom if ever more than 
slightly ajar. Foremen presenting evidence before the various 
committees of inquiry into the FAA continually stressed the futility 
of attempting to pursue grievances on an individual basis 
(2S) 
The concepts of individualism put forward by employers were no 
doubt strongly held beliefs but they were seldom articulated beyond a 
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continual recital of basic axioms - individualism, merit, 'the 
American way' and so on. That there now existed inherent 
contradictions between the potential for individual action and the 
structure of large scale organisation was not seen to be problematic. 
These contradictions would often be implicit in managerial statements 
themselves. Briggs Personnel Director, Fay Taylor, could talk of the 
company as "made up of individuals... individualists all of them" but 
go on to liken the firm to a cooperative. 
(26) Perhaps the best 
summation of the employers' position is revealed in the candid 
remarks of Chrysler's Robert Conder; "The Foreman's Association, I am 
convinced, would ask us to do what was best for the majority rather 
than what was best for the individual. "(27) 
While employers were to a large extent forced to tolerate unions 
for production workers, a major plank of their argument against the 
FAA was based on the fact that foremen were a distinct and different 
class of worker. They were at pains to demonstrate that foremen were 
management, firmly located within the controlling structure of the 
firm, part of the administration and fully integrated into the 
decision making process. "Is the foreman part of management? " became 
the the central question in the debate surrounding the legitimacy of 
the FAA. GM presented the most elaborate and perhaps most persuasive 
argument in this respect. In line with their stated commitment to 
restress the status and responsibilities of of shop floor supervision, 
a programme initiated in the 1930s(28), GM posited a managerial 
hierarchy based upon a two way flow of information and response in 
which the foreman was an integral, policy making figure. Indeed in 
GM's schematic representation the factory foreman had the largest 
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"area of responsibility and authority requiring flexibility of 
treatment and individual judgement". (Figure 1) GM maintained that 
foremen held a pivotal role, being "alone in a position to convey up 
the line to his superior, his intimate understanding of the personal 
and human considerations involved in the field of industrial 
relationsthus influencing the formulation of policy. " 
(29) GM's 
attitude towards, and treatment of foremen must be seen in many ways 
to dovetail with general ethos of 'Sloanism' in terms of 
decentralisation and delegation of managerial authority initiated 
during the inter-war period. 
(30) Although to a large extent such 
initiatives were confined to general company policy at a higher 
managerial level, real efforts had been made throughout the 1930s and 
early 1940s to reincorporate or rebuild the foreman's position through 
the work of GM's Director, Albert Sobey and Vice-president, William 
Knudsen via a series of ambitious training schemes, enhanced 
responsibilities and more effective pay differential schemes. 
(31) The 
initial rationale behind GM's attempts to restress the role of shop 
floor foremen had been driven by the corporation's tough stance on the 
spread of unionisation amongst production workers. In the event GM had 
been among the first to succumb to the UAW, but had insisted on 
tighter shop floor restrictions on union representatives, not allowing 
the autonomy to shop stewards which featured in many other companies' 
agreements. 
(32) This action was later to stand the company in good 
stead in its programme of resistance to the FAA. 
As early as 1934 Knudsen had issued a directive urging 
"A 
complete rebuilding of the foreman organisation within the 
divisions... It is important that quality and quantity of both work and 
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working force is put squarely back to the foreman where it 
belongs... The foreman should be called into frequent meetings with the 
department head ... He should be given to understand that Clause 7a has 
not in any way impaired his authority or his rights to hire and 
fire ... "(33) While it must be noted that, in common with other 
manufacturers, the rationalised production processes and extended 
division of labour described throughout this thesis, had made this at 
best only a partially achievable goal, nevertheless it is significant 
that GM, alone among the major manufacturers, proved to be a very 
difficult recruitment area for the FAA. 
Contrast the GM initiatives with those of Ford, where the FAA was 
to experience its greatest successes, Ford becoming the epicentre of 
foremen's unionisation in this period. Ford management, as we have 
seen in chapter two above, ignored ideas of enhancing the role of 
production foremen choosing instead an essentially repressive strategy 
of shop floor personnel control centred around the servicemen's regime 
- often as intimidatory to foremen as to workers in general. When it 
came to assessments of the foreman's part in the management structure 
Ford spokesmen seemed to accept that there were only tenuous 
connections. Ford Director, John Bugas rated such ideas "just a big 
fat zero ... We could like to think that they are 
(part of management), 
but if they don't and they want a union contract, 0K. "(34) 
The majority of employers, unlike Ford, continued to expound 
arguments stressing that foremen were an integral part of management, 
and therefore beyond the bounds of unionisation. These were to be well 
aired in the forums of government enquiry surrounding the legal rights 
of the foremen to unionise. The image portrayed, in spite of such 
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initiatives as those undertaken at GM, was often wildly inaccurate. As 
Seitz comments, "the language employed is devoid of reference to the 
social, economic and political reality of the foreman's position at 
that time. Instead an abstract picture of an ideal foreman is 
legislated, adjudicated and manipulated into existence... 11(35) (See 
Appendix A for Packard's description) Formal job descriptions were 
invoked as evidence for the foreman's daily routines and 
responsibilities. In addition the various written forms which foremen 
had to deal with were put forward as indicators that they were both 
part of the factory bureaucracy, standing across the divide marked off 
by involvement in "paper work" which separated worker and management, 
and also that they exercised the authority implicit in such forms. Two 
broad divisions were drawn in this line of argument, between personnel 
and production functions. 
In terms of personnel functions companies attempted to maintain 
that foremen retained control of hiring , firing, training, 
absenteeism and discipline. Chrysler for example regularly produced 
examples of foremen's reports concerning poor timekeeping, workers 
being caught sleeping, "loafing", gambling, leaving the job early, 
absenteeism, lateness, drunkenness and unsatisfactory work. 
(36) 
Requests for transfer, reclassification or promotion were also 
produced. In one case Chrysler produced 27 pages of foremen's reports 
and went on to insist that, "The language of these reports, "I 
discharged him", "I decided", "I am letting him go", "I told him he 
was fired"... "I changed his job", "I am giving her leave of absence", 
permit no doubt that in dealing with their employees, Chrysler's 
foremen have authority, that they have the latitude in which to 
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exercise it and that they do exercise it. "(37) 
In terms of production or routine administration a further batch 
of forms was produced by employers to bolster their case. Tool release 
forms, requisition of stocks, materials and labour, production and 
inspection reports, gate passes, first aid slips, temporary rate 
increases, time study sheets, and miscellaneous "departmental 
communications" were among the many classes of paperwork processed 
initially by the foreman. Hudson listed 29 different forms of this 
type which the foreman had to fill in as part of their job 
description. (38) In addition there were wartime reports which were the 
responsibility of foremen such as those dealing with aliens' 
suitability for employment based on the foreman's judgement of their 
patriotism or loyalty. 
(39) Foremen also had to file periodic reports 
on the progress of probationary employees or those undergoing 
training. (40) 
Many qualifications need to be put upon this general line of 
argument that an immersion in paperwork effectively marked off foremen 
as part of management. At a simple level it was noted that most of the 
forms mentioned needed countersignature by superintendents, personnel 
or labour relations offices or, during wartime, the labour control 
office. 
(41) Night shift foremen may have had greater autonomy in this 
respect although they would, in common with their day shift 
counterparts, have also had to seek approval and countersignature to 
the many disciplinary forms, from union representatives. As far as 
discretionary content was concerned many forms dealt with preordained 
actions. Many disciplinary actions were, since the establishment of 
union procedures, governed by fixed codes leaving little room for 
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adjudication by foremen. Packard had a series of fixed punishments for 
"standard" offences. Being caught gambling for example meant three 
days suspension for the first offence, six days for the second and the 
sack if caught a third time. 
(42) Foremen did retain discretion over 
whether to submit such official notifications, but in the mechanism of 
their submission he now represented a far from independent figure. 
This case presented by employers can also be turned against them 
in that such a volume of reports and forms could be seen to represent 
a constriction of foremen's discretion. By laying down fixed 
parameters of action as defined in the forms themselves a reduction in 
the scope of autonomous, non accountable activity by supervision is 
effected. Disciplinary action was on a fixed scale as noted. 
Production related forms - requisitions etc. - represent merely the 
continual servicing of a labour process determined through 
increasingly remote design and control systems as noted in chapter 
two. As one foreman complained in 1943; "No, I am not management. If I 
want to change a tool on a machine I must first put in what we call an 
S. P. C. and ask for permission. If I want to change the position of a 
reamer on a turret lathe, I first must ask the permission of the tool 
designer. All my work is laid out. "(43) Employer arguments had little 
to say about the informal changes to work practices which foremen 
undertook or acquiesced in to ease workloads or facilitate production, 
since such activities seldom came to the attention of higher 
management. 
In reality the foremen's day typically involved liaison with 
progress and stock chasers, and, in attempting to keep production at 
target levels, they would be particularly concerned with maintenance, 
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breakdowns or bottlenecks in production, avoiding "serious shortages" 
or speeding through "hot parts" - urgent jobs due to production 
planning alterations or unforeseen problems. To facilitate this the 
foreman had to distribute labour as production patterns dictated, and 
ensure relief workers were available. 
( 44) Foremen worked with limited 
"managerial" horizons. While they worked to production schedules 
prepared by specialist departments on a monthly, weekly or daily 
basis, their contribution to these schedules was likely to effect only 
immediate revision. Such schedules were far more likely to be affected 
by external considerations originating in marketing patterns, 
purchasing factors and so on. 
(45) For most foremen, when production 
was running smoothly their job became one of assigning labour, dishing 
out gloves and aprons etc. and presiding over overtime allocation. 
(46) 
This meant a major portion of the day lef t over to petty shop 
discipline. Provision of relief for workers on the line was often part 
of an ongoing conflict around the amount of time workers could expect 
free of the pace of production. Frequent accusations of foremen 
"hanging round" washrooms or timing workers absence from production 
are to be found in union grievances. Washing up times at the end of 
the shift were also "policed" by foremen and became the subject of 
sporadic crackdowns in what became an incessant battle around the last 
few minutes of the day. 
(47) 
Such activity - troubleshooting production through immediate 
crises, simple allocation of labour and equipment and the enforcement 
of petty discipline - is clearly at variance with accounts promulgated 
by employers and do not match the concepts of "management" on the 
scales laid out in the idealised job descriptions which employers put 
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forward as proof of foremens responsibilities. (For an example of the 
structure of responsibilities outlined by employers see Appendix 1) 
Such accounts made slight reference to the ways in which 
rationalisation of production had affected the scope for foremen to 
exercise real discretion. Employers also had little to say about the 
way in which unionisation of production workers had proceduralised 
many aspects of discipline and job allocation, and as noted in chapter 
four, proscribed much of the foreman's independence of action. In 
general employers were reluctant to admit their neglect of the 
foreman's position, preferring instead to stress aspects of power 
which their foreman may have held in previous periods, when higher 
management had been content to abdicate responsibility in the labour 
market and on the shop floor, but which bore little relevance to the 
rationalised and unionised factory. At a time when foremen were 
increasingly caricatured as at best "men in the middle", claims that 
foremen were "part of management" were increasingly seen by FAA 
members as hollow rhetoric. As Robert Keys insisted, "They have little 
if any prestige, they are fearful of insecurity, and almost all 
dignity has been detached from their job... In reality they are puppets 
in the industrial bureaucracy... u(48) 
If this general line of argument was not persuasive on the shop 
floor employers were not too concerned. It was after all primarily 
designed to influence legislators and a wider public. Employers had a 
series of further concrete strategies in their campaign against the 
FAA, and at a tactical level they employed a range of specific anti- 
union measures designed to dislodge the union or hamper its organising 
efforts. 
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The most straightforward of these tactics was to fire or demote 
foremen who were thought to be active in membership recruitment. 
Briggs for example demoted all their foremen FAA members in 1941. 
(49) 
Such provocative activity was likely to provoke a hostile and costly 
response however and often more subtle tactics were employed. 
Supervision at Bohn Aluminium were expected to sign a statement, 
reminiscent of the notorious "yellow dog" contracts of the 1920s and 
1930s, whereby they accepted that employment could be terminated 
without notice if their services were not "in every respect 
satisfactory" to the company. Bohn's foremen recognised this to mean 
non-membership of the FAA and eventually struck over the issue. 
(50) 
An alternative company anti-FAA manoeuvre involved manipulating 
classifications of workers to exploit ineligibilities for membership. 
Employers had used the strategy of 'promoting' leading hands and 
similar workers to supervisory status in order to disqualify these 
workers from voting in NLRB elections or joining production workers 
unions. 
(51) Similarly when the FAA secured the right to hold 
elections, companies such as Ford and Briggs reclassified many of 
their foremen as "chief inspectors" or "superintendents" without any 
commensurate change in duties but simply to place them outside the 
ambit of the FAA. 
(52) In a variant of this tactic Packard tried to 
pack one of the FAA elections by 'promoting' salesmen and 
fieldmen to 
the rank of foreman, issuing instructions that they should vote 
against certification of the union. 
(53) Ford also switched their 
recruitment patterns to introduce foremen from outside the plants 
rather than continue internal promotion patterns which seemed to 
be 
generating so many FAA members. 
(54) 
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In a similar set of tactics involving classification employers 
threatened that if foremen's unionisation became established they 
would restructure their managerial hierarchies to withdraw many areas 
of responsibility from shop floor supervision. Foremen would in effect 
be reduced to "straw boss" or charge hand status. 
(55) They would for 
example be removed from involvement in the first step of production 
unions' grievance procedure and no longer allowed to issue passes or 
write discipline reports. Employers claimed they could not have 
confidence in unionised foremen and would cease to communicate 
directly with them - an ironic threat in view of the popular complaint 
made by FAA members that they were largely ignored by higher 
management anyway. 
(56) Nevertheless this plan "to degrade the foreman, 
and put his management duties at a higher level", effectively 
redrawing the nominal boundary between worker and manager, was viewed 
as a viable or necessary strategy by a large number of employers. A 
survey carried out in 1946 for example found 71% of firms responding 
that some such action seemed necessary, ranging from the creation of a 
new non-unionised strata of "super-foremen" or "master foremen" to the 
external recruitment of graduate engineers and the withdrawal of all 
personnel functions from the shop f loor. 
(57) In reality such action 
was seldom taken. The most vociferous advocate of this type of 
response was GM where the FAA was least successful in recruitment and 
thus employers resolve in this matter was never fully tested. In the 
event other strategies were to prove more effective and the threat 
posed by the FAA receded, nevertheless the restructuring of 
supervision was a popular theme among anti-FAA lobbies at the time. 
Employers often acted collectively in their opposition to the FAA 
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through the agency of a number of associations. The National 
Association of Manufacturers (NAM) for example lobbied congress 
constantly to put pressure on the NLRB and to revise the law to 
exclude foremen from unionisation rights. 
(58) The NAM also formed a 
pressure group to persuade the government's Salary Stabilisation Unit 
to withdraw limits on foremen's pay rises, thus eliminating one of the 
foremen's major complaints. 
(59) The Automotive Council for War 
Production (ACWP) based in Detroit and composed of companies employing 
a total of over 1,200,000 workers in the arms industry - mostly in the 
major automobile firms - also conducted a vigorous anti-FAA campaign, 
coordinating employers' activity and issuing publicity. 
(60) The 
Chamber of Commerce of the USA also collaborated with the NAM in 
efforts to change labour laws as did the Automobile Manufacturers 
Association (AMA) which, through the leadership of GM president 
C. E. Wilson, also orchestrated an extensive propaganda campaign against 
the FAA. (61) 
The press campaign against the FAA often took the form of full 
page statements issued by GM or the ACWP stressing how the FAA was 
"bad for industry, bad for labour, bad for America" and asking such 
questions as "Where is unionisation going to stop? I(62) Notaries such 
as Leo Wolman, one-time chairman of the Automobile Labour Board set up 
by Roosevelt in 1934, were called upon to write features stressing 
"... how demoralising to management such a change in the position of 
the foreman would be... with the foreman organised... American industry 
will have become a closed-shop industry. "(63) Editorials in pro-AMA 
papers, from the local Detroit News to the Wall Street Journal, were 
also frequently published urging Congress to act and ban the FA-A. 
(64) 
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Wilson at GM represented the major figure in the concerted 
campaign against the FAA. He was responsible for setting up four 
congressional committees to inquire into the "problem" and constantly 
petitioned or sent telegrams to various government departments 
demanding legislative action. 
(65) Building on the base, which GM had 
established, of resistance to the FAA, at least partially achieved 
through restressing the status of foremen in the 1930s and aided by 
the greater stability, when compared to other automobile plants, of 
GM's labour relations in general by the outbreak of war(66), Wilson 
worked, through the AMA, towards a united opposition to the FAA. This 
was not always an easy task. Packard for example, a member of the AMA, 
was at times willing to reach agreement with the foremen's union. The 
lower levels of Packard management had been unofficially negotiating 
with FAA representatives and settling various grievances up until 
1944. (67) Their Industrial Relations Director had stated that he 
considered the FAA a lesser evil than losing the foremen to one of the 
CIO unions. 
(68) With pressure exerted by the AMA and in particular by 
GM, a major parts supplier to Packard, the firm was held to a line of 
resistance to the FAA however, sustaining a series of costly strikes 
and legal battles in the process. 
(69) 
If firms such as Packard could be coerced or coopted into the 
anti-FAA movement one other major manufacturer was notable by its 
steadfast refusal to join in any of the activities of the employers 
associations. Ford had a long legacy of of remaining aloof from 
organisations like the NAM or the AMA. This had its origins in the 
early years of the industry with Henry Ford's refusal to join the 
patent associations. Ford was generally regarded as some form of 
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renegade employer when it came to industrial relations. Having held 
out against the UAW until 1941 for example, only acceding to union 
organisation under the threat of government sanctions, Ford then 
offered the union the most generous terms in the entire industry, 
including some concessions even the union felt bound to reject as 
going to far in giving them control of the shop floor. 
(70) Similarly 
with the FAA, Ford signed what was to be the union's most prestigious 
agreement, much to the chagrin of AMA members. Some employers, seeing 
the hand of the notorious Harry Bennett in these proceedings, went so 
far as to suggest that the FAA was being actively fostered by Ford in 
order to disrupt industrial relations at other companies. 
(71) 
Ford had certainly given a boost to the FAA's organising 
activities by virtue of signing agreements early on, without any real 
resistance from Ford management or appeal to the NLRB. The situation 
at Ford was in many ways different to other manufacturers. The size 
and strength of the FAA chapter at Ford's River Rouge plant was 
considerable and key organisers such as Keys and Bonaventura were 
based there. Foremen at Ford had also been put under greater pressure 
during the inter-war period with the additional burden of the 
servicemen's regime which controlled much of factory floor activity. 
When contrasted against the early interest which GM had shown in 
fostering better industrial relations with their foremen, Ford's 
seeming abandonment of shop floor supervisors, beyond the proviso that 
they drive production, certainly fuelled the general discontent 
manifested in FAA recruitment levels. When added to the often quixotic 
nature of Ford's industrial relations strategy, and their 
recalcitrance in involvement with employers associations, the result 
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was by far the most important boost to the FAA when it was formally 
recognised. 
Ford's cooperation with the FAA was destined to change however. 
Higher management at the company underwent radical restructuring with 
the accession to power of Henry Ford II in late 1945 and the resultant 
ousting of Bennett. The new regime began almost immediately to focus 
significant attention on the foreman "problem". 
(72) The decision to 
withdraw from the FAA agreement probably soon followed although 
favourable conditions in which to do so did not emerge until 1947. By 
then initiatives designed to strengthen the foremen's status were well 
under way and automobile production was approaching full capacity, 
thus eliminating many remaining foremen's fears of demotion. The 
previous years post-war contractions had eroded membership of the FAA 
at the Rouge to a low of 3,800. With the prospect of the successful 
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in the coming months Ford management 
felt confident of victory and consequently announced its intention not 
to renew the FAA agreement in April 1947. 
(73) For its part the FAA saw 
this as the occasion to demonstrate to legislators involved in the 
impending act the consequences of withdrawal of foremen's organising 
rights. 
(74) 
Ford at last came fully into line with the other Automobile 
manufacturers issuing widespread denouncements of the consequences of 
unions for foremen. These were all the the more damning given Ford's 
experience of over three years of operating under FAA agreements. Ford 
were to publish statements claiming that they were "disappointed and 
disillusioned" and that foremen's unionisation had been an "unhappy 
and unfortunate experience. "(75) The FAA was held to have been anti- 
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management and counter productive in terms of labour relations 
resulting in a widespread erosion of discipline on the shop floor. 
(76) 
Some measure of the new spirit of cooperation between Ford and 
the other major manufacturers, or at least their now common belief in 
the suppression of foremen's unionisation, is indicated by the fact 
that when Ford set up its new Management Relations Department to deal 
with supervisory personnel problems during the 1947 FAA strike, it was 
staffed with General Motors supervisory personnel specialists. Richard 
E. Roberts for example, who was in charge of the new Ford department, 
was recruited from GM to head a team specialising in the restructuring 
of the foreman's role at the Ford factories along lines pursued at the 
GM plants. 
(77) 
The general level of concerted action among American employers in 
attempting to offset the unionisation of their foremen in some ways 
reflected the activities of employers in Britain. Although the 
foremen's unionisation movement came at an earlier period in Britain - 
around the end of the First World War - it was stimulated by similar 
developments. The onset of armaments manufacture producing changes in 
the labour process and demography of the workforce, the expanded role 
of the state regulating labour, pay and conditions, the resultant 
erosion of pay differentials and increased workloads, rapid promotion 
of inexperienced foremen, and restrictions placed on foremen from an 
expanse in the union presence on most shop floors, all paralleled 
developments in the USA. Of the several foremen's unions which emerged 
around 1918 the National Foremens Association (NFA) was the most 
prominent and was eventually to form the basis for the successful 
supervisory union movement led by the ASSET, later to become the 
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ASTMS. (78) Employers fought against the NFA on an individual basis 
although the major effort to eliminate the NFA came through the 
offices of the Engineering Employers Federation (EEF). Arguably a more 
cohesive organisation than its American counterparts, the EEF was 
able, through centrally directed policies and threats of sanctions, to 
enforce a rigid code of conduct among member firms concerning 
foremen's unions or recruitment of foremen by production workers' 
unions. The latter, having at the time shown more willingness to 
recruit foremen than their later American counterparts were to do, 
were decisively beaten following the defeat of the Electrical Trades 
Union at Penistone in 1920 over the eligibility of foremen for 
membership in production workers unions. 
(79) The campaign against the 
NFA, although failing to eliminate the union, certainly helped to stem 
the growth in its recruitment levels until the Second World War. 
Employers in Britain were unable to pursue activity against 
unionisation in the same arena as their American counterparts given 
the absence of a formally defined legislative framework. There was no 
equivalent to the National Labour Relations Act or NLRB for them seek 
to amend or lobby. They did have one major strategy however which 
American employers were later to emulate in close detail - the setting 
up of alternative organisations for foremen, under the control of 
employers and more closely adhering to managerial ideologies. In 
effect these represented company unions for foremen. 
British engineering employers had set up the Foremen's Mutual 
Benefit Society (FMBS) in 1899 in an attempt to woo foremen away from 
the craft union recruitment initiatives of the time. Foremen, defined 
as workmen "in a position of trust", had fees partially paid and 
Chapter Eight -413- 
received various benefits including sickness benefits, pensions, 
insurance and unemployment provisions in addition to organised social 
activities. In return foremen were expected to rescind their 
membership of any trade union. Held up as a model for similar 
societies in other industries, the FMBS experienced moderate success, 
reaching a peak of recruitment in the early 1920s following the 
initial successful years of the NFA. 
(80) Other factors in addition to 
the predations of the FMBS led to the stalling of the NFA in the 
inter-war years, notably the end of war production, economic downturns 
and reverses in the union movement in general, but the employers in 
the USA saw such a strategy as a useful and integral part of their 
fight against foremen's unionisation and were to foster similar 
organisations to the FMBS in the 1940s. 
The most prominent American organisation of this type was the 
National Association of Foremen (NAF). Accounts vary as to the exact 
date of its foundation. Sometime between 1918 and 1925 the NAF was 
formed out of a federation of foremen's clubs in Dayton, Ohio. 
Initially sponsorship came from YMCA organisations and "enlightened" 
personnel and managerial sponsors such as Glen Gardiner and factory 
owner L. Ruthenberg. 
(81) Like the FMBS in Britain the NAF initially 
grew in response not to foremen's unions per se but rather in response 
to the perceived threat from the spread of unionisation among 
production workers. The NAF experienced steady growth throughout the 
1920s, particularly in Ohio, forming city-wide associations of 
existing plant foremen's clubs across a range of industries. In the 
early 1930s membership dropped somewhat but picked up with the revival 
of interest by employers following the unionisation of production 
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workers and carried on expanding at a steady rate from the mid 1930s 
on into the 1940s. 
(82) With the formation of the FAA the NAF was the 
subject of renewed recruitment efforts and between 1945 and 1947 
membership rose from around 20,000 in 135 clubs to over 30,000 in 200 
clubs spread across 42 states. 
(83) There were strong links between the 
NAF and the automobile firms. Chrysler for example hosted the 1937 NAF 
conference and GM Director of Education, Albert Sobey, was one of the 
movement's leading advocates. 
(84) 
In addition to membership fees the NAF was supported by 
extensive corporation funding. Whereas in Britain the FMBS member 
foremen had to pay 50% of their subscription personally, the NAF 
foreman was entirely company sponsored. This led to accusations by the 
FAA that many foremen were in fact unaware of or indifferent to their 
membership of the NAF and thus total membership claimed in no way 
reflected active participation levels. 
(85) Membership was open to all 
grades of management and the organisation included many personnel 
department and training staff. The majority of members were ordinary 
shop floor foremen however. Conferences, while attended by personnel 
staff primarily interested in observation, were reported to be 
dominated by ordinary foreman members. 
(86) 
The aims of organisations such as the FMBS and NAF were as 
similar as they were transparent. Those founding and supporting them 
were quite candid in their assertions that these were bodies primarily 
designed to offset unionisation proper. "Checkmating the influence of 
the new (union) movement" as the FMBS literature put it. 
(87) 
Collective bargaining was firmly rejected and any associated club 
found to be engaging in such activity was to be expelled. As the 
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Foremen's Club of Columbus put it, "Human nature responds to 
legitimate motives of self interest. " Individualism, not collectivism, 
should predominate. Arguments put forward by NAF affiliates echoed 
those of employers on this issue. "A foreman member of a collective 
bargaining unit has an interest antagonistic to that of his employer, 
and his value and worth as a "PART OF MANAGEMENT" is destroyed. tt(88) 
Seniority of any sort was also rejected, or as the NAF held, to be 
relied upon only as the last resort, when "knowledge, training, 
ability, skill and efficiency, physical fitness, family status and 
number of dependants" were equal. In other words, never. 
(89) 
Organisations like the NAF were oriented towards leadership by 
higher executives - in effect a replication of the factory hierarchy. 
Seen as a medium of education and a means of "raising the quality of 
foremanship" they were also to embody a meeting of foremen and higher 
management in a "cooperative spirit of loyalty to the company. "(90) To 
this end the NAF organised monthly meetings with guest speakers, trips 
to factories or civic institutions, social evenings and training 
courses. The latter were strongly oriented towards human relations 
management styles as well as attempting to broaden foremen's 
understanding of the general functioning of the firm. 
(91) In this the 
NAF's trajectory can be seen to be closely linked to that of 
organisations like the National Foreman's Institute (NFI), the 
Foreman's League for Education and Association and the YMCA sponsored 
National Council of Foremen's Clubs, all of which promoted educational 
programmes aimed at enhancing foremen's education and training as a 
means of rebuilding the prestige and reclaiming the allegiance of the 
shop floor foreman. 
(92) "Management" was the key word to be found in 
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the literature of all these organisations, reinforcing the message in 
employers arguments concerning the status and hierarchical position of 
the shop floor foreman. This was also reflected in titles such as that 
given to the Gar Wood NAF affiliate in Detroit - the "Management 
Club", or area clubs such as the "Management Club of Chicago". There 
was an attempt in 1947 to rename the NAF itself the "Management Men of 
America". (93) 
There was no attempt to hide the allegiance of organisations like 
the NAF. Its members lined up beside employers to give testimony 
against the FAA at congressional hearings for example and generally it 
took every available opportunity to promote the demise of the FAA. 
(94) 
For their part the FAA saw these employer sponsored organisations as 
little more than "social clubs" and made strenuous attempts to expose 
their true purpose. 
The overall success of initiatives like the NAF in offsetting 
foremen's unionisation were probably marginal. Although membership 
figures grew these are a poor indication of the response of foremen 
themselves since fees were paid by employers for their total 
supervisory workforce and did not reflect any decision or commitment 
on behalf of individual foremen. They are best viewed as agencies for 
the dissemination of anti-FAA information. Organisations such as the 
NFI concentrated almost exclusively on such activity. Through its 
monthly reports - the 'Collective Bargaining Bulletin' and 'Executive 
Labour Letter' it sought to give constant warnings of the consequences 
of ignoring foremen's unionisation - "the number one problem facing 
American employers" - and offered advice varying from how to sack 
unionised foremen without transgressing the NLRA to "guidelists" 
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advising ways in which to foster good foreman-employer relations. 
(95) 
Other factors were more important in the decline of the FAA, and other 
strategies open to American employers were to prove, in the end, more 
potent in hastening that decline. 
Prominent among these was the attempt to obtain legal sanction 
against the FAA - to place the union beyond the protection of the 
Wagner Act. 
Supervisory Unionism and the State 
The history of the foremen's unionisation with regard to 
legislative developments and intrusions of state institutions into 
industrial relations has been extensively studied. Excellent and 
detailed accounts are available which chart the fortunes of the FAA 
and focus intensively on the role of government in alternatively 
fostering or withdrawing support from the union. 
(96) While it is the 
contention of this thesis that a range of other factors need to be 
taken into account in understanding the determinants of supervisory 
unionisation and primacy should not be afforded to the formal legal 
atmosphere of the period, this is not to say that such an account 
should ignore what is clearly one of several major factors. 
The New Deal period following the accession to power of 
F. D. Roosevelt is, certainly in peacetime, one of the most visible and 
controversial examples of the expansion of state power into the 
economy of an advanced capitalist nation. The American state of the 
early 1930s intervened in industry in ways far overshadowing previous 
initiatives such as factory inspection or workers compensation 
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laws. (97) Debates around the exact nature, motivation and impact of 
this intervention continue. The range of interpretations spans 
accounts which point to the pro-capitalist, regulatory nature of the 
New Deal state, managing a capitalist crisis, through accounts 
stressing the proto-Keynesian liberal-welfarist project originating in 
the progressive era, to those, contemporary (such as Coughlin and 
Townsend) and current which see the Roosevelt initiates as of a 
corporatist nature, carrying overtones of the European Fascist states 
of the period. 
(98) Such debates confront the relationship between the 
state and civil society. A rekindling of interest in the work of 
Gramsci and neo-Marxist interpretations has produced more recent 
interpretations ranging from the "Fordist" or "neo-Fordist" state as 
the structurally determined guarantor of capitalist relations of 
production, through a more loosely connected "relatively autonomous" 
state as outlined by Poulantzas, to the state as a politically 
determined arena of pluralistic struggle favoured by Skocpol. 
(99) 
Study of a specific issue, such as the state intrusion into the 
question of foremen's unionisation can illuminate, at the very least 
by empirical reference - singularly absent from some accounts(100) - 
this debate, showing the precise contours of state intervention and 
assessing their impact in terms of capital and labour. 
The New Deal itself comprised a range of governmental initiatives 
designed to pull the US economy out of the burgeoning depression of 
the early 1930s. There were a variety of direct interventions in the 
labour market as work projects were set in train ranging from major 
programmes like the TVA to the localised initiatives of the CCC. 
Federally organised welfare initiatives were established through the 
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Social Security Act and attempts were made to control wages and prices 
through the offices of the NRA. The National Industrial Recovery Act 
(NIRA) (and subsequent amendments through the Wagner Act) established 
workers rights to bargain collectively through agents of their own 
choosing and was to be administered by the National Labour Relations 
Board. With regard to industrial supervision we have already noted the 
impact of some of these developments - the relatively limited effect 
of the NRA codes on the actions of employers or foremen in the 
automobile industry, the impact of industrial unionisation - at least 
partially stimulated by state support - on the role of the foreman and 
so on. What of the direct impact on the unionisation of foremen. How 
far can the actions of the state be seen to stimulate or retard the 
growth of the FAA? 
In the formal sense the NIRA made no specific mention of 
"foremen" in its drafting of workers rights. Arguments pursued by 
employers and the FAA were to reflect the central definitional dilema 
surrounding the categorisation of shop floor supervision within the 
changes which had occurred in the structures and hierarchies of mass 
production industry. The NIRA had laid down provisions for the 
protection of "employees" rights to organise and thus the argument 
devolved to one basic question - were foremen "employees" or 
"employers"? 
The NLRB went through a series of interpretations of the law as 
they seemingly responded to alternatively to pressure from employers 
and the FAA. In the earliest pre-FAA decisions the board took it for 
granted that foremen were "employees" under the provisions of the act 
for unions wishing to include foremen amongst their membership. 
(101) 
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In 1941 in a case brought by GM a ruling was made that certain classes 
of supervisory engineers were excluded from the legal protection. This 
was to be a short lived decision as in 1942, in the Union Collieries 
case foremen were deemed by the board to be under the full protection 
of the Wagner Act. Thus the UMW gained the right to organise assistant 
mine foremen, fire and weigh bosses and coal inspectors into separate 
locals. More importantly, because of the closed shop agreements held 
by the UMW foremen would be compelled to join the affiliated 
UCTSE. (102) The Godchaux Sugars case of the same year confirmed this 
decision and extended it to condone supervisory workers' membership of 
unions containing production workers. The following year, 1943, in the 
Maryland Drydock case the NLRB reversed this position entirely, now 
ruling that supervisory workers should not be included in any 
bargaining unit. Only in the case of traditionally organised 
supervisory workers, notably in the print and maritime industries, was 
organisation among this group of workers allowed to continue. This 
decision was confirmed later the same year in the GM Detroit Diesel 
Engine case. 
(103) Following a series of strikes and intervention by 
the National War Labour Board, the NLRB switched its position again in 
May 1944 in the Soss and Republic Steel cases to give an ambiguous 
ruling that while foremen were "employees" under sections 8(1) and 
8(3) of the Wagner Act and therefore were protected against unfair 
labour practices, they were not entitled to hold union certification 
elections as guaranteed under section 8(5) and 9. Thus foremen were in 
the odd position of being free to organise and collect 
dues etc. 
without employer interference, but were unable to use the 
law to force 
recognition of their union. 
(104) In March 1945 in the Packard case the 
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board finally resolved this anomalous situation by deciding in favour 
of supervisors being able to organise but not in a union affiliated in 
any way to those of the production workers. 
(105) The Young Spring and 
Wire case of 1946 confirmed this position but the Jones and Laughlin 
Steel case of the same year again extended the rights of most 
supervisors to belong to affiliated unions. The reversal became 
complete with the California Packing Corporation Case, again in 1946, 
which gave foremen the right to form their own unions or freely join 
those of the production workers. 
(106) 
Success for the foremen's union movement was short lived however. 
In July 1947, despite a veto attempt by President Truman, the Taft- 
Hartley Labour-Management Relations Act became law and, while it did 
not withdraw the right of individual supervisors to join unions, it 
unequivocally withdrew legal protection or support for those who did. 
The NLRB promptly dropped all certification appeals on behalf of 
foremen which, at the time numbered around 50, including those at 
Briggs, Chrysler, Hudson and Firestone. 
(107) The court of appeals, in 
setting aside the Young Spring and Wire decision of the previous year 
in September 1947 marked the end of formal state support for foremen's 
unionisation. Judge Wilbur K. Miller stated that it was "unmistakably 
clear... that the 80th Congress intended to deny, and has denied the 
benefits of the (National Labour Relations) Act to 
"supervisors".,, (108) 
What had led to the considerable vacillation by the NLRB in the 
intervening years and what pressures had finally resulted in a defeat 
for the foreman's unionisation movement over legal sanction? 
Definitional arguments had been fairly consistent throughout the 
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1940s. Employers had argued that the provisions of the NIRA had 
applied to "employees" rights and as such foremen, by the nature of 
their responsibilities and duties were technically "employers". 
Previous legislation such as the Railway Labour Act had specifically 
included foremen and "subordinate officials" and employers maintained 
that if the NIRA had meant to include foremen it would likewise have 
specified them. (On this point the FAA argued that the Act did define 
groups of workers to be excluded i. e. agricultural labourers, domestic 
servants etc., so if foremen were meant to be excluded they should 
have been mentioned along with these other groups of workers. ) 
Employers pointed to the historical circumstances surrounding the 
implementation of the NIRA in the early 1930s when no labour unrest 
among foremen was evident - clearly by this token the act was aimed at 
placating the production worker not the foreman. 
(109) Indeed the 
foreman was responsible under the NIRA for seeing the law was carried 
out i. e. that no unfair labour practices or discrimination took place 
against union members - the NLRB itself had issued circulars advising 
foremen of their responsibilities under the act. 
(110) As GM Vice- 
president Bayard D. Kankle asserted, "Due to the authority and 
responsibilities vested in the foremen in GM... it is impossible for 
the foreman to be in the dual position of an 'employee' and 
'employer'... the corporation is held legally responsible for the 
foreman's conduct. "(111) 
The NIRA itself had defined an employer as "... any person acting 
in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly. " Company 
spokesmen argued that this must mean the foremen, especially when it 
came to discrimination on the shop floor. Conversely however the term 
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"employee" as defined in the Act could be applied to virtually all 
personnel including vice presidents and directors. 
(112) Such non- 
specificity exasperated company spokesmen who saw a common sense 
division. As Packard's lawyers argued, "There is a clear and distinct 
line of cleavage between the foreman as the lower level of management 
and the workers. Unless the line is drawn at this point, where will it 
be drawn? Surely Congress did not intend the president of the company 
to be an "employee". "(113) The whole argument revolved around 
semantics. Clearly, with the divorce of ownership and control 
engendered in most large, joint-stock corporations, most, if not all 
of the managerial hierarchy were in essence "employees". Yet there was 
merit in the argument that the NIRA was not intended to refer to all 
strata of workers. The resolution of the argument could only come 
about if the law included clear distinctions based on definitions of 
executive prerogatives. In the absence of such clarity company 
spokesmen were to proffer a multitude of their own definitions to 
distinguish foremen from "employees" - "part of the managerial force", 
"agent for the employer", "instrumentality of management", "exercising 
the authority of management", and so on. 
(114) 
The interpretation of the law remained entirely at the discretion 
of the NLRB panel members however, a tripartite board composed of 
representatives from labour and employers, and a government appointed 
neutral. In the event, as we have seen, the imprecision of the NIRA 
led to the pattern of irregular and frequently quixotic decisions over 
foremen's rights. As one contemporary commentator noted, 
"In 
consequence of the spare legislative yardstick provided to measure 
their application of the Act the board members often indulged 
in well- 
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meaning but inconsistent expressions of current policy. "(115) Although 
Senator Wagner, responsible for amending the legislation in 1935, went 
on record in support of foremen's unionisation(116) the board 
continued to alternate between notions of the foreman as responsible 
for production, "correlation" of workers and maintenance and 
discipline, to assertions that he was merely the "traffic cop" of 
industry, "more managed than managing, more and more the executor of 
other mens' decisions less and less a maker of decisions himself. " The 
board also noted the marginalisation which had occurred with the 
advent of union procedures. 
(117) 
With such wide discretion in interpreting the limits of the law 
the actual make up of the board was at times crucial. For example at 
the time of the Union Collieries case in 1942, the outcome of which 
favoured the FAA, the board was composed of Harry Millis and William 
Leiserson, both more or less sympathetic to labour's demands, with 
Gerard Reilly the sole voice of dissent. 
(118) The Maryland Drydock 
decision of 1943, which went against the FAA was arrived at when 
Leiserson had been replaced on the board by J. M. Houston. Houston had 
been appointed when Roosevelt was under pressure to shift the NLRB 
away from its pro-union balance. The result was that Millis was now in 
the minority in supporting the FAA-(119) With the Packard decision of 
1944 however Houston had in fact changed his mind and came out in 
favour of the FAA, perhaps because of the impact of the wave of 
strikes undertaken by the FAA. In the event Reilly was again left in a 
minority of one. Finally in 1944 both Reilly and Houston were replaced 
by J. J. Reynolds and Paul Herzog, both pro-FAA, leaving the way clear 
for a string of subsequent decisions in favour of collective 
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bargaining for foremen. (120) 
Thus we can see that the the composition of the NLRB, largely 
determined in the political sphere, strongly influenced the changing 
contours of legislative sanction for supervisory unionisation. Reilly 
for example was never likely to be influenced by even the most 
persuasive advocacy of the foremen's cause. Constantly issuing 
dissenting statements when he found himself in the minority, his 
strength of feeling on the issue is reflected in the recommendations 
he made on retirement from the board, the foremost of which was that 
the Wagner Act be amended to exclude supervisory workers. 
(121) 
Other members of the board were less intransigent however and 
there was some space available for persuasive argument. This argument 
was not necessarily confined to the board's meetings however. Strike 
activity could be used as a means of indirect persuasion, as in the 
case of Houston's volte face in the Packard case. In 1944, following 
the unfavourable Maryland Drydock decision and while the Packard case 
was still pending, the FAA had launched a series of "showdown" strikes 
at thirteen major Detroit plants including Briggs, Hudson, Packard and 
Murray specifically aimed at putting pressure on the NLRB, and clearly 
with some success. 
(122) As Leo Wolman commented at the time, echoing 
the thoughts of the automobile company management, "The new foreman's 
unions have learned... what older unions have known all the time; that 
what they may be denied by law they stand a good chance of getting by 
threats and strikes and what they are unable to wrest from one board 
they may the more easily wring from another. "(123) 
The latter part of Wolman's statement referred to the the FAA's 
attempts, when unsuccessful with the NLRB to shift jurisdiction of the 
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issue to the National War Labour Board (NWLB) in the hope of a more 
favourable set of decisions. In the event the NLRB was glad to hand 
over its problems to the NWLB which, acting under the provisions of 
the War Labour Disputes Act, became involved in the foreman "question" 
in 1944. After convening a series of public meetings on the subject of 
foremen's unionisation the NWLB took full jurisdiction over the issue 
in May of that year. 
(124) Despite protestations from employers that 
this was beyond the NWLB's brief, that the board itself was bound by 
the provisions of the Wagner Act and had no powers to arbitrate on 
issues relating to collective bargaining, it eventually undertook to 
hold a series of investigations into the case of supervisory unions on 
condition that the wave of strikes, then under way, were called 
off. 
(125) Two panels were set up, one to preside over the question of 
supervisors in the mining industry, the other to examine the problems 
of the FAA in Detroit. The latter was chaired by Sumner H. Slichter, a 
Harvard economics professor. The two other members of what became 
known as the Slichter Panel were Robert Calkins, Dean of Columbia 
University, and Madison attorney William H. Spohn. 
(126) At a series of 
hearings the panel heard testimony from FAA members, company spokesmen 
and foremen from thirteen companies, mostly based in Detroit and 
including Murray, Hudson, Chrysler, and Packard. 
(127) 
The panel issued a report of its findings in January 
1945, an 
essentially contradictory document which did little to clear up 
current problems. 
(128) Internal memos reveal that the panel and its 
advisors took the FAA to be an inevitable and ultimately successful 
movement. As Robert A. Winters, one of the panel's chief advisors 
informed them, "We are faced by an accomplished fact at the present 
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moment; so I can see no particular good purpose in trying to break 
down the foremen's organisations. It could be more constructive to 
guide them to socially valuable channels. "(129) The panel attempted to 
take a sympathetic line in relation to the foremen's problems in the 
face of hostile and intransigent employers. Recognising that the FAA 
was not being unreasonable in many of its demands the panel conceded 
that changes had taken place in industry which had changed the 
structure of the foreman's role and concurred with the "forgotten man" 
view of the foreman brought about by the advent of production workers 
unionisation. 
(130) The panel placed greatest stress on the uncertainty 
and insecurity which many foremen felt about the prospects of a return 
to normal working in the post war period. 
(131) Having said this they 
went on to reject specific hours of work and rate of pay complaints as 
not centrally important. 
(132) The panel also rejected claims by the 
FAA for seniority in promotion, demotion or lay-offs and, while 
agreeing that existing grievance procedures were largely inadequate 
and that the "open door" method was not working, they also 
emphatically rejected any grievance machinery which had ultimate 
reference to a neutral arbitrator. 
(133) Instead the panel put forward 
vague recommendations for a "freer interchange of viewpoints with 
managements" and more rigorous and effective communications 
systems. 
(134) 
Thus despite the recognition that the development of mass 
production had pushed the foreman down towards a position of greater 
homogeneity with the production worker, the Slichter panel clung to 
the idea that foremen were none the less still a separate and 
strategically important managerial strata. "Because of the key 
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position they hold in the organisation, and because higher management 
is so dependent upon them for the execution of company plans and 
policies, higher management must exercise greater discretion and care 
in the selection, advancement, retention in service, and discipline of 
foremen than (that of) rank and file employees. "(135) On balance the 
report had something for both parties although the FAA had more cause 
to be critical than the employers. 
(136) The panels recommendations, 
such as they were, were not implemented as they were rapidly overtaken 
by events. With the pro-FAA NLRB decision in the Packard case 
certification disputes were withdrawn from the NWLB and resubmitted to 
the NLRB thus withdrawing jurisdiction from the NWLB before the 
special panel reports were issued. 
(137) 
The NWLB deliberations had shown that, despite the fact that the 
end result in no way favoured the foremen, unions like the FAA had 
sufficient room to manoeuvre within and between bodies like this and 
the NLRB, and were constantly able to put their case, get it heard by 
a wider audience, and generally obtain publicity in support of their 
movement. Eventually it seemed that if the FAA were persistent enough, 
and continued their strategy of selective strikes and legislative 
appeals, the union would ultimately secure the consistent legal 
support which would provide a springboard to organisation on a large 
scale. Employers saw that their victories at the NLRB and in the 
courts were only transient, were vulnerable to reversal dependent on 
judgements by a politically shifting board and were based on the 
imprecise legal definitions as they now stood. Thus they embarked on a 
more serious and long term strategy, parallel to that of the 
interpretational guerrilla war at the NLRB. They worked to get the law 
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itself amended. 
There were to be several attempts to achieve a redrawing of 
industrial relations law to specifically exclude supervision from 
protection. In 1943 GM's president Charles Wilson was vigorously 
lobbying several congressional committees and was a major driving 
force behind the bill sponsored by Howard W. Smith. This bill sought 
to amend the Selective Service Act to prohibit the unionisation of 
foremen in industries supplying the government. Since most of the 
major automobile firms were now almost exclusively occupied in 
military production this would have in effect meant a ban on the FAA, 
the majority of whose members were concentrated in these firms. (138) 
The proposed bill included the proviso that any foreman found in 
violation of this law would have his reserved occupation status 
rescinded. Wilson appeared personally on behalf of GM and the AMA at 
hearings on the bill but it ultimately foundered. 
The Case bill fared somewhat better. In the same vein as the 
Smith -bill it sought to exclude foremen, clearly defined, from the 
protection of the NLRA and was passed by Congress in February of 1946. 
On this occasion however the President, Harry Truman, stepped in to 
veto the the bill in June of the same year. Mindful of the mid-war 
strike waves staged by the FAA, Truman argued that foremen would react 
in a similar way to the implementation of such law. 
(139) employer 
lobbyists finally succeeded when they secured the passage of the Taft- 
Hartley Act in 1947. Truman's veto was on this occasion 
overridden. 
(140) Employers now had the legislation they wanted. 
The Taft-Hartley Act incorporated a range of measures aimed at 
restricting the power of the whole union movement. Secondary boycotts, 
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jurisdiction strikes, strikes among federal employees, maintenance of 
membership clauses, union shops and closed shops were all banned. 
Compulsory cooling off periods, possible damage claims for breach of 
contract and government intervention in strikes deemed to be a threat 
to national health and safety were also incorporated into the new law. 
On the issue of supervision, seen by some commentators as the most 
important aspect of the new law, 
(141) 
the drafting was as unambiguous 
as the previous law had been lax; "Nothing herein shall prohibit any 
individual employed as a supervisor from becoming or remaining a 
member of a labour organisation, but no employer subject to this Act 
shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors 
as employees for the purpose of the law, either national or local, 
relating to collective bargaining. "(142) Definitional criteria were 
clearly laid out in terms leaving no room for argument; "The term 
"supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest of 
the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, 
discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or 
responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or 
effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the 
foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or 
clerical nature but requires the use of independent judgement. "(143) 
The FAA might have attempted to pursue its line that many foremen did 
not in fact carry these responsibilities, in particular those calling 
for "independent judgement", but the chances of success for such an 
approach were now extremely slim. Instead the FAA chose to concentrate 
its efforts on attempts to show that the new law was a violation of 
foremen's constitutional rights under the first and fifth amendments. 
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In this they had no success. The Supreme Court overruled the FAA 
interpretation, deciding that the new law allowed foremen to organise, 
but not under legal protection, and also that the new act was not at 
variance with existing labour legislation which excluded other groups 
of workers, specifically those involved in agriculture or domestic 
labour. (144) 
The effect of the Taft-Hartley Act was almost immediate. Some 
sectors of the labour movement did not even wait for the law to be 
confirmed through the courts. The UMW negotiated a new contract with 
mine owners which resulted in the dissolution of the supervisory 
affiliate, the UCTSE, within a month of the act's passing. In this 
respect the FAA were perhaps fortunate to have retained their 
independence. As it was their own legal battles through the NLRB were 
abruptly curtailed as the board ceased processing all the appeals 
currently under way. Somewhat ironically many employers saw in the 
Taft-Hartley Act's delineation of the bounds of union protection an 
opportunity to promote various production workers beyond the scope of 
unionisation and numbers of foremen were increased following its 
passage. 
(145) 
To what extent did state activity, as defined by the legislative 
framework and its interpretation, support or hinder the growth of 
supervisory unions such as the FAA? Certainly bodies such as the NLRB 
provided a forum for debate over the various definitions of 
supervision and the nature of the problems facing foremen. Employers 
frequently complained that the intervention of the board had greatly 
aided the FAA. 
(146) In support of this contention it can be seen that 
there were periodic upsurges in membership following favourable 
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decisions for the union. The period following the Packard decision in 
support of the FAA for example saw a wave of relatively easy victories 
for the union in certification elections, which greatly aided 
recruitment. 
(147) The contours of FAA growth do not fit too closely to 
the pattern of NLRB sanctions however. 
Several factors are important in understanding the ramifications 
of the boards decisions. Approval by the board often proved to be 
merely the start of a lengthy process. When cases were decided in 
favour of the FAA most employers continued their refusal to recognise 
the union - even where elections had been held and foremen had voted 
their support for representation by a specific union. At Chrysler in 
1946 for example, the company issued a letter to all foremen following 
its unsuccessful anti-FAA campaign, stating that it would continue to 
refuse to recognise the union, in spite of election victories for the 
FAA in four out of five Chrysler plants, and outlining its intention 
to campaign through the successive courts to reverse the NLRB's 
ruling. 
(148) This kind of stalling tactic only added to the already 
substantial delays in getting the NLRB to process complaints. At one 
point in 1945 there were over 100 cases outstanding. The Packard 
decision of 1945, decisive in restoring foremen's legal protection in 
organisation, was only finally ratified by the Supreme Court in 1947, 
some three months before the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. 
(149) 
The overall connection between supportive legislation and union 
recruitment levels is further complicated by the fact that no 
significant efforts to organise foremen were attempted when the NIRA 
was first passed in 1933 or later when decisively amended by the 
Wagner Act. This is easily explained in terms of the lack of an 
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institutional agency such as the FAA for foremen to organise within, 
but patterns of recruitment still do not coincide too closely with 
legal sanction even after the union was well established. Company 
agreements successfully secured, such as that at Ford in 1941 - 
seemingly unconnected to any specific state intervention beyond the 
final compulsion of accepting production workers unions - and 
successful strike campaigns while unsupported by the NLRB, seem 
equally if not more important in determining the immediate boosts in 
membership for the FAA. The eventual passage of the Taft-Hartley Act 
was met by the FAA with a major strike, albeit preemptive, at Ford. 
That this effort finally failed was due to a combination of 
circumstances including falling membership levels in line with 
immediate post-war production cut backs, withdrawal of strategic 
support by UAW locals, new employer initiatives over pay and 
conditions and simple exhaustion of union resources, in addition to 
the withdrawal of legal protections. 
State activity in relationship to union growth is better 
understood as one of many important factors in the contours of 
unionisation, at least in the medium term. State agencies such as the 
NLRB can be seen to act in erratic fashion, alternatively finding in 
favour of employers and the FAA, now acting as a stimulant to union 
growth, now acting as one of its impediments. Decisions can be seen to 
be made on the basis of strength of argument, the political affinities 
of constituent members, the imprecision of the law, response to 
pressure from industrial action, and pressure from employer's lobbies. 
In the long term, explanations of a more structural nature seem to fit 
a little more closely. The passage of enabling legislation such as the 
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Wagner Act to bring a general union movement into the ambit of a 
regulated, proceduralised industrial relations system, the problems of 
a threat of expansion of that movement beyond the shop floor to 
encompass intermediate levels of management met by the revisions of 
Taft-Hartley and resultant fixed limits on the extent of union 
influence, points to a larger picture of successful state regulation. 
Such an interpretation, besides being teleological, remains inadequate 
however in that its functionalism ignores the actual fluctuations and 
possible alternatives outlined above. More importantly it ignores the 
range of other factors, many of which themselves influence state 
activity, which contribute to the dynamics of unionisation. Just as 
the Wagner Act can be seen to be as much a response to union growth as 
a stimulant, so too the activities of the NLRB and NWLB can be seen to 
be reacting to a situation determined largely outside their control. 
As Winter had informed the Slichter panel members, "We are faced by an 
accomplished fact... ". This fact, the establishment of the FAA, was as 
much the product of the long term reshaping of the foreman's position, 
short term pressures and demographic shifts of wartime production 
within the ranks of workers and foremen, and the impact of the wider 
union movement, as the contours of legislative support. If the concept 
of the state is broadened and the impact of its actions examined 
indirectly enough then causal chains can be set up to incorporate 
these latter factors as well. These links become so extended however 
as to deny any useful explanatory function. In terms of direct causal 
dynamics the role of the state must take its place, albeit an 
important place, as just one of many causal factors. 
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The FAA in decline 
Two immediate events in 1947 signalled the beginning of the final 
phase of US supervisory unionism - the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act 
and the loss of the major strike effort at Ford. The strike involved 
around 3,800 foremen. Lasting 47 days it was initially well supported, 
but when union resources dwindled large numbers of foremen began to 
return to work. A ten to one majority of remaining strikers voted to 
terminate the strike on July 7- two weeks after the passage of Taf t- 
Hartley. (150) Thirty-two strikers were subsequently dismissed by Ford 
for alleged involvement in violent activities during the strike. Most 
of these men were prominent in the leadership of the Ford FAA chapter, 
and the action was widely viewed as a purge by the employers, later 
confirmed by the success of an unfair labour practice charge brought 
before the NLRB by the FAA. Although Ford eventually paid substantial 
compensation the foremen were not to be reinstated. 
(151) Robert Keys, 
FAA president since its inception, was an early casualty of the 
strike's failure. At the next FAA annual conference in September Keys 
succumbed to pressure for his resignation. The strike was now viewed 
as a major tactical error. Carl Brown, the newly elected president 
echoed popular opinion when he called it "ill-advised, ill-timed and 
ill-conducted. "(152) 
Loss of members now became a serious problem for the FAA, 
although estimates of membership vary considerably. In the late 1940s 
figures between 10,000 and 33,000 are variously reported, but accounts 
of the early 1950s agree a figure around 20,000. 
(153) This represents 
a serious enough loss from a total membership which peaked above 
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50,000 in 1945, but is more damaging when considered in the context of 
the hopes of the FAA in expanding beyond its Detroit, automobile 
industry base into other sectors nationwide and recruiting among the 
estimated two million non-unionised foremen of America. Some chapters 
of the FAA formed splinter groups following the set-backs of 1947. 
Thirteen chapters withdrew immediately after the Ford strike. Members 
at Packard for example formed the Packard Foremen's Guild before the 
year was out. Those at Hudson waited until 1948 before forming the 
Hudson Supervisors Association (HSA). Still confident of their 
strength the HSA almost immediately held a nine day strike over 
recognition which involved nearly 550 foremen. The strike was a 
success for the association, and agreement was reached with the 
company, but with the proviso that there were to be no links with the 
FAA. (154) The HSA was still holding the majority of Hudson foremen as 
members in 1953 when walk outs over lay off procedures were 
staged. 
(155) 
The FAA did retain some of its contracts, most notably at Kaiser- 
Frazer where over 600 foremen were organised. Other small contracts 
such as those at Detroit Edison and United Stove Works were maintained 
and some new ones negotiated with minor railroad and maritime 
companies. 
(156) FAA members at the major factories including Briggs, 
Ford, Chrysler, and Studebaker continued to pay their dues but found 
themselves in a union with no formal agreements and which was being 
effectively ignored by management. For their part employers were 
reluctant even to pursue their new rights under Taft-Hartley. There 
was no need. As one labour relations director put it, "The thing is 
dying on the vine anyway, so why not let it go ahead and die a natural 
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death? "(157) 
The FAA did attempt to fight Taft-Hartley throughout 1948 and 
1949, not through the courts but rather through setting up a lobby in 
Congress to get the law revised. Their resources in this were greatly 
unequal to those which the employers could muster, and partly in 
recognition of this the FAA set itself limited aims. Reversion to the 
provisions of the Wagner Act were not to be expected, the FAA 
admitting that, "there would be fundamental and proper objections to 
organising by foremen. One of these would be the eligibility of 
foremen to membership in a rank and file union. "(158) Instead the FAA 
proposed a "happy medium", protesting that with Taft-Hartley the 
"pendulum had swung too far one way. " The FAA now called for a 
separate law establishing collective bargaining rights for foremen. 
Many Democratic Senators and Congressmen were openly supportive of 
such legislation and a few Republicans were also reported to be 
"sympathetic", but the FAA's efforts were never given serious 
consideration and were to come to nothing in the increasingly 
inhospitable political atmosphere of the late 1940s and early 
1950s. (159) 
The FAA had early on abandoned hope of support from organised 
labour. Appeals during the crucial final stages of the Ford strike had 
been rejected more or less out of hand by the UAW, the AFL and the 
CIO. The union had even appealed to John Lewis's mining union, the 
UMW, for affiliation. By way of a response Lewis was shortly to 
abandon his own supervisors union, the UCTSE. 
(160) In recognition of 
the futility of any further approaches to any of these organisations 
the FAA again attempted to distance itself from any notions of 
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involvement with the wider labour movement, appealing for separate 
legislative controls and claiming by 1949 that the FAA had in fact 
defied production workers picket lines during post war strike 
activity. 
(161) As in previous periods the FAA was forced by pragmatic 
considerations and rejection by production workers' organisations to 
make the most of an independent stance it would rather not have taken. 
The union continued on into the 1950s under the leadership of 
Carl Brown. A "forgotten union" it was reduced to claiming secret 
contracts with small companies for fear "the big boys", meaning larger 
companies, would exert pressure to oust it. 
(162) By 1963 the FAA was 
down to a handful of members - perhaps 700 nationally - 150 of whom 
were active in the Detroit area. Requesting affiliation to the UAW-CIO 
in that year they were again rejected. By now the officers of the UAW 
had little idea who the FAA were, thinking it a good idea to attempt 
to recruit white-collar supervisors as a way of attracting white- 
collar rank and file members, but expressing no interest in "blue- 
collar shop floor foremen" at all. 
(163) 
In summary, this chapter has examined the interrelated responses 
of both employers and the state to foremen's unionisation. Employers 
undoubtedly saw the advent of the FAA as a major threat to their 
control of industry, even after taking account of the alarmist and 
often rhetorical nature of their anti-FAA proclamations. Employers at 
the time saw the rolling effect of the success of the general union 
movement, the consolidation of the UCTSE into the mineworkers union, 
and the FAA's initial recruitment levels as portents of the extension 
of union power to a whole new strata of the workforce. White collar 
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workers were sure to follow, although claims that management itself 
would similarly come under the aegis of the union movement were 
perhaps not seriously held beliefs. While employers could not by the 
1940s hope to dislodge the general union movement, they determined to 
draw a boundary line across which union influence should not spread. 
Shop floor supervision was to be this line. Evidence of the FAA's 
independence from the general union movement or production workers 
locals, whether from observation or the assurances of all parties, did 
not allay employers stated fears that, should foremen become 
unionised, managements shop floor representatives would become "union 
conscious". Foremen would be unable to carry out their duties 
effectively, and would eventually be taken over by an anti-management 
ethos. 
Employers' arguments against the unionisation of foremen rested 
on the proposition that foremanship represented a tangibly different 
form of work from that of the general factory worker. The foreman was 
"part of management" and the proceduralisation of industrial relations 
typical of general union agreements would be incompatible with such 
responsibility. Individualism and the "open door" were available to 
foremen and their ability to function under such a system was itself a 
characteristic which marked them off from the common worker. A good 
foreman should be able to stand up for himself. 
In putting forward as evidence idealised job descriptions and a 
multitude of forms requiring the attention of foremen, employers 
strove to indicate to formal inquiries the extensive responsibilities 
residual in the foreman's job. In doing so they ignored the serious 
erosion of the foreman's power, both in the long run in terms of 
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production rationalisation and in terms of the transfers of power 
inherent in unionisation of the production workers. Some companies, 
notably GM, had made greater efforts to restructure and support the 
foreman's role in advance of these events, and could thus present a 
stronger case, but generally employers' insistence on the continued 
integration of foremen into the executive management structure was of 
little empirical substance. Employers did not rely solely upon 
arguments put forward in the arena of official inquiries however. 
More direct employer anti-FAA strategies included firing 
individual foremen, reclassifying foremen to put them beyond the reach 
of the union or threatening to create a new strata of supervisory 
workers to supplant unionised foremen. Employers acted collectively 
through such agencies as the NAM and ACWP to disseminate anti-FAA 
propaganda and coordinate, largely through the leadership of GM's 
Charles Wilson, a campaign to obtain legal sanctions against the 
union, either through existing legislation or through the promotion of 
new laws. Such concerted activity was initially frustrated by the 
momentary reluctance of firms such as Packard and the longer term 
recalcitrance of the Ford management, but generally the automobile 
industry, under the leadership of GM, presented a united and effective 
lobbying force against which the FAA, with limited resources 
available, was always struggling. Managerial changes at Ford which 
brought them into line with the rest of the employers, and the FAA's 
consequent loss of its most prestigious contract and the unsuccessful 
attempt to resecure that contract by strike action in 1947, saw the 
FAA facing a united and purposeful opposition finally successful in 
obtaining the legislative backing for their anti foremen's union 
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drive. 
Employers also supplemented their more overt anti-FAA activity 
with a strategy reflecting that of British engineering employers when 
faced with unionisation of their foremen following World War One. By 
fostering alternative organisations for foremen, more closely under 
their own control, employers in both countries had hoped to divert 
potential NFA or FAA members, or at least attempt to put them under 
some form of contractual obligation not to join a union. Organisations 
such as the NAF in America, were moderately successful in recruiting 
foremen, although the direct financial and ideological influence of 
employers precluded such institutions addressing any of the pressing 
issues which foremen sought to air through the agency of authentic 
unions such as the FAA. Such initiatives represented only an adjunct 
to the major employer strategy to dislodge foremen's unions, important 
more as a forum for the dissemination of information to employers and 
non-union foremen alike. 
Employers concentrated a major part of their anti-FAA effort into 
attempts to change the law which, as it stood under the Wagner Act, 
had the potential to aid the union. The ambiguity and imprecision of 
the law as it defined, or rather did not define, the eligibility of 
supervisors for protection in organisation provides an illuminating 
example of the way in which legal strictures - the rules under which 
state agencies operate - are open to degrees of interpretation and 
individual, political intermediation. The part played by the New Deal 
generally in promoting unionisation or channelling it into more 
acceptable forms remains controversial. On the specific issue of 
foremen's rights the NLRB was to go through a series of vacillating 
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positions dependent on individual board members political orientation, 
strength of arguments, and pressure brought to bear by employer or 
union action. The board's decisions ranged from outright rejection of 
claims by the FAA to be allowed to operate as a union, to the approval 
of foremen joining any union be it specifically for foremen or open to 
membership by production workers. A brief interregnum by the NWLB, 
provoked by the damage to war production caused by the FAA's strike 
activity, failed to produce any decisive position on the issue. The 
Packard decision by the NLRB and its support through the courts, which 
seemed to finally affirm the rights of the FAA was to be only a brief 
moment of success for the union as, under the continued sponsorship of 
the employers, the last of a series of attempts to permanently modify 
the law resulted in the successful passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. 
This act unequivocally withdrew legal support for foremen, now clearly 
defined, to unionise. Foremen could still organise, but they could no 
longer force employers to recognise their organisation or seek 
protection in such activity through the law. 
The passage of Taft-Hartley can be represented as the final 
triumph of employers over the initiatives of the FAA, the marshalling 
of state power in favour of the wishes of capital and guarantor of 
continued control over the lower echelons of industrial management. 
The state had effectively drawn the boundary line for employers over 
which unions should not encroach. The contours of support by the state 
however show that such an interpretation can be misleading. Other 
configurations of state-capital relationships were possible. The NLRB 
had shown that in the medium term at least employers could not expect 
unwavering support. The final passage of the act itself represented no 
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surety that the FAA would not continue in defiance of the law as they 
had done on previous occasions, or force further revisions or 
reinterpretations through the NLRB or the courts. To be sure the Taft- 
Hartley Act was a great deal more water tight than the Wagner Act had 
been from the point of view of the employers, but its seeming success 
in reversing the fortunes of the FAA needs to be placed in the context 
of other trends evident in 1947. 
1947 does mark a watershed for the FAA and supervisory unionism 
in the USA, and subsequent years are marked by an inexorable decline 
into virtual oblivion by the early 1950s. 1947 does not simply mark 
the passage of legislation enabling employers to quash or successfully 
ignore the FAA however - as witnessed by their having no need to use 
the legislation to any great extent - but also the point at which a 
crucial strike at Ford was lost. The strike itself was a reaction to 
both the prospect of the passage of the act and to the reorientation 
of Ford management -a management emboldened by the impending law no 
doubt, but also one which had radically different ideas about the 
structure and status of shop floor supervision to those of its 
predecessors. 
In the longer term 1947 lies at a point where post war production 
was beginning to settle into what could now be seen as industrial 
stability based on economic growth rather than a return pre-war 
depression. The insecurity felt by many foremen had either been 
realised as they had been demoted following the conversion from war 
production or receded as salaries and jobs had become reestablished 
with the return of more normal working conditions associated with a 
return to automobile production. Economic stabilisation and the 
Chapter Eight -444- 
gathering climate of hostility of had seen production workers' unions 
establishing the basis for the forthcoming so-called "Treaty or 
Detroit" and had finally shown their reluctance, at both national and 
local level, to contribute effective support for the unionised 
foreman's cause. Foremen's unease with proceduralised industrial 
relations was also slowly being abated as foremen became acclimatised 
to new structures of discipline and power and as employers came to pay 
more attention to the training of foremen. 
All these factors, immediate and long term need to be taken into 
account in assessing both the rise and decline of supervisory 
unionisation. The role of the state, attitudes and activities of 
employers, the orientation of the wider union movement all provide 
immediate signals in the history of the FAA, but these must be 
understood in the context of changes in the structure of the 
supervisors role, whether in terms of restructuring brought about by 
mass production, the advent of unionisation or the more immediate 
concentration of such changes consequent on wartime production 
imperatives. None can be separated out as the single most important 
stimulant or retardant to the FAA but rather all are interconnected 
and provide the framework within which leaders such as Robert Keys 
were to find, for a brief span at least, a hitherto unorganised sector 
of the workforce now acutely receptive to ideas of unionisation. 
The FAA had without doubt given the automobile employers a nasty 
shock, and if it achieved little of lasting consequence beyond closing 
the door of legal sanction for supervisory unionisation down to the 
present day, the union had awakened in employers the need to pay 
closer attention to this strata of the workforce. The following 
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chapter will explore the reaction of employers in terms of consequent 
attempts to restructure and enhance the role and prestige of foremen 
and the origins of those schemes they chose to implement. 
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Chapter Nine: Restructuring the Foreman's Role 
The period of the ascendancy of the FAA, brief and transitory as 
it was, had, more than any other factor, thrown the "foreman problem" 
into sharp relief. It became belatedly recognised that changes within 
the labour process, the division of labour and the division of 
supervisory tasks, and the advent of union powers and procedures had 
created a strata of workers seemingly cut adrift from managerial 
prerogatives and status and demonstrably susceptible to the further 
encroachment of unionisation. In tandem with efforts to proscribe the 
activities the unions such as the FAA, employers began to perceive the 
need to embark on programmes of adjustments to both the foreman's 
material wellbeing and also the structure and content of his role at 
the workplace. A search for the answer to the problem began in 
earnest. As Business Week commented in June 1947, "Management 
generally is convinced that it was caught off guard once and will not 
be again. It is showing intense interest in programmes to give 
supervisory workers definite management status. Company officials do 
not want any rebirth of foremen's conviction that unions are 
necessary. "M 
This chapter will examine the chosen solutions in the aftermath 
of the FAA, aimed at reclaiming the allegiance of foremen, in 
particular the emphasis placed on human relations based techniques 
attempting to stabilise relationships among the workforce in general 
and give foremen a new understanding, through rigorous training 
schedules, of their responsibilities and position in the company. It 
is important to trace the history and origins of these ideas which 
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were not new but rather underwent a period of renaissance following 
the World War Two, and assess their impact or success in obviating 
unrest among the ranks of foremen. In doing so this chapter will also 
contrast the approaches of different companies to the "foreman 
problem", in particular that of Ford and General Motors, outlining the 
ways in which divergent strategies employed in the pre-war period were 
realigned and a clear and homogeneous pattern of response was to 
emerge. 
The search for a solution to the "foreman problem" was made more 
difficult in that at least some of the contributory factors became 
compounded in the years following the war. Technological developments 
which had resulted in the progressive deskilling of workers and 
supervision could not be reversed or restructured in the post-war mass 
market boom which was developing. Indeed certain areas of production 
underwent a new phase of rationalisation based on wartime 
technological advances. Transfer machinery was introduced for example, 
whereby large complex components such as engine blocks, underwent a 
series of operations in one fully integrated machine tool system. 
Union procedures which had done so much to curb the foreman's 
vestigial social power, had also become firmly established by the post 
war period. The shift in intra-union power away from the shop floor 
towards the leadership of the UAW was mainly to do with remunerative 
issues - pattern bargaining and COLA agreements - and still 
left the 
local committeeman to deal with the everyday grievances in the shop. 
He was however increasingly likely to deal with the personnel or 
industrial relations departments which had themselves seen a 
significant expansion during the war to deal with government 
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directives and the established union presence, and were to remain into 
the post war period. 
On the plus side for employers the FAA was seemingly decisively 
beaten, Taft-Hartley legislation had been secured and the UAW had 
indicated that it had no serious intention for the moment of 
recruiting foremen. In addition wartime government pay restrictions 
had been lifted enabling differentials between foremen and operatives 
to be restored, thus reestablishing a tangible division between 
supervisor and worker. Employers knew however that pay issues had been 
of less importance than issues relating to security and status to many 
of the foremen who had joined the FAA. In addition the current 
disinterest in foremen displayed by the wider union movement was no 
guarantee that in future they might assume a more predatory stance. 
Nor was there any guarantee that some future administration would not 
amend the legislation to enable foremen to organise. Management 
perceived the need for a more fundamental change in the foreman's 
position than pay rises could provide. Reflecting the recurrent themes 
of security and status of the FAA years the solution had to be found 
in terms of effectively reestablishing shop floor supervision as "part 
of management". 
There was no shortage of advice on the subject. The "foreman 
problem" had generated a virtual avalanche of academic and 
professional surveys, studies and monographs. University departments, 
personnel consultants and company representatives published and 
disseminated an increasingly large body of advice on how to treat the 
maladies of the foreman or welcome him back to the managerial fold. 
The great majority of this advice was in no way new however and it is 
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necessary to return to the inter-war period to trace the origins of 
these extremely numerous but essentially similar solutions. 
Some earlier managerial theories had had little to say concerning 
the role of shop-floor supervision. Scientific management and the 
practical applications of its Fordist derivatives had only sketchily 
formalised the foreman's role in theoretical terms. The Rigidly 
segmented functional foreman system of Taylorism for example was never 
implemented in its full sense. Although the functions themselves were 
to become structurally located within the increasing 
departmentalisation of control there did not develop any specific 
group of workers who could be identified as, or identified themselves 
as "functional foremen". Work measurement and bonus oriented schemes 
such as the Bedaux or Gantt systems relied on a mixture of self or 
gang regulation and expert rate setting - again with little to say 
about the formal roles and functions of foremen. Fordism, in as much 
as the system was practised, saw foremen as fulfilling an increasingly 
police oriented function in support of the control inherent within 
work systems and, correspondingly, increasingly remote from the formal 
managerial structure. Another branch of managerial theory - the Human 
Relations school - had by contrast to impart a central role to the 
question of shop floor supervisory practice, and it was the foreman as 
practitioner of this method of management that initially focussed 
attention on this strata. 
Human relations managerial theory has been well documented and 
vigorously criticised elsewhere. 
(2) A brief summary of the general 
tenets is necessary here. Usually seen as originating in the work of 
Elton Mayo, human relations is based in a behavioural psychology 
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approach to understanding and designing work. Founded upon notions of 
Durkheimian anomie with the onset of the division of labour, the 
school used the work of Hugo Munsterberg in industrial psychology, 
employee selection techniques pioneered by Walter Dill Scott(3) and 
the results of Mayo's own Hawthorne experiments, to demonstrate that 
social cohesion and group identification at the workplace is an 
integral factor affecting output quantity and quality. Social activity 
at the workplace had of course been recognised by Taylor in terms of 
"systematic soldiering" - the informal group regulation of output 
levels to subvert or manipulate piecework. Whereas Taylor and 
rationalisation practitioners adopted systems designed to eliminate 
the possibility of such activity by strictly defining and encoding 
work regulations or by mechanical substitution, human relations 
advocates sought to foster and exploit this phenomenon for the benefit 
of production. Communal spirit on the job, instead of being repressed, 
could be harnessed and directed via a reorientation of goals towards 
the good of the firm and thus, indirectly, the good of the employees 
themselves. 
In addition, as a further plus to management, the inherently non- 
conflictual nature of human relations management supposedly rendered 
unionisation obsolete. Though never explicitly promoted as an anti- 
union system (Mayo himself for example had little to say on the 
subject) the human relations approach was seen by many as a way of 
setting up alternative representational structures to unionisation. 
(4) 
Thus early interest was shown in such alternatives in the period of 
industrial unrest following the First World War. Also the high 
turnover problems of this period promoted interest in such non- 
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coercive solutions to waning company loyalty. The human relations 
solution can also be seen to dovetail with the broad trend of 
welfarism in industrial relations which emerged after the war, 
encompassing pension schemes, employee stock ownership, investment and 
savings plans, canteen and medical facilities, company magazines, 
clubs, picnics and general recreational facilities. Automobile 
companies were well represented in such activities throughout the 
1920s. (5) 
If a human relations perspective was to be applied as part of 
this trend then the position of the foreman became the lynchpin to 
success of any such scheme. If employees' energies and innate 
cooperative spirit were to be effectively channelled towards the 
firm's goals then the supervisor who was in immediate contact with the 
workers held a crucial position. "Human engineering" required the 
presence of an able human relations engineer and if the foreman was to 
fulfil this role he needed to be equipped with the requisite 
psychological tools with which to "engineer" his workers. The foreman 
also had to become a leader rather than a driver. High turnover in 
particular had been blamed on driving supervision and a new generation 
of foremen had to be trained to understand the social and 
psychological problems of mass production, to empathise with rather 
than chastise workers, to lead by example, and to select the right man 
for the right job, "to know his square men and his round men". 
(6) 
This transformation of foremanship could supposedly be achieved 
by two methods. Firstly foremen could be recruited on the basis of 
their aptitude for the new emphasis on personnel over technical skills 
by means of rigorous selection and rating procedures. This entailed 
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the use of I. Q. tests, job psychographs, and other pre-selection 
procedures developed by Ordway Tead and others, being applied to 
foremen in addition to production workers. Foremen's tests were far 
more problematic however. Production workers tests could be limited in 
part to seemingly tangible physical or mental measurements. Popular 
versions included the Minnesota Dexterity Test, the Johnson O'Connor 
Wiggly Block Test and the Otis Test of Mental Ability. 
(7) (It must be 
noted that the formulae involved in these tests and their measurement 
criteria are of dubious worth and the subject of ongoing debate, 
nevertheless they continued to have a fairly widespread impact. ) 
Foremen's selection tests by virtue of the personality attributes 
being sought were to involve attempted measurement based on more 
abstruse criteria. In the event the search for an effective measuring 
device was largely unproductive. As a 1926 survey of foremen selection 
and training observed, "the primary question is to be able , if 
possible, to know in advance of the existence of traits of 
leadership... Attempts in this direction... have not led to any 
worthwhile results. "(8) 
The continued emphasis on selection of foremen from the ranks of 
production workers and the general rejection of recruitment of 
specialist or college trained supervisors, plus the impracticalities 
of reselecting large sections of the existing supervisory workforce, 
meant that the second option, that of inculcating human relations 
foremanship, was most widely applied i. e. training existing 
supervision in "human engineering" techniques. Good foremen were to 
be, as Whiting Williams asserted, "made not born". 
(9) 
In the process of introducing what became known as the 
"new 
Chapter Nine -473- 
foremanship" the principles of human relations were to be applied to 
the foremen themselves. For example, as a way of reorienting the 
foreman's own goals a major part of many training schemes was reserved 
for teaching a general understanding of the overall functions of the 
firm, to put foremen back in touch with the total picture of 
production and all its phases and provide an understanding of the role 
of departments and functions now remote from the shop floor - 
production control, accounting, quality control etc. - but 
nevertheless influencing the foreman's everyday tasks. This was 
designed to offset the foremen's own alienation engendered by the 
subdivision of supervisory and control tasks. 
(10) In some cases this 
practice was extended to the regular furnishing of foremen with 
periodic appraisals of company policy. 
(ll) 
Once equipped with an expanded and comprehensive conception of 
his role relative to the corporate whole the "new foreman" had to be 
provided with the psychological and social skills of personnel 
counselling in order to bring out the new positive attitude towards 
work in those below him. These skills could be imparted using the 
standard psychology methods of role playing and group therapy applied 
on a regular basis to groups of foremen. This method had the 
additional benefit of modifying foremen's own behaviour by exposure 
to, and criticism from within their own peer group. 
What became known as the "conference method" thus emerged as the 
single most popular means of foreman training throughout the 1920s and 
1930s. Expansion of this type of training over purely technical, job 
related training was such that as early as 1921 a survey by the 
National Association of Corporate Schools found that of 156 topics 
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taught in 16 sampled foremen's courses, over two thirds were human 
relations oriented. 
(12) For Calder, writing in 1921, only two out of 
twelve qualities needed by foremen related to trade skill or knowledge 
of production methods. 
(13) One Swedish visitor to the US in 1926 
remarked upon this shift in emphasis at the time, "the same importance 
is not given to a foreman's technical knowledge in the United States 
as in Europe. A thorough acquaintance with his own work's technical 
details is demanded of him, nevertheless, but the knowledge is 
restricted to a relatively small sphere. "(14) The highly rationalised 
labour processes much of the US industry, the automobile industry in 
particular, was reducing this small sphere to progressively smaller 
dimensions. Human relations advocates recognised a trend rather than 
creating one. It was not as if they were advocating any diminution of 
the foreman's technical training but rather reacting to the fact that 
such an aspect of the foreman's job was declining anyway. In the 
vacuum created by the exodus of aspects of the technical role of 
supervision from the shop floor the foreman was seen to be left with 
more of a personnel role, especially in terms of disciplinary 
functions, but had adopted a harsh, confrontational approach to 
sustaining production. Human relations simply sought to supplant this 
with a softer, more reasoned approach. 
Expansion of human relations retraining was promoted through a 
number of agencies. Firstly there was state intervention via the 
education system. Under the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917 the federal 
government made $3,000,000 available annually for vocational 
education, stipulating that states or communities must match federal 
funds from their own resources. Thus local authorities could defray 
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50% of the cost of vocational education. 
(15) The Federal Board for 
Vocational Education (FBVE) was set up and foremen training became one 
of its major preoccupations. Frank Cushman, head of the industrial 
education service of the FBVE was particularly interested in shop 
floor supervision, publishing a number of books and articles on the 
subject in which he advocated attention to the "human factor" and 
conference methods. 
(16) The FBVE Bulletin carried regular reports on 
foreman training schemes in operation and recommended expansion in 
this area as "one of the most vital and pressing problems in the field 
of industry. ..,, 
(17) Conference meetings of foremen were given 
recommended topics. "The Best Team Wins", "Man Factors", "Promotion of 
Interest", "Job Pride as an Interest Factor", "The Development of 
Satisfaction", and "Appreciating the Other Fellows Troubles" are 
fairly typical examples. 
(18) A particular emphasis developed on the 
need to train conference leaders among foremen who could guide group 
sessions among other foremen to ensure that the spontaneity of such 
occasions was carefully channelled into productive directions. Economy 
dictated that such leaders could then disseminate their own skills to 
the wider audience of foremen. 
Foremen training became available in two thirds of all state 
vocational education departments by the mid 1920s and became a major 
preoccupation with many universities and colleges. 
(19) The conference 
method fitted in easily with academic seminar practice, and academic 
industrial experts of the burgeoning human relations school were keen 
to have some direct input into industrial practice via the training of 
foremen. Some universities became directly involved in on site foreman 
training in the 1920s. Purdue was the leader in this field holding 
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lectures and demonstrations and organising conferences in board rooms, 
production areas, warehouses or outside in factory yards, at over 400 
companies between 1923 and 1930. A lecture followed by a round table 
discussion was the standard format employed during a course of six bi- 
weekly meetings. The service, paid for by state funds was entirely 
free to participating companies. 
(20) Similarly Pennsylvania had taken 
its foreman training course to over 100 engineering plants by 
(21) 1927. 
Many foremen were trained outside the factory at night school, 
weekend conferences, or through personal initiative in subscribing to 
the growing corpus of correspondence courses which were becoming 
available. 
(22) A significant percentage of the latter were aspirant 
workers who saw some form of certificate of foremanship as a key to 
promotion. Most foremen continued to embark on training programmes 
under the sponsorship of industry however and many direct links were 
to be forged between colleges and companies for this purpose. 
(23) This 
trend was aimed at individual firms which could not bear the cost of 
permanent training schemes or personnel. A Modern Foremanship Council 
was set up at La Salle Extension University with the active 
involvement of business leaders and factory managers for example. 
Human relations advocates including Hugo Diemer and Meyer Bloomfield 
produced course manuals on modern foremanship with a strong emphasis 
on leadership and urging that "Discipline is not to be gained by harsh 
or tyrannical treatment .,, 
(24) Universities including Wisconsin and 
Rutgers ran similar extension courses for foremen with a growing 
element of "leadership" oriented components. 
(25) 
In addition to initiatives by the state and education authorities 
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numerous other agencies were at work throughout the 1920s promoting 
the new foremanship. The U. S. Chamber of Commerce issued a series of 
bulletins stressing the need for foremen to be trained in 
responsibility for human organisation, loyalty and teamwork, and also 
gave general appraisals and aggregate lists of foremanship courses 
available. It is worth noting that top of the 1935 list was "Analysing 
Yourself", followed by "Development of Personality", "Effective 
Leadership" and so on. "Basic Factors in Production" came 59th on the 
list, well behind "The Foreman and the Social Order" and "Example of 
Character". (see Appendix II) In addition the Chamber of Commerce 
invited speakers to its annual meetings to discuss foremanship. Cyrus 
McCormick for example gave an address in 1926 entitled, "Foreman 
Training is Essential to Plant Self Governance "(26) 
The YMCA also promoted foremanship training in addition to the 
existing inter-war efforts to develop foremen's clubs and social 
activities which were to form the basis of the National Association of 
Foremen. Their pocket manual Foremanship, which contained the outline 
of courses taught in YMCA schools, went through several reprints 
throughout the 1920s. The schools themselves made training available 
to firms at a cost of between $25 and $50 per foreman. Course content 
echoed human relations tenets. Of the YMCA list of qualities necessary 
in good foremanship 75% related to the foreman's "attitude" and only 
25% to "personal and technical skill" . 
(27) The National Foremen's 
Institute also issued guidelines for those firms interested in in 
setting up foremen's conference training to aid foremen in developing 
communications skills, "understanding workers home problems", and 
rehearsing foremen in the use of "practical psychology". 
(28) 
Chapter Nine -478- 
Most manufacturers' associations also joined the general clamour 
for the promotion of more thoughtful foremanship. The National Metal 
Trades Association (NMTA) for example compiled its own manual for 
foremen's conferences. At the NMTA meeting in Cleveland in 1925, 
Albert Kauffman of the Link Belt Company outlined the direction in 
which foremanship should progress. "In the successful management of 
the future, knowledge of finance, technical processes, salesmanship 
and business law will all be subordinated to knowledge of men and to 
an appreciation of their problems and needs and factors making for 
their contentment and happiness. "(29) The National Association of 
Corporation Training, absorbed by the American Management Association 
in 1924, also promoted foreman's training courses. 
(30) 
Companies were also regaled by independent industrial consultants 
cashing in on the wave of heightened interest in the foreman. The 
Business Training Corporation for example claimed to have trained over 
30,000 foremen from 400 companies between 1918 and 1921. Industrial 
Relations Counsellors Incorporated consultancy promulgated Mayo's 
Hawthorne experiments and their applicability to the role of the 
foreman throughout the 1930s. 
(31) 
Many larger firms had no need for government agency or outside 
consultants. Following the increase of many personnel departments 
during the First World War and early 1920s some larger corporations 
were able to set up their own programmes of education and training for 
foremen. Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing for example set up 
committees in the 1920s for this purpose. The programme expanded 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s into a regular series of conference 
bases courses. Groups numbered up to twenty participants ideally 
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including one participant each from production control, accounts, 
inspection, time study and the toolroom and at least six ordinary 
foremen. The resultant pooling of ideas and experience, in as informal 
atmosphere as possible was designed to aid personality development, 
leadership, morale, discipline, and self analysis. 
(32) General 
Electric, National Cash Register, American Rolling Mills, Armco, and 
Procter and Gamble are among those firms pursuing similar in-house 
programmes. 
(33) 
Personnel and industrial relations departments implementing "new 
foremanship" schemes had a wealth of information at their disposal 
provided by a rapidly increasing number of publications. Journals 
carried many hundreds of articles based on the foreman throughout the 
1920s. The American Machinist for example ran 'The Foreman's Round 
Table' weekly discussion from 1926 onwards. Journals including 
Iron Age, Machinery, Mechanical Engineering, Factory and Industrial 
Management, and Industrial Management all ran regular contributions, 
often by company personnel, outlining existing or proposed schemes for 
new foremanship training. 
(34) Books in the now classic human relations 
mould such as C. R. Allen's The Foreman and His Job, Frank Cushman's 
Foremanship and Supervision and Hugo Diemer's Foremanship Training 
were widely read by personnel employees and managers. Clarence Howard, 
president of Commonwealth Steel and a convert to "human engineering" 
principles, bought several hundred copies of Sherman Rogers' Foremen! 
Spark Plugs or Grounded Wires, for distribution around his plants, 
(35) 
The automobile industry in general was an important participant 
in the movement to retrain supervisors in the "new foremanship". The 
FBVE estimated that in 1927 approximately 30% of all foremen trained 
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in conference leadership came from the industry. 
(36) 
An National 
Industrial Conference Board survey of the same period produced similar 
f indings. (37) The Purdue programme outlined above was taken up by 44 
automobile industry companies by 1931 including Delco Remy, 
Studebaker, Stutz, Chrysler, Automotive Gear, American Car and General 
Motors-(38) Packard established close links with the National 
Association of Corporation Schools (NACS) in the early 1920s and 
established their own foremen's school where foremen could attend 
conference style training courses. 
(39) Chrysler also gave foremen's 
training a high priority, so much so that their Director of Industrial 
Relations, John M. Amiss, was told to concentrate on this at the 
expense of apprenticeship training in 1927. 
(40) The industry's trade 
journals carried regular features designed to inform managers of 
schemes available. The Society of Automotive Engineering's journal for 
example outlined programmes and ran contributions from automobile 
companies on foremanship initiatives. 
(41) 
It was General Motors which was to take the lead in the adoption 
of new foremanship principles. It is here that one of the interesting 
contrasts arises between GM and Ford during the inter-war period, a 
contrast which, as noted in previous chapters, may have some bearing 
on the varying levels of success of the FAA in recruiting members at 
both companies. GM was to remain impervious to FAA recruitment drives 
throughout the 1940s, with a few notable exceptions such as the Diesel 
Engine plant. That GM was to take up a position in the vanguard of the 
legal and political campaign against the FAA, reflects an early 
commitment to the idea that the position of the foreman was of great 
strategic importance in industrial relations and a determination from 
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the mid 1920s onwards to reinforcing the foreman's sense of belonging 
to management. 
The GM stance stands in marked contrast to that adopted by Ford 
during this period. The continued Ford preference for "driving" 
foremanship has been outlined in chapter four. The solution to 
turnover, absenteeism and production problems for Ford lay in a 
combination of high wage-effort bargains, labour market manipulation 
and the substitution of machine control for human discretion wherever 
possible. The emphasis for Ford foremen was on a policing function 
based on at the least a respect for the authority, and more often, 
abject fear among workers. Foremen themselves were to be overseen by 
the omnipresent office of the servicemen as the thin veneer of Ford 
paternalism faded into the 1920s. Some minor satellite factories did 
take an interest in new foremanship - the Indianapolis plant became 
involved in the Purdue training projects for example(42) - but for the 
major complexes such as the River Rouge in Detroit the only psychology 
foremen were deemed to need was that of the ability to intimidate. 
This had not always been so. The brief period of experimentation 
at Ford after 1913 during which the sociological department had been 
set up represented a pioneering attempt to implement a structure of 
industrial control based on human relations principles. In intention 
at least these initiatives were aimed directly at reorienting the 
attitude and role of foremen. J. R. Lee had after all pinpointed the 
"unintelligent handling of men on the part of the foreman" as one of 
the reasons for the high turnover at Ford before the war. 
(43) Such 
initiatives, as noted in chapter two above were to be short lived. 
Foremanship at Ford in the 1920s and 1930s settled into a routine of 
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recruitment and practice based on brutal and harsh treatment. 
. -fis 
foreman Howard Beebe recalled, "you were told to treat your men tough 
to keep the production going. They would be all over your back 
too... Oftentimes you would get treated pretty rough yourself. " His 
contemporary Bill Klann was similarly instructed to "give the men 
hell" in driving production. 
(44) The most prevalent reason for the 
dismissal or demotion of foremen around this period was that they were 
"not heavy enough for the job" or "would not push the job enough". 
(45) 
With the general decline of welfare initiatives into the 1920s 
including the eclipse of Lee's efforts at Ford, and the accession to 
power there of Charles Sorenson, a man noted for favouring a robust 
attitude at all levels of supervision, Ford foremen began to build a 
reputation as the "slave drivers" of the industry. 
(46) The situation 
carried on unaltered into the 1930s. The Works Progress Administration 
heard evidence in 1937 that workers at Ford were "driven at an inhuman 
pace by foremen picked for their brutality". 
(47) An indication of the 
way in which Ford factories became synonymous with this type of 
foremanship is given in the recommendation by workers at Kelsey Hayes 
in 1937 that two foremen, deemed to be pushing men and production too 
vigorously, "should be shipped to Ford's for a try out. t(48) Beyond 
the overall recommendation that foremen should behave in this fashion 
Ford management seem to have paid little formal attention to either 
the training or general role of foremen throughout the 1920s and 
1930s. In line with the general dearth of formal record keeping at 
Ford foremen were not even formally classified in terms of their 
responsibilities. This was revealed when unionisation succeeded at 
Ford. During the NLRB elections foremen had to be identified through 
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verbal descriptions of job activity by production workers in order to 
separate those eligible to vote. 
(49) 
In contrast, General Motors maintained a position of considered 
attention to the position of shop floor foremen in terms of his 
selection, training and responsibilities, throughout the 1920s and 
1930s. The GM Executive Training Programme for foremen had been 
implemented in 1920 aimed at giving an overall view of the company and 
stressing their "managerial responsibilities". 
(50) GM also enrolled 
their foremen in the foremanship courses of the NACS and the Business 
Training Corporation between 1918 and 1921. 
(51) The company began to 
develop its own courses by the mid 1920s, run at the GM Institute of 
Technology and other training centres. Again the conference method 
soon established primacy as over 300 foremen took the 40 part courses 
each year. These were supplemented by regular monthly conferences in 
which foremen from all divisions of GM took part. 
(52) The courses 
themselves tended to favour the selection of younger applicants for 
training and were also open to workers not yet promoted but who 
wished, on payment of $30, to enhance their suitability as candidates 
for a foreman's post. 
The GM programme became increasingly influenced by the human 
relations school as the 1920s progressed. Glen L. Gardiner, soon to 
become the leading advocate of human relations foremanship, became 
employment manager at their Oakland division in the mid 1920s. While 
in this post Gardiner continued his involvement in the University of 
Wisconsin Extension College foremanship courses-(53) For Gardiner the 
stress of new foremanship was to be placed on "man factor" problems, 
soluble through the training of foremen in industrial psychology. 
54 
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This approach also greatly influenced the work of Albert Sobey who was 
to assume overall control of foreman training as GM's Director of 
Education. Sobey, a keen supporter of YMCA style foremen's clubs and 
similar activities of the National Association of Foremen, held that 
the optimum training for foremen in human relations would mark "the 
return swing of the pendulum from the F. W. Taylor movement". 
Subscribing to notions of a new industrial revolution "centred in 
human science, a growing knowledge of men, the administration of 
manpower, and the social and economic relationships of life", Sobey 
advocated that new foremen must be trained "to develop leadership, a 
broad understanding of men, vision and something of industrial 
statesmanship". 
(55) 
The impact of these programmes in terms if industrial relations 
is difficult to assess. Certainly many thousands of GM foremen 
dutifully completed the courses championed by Gardiner and Sobey, and 
in the process undoubtedly gained a broader view of the structure of 
the company. The initiatives probably failed in their major aim of 
imparting the craft of "industrial statesmanship" but the management 
at GM was nevertheless sufficiently convinced of their worth to give 
Sobey a prolonged reign. The programmes were carried on into the 1930s 
as were general welfare initiatives including housing, savings and 
insurance plans and provision of recreational facilities to which 
benevolent foremanship was probably seen as an ancillary. When the 
balance of welfare initiatives did start to decline as a response to 
the depression the "Leadership Training" programmes were extended to 
cover all divisions of the GM corporation and remained well supported 
throughout the 1930s. 
(56) 
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Foreman training in human relations and its implied benefits to 
the wellbeing both worker and supervisor in terms of job satisfaction 
via a worthwhile and harmonious social existence on the shop floor 
were not attempted purely from altruistic motives of course. The 
rationale behind human relations management had always been implicitly 
linked to increased or improved production and hence to higher 
profits. A happy workforce meant high output of good quality. The 
other implicit benefit of this strategy was its supposed value in 
offsetting the need for unionisation. With the growth of the 
industrial union movement in the 1930s a new sense of urgency was 
imparted to the correct training and preparation of GM's foremen if 
not to offset then at least to cope with the onset of unionisation 
among production workers. 
(57) As the establishment of the UAW became a 
real prospect Sobey's emphasis in training began to shift however. 
There was a continued advocacy of the inculcation of "team spirit" in 
foremanship, the difference being that now the foreman was to be 
convinced of his place in the management "team". Driven by the early 
recognition that many foremen were expressing feelings of being 
"short-circuited" by the procedures set up in the transitory "employee 
representation" plans during 1933 and 1934, Sobey's conference 
training shifted emphasis to the need for stronger links and 
understanding between the foremen on the shop floor, members of other 
technical and production related departments, and most importantly, 
higher management. If a line was to be drawn between management and 
worker, then members of shop floor supervision were to be in doubt on 
which side they stood. 
(58) 
Sobey's work, and its shift of emphasis, reflected a recognition 
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by GM's higher management that in the forthcoming restructuring of 
industrial relations the foreman was to hold the "key role". William 
S. Knudsen, Executive Vice-president in the 1930s publicly outlined 
his views on the importance of job of foreman. Recognising the threat 
of foremen as "men in the middle" of a polarised industrial relations 
system, Knudsen proposed a reemphasis of their status and power. In 
Knudsen's view personnel departments had encroached too far onto the 
foreman's territory, especially in terms of hiring, firing and general 
discipline. Too much "industrial science" had interfered traditional 
foreman-worker relationships. It was Knudsen's hope that "we will get 
back to a time when the so-called personnel department was out on the 
bench. "(59) A clear demarcation also needed to be reestablished 
between foreman and worker and to this end Knudsen abolished working 
foremen and group leader classifications. Ratios of workers to foremen 
were also to be stabilised at an optimum of twenty to one. Foremen's 
wages were to be pegged at af ixed rate 25% above the highest paid 
worker in their section. 
(60) Around the same time individual GM 
companies began redoubling their efforts in sponsored social events 
for foremen only and increasing support for foremen's clubs. 
(61) In a 
prophetic statement made in 1934 Knudsen foretold of what he saw as 
principal danger of neglected shop floor supervisors, that of 
unionisation. He told managers, "I plead with you to go out into your 
factory and gather up the bottom strata. Someone else has been trying 
to gather it up while you were not looking. "(62) 
The purpose of the strategy of increased attention to foremanship 
in the early 1930s was more to do with offsetting unionisation of the 
workforce in general however than confronting the unionisation of 
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foremen. A foreman, newly invested with formal disciplinary powers and 
infused with a new sense of loyalty from a feeling of belonging to 
management, could stand as the first line of defence against the 
nascent industrial unions. This is revealed in a series of inter- 
office memos from Knudsen to his managers in 1934. In view of the 
restrictions imposed by the National Industrial Recovery Act over 
discrimination once a worker was hired it was deemed important to 
avoid recruiting men with a history of union activity. "We must watch 
our hiring. Don't just pick men out of the line but be sure we know 
who we are hiring. Check them up very carefully. We must be sure our 
foremen are with us and are doing the job. " Foremen would be more 
effective than employment departments at weeding out known organisers 
and thus the foreman's right of veto over hiring was to be 
restressed. 
(63) 
Once unions were established at GM, foremen there were to have 
their position at the first stage of the grievance machinery protected 
-a frequent complaint of FAA foremen at other factories being that 
they felt left out of this stage of the procedure. 
(64) More 
importantly perhaps GM never allowed the same degree of freedom to 
local union representatives as in other factories and thus avoided the 
challenge to the foreman's power of a strong union presence on the 
shop floor. The shop steward system was not formally recognised, 
rather a series of negotiated agreements led to a compromise 
bargaining committee without the acceptance of full shop floor worker 
representation. Given the high ratio of committeemen to workers the 
latter had little option but to approach their foreman in the first 
instance if aggrieved. 
(65) Despite the initial wave of conflicts 
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around the establishment of the UAW through the period of sit-down 
strikes etc. GM was relatively quick to normalise its relations with 
the UAW. As Harris notes, "GM alone of all the major automobile 
manufacturers managed to stabilise its labour relations on more or 
less acceptable terms before the outbreak of war. "(66) These stable 
relations included a jealous protection of the foreman's position in 
agreements in terms of hiring, firing, discipline and, as noted, in 
the grievance process. 
(67) 
This tough stance on the extent of influence of the union 
movement over the position of the foreman was later to be reflected in 
the GM campaign against the FAA described in the previous chapter. GM 
foremen themselves were never to display much enthusiasm for the FAA 
however, and much of the company's campaign against the union was 
conducted against the efforts of the FAA at other employers premises. 
If GM had capitulated to the FAA then its future success would have 
been more or less guaranteed, instead foremen at the GM plants were to 
exhibit a singular indifference to recruitment efforts. FAA president 
Keys made numerous visits to GM plants to no avail. GM foremen took no 
part in any FAA strikes and there were only two petitions for 
representational elections presented to the NLRB from GM plants, one 
from the Diesel Engine plant in Detroit and the other from the Melrose 
Park plant in Chicago - both recently established factories. 
(68) Thus 
GM foremen appeared to have no need of legal constraints on their 
interest in the FAA, being seemingly impervious to all organising 
efforts. 
Something had made foremen at GM more resistant to unionism than 
their counterparts at other automobile factories. How much had the 
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influence of long term training programmes along human relations lines 
contributed to this resistance? Were GM's foremen convinced that they 
were an integral part of management or had more tangible factors been 
responsible for the isolation of GM foremen from the union movement 
which was readily accepted by a large majority of foremen at the other 
major automobile manufacturer's plants? 
As we have seen the foreman's position at GM had been bolstered 
throughout the 1930s by pay differential maintenance, support of their 
shop floor status in terms of protection against the erosion of their 
power by union procedures or the expanded role of personnel 
departments in terms of hiring, firing and discipline, and by 
attention to selection and training programmes. Underpinning all these 
initiatives was the attempt to maintain or widen a division between 
foreman and worker manifested in the foreman's perception of his 
essential difference from those engaged in production. This was in 
spite of the objective fact that the division of labour had brought a 
reduced role to shop floor supervision -a fractionalisation which had 
more closely aligned the foreman with production workers than with 
executive management. How useful was the human relations training 
component, pushed at GM more than any other automobile plant, in 
defying this objective diffusion of the foreman's status or difference 
and reestablishing at least the notion of separateness, responsibility 
and an ideology linked to that of management? 
Human relations had not been without its critics during the 
inter-war period. As noted, GM's Knudsen had railed against too much 
"industrial science" when the danger of unionisation loomed. 
The 
remote, academic environment of many of the theoreticians and the 
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inapplicability of the method of human relations had also been singled 
out for criticism. Goodyear's industrial relations department for 
example discounted the value of non-industry based advisors. "We have 
not found any high-school or college-trained professor who can step 
into industry. t(69) The seminar or round table method of the foremen's 
conference also lacked credibility in some circles. Despite intense 
efforts to train conference leaders able to guide discussion and thus 
promote the desired group therapy, meetings tended to be dominated by 
a minority of more vociferous individuals. 
(70) More serious were 
criticisms that these type of foremen training schemes were only 
grudgingly accepted by participants, especially older foremen. As 
Roethlisberger, in the vanguard of the post war renaissance of the 
human relations method, was to comment, "the foreman gives lip-service 
in his courses to things which in the concrete shop situation he feels 
it would be suicidal to practice. "(71) Take GM's Glenn Gardiner's 
advice on psychology which would see workers "disarmed of their 
bitterness". A foreman cutting the pay of his workers for example 
should break the news in the following fashion: "Here's the company's 
side of it: You fellows have no doubt noticed that the selling prices 
of our competitors are getting down below ours... 
"(72) Workers 
reactions to a cut in pay were unlikely to be mollified by such 
statements which only serve to illustrate Gardiner's tenuous grasp on 
the reatilies of shop floor life. 
Other critics saw the abstract and complex nature of 
human 
relations management as too much to take in for the average 
foreman 
who, by virtue of his shop floor origins lacked the 
"necessary 
intelligence". It was therefore deemed "futile to attempt to teach 
the 
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subtleties of human behaviour"(73) A more specific criticism was aimed 
at the lack of substantive content in many of the programmes 
implemented under the aegis of conference training; ""Conference" is a 
broken winded and pestiferous term. Any meeting from two to perhaps 
one hundred persons who gather to conduct a "gab-fest" is dignified as 
a conference. "(74) Finally there were doubts expressed about the 
lasting effects of such training even where properly conducted. 
Foremen might modify their behaviour for short periods following the 
courses but under the everyday pressure of shop floor life a reversion 
to adversarial methods of achieving production would be inevitable. 
The testimony of one foreman before the NWLB Special Panel highlights 
the transitory nature of human relations retraining programmes; 
"Q. They passed out literature to you and then you had 
conferences? 
A. That's right. 
Q. The conference method of instruction, is that right? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And the course dealt chiefly - it did not deal with 
technical aspects of your work, but with the human relations and 
labour relations, psychological aspects of it, is that right? 
A. Well, yes. We had a first-aid course. We had a course in 
grievance procedure set up... and we had, oh I forget now, general 
schooling I imagine you would call it... 
Q. And there was considerable stress on the importance of 
cooperation between foremen and the the interest of of integrating the 
work among the various departments; do you recall that was one 
subject? 
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A. No, I can't recall it... "(75) 
The major criticism of human relations training techniques 
remained that they ignored the realities of modern rationalised and 
subdivided mass production methods. In many cases it was simply not 
possible to impart a degree of interest or satisfaction into the 
section of the overall process that the detail labourer, or his 
supervisor was left with. Wage-effort bargains and their constant 
reorientation through optimalising pay, bonus and incentive related 
schemes continued to run in tandem with reappraisals of job 
measurement and mechanical substitution, to guarantee output, not by 
group leadership but rather a mixture of physical compulsion and 
manipulated consensus. Workers resisted these methods, individually 
and collectively with varying success at differing periods and 
locations, but the persistent dominance of Taylorist and Fordist 
derivatives or various alternative or complimentary incentive related 
systems, and the continued implicit acceptance of adversarial 
industrial relations, is in itself evidence of the rejection or 
inapplicability of a system of production revolving around the 
diplomacy or "human engineering" skills of foremen. 
Futile as it may have been attempting to change the nature of 
soliciting effort or the social relationships on the shop floor, the 
considerable attention paid to the question of educating foremen is of 
importance. It demonstrates that for some companies at least, notably 
GM, the foreman was a figure worthy of some considered attention. GM 
still used intensely rationalised production methods - their flow line 
assembly for example was as fully integrated and paced as any at Ford 
- and only token attention was paid to the notion of fitting workers 
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to jobs. The considerable investment made in the elaborate training 
schemes in terms of direct costs and the costs of absentee foremen 
while undergoing training however may have been recouped in different 
ways than the successful transmutation of foremen into industrial 
psychologists or counsellors. The programmes' value lay in convincing 
the participating foremen of the company's continuing high estimation 
of their worth. If nothing else the expressed emphasis on the "key 
role" which supervision played and the fact of selection for quasi- 
academic training, often away from the shop floor, reinforced the 
foreman's feeling of separation from the ranks of manual workers and 
encouraged notions of elitism. 
GM had made a long term effort to guarantee that their foremen 
felt tangibly different in status and prestige from those who operated 
machinery or assembled parts - to insulate the foreman from 
identifying with those "below" him. That one of the earliest and 
methods chosen, that of human relations training, carries as one of 
its basic tenets empathy with the pressures or problems of other 
workers is not as paradoxical as it may seem. The foreman's human 
relations knowledge was in reality meant to give him an understanding 
of workers feelings, not in order that he would more closely identify 
with them, but rather that these feelings could be manipulated to 
maximise work efficiency. Just as the foremen's conference was to be 
manipulated and controlled by the trained conference leader so too the 
foreman was to take on the guise of mentor, counsellor, even friend, 
but the essential separateness, the notion of leader was always to 
remain. Thus human relations training of the foreman to instil and 
reinforce a continued division between foremen and the ordinary 
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production worker. 
In spite of the apparent usefulness of human relations in these 
terms, the general movement declined into the 1930s as unionisation 
became an established fact, as labour market problems such as turnover 
and absenteeism on the scale of the post World War One period 
declined, as the ethos of welfarism was dissipated and, not least, as 
the general effectiveness of human relations in extracting greater 
profits was revealed to be somewhat doubtful. Some firms, such as 
Ford, had never bothered to find out if human relations could achieve 
worthwhile results. Even GM as we have seen, had opted in the end for 
a more pragmatic version of human relations aimed primarily at 
building a team spirit encompassing the foreman and the rest of 
management rather than the general workforce. The idea of the human 
relations foreman was not finished however. As the FAA arose following 
1941, seemingly to confirm Knudsen's warnings, a wider range of 
managements turned their attention to the problem of the foremen. Two 
factors now seemed apparent to all. The unionisation of production 
workers had left the foreman as the "man in the middle" or worse, as a 
marginalised figure, bypassed by grievance and seniority procedures 
and pay negotiations. Secondly the foreman had become the subject of a 
spreading union consciousness, had been drawn into the fold of the new 
union movement and in the polarisation of industrial relations was 
beginning to chose the side of the worker rather than that of 
management. Human relations theorists were again to put themselves 
forward as the only people with the answer to this problem and the 
result was a renaissance for the movement. 
The same range of agencies were to the fore in promoting what was 
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in essence a rehash of the "New Foremanship" movement of the early 
1920s. The federal government, just as it had sponsored vocational 
education at the end of World War One, began to push initiatives such 
as the War Manpower Commission's Training Within Industry (NI) scheme 
throughout World War Two. Broken down into several 'J' courses 
comprising Job Instruction, Job Methods, and Job Relations training 
the five-day courses were attended by hundreds of thousands of foremen 
throughout the USA. 
(76) The Job Relations section was heavily human 
relations influenced and advocated the ubiquitous conference method. 
Foremen were also issued with a supervisors handbook containing a 
balance of information on wartime regulations and advice on how to 
cope with employees "personal problems". The Department of Labour also 
issued a variety of aids to foremanship, again stressing the ideal 
attributes of "leadership ability rather than drivership". 
(77) 
University departments again became interested in the foreman as 
a "problem" figure during the 1940s. Although many university staff 
were actively involved in setting up training schemes (Roethlisberger 
at Harvard played an important part in setting up the TWI programme 
for example(78)) the major academic focus became one of extensive 
study. Perhaps influenced by criticisms of scholarly abstraction in 
previous attempts to outline the ideal attributes of good foremanship, 
several university departments began major projects based on rigorous 
case study, questionnaire, interview and direct observation 
methodologies. In this way the social scientists involved hoped to 
uncover the precise constituents of the malaise which had 
driven 
foremen to seek the protection of collective action. The University of 
Michigan for example inaugurated a ten year research project 
in 1947 
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to cover foremen in the mid-west manufacturing industry. Controlled 
groups of human relations trained foremen were compared with those who 
had not received such training. Attitudes of workers, shop stewards 
and foremen were also tested across a range of issues under the 
supervision of Renis Likert and Robert L. Kahn. Despite impressive 
compilations of results and attempted correlation of attitude surveys, 
output levels etc., interim reports came out in favour of most of the 
now traditional human relations axioms. "Employee centred" foremen 
would get more production, foremen should be given more 
responsibility, and the notion of leadership was again deemed to be 
all important. These findings were in spite of the fact that no actual 
significant difference could be identified in comparisons between the 
performance of the controlled groups of human relations trained and 
those not in receipt of such training. 
( 79) In the section of the study 
conducted at the Studebaker automobile plants foremen with higher wage 
levels or higher seniority were shown to be more satisfied with their 
job. Human relations trained foremen asked about their preparedness to 
help the company out by taking a pay cut in "hard times" responded in 
exactly the same way as ordinary production workers, 
(80) 
although 
newer, younger foremen tended to be more "pro-company" than older 
ones. 
(81) 
The net result of the Michigan survey was predictably pro-human 
relations, although much was made of the foreman's position relative 
two organisational groupings - workers and management - and the 
conflictual nature of his role. This was seen to be normally tolerable 
but exacerbated during polarisations caused by industrial disputes or 
in the event of a divergence of goals between the two groups -a 
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reiteration of the now popular "man in the middle thesis". (82) 
Solutions offered by Michigan were essentially a restatement of the 
need to train and cherish good human relations foremen although a 
significant level of realism, based in legitimate study, informed the 
surveys. It had been Michigan's Industrial Relations department which 
had given out advice in the 1930s that foremen should have their 
workers learn a simple set of rules by rote. The envisaged result was 
that; "A foreman, instead of bawling a man out, can say to him, "John, 
what is the fifth rule? " The man answers, "Take care of company 
property. " Many times little more need be said. The man improves 
himself. v(83) Advice based on the new Michigan surveys, when it 
emerged in the early 1950s, was altogether more pragmatic and 
cautious. 
Most other universities also put resources into surveys of the 
role of foremen, especially after 1947. At Purdue Lillian Gilbreth and 
A. S. Cook led a number of studies into the psychology of 
supervision. 
(84) A survey of International Harvester's foremen was 
undertaken by Ohio State University, eventually critical of human 
relations training only in that it was of ten not rigorously applied 
and thus produced only brief changes in attitudes and behaviour. 
(85) 
Harvard's study produced similar results. Portraying management as a 
series of specialist department subgroups and management teams the 
survey concluded that they all afforded the shop floor supervisor low 
status. Again the contradictory and difficult role of the foreman was 
seen to result in anger and resentment on his part. Recommending 
improved horizontal and vertical communications, the study could offer 
no better recommendation than the traditional conference method of 
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training for foremen. (86) 
Some universities continued an active on site involvement with 
collaborative programmes of training. Pennsylvania State for example 
after surveying foremen by questionnaire and interview method, 
designed specialised systems for individual companies. 
(87) The Curtiss 
Wright Corporation for example, manufactures of aircraft propellers, 
was the recipient of one Penn State idea - the Foreman Training 
Personality Wheel. Using propeller blades and foremen's personality 
attributes as analogies. If any of these attributes such as 
"suggestibility", "irritability", or "sociability" was 
disproportionate to the others then the propeller would become 
imbalanced - the dysfunction of an imbalanced propeller being deemed 
to be a consequence which all Curtiss Wright foremen could identify 
with. (see fig. 2) 
While some of the major academic studies did begin to take a 
slightly more critical line on human relations and undertake a more 
searching evaluation of the genesis of the foreman's alienation, other 
agencies seized the opportunity to recirculate the programmes of the 
1920s in virtually unaltered form. The National Association of 
Manufacturers (NAM) began distributing guidelines and film slide shows 
for foremen's conferences. The following narrative between two foremen 
is typical. "Steve made what to Al seemed like a queer observation: 
"Men's traits deserve as careful study as the instruments of 
production. " The analogy set Al thinking. "(88) The American Management 
Association (AMA) issued a bound collection of articles in easy clean 
covers designed for shop floor use, entitled "The Foreman's Basic 
Reading Kit". Titles included "The Foreman and Human Relations", 
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"Understanding Human Relationships" and "Helping the Worried 
Worker". (89) The AMA also promoted the "foreman's letter" as a means 
of bringing the foreman back into the ambit of management. Monthly 
bulletins issued to foremen were to improve communication and, by 
imparting "confidential information", increase the foreman's sense of 
belonging to the privileged circle of management. General Electric, 
Allis Chalmers, Standard Oil, Eastman Kodak, Dupont and Caterpillar 
were among the many firms implementing this scheme. 
(90) The employer 
sponsored National Foremen's Institute (NFI) continued to publish 
information to aid managers in their avoidance of unionisation among 
their foremen and also set up its own courses for the training of 
foremen conference leaders - claiming to be training nearly two 
thousand annually. In addition the NFI distributed advice on enhancing 
the foreman's prestige by providing status trappings such as offices, 
phones, nameplates, encouraging the wearing of business suits and so 
on. The NFI also undertook its own surveys into foremen's attitudes, 
the findings of which, not surprisingly confirmed the worth of NFI 
sponsored human relations training. 
(91) For foremen themselves the NFI 
issued a monthly "Supervisor's Memory Jogger" -a notebook cum diary 
interspersed with human relations homilies pointing out how George 
Washington and Abe Lincoln would have made good foremen and advocating 
the use of direct eye contact. Vickers, Westinghouse, Remington-Rand, 
and Borg Warner were among the companies distributing these to their 
foremen. (92) The National Association of Foremen (NAF), much expanded 
due to increased employer sponsorship in the 1940s, formed the 
Foremen's League for Education and Association in 1945 to sponsor and 
coordinate foreman training consistent with the NAF "Code of Ethics", 
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a series of human relations oriented tenets. 
ý93) 
As in the 1920s a wealth of publications appeared outlining the 
basic human relations attributes of the ideal foreman and delineating 
suitable schedules and topics for foremen's conferences. Glenn 
Gardiner reemerged with titles such as How To Create Job 
Satisfaction: A Manpower Maintenance Manual For Foremen. N. R. F. Maier's 
Principles of Human Relations, popular into the 1960s, was published 
in 1952. Uncritical of Mayo's Hawthorne findings, Maier posited a 
somewhat contradictory "democratic leadership" for foremen and likened 
workers to children in need of behavioural exemplars, encouraging the 
training of foremen in psychology and counselling techniques. 
(94) 
Many individual companies had, by the late 1940s established 
their own foremen training schemes. Caterpillar Tractors installed its 
own conference training system around this period after undertaking a 
study of the systems at 67 other companies. Caterpillar foremen were 
made to sit in different positions periodically and conference leaders 
were chosen on a rota basis. 
(95) Other major automobile companies in 
addition to GM also began intensifying efforts to train their 
foremen. 
Chrysler set up its own Foreman's School near the Jefferson Avenue 
plant in Detroit where foremen took the 
"Chrysler Conference on 
Business Management" course. 
(96) Course material stressed the 
importance of "the square deal", the foreman 
"putting himself in the 
worker's place" and "the importance of cooperation". 
Foremen were to 
be trained in "stimulating job interest and enthusiasm". 
(97) 
Chrysler's foremen were instructed that "human reactions" were 
their 
biggest problem. They were also warned to limit their expectations 
of 
certain workers' capacities since such workers' 
intelligence was 
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"limited by heredity". Nevertheless the power of psychology was not to 
be underestimated; "It is possible to make some workers sick by 
telling them they look sick. It is possible to make some workers 
better by telling them they look well. Obviously supervisors can make 
use of this principle. "(98) 
As previously the foremanship training programmes had the dual 
function of attempting to construct harmonious industrial relations 
and also of enhancing the foreman's feelings of executive status. By 
giving foremen an insight into the general management structure 
Chrysler's "Management Fundamentals" course hoped augment the more 
ethereal psychological training with concrete information on the 
overall functions of control and authority in the firm. There were 
also practical sections on job analysis, work schedules, costs, 
overheads, waste control etc. but even these sections frequently 
lapsed into issues of morale, personality, leadership, and other human 
relations concepts. 
Other automobile manufacturers also implemented human relations 
based training for foremen around this period. Packard increased the 
intake to their foreman's school's conference based courses throughout 
the 1940s and shifted the emphasis of course content towards topics 
such as "Psychological Aspects of Delegating Authority and 
Responsibility" and "Developing Job Satisfaction". In common with 
Chrysler, Packard claimed that the conferences were a forum both for 
the discussion of job related problems and the foreman's own 
grievances - "an opportunity for them to get off their shoulders 
things they want to. "(99) Briggs also became involved in conference 
training for foremen, holding a series of up to 200 meetings a year by 
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the mid 1940s. 
(100) Studebaker held similar conferences as did the 
Detroit Motor Products Corporation. The latter company went as far as 
inaugurating classes on public speaking for foremen to overcome the 
reluctance of some foremen to take part in the conferences. 
(101) By 
1944 all the major automobile companies surveyed by the Automotive 
Council for War Production based their foreman training on conference 
or "round table" methods with a substantial element of human 
relations-(102) 
This form of training, in addition to being a response both to 
the threat of general unionism and to the specific unrest among 
foremen, was also designed to help supervision overcome the evident 
problems many of them faced with the new wave of wartime recruits to 
the factory. As we have seen above, women, and rural workers, 
unaccustomed to the rhythms and habits of industrial life, had caused 
particular difficulties for many foremen. Women workers, in view of 
their many "weaknesses" and perceived susceptibility to psychological 
manipulation, were singled out as a particularly suitable subject for 
special treatment by many human relations advocates. Jack Byrd, 
foreman at GM's Cadillac plant in 1944, attested that he spent a great 
amount of time on "humanics" (a favourite GM human relations term) in 
"the conversion programme from manpower ... to womanpower". 
(103) 
Special conference titles at Chrysler were reserved for topics 
including "Women and War Work" and "Inter Racial Relations" and so on. 
The general assumptions of the behavioural psychology underpinning 
human relations training of foremen with regard to dealing with women, 
blacks, ethnic groups, or workers in general continue to be based on 
the notion that all were susceptible to manipulation and control by 
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simplistic combinations of selection, counselling and judicious 
praise. Failing this, human relations experts were not above 
advocating more straightforward and traditional methods of overcoming 
problems of group integration. Continued segregation of black workers 
was advised in the pragmatic recognition that there were some areas 
where the engendering of team spirit was beyond even the powers of 
human relations. As a Harvard spokesman advised, "In introducing the 
single negro... into the department, the foremen must take great care 
with whom he comes into contact. He must be quite sure that he can 
adjust to the persons with whom he must work, or if no such 
adjustment is practical, that he placed on a job where his frequency 
of contacts with others is relatively low. "(104) 
In spite of the changes in manufacturing methods and technology 
brought about by war production, human relations advocates continued 
to emphasise the need to downplay the purely technical criteria in 
foreman training, as they had done in the 1920s. Ruthenberg for 
example thought that technical ability constituted only 15% of the 
necessary qualification for foremanship, the remaining 85% being 
composed of initiative, leadership, and the ability of developing 
men. 
(105) The TWI programme of the 1940s concurred with this 
preference for personnel skills; "Experience proves that intelligence, 
personality, vitality, and other leadership abilities should outweigh 
technical or trade ability. ..,, 
(106) Many foremen continued to face 
pressure from the introduction of new processes during wartime 
however, a problem compounded for the many foremen transferred 
from 
now defunct automobile processes such as painting, trimming etc. and 
one especially acute for the large number of newly promoted 
foremen. 
Chapter Nine -506- 
The increase in the level of training, heavily human relations 
influenced, was in large part a response to this wave of new 
promotions. Attempts were made, mostly unsuccessful, to establish 
rigid selection and rating criteria to ensure that only the most 
suitable foremen were promoted in the first place. Murray Bodies for 
example used a series of psychological tests to determine candidates' 
suitability gauged by potential to work "harmoniously" and their 
"skill in human relations". 
(107) In reality the promotion process was 
swamped by the large number of new foremen necessary to meet the 
wartime expansion of the workforce, and as in the 1920s, such tests 
again proved to be of dubious worth. 
Despite its widespread application human relations based 
selection and training proved to be of little lasting value to the 
shop floor foreman, especially during increasingly stressful war 
production and, as in the previous period of its ascendancy, there 
were contemporary critics who recognised this. The inevitable 
domination of foremen's conferences by one or two individuals, often 
members of higher management in attendance, and the implausibility of 
a major restructuring of a foreman's personality - especially those 
older foremen who had been selected in earlier years on the basis of 
the robustness of their character - were frequent criticisms. 
(108) 
This unsuitability of training for older foremen was confirmed by the 
University of Michigan researchers during the war. 
(109) 
Spokesmen for the now established production workers' unions 
generally scoffed at the whole idea. Since human relations had little 
explicit comment on trade unionism it was not perceived as an 
imediate threat and its uncertain impact in real terms gave little 
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cause for alarm. Comment, where it occurred, tended to be of a 
dismissive nature. The Electrical Workers' journal review of Lillian 
Gilbreth's The Foreman in Manpower Management is fairly typical, 
pointing out that the book, "smacks more of classroom academics than 
it does the noise and dirt of the factory". 
(110) 
Some human relations advocates were themselves critical of the 
new training movement, pointing out that the course contents were 
unrealistically complex for the ordinary foreman to grasp and the 
range of topics both too wide and too impractical. Salner thought so; 
"Analysis of a large number of foreman training programmes that are 
recommended as models by respectable publications seems to indicate 
that good industrial foremen must possess a combination of the 
characteristics of an operating vice-president, a sergeant of marines, 
an inventive genius, Mahatma Gandhi and the Committee for Economic 
Development. "("') Others thought foremen's conferences to be 
ineffectually superficial. Maier for example highlighted the problems 
surrounding the transient nature of the foreman's training in 
psychology which was bound to break down under the everyday pressures 
of production and the entrenched attitudes which no amount of role 
playing could shift. 
(112) 
Maier, Roethlisberger and others continued to champion the basic 
tenets of human relations, in spite of the revealed weaknesses or 
impracticalities of such schemes. Roethlisberger traced the foreman's 
current wave of unrest to the division of supervisory labour and the 
foreman's alienation by technological rationalisation until he had 
become "victim and not monarch of all he surveys". Critical of the 
uneven and unrealistic application of human relations, Roethlisberger 
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nevertheless maintained his faith that, through learning to foster 
superior - subordinate relationships and learning to promote change in 
a "positive way", the foreman was set to become "the new 
representative of a new "adaptive society". "(113) 
Human relations advocates such as Roethlisberger and Maier were 
correct to attribute at least some of the foreman's problems to a 
growing sense of alienation, and to identify the foreman as an 
important presence on the shop floor in terms of either combatting or 
compounding the same trend of alienation among the workforce in 
general. Human relations had successfully pinpointed the causes of 
these problems in terms of the division of labour and bureaucratic and 
technological rationalisation of the labour process. It failed in that 
the remedies offered never sought to affect or redirect what were 
structural changes to the way in work is done. Rather foremen, as 
human relations practitioners, were expected to deal with the 
consequences of modern industrial production methods, adapting and 
conforming both their own and their workers' behaviour to fit in with 
rationalisation and change. This tinkering with the effects of the 
division of labour could only hope to have a marginal impact. Worse, 
the human relations retraining of foremen could actually have a 
negative effect on their identification with the goals of the firm. By 
giving foremen an inflated view of their position in the managerial 
hierarchy and encouraging the notion of occupational status and self 
esteem, which was at the core of human relations training, unfulfilled 
expectations could result. Donald Wray cited the case of foremen 
joining the FAA following their participation in one human relations 
programme. "The course emphasised their importance to and 
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identification with management, thereby sharpening the foreman's 
consciousness of the cleavage between the expected norm held before 
them and the realities of experience. "(114) 
In spite of these general misgivings the resurgence of human 
relations based training continued apace into the 1940s. GM, for 
example, carried on with programmes based on Sobey's bi-weekly "team 
training" conference sessions. 
(115) The shifted focus of the training, 
to encourage identification among foremen of their role with the 
management "team", was also accompanied by a parallel set of more 
tangible indicators of GM recognition of the worth of their foremen. 
In 1945, following the lifting of government restrictions foremen were 
receiving perks including three weeks paid vacation, unlimited sick 
leave, 25% discount on car purchases, and full pay during any 
stoppages due to industrial dispute. The foreman's 25% minimum 
differential continued and foremen were now paid shift and overtime 
rates proportionate to those of the production workers. Foremen at GM 
continued to have their position in the grievance machinery supported 
by higher management and industrial relations departments. Existing 
procedures covering hiring, discharge and discipline, in which the 
foreman's role at GM was assured, were not up for negotiation. "In 
1948 the GM spokesman told Reuther that these. .. be changed only 
by revolution. "(116) 
GM continued to build on the established multi-level support and 
training of the foreman, seemingly to good effect from the point of 
view of resisting the FAA. Ford, as we have seen, had no such basis of 
support to build on given the neglect of the foreman's position up to 
the 1930s. When Ford eventually capitulated to the UAW in 1941, the 
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agreement's signed were paradoxically probably the best available to 
the UAW at that time. 
(117) These agreements left the Ford foreman high 
and dry - unused to compromise yet now expected to comply with 
decisions made remote from the shop floor, or to work in situations 
dictated by new procedures, all of which took place under the 
increasing pressure of wartime production. While Ford management was 
under the regime of Harry Bennett its response to growing unrest among 
foremen was to acquiesce in their formation of the preeminent chapter 
of the FAA and to stand aloof from the other automobile industry 
employers who, led by GM and the manufacturers associations, were 
building a multi level campaign of resistance to the union. Foremen 
training was not seriously considered and the enhancement of foremen's 
prestige, if not by financial reward given continued government 
restriction, then by other less tangible means, was not attempted. 
With the collapse of the Bennett regime in 1945 and the 
assumption of control by Henry Ford II the Ford company underwent an 
immediate reappraisal of their position with regard to foremen. In 
addition to the withdrawal of the agreement with the FAA and 
subsequent confrontation culminating in the strike of 1947, which saw 
victory for the company, Ford management began to instigate a series 
of measures, emulating the strategies of GM, aimed at rehabilitating 
their foremen via a combination of training, status enhancement, and 
material reward. Such moves were facilitated by the lifting of 
government restrictions on pay and the return to automobile 
production, but an equally important factor in the case of Ford was 
the change of outlook brought about by the change of regime and the 
ousting of the Bennett, very much the figurehead of the pre-war 
Chapter Nine -511- 
methods of driving production. 
There had been tentative moves at Ford to confront the "foreman 
problem" before Henry Ford II took over power. A specialist Foremen's 
Personnel Office (F'PO) was set up in 1943 for example, largely to deal 
with the procedures set up by the FAA agreements, but also to support 
the foreman's position in disputes with higher supervision. 
(118) 
Superintendents were no longer allowed to fire or demote foremen 
without prior consultation with the FPO which now assumed absolute 
power over promotion, demotion, discharges and grievances. 
(119) This 
department, which proved unpopular with both superintendents and FAA 
representatives, was set up partly in response to the greatly 
increased turnover of foremen during the war years. The systematic 
gathering and compilation of information on foremen was to form the 
basis of more intense interest in foremen when it was later to be 
controlled by personnel staff specialising in foremen, recruited from 
GM. (120) 
One of the manifest differences between management and worker had 
always been the method of wage payment. Shidle and Peat recommending 
a move of foremen to a salaried basis in the early 1940s, were 
convinced that the abolition of time clocks was a weapon against 
foremen's unionisation. Bringing the foreman out of the "hourly rated" 
category could also serve as a general delineation of those eligible 
for union membership. By 1943 Ford brought their payment methods into 
line with most other automobile manufacturers, including GM and 
Chrysler, in taking foremen off the clock. 
(121) 
Ford also began to implement a more intensive training programme 
for foremen in 1943. (122) This training, adopting the human relations 
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conference technique, was linked to a $500,000 research programme 
undertaken into human relations management throughout the war. 
(123) 
Stress was placed on the elimination of fear among workers. Mussolini 
and Hitler were used to betoken bad foremanship and control by terror; 
"understanding" was to be the foreman's key attribute. "Every mistake 
by a worker is a foreman's opportunity. "(124) Cooperation, sincerity, 
patience, interest in a man's personal affairs and so on were all 
recommended in classic human relations fashion as job skills were 
pushed into the background. The accompanying Ford 'Supervisor's 
Manual' emphasised that "85% human relations ability as compared with 
15% in technical and trade skill is the desired ratio in a 
supervisor. "(125) Foremen also began to receive a regular newsletter , 
the 'Ford Supervisory Bulletin', in 1945, for "the dissemination of 
essential information among management personnel", thus attempting to 
bridge the information gap between higher management and shop floor 
supervision and simultaneously enhancing the foreman's identification 
with "management", which was itself one of the dual aims of the 
programme of human relations training for foremen. 
(126) 
All these initiatives received a new impetus when Henry Ford II 
took over in 1945. By 1947 the campaign to "restore the prestige and 
dignity of foremen" was well under way. Foreman's conferences had been 
greatly increased in 1946 and a series of management meetings was set 
up, overseen by Ford himself, to discuss foremen's development. 
(127) 
Elmo Roper was commissioned to undertake a survey of all Ford foremen 
to ascertain opinions on working conditions, inter-shift cooperation, 
knowledge of the union contract, conditions on the shop floor, and the 
general position of foremen compared to 1941, the year which saw the 
Chapter Nine -513- 
rise of the FAA. 
(128) Results confirmed that the foreman's lot at Ford 
had improved over the intervening years but nearly 50% of foremen 
still thought they had insufficient authority, 77% thought that 
workers under them were unsatisfactory, 41% thought that favouritism 
or kinship governed possibilities of advancement and 55% thought their 
job to be insecure. An overwhelming 80% thought that Ford was "worse 
or no better" than other companies to work for. 
(129) Roper summed up 
the results of his survey; "If we are to paint a portrait of the Ford 
foreman today, one would find a man rather dejected on all of the four 
points which contribute to employee morale. He does not feel secure in 
his job. He believes his chances of advancement hinge to great extent 
on how much "pull" he has with those at the top. He thinks he is 
treated as a number on a payroll and does not receive the dignified 
and fair treatment due an individual. He thinks the workers under him 
are "second grade". "(130) Shop floor supervisors stood in contrast to 
white collar workers and their supervisors who were said to exhibit 
few of these problems. 
(131) 
The timing of the Roper surveys and Ford's management meetings 
was coincidental with the decision to move against the FAA and, 
following the company's victory in the strike, the way was cleared for 
a new phase of reforms beginning in late 1947. One of the basic aims 
of the ensuing programme was to separate, as completely as possible, 
the foremen from their subordinate workers. Status indicators were to 
play an important part in this process. In addition to substantial pay 
increases a package of reforms was agreed upon in September 1947 to 
include reserved parking lots, individual desks, private locker rooms, 
and segregated dining areas. 
(132) Foremen were to be fitted out with 
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"distinctive" work coats and the identification badge, worn in common 
with ordinary workers, was to be replaced by a special I. D. card. 
Regular dinners, attended by foremen and higher management were also 
set up. 
(133) The wage structure was formalised into six ranges with 
merit increases to determine individual levels, with improved shift 
and overtime rates. 
(134) Ford also undertook to make periodic 
"community salary surveys" to ensure that their foremen maintained 
parity with, or earned more than their counterparts in other 
industries in the area. 
(135) Vacation entitlements were improved and 
a new car purchase plan giving foremen improved discounts was 
announced. 
(136) 
An earlier plan to recruit more college graduates into the job of 
foreman was dropped, having been revealed as impractical, and internal 
promotion ladders were again restressed. The Salaried Fmployee History 
record system was set up as an aid to selection and to placate 
accusations of favouritism in promotion. 
(137) The hierarchy of shop 
floor supervision was shortened to three levels - foreman, general 
foreman, and superintendent - replacing what had previously been as 
many as eight classifications. Foremen were endowed with new levels of 
authority, especially in disciplinary terms as the 'Foremen's Report 
of Reprimand' was introduced to deal with a wide range of "violations" 
on the shop floor including failure to meet production or quality 
targets, interference with other employees, timekeeping infractions 
and other misdemeanours. Union officials were advised accordingly on 
the reinstatement of the foreman's immediate disciplinary power. 
(138) 
By the beginning of 1950 Ford's supervisory employee programme 
had been well established. Specialist personnel such as Richard 
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Roberts, head of the new Management Relations Department which 
coordinated this programme, and some of his team had been recruited 
from GM bringing their long term experience and underlining the new 
spirit of cooperation on this issue between Ford and the other 
automobile producers. 
(139) There were two basic components; firstly 
selection and training and secondly compensation and prestige and 
status building. The selection procedure involved individual 
application either through prompting by immediate supervision or 
through reading about the programme through the plant papers. 
(Interestingly the college graduate recruitment programme was once 
again rejected almost entirely. )(140) Aptitude testing and series of 
interviews followed, the most crucial of which being by the specialist 
Trainee Foreman Selection Committee. Once accepted foremen went onto a 
waiting list to be selected by departmental superintendents and 
general foremen as vacancies arose. 
(141) In general Ford professed a 
desire to recruit younger men, apprentice trained or high-school 
educated and showing "informal group leadership" skills. The criteria 
that a prospective foreman be "respected by his fellow employees as a 
"regular guy"" was to replace an earlier insistence on "the "driver" 
or "two fisted" type. "(142) 
In the period between 1948 and 1951 over 4600 applications were 
received for foreman training. By 1951 477 were in training, 1020 had 
completed the course and were on the waiting list and 554 had been 
placed. 
(143) The scheme thus created a pool of available foremen from 
which to select new supervisors, many times the size of the vacancy 
list. Despite company statements to the contrary, it seems clear that 
this pool formed part of strategy to extend the inculcation of what 
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was deemed to be good behaviour - meeting production schedules, 
observing quality constraints, working as a team etc. - to a wider 
group of expectant supervisors amongst the ranks of the ordinary 
worker, in particular those more recently recruited, younger, skilled 
workers. 
Training for Ford's established foremen continued along the lines 
set up of ter 1945. Each level of supervision was expected to be an 
"on-the-job coach" to his immediate subordinate and this was 
supplemented by regular attendance at the conference based training 
programmes. Conferences were held each week, usually involving a group 
of around 20 foremen, and covered personnel responsibilities, 
production, cost, and quality controls, and general explanations of 
overall company functioning and policy. All of Ford's supervisory 
training programme contents and effectiveness were now continually 
monitored by a special committee of top operations managers. 
(144) 
Established foremen who aspired to higher responsibility could also 
enrol in the Industrial Management Training Programme run by Ford in 
conjunction with Wayne State University. 
(145) 
The training for prospective and existing foremen continued to 
have an inbuilt bias towards the development of personnel skills. In 
the 1951 programme for example the time allocated towards "personnel 
responsibilities" was 60 hours - compared to a combined total of 18 
hours for tools, machines, equipment and material. By 1954 this ratio 
had been further extended to 74 to 18. 
(146) In addition lower levels 
of supervision were encouraged to "engage exclusively in the 
performance of management functions" and stay aloof from the 
performance of manual work. 
(147) 
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Status and prestige reforms of the early-post war years, from 
parking spaces to separate eating facilities were also consolidated 
and extended as were the foremen's newsletters, bulletins and 
management-foreman social events. Ford also continued to build on 
earlier salary reforms into the 1950s further increasing differentials 
to outpace the automatic cost of living allowance schemes won by the 
UAW. Shift and overtime pay, vacation allowances, sick pay, life and 
disability insurance and pension schemes were also further 
improved. (148) These measures, designed to restore tangible divisions 
between supervision and production workers, were replicated within 
differing sections of the supervisory workforce. Foremen in the tool 
and die department now earned substantially more than assembly 
operation foremen for example. This was partly a reflection of the 
continuance of differing levels of technical skill but also indicates 
a strategy of imparting divisions among the supervisory workforce in 
an attempt to offset a recurrence of any consensus in favour of 
collective activity. 
(149) 
The fading FAA reacted predictably to Ford's post Taft-Hartley 
reforms, asserting that they meant a return to the problems for 
foremen of 1941, and generally trivialising Ford efforts at status and 
prestige enhancement. 
(150) Few foremen were by now interested in the 
comments of the FAA it seems but as an extra precaution the company 
deemed it necessary to introduce a document for foremen to sign, 
reminiscent of the "yellow dog" contracts of the 1930s. The contract 
underlined the employers strength after Taft Hartley and was a thinly 
veiled message that activity in promotion of the FAA would not be 
tolerated; "I understand that my employment is not for any definite 
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term and may be terminated at any time without advanced notice... and 
that my employment is subject to such lay-offs an my compensation to 
such adjustments as Ford Motor Co. may from time to time 
determine ... "(151) 
In summary, this chapter has examined the activity of employers 
in the period following the rise of the FAA. Employers' responses to 
the FAA had encompassed initiatives ranging from the restoration of 
material differentials in terms of pay, employment conditions etc., to 
the attempt, through recruitment and training programmes, to convince 
foremen of their place within the management team and thus reestablish 
the distance, in terms of prestige, status and ideology which had 
traditionally separated the foreman from production workers -a 
distance which had been seemingly reduced to a dangerously narrow 
margin as evidenced by the popularity of the FAA. 
The search for an answer to what had become popularly known as 
"the foreman problem" had provided an opportunity for a range of 
agencies to promote a human relations based schema of selection and 
training for foremen, aimed partly in ameliorating the effects of 
general unionisation, but mainly at reorienting the foreman's goals 
and job content. The application of human relations management 
techniques to the role of foreman, and the training of foremen to 
disseminate these techniques was, by the 1940s, an idea of 
considerable lineage. The original movement promoted by the work of 
Mayo, Scott, Munsterberg, Tead and others, had generated an initial 
phase of widespread interest following World War I and in response to 
increasing industrial unrest revealed in unionisation, turnover and 
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absenteeism. Human relations techniques also had a strong appeal 
during the period when welfare measures were popular. A large number 
of companies, including many of the automobile manufacturers, had 
shown an interest in the system which, by virtue of its behavioural 
psychology base, had placed a primacy on understanding and modifying 
the role of the foreman, seen as the key figure in inducing industrial 
harmony. Terms such as "human engineering" and "humanics" became 
commonplace as foremen were to be trained to abandon "driving" methods 
of supervision in favour of maximising production through engendering 
notions of team spirit and responsibility. What became widely known as 
the "new foremanship" was to utilise the tools of behavioural 
psychology on the shop floor, fitting workers temperaments to tasks, 
understanding and counselling workers though immediate problems - 
whether work related or domestic - and generally promoting positive 
attitudes to work. The foreman was in short to become the workman's 
friend and mentor, no longer a figure to be either feared or resented. 
Given the impracticalities in selecting a complete new strata of 
foremen, existing foremen were to be retrained in human relations. 
This training itself utilised the techniques of human relations and 
the conference method, based on the practice of group therapy, became 
the predominant mode of foreman training. Personnel skills replaced 
job related skills as the major proportion of these training 
programmes. 
Human relations based training for foremen was promoted 
by a 
number of organisations and individual firms. Government 
initiatives 
such as the Federal Board for Vocational Education encouraged 
local 
state programes. Many universities and colleges 
drew up courses 
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either for remote learning or for direct implementation within 
factories. Organisations such as the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, the 
YMCA, manufacturers associations and independent consultants all 
established courses in this area or promulgated information. 
Many of the larger firms were to set up in-house schemes 
administered by their own personnel departments. Foremost among these 
was General Motors who, by virtue of their leadership in this field, 
and their ultimate success in resisting the efforts of the FAA, 
present an interesting contrast to Ford, where driving foremanship 
prevailed in the inter-war period and where the FAA achieved its most 
notable success. Under the guidance of Sobey, GM implemented a series 
of measures designed to enhance the role of foremanship. In addition 
to guarantees of the foreman's pay related status, GM enrolled their 
foremen on a range of courses which were heavily human relations 
influenced. Into the 1930s, as the threat of unionisation among the 
production workers increased, a shift of emphasis in this training 
occurred in line with a new level of commitment to establishing closer 
links between shop floor supervision and the rest of management. This 
reflected Knudsen's determination to bring foremen into the management 
team, both to aid in the resistance of unions like the UAW and to 
ensure that the idea of unionisation should not permeate the lower 
ranks of management. When the UAW was established management at GM 
continued to protect their foremen through continued wage related 
benefits but also by ensuring the foreman's position relative to the 
power of the shop steward. The ultimate success of GM in resisting the 
recruitment drives of the FAA, in contrast to Ford, cannot be solely 
attributed to human relations training for foremen however. In spite 
Chapter Nine -521- 
of an earlier capitulation to the UAW than other firms GM was foremost 
in limiting the extent of union influence in general and the FAA in 
particular through available legal channels. The material attention 
they paid to their foremen's status and managerial position from the 
early 1930s onwards ensured that GM had a firm base from which to 
resist the FAA. Ford by contrast had shown no such interest and had 
accepted the FAA on a wave of capitulation in 1941, the year the UAW 
finally secured recognition. 
Interest in human relations management techniques in general had 
declined into the 1930s under the impact of economic constraints on 
welfarism in general, lack of tangible results and a more pragmatic 
view of shop floor managerial practice when faced with the reality of 
production workers' unionisation. Following the emergence of the FAA a 
resurgence of interest was shown in this form of training, this time 
almost exclusively in response to the "problem" of the foreman. 
Government, the education system, manufacturers organisations and 
private consultancies once again produced a flood of courses and 
literature designed to promote the human relations foreman and as a 
means of enhancing his identification with management and nullifying 
the appeal of the FAA. For their part the interest of academics tended 
to be more introspective than during the previous phase of interest 
and several objective studies of the efficacy of this type of training 
were undertaken. Despite some reservations from this quarter and the 
continued criticism of some sectors, human relations training for 
foremen experienced a considerable renaissance during the 1940s among 
many of the automobile manufacturers and spread to encompass even the 
Ford factories. Aided by a change of higher management with the 
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replacement of the Harry Bennett regime by that led by Henry Ford II, 
Ford adopted a newly confrontational approach to the FAA and began a 
range of initiatives designed to salvage the foreman from the 
perceived neglect that had resulted in the spread of a union 
consciousness. A series of measures into the early 1950s reestablished 
material differentials between Ford foremen, and status and prestige 
were further enhanced by extensive selection and training programmes 
which borrowed heavily on the programmes undertaken at GM in 
particular, even to the extent of recruiting GM specialists. 
The overall effectiveness of the initiatives aimed at recovering 
the foreman is difficult to assess. Certainly the FAA was in terminal 
decline after 1947, a point at which such initiatives were being most 
vigorously applied, particularly at Ford. Other factors contribute to 
the FAA's decline as outlined in previous chapters - disabling 
legislation, the return to normal production and labour market 
conditions, the rejection of the FAA by the wider union movement, the 
loss of the Ford agreements and so on. The role of tangible factors 
designed to enhance the notion of separation from the general 
workforce - salary levels and benefits, offices, distinctive clothing, 
separate facilities etc. - no doubt also had some impact on the 
foreman's identification with management and dissipated some of the 
need for collective action. 
The part played by human relations training and counselling, and 
the considerable resources spent in this direction during the 1940s 
remains problematic. Managements were clearly ready to try anything 
which might offset the appeal of the FAA and, if nothing else the 
human relations school had for a very long period been stressing the 
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centrality of the foreman and had ready made courses of action 
available. Given that the current stage of rationalisation of 
production was deemed to be irreversible (no one in the 1940s was 
suggesting the breakdown of extensive integrated production lines, nor 
were there flexible enough control mechanisms available) a set of 
solutions which dealt with adapting either the worker or the foremen 
to function more effectively under existing production configurations 
had many attractions. Some foremen undoubtedly responded to the 
exclusivity of special training involving periods away from the shop 
floor, and such training was at least another indication that 
management had no longer "forgotten" the shop floor supervisor. 
Thus in achieving the aims of convincing foremen that they were 
part of a management team and subject to special privileges and 
consideration, the human relations conference programmes may have 
achieved some measure of success. In terms of the impact of such 
programmes on the style of everyday foremanship under the pressures of 
production however, serious reservations must be made. We have seen 
how individual foremen tended to forget the intricacies of what they 
had been taught within a short period of their return to the shop 
floor. Human relations champions such as Roethlisberger had confirmed 
this as the main problem for such training. Whereas Roethlisberger was 
to criticise the content and application of the courses, in reality 
the aims of such training, given both the background of foremen in 
educational terms, their continued selection on non rational grounds, 
the uncertain response of workers to amateur psychology and most 
importantly the failure to adapt production methods in order to 
facilitate any degree of interest or identification with either 
firm 
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or product, meant that such attempts to turn the foremen into the 
guiding spirit of a new industrial age were, to say the least, ill 
founded. 
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Conclusions 
An historical study of this particular group of workers, the 
foremen, in the formative stages of twentieth century mass production, 
reveals a complex and shifting set of experiences and relationships, 
both to other workers and to the labour process. 
Initial shifts towards intensive rationalisation of production - 
the development of, and predominance of the 'Fordist' system - and 
accompanying shifts in skill levels and worker origins, generated a 
new form of foremanship, significantly different from its nineteenth 
century predecessor. The 'traditional' realm of foremanship, now 
reshaped by vertical and horizontal sub-divisions and the 
establishment of specialised hierarchic and departmental functions, 
was nevertheless not reduced in terms of some immediate elements of 
power and control. In many aspects the foreman on the shop floor found 
his power enhanced. Accepting the reservations placed on this 
interpretation by the shif t in control of the overall direction of 
production which extensive integrated factory methods entailed, within 
the sphere of the shop floor elements in the labour market and the 
nature of the new methods of production combined to create 
opportunities for foremen to set up a system of arbitrary and 
unilateral controls over workers and the labour process. 
Fordism - the machine solution to control of mass production - as 
actually implemented, can be seen, in the case of the automobile 
industry, to generate a number of contradictory trends 
in terms of 
control. Extensive division and the predominance of 
deskilling 
(disproportionate to the amount of reskilling on the factory 
floor) 
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and the nature of work which resulted, reduced commitment levels among 
the workforce. Added to this the increased vulnerability of fully 
integrated production systems placed a high cost on individual 
interruptions. Furthermore, even the most highly rationalised system 
of production was tempered by uneven levels of applicability as areas 
of the labour process remained impervious to redesign. Workers could 
also continue to regulate aspects of work, by group or individual 
methods, even in those areas which seemingly left little room for 
discretion. These compromises on control were compounded by developing 
market pressures to reincorporate flexibility into production with the 
advent of Sloanism - the annual model change. The chosen response of 
automobile manufacturers was to increase the intensity of supervision, 
both in purely numerical terms, and in terms of the parameters of 
authority available to foremen to enable them to push production. The 
'driving' method of supervision thus emerged as the typical means of 
securing output levels, intensifying as greater productivity was 
sought into the 1920s and 1930s. 
The changing nature of the labour markets surrounding the 
industry served to enhance further the power and authority available 
to shop floor foremen during this period. The influx of workers to the 
relatively high wage/low skilled work in the industry, many from rural 
America or Europe bringing 'pre-industrial work habits', led to both a 
highly unstable labour market and distinct ethnic and racial divisions 
and groupings. Foremen came to occupy a central position both in terms 
of the acquisition, security and quality of jobs, and in the 
reproduction and continuation of cleavages within the workforce. 
The 
developing seasonal and cyclical nature of automobile production 
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served to further enhance the power of foremen in the labour market, 
with the result that many foremen were able to use their position to 
exert considerable pressure on workers either to conform to various 
informal supervisory demands or in support of unequal treatment of 
particular ethnic, racial or gender based groups. 
In the division between personnel and technical supervisory 
functions in mass production it has been noted that care must be taken 
not to place too much emphasis on the enhanced role of specialised 
personnel and welfare departments during this period. Developments at 
Ford, and the short lived success of the Sociological Department 
highlight this assertion. Instead we must make a wider reference to 
the continued dominance of foremen over the experience of workers - 
their pay, security, work intensity etc. - in all automobile 
factories, and this needs to be balanced against assertions, drawn 
from numerical analysis of the spread of specialist departments and 
the idealisations of a prolific secondary literature, that personnel 
specialists and bureaucratisation shaped the nature of work in any 
period before the late 1930s. The shop floor foreman remained a 
powerful and central figure in the determination of most workers 
experience on the shop floor. 
In terms of overall managerial strategy, the period up to the 
1930s is clearly typified by a rapid switch from either direct 
entrepreneurial control or the Balkanised hierarchies of the 
nineteenth century internal contract systems. Beyond the formal 
implementation of extended managerial systems however, considerable 
autonomy was granted to the foreman. In return for guaranteed 
levels 
of production, a general abdication of further responsibility 
for 
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methods of supervision was displayed by employers. As long as foremen 
obtained sufficient output, their methods went largely unquestioned. 
There were periods when voices were raised in protest, in particular 
during the periods of high and costly labour turnover rates. These 
protests often originated amongst those promoting human relations 
approaches to management. The impact of such advice was minimal 
overall however and, while it is true to say that General Motors 
perhaps took greater account of such schemes, the drive method of 
supervision continued to enjoy informal sanction from the majority of 
employers. 
We can use the developments outlined so far to construct a 
general model of division on the shop floor between supervision and 
worker which emerged in mass production industry. Elements of this 
division comprised power over workers and the labour process in 
addition to more tangible prestige and status indicators such as pay 
levels and working conditions. Again developments throughout the 
industry were uneven, Ford for example displaying a seemingly low 
commitment to the prestige of foremen in terms of the countervailing 
pressure of the Servicemen's department and lack of symbolic 
indicators such as offices or administrative trappings. Generally 
though a distinct cleavage between those working and those supervising 
develops in the period up until the 1930s. This cleavage was no longer 
based on intrinsic job skills, since the level of technical competence 
associated with supervision became diminished in proportion to the 
general division of labour among those supervised. Rather this was a 
division based in less tangible factors of occupational prestige and 
power, and the complementary ideology which developed placed 
foremen 
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in general (although with some exceptions) beyond any broad sympathy 
or class cohesion with production workers. It is important to 
recognise this cleavage in terms of ensuing developments in 
unionisation. Explanations of the dynamics behind the movement to 
unionise foremen must take account of the polarity between foremen and 
production workers on the eve of the CIO successes of the 1930s. 
Although twentieth century mass production methods had superficially 
driven the foremen into a common process of deskilling and division of 
labour, the countervailing enhancement of control and power outlined 
above had more than compensated in producing a distancing, rather than 
convergence of experience between the two groups. 
The unionisation of production workers had a profound effect on 
the structure of authority surrounding foremen. Indeed the appeal of 
union protection against the arbitrary activities of foremen can be 
seen to be an important factor in the success of industrial unions 
like the UAW in the mid 1930s. Foremen had previously been regarded as 
central to the inhibition of the spread of unions through their 
general surveillance and administration of blacklists, and had enjoyed 
continued power during the brief interregnum of the company union 
movement of the early 1930s. With the establishment of bona fide 
unions however, new structures of power were ushered in in the form of 
formalised procedures and agreements. Beyond the initial difficulties 
of the transitionary phase, when many workers and committeemen 
displayed understandably vigorous reactions to many years of arbitrary 
foremen's control, unionisation meant that seniority provisions, 
grievance procedures, negotiated pay and conditions etc. formed the 
basis for new levels of job security and job quality, to the exclusion 
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of the foreman's intervention. To be sure, foremen retained 
considerable levels of power beyond the advent of unionisation - in 
the continued manipu lation of seniority through the various "preferred 
employee" loopholes for example - but in general there was a marked 
diminution of their general range of discretion. This diminution of 
power was also characterised by the parallel rise in importance of 
personnel and employment departments to formally administer union 
contracts, and led to the further, much commented upon, 
marginalisation of foremen. 
The other major effect of unionisation among production workers 
was that of stimulating unionisation among foremen themselves. 
Unionisation of the general workforce is an obvious precondition for 
the spread of unions into the ranks of supervision, and yet the effect 
of unionisation, rather than the support of the union movement is 
probably the key factor here. Direct support for the Foremen's 
Association of America was not forthcoming from the leadership of 
unions like the UAW, who, beyond tactical support to further their own 
organising and bargaining efforts, lent only token assistance to the 
foremen's organisation efforts - perhaps understandable given building 
employer opposition to both union movements, and the perceived danger 
of accusations of the widespread extension of union control of 
industry. The FAA was seen as more trouble than it was worth in terms 
of the settling delineation of established union power. The rank and 
file of the production workers unions, in developments reflecting 
hierarchical splits in the union movement, were, in contrast, more 
supportive of the FAA. 
Unionisation of production workers provided other stimulants 
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beyond institutional support, whether at national or local level. The 
demonstration of what unionisation could achieve, particularly in 
terms of security and pay levels, had a strong effect on many foremen, 
as wartime production conditions further exacerbated existing 
problems. The decline in differential pay levels, for example, 
coincided with new pressures on foremen in terms of both labour and 
production restructuring. Wartime also brought a flood of new recruits 
to the ranks of supervision, bringing their union background to a job 
now typified by long hours, relatively declining remuneration, the 
need to cope with a greatly increased and often inexperienced 
workforce, and the breakdown of many traditional forms of labour 
process with the shift to arms manufacture. Many foremen, both newly 
promoted and established, sought protection of the kind demonstrably 
achieved by production workers' unions, especially as the end of war 
production, and consequent large scale demotions threatened. 
Security and an instrumental, economistic outlook probably 
typifies the general stimulus for many foremen to enrol in the FAA, 
although a broader strategy was propounded by the leadership of the 
union, which certainly had far reaching ambitions in terms of eventual 
recruitment levels. Like their British counterparts in the National 
Foremen's Association, however, the FAA leadership were to fall back 
on an avowed position of "neutrality", increasingly difficult to 
define and implement in the face of pragmatic imperatives and 
employer reaction. The union leadership and general membership did 
exhibit a real degree of militancy, surprising given the wartime 
circumstances of many strikes, and achieved high rates of core 
recruitment, but, without support of the wider union movement, 
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consolidation of initial gains was inevitably difficult. 
The strength of reaction to the FAA from employers, with the 
notable exception of Ford, certainly influenced the reluctance of 
unions like the UAW to forge closer links with the foreman's 
unionisation movement. This reaction took place at a number of levels 
including various forms of direct action by individual companies and 
employer's organisations. One of the principal long term strategies 
used by employers, under the leadership of GM management, involved 
attempts to work through the legislative structure to restrict the 
rights of foremen to organise. Initially by seeking anti-FAA 
interpretations of the Wagner Act and ultimately by obtaining the 
amendments in the Taft-Hartley Act which clearly placed foremen beyond 
legal protection in organisation. There is no doubt that employers saw 
the FAA's rapid growth, following so closely the successes of the 
production workers' union, as a real threat to control on the shop 
floor. Allowing for the alarmist nature of some of the extreme 
rhetoric of many management statements of the period, a significant 
degree of real apprehension existed within the ranks of most 
employers. If unionisation of production workers had to be tolerated, 
or could be viewed in a positive sense, a limit could, indeed must, be 
placed on its spread to the ranks of supervision. The foremen were to 
be the boundary over which unionisation must not pass. 
Success in resisting the FAA through the machinery of state 
regulation, notably the National Labour Relations Board, followed an 
undulating path. The series of contradictory and vacillating 
judgements handed down by the board reflect both the imprecise 
definitional nature of the law, and various shifting political 
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configurations in the make up of the board itself. As such the 
activity of the NLRB, and National War Labour Board during its brief 
jurisdiction over the issue, provide a useful example of the working 
out of the relationship between state and capital, defined through 
the prism of politics and pragmatism. In the long run the employers 
got what they wanted from the state, but the intervening period had 
shown how a state agency could promote developments which employers 
viewed as against their interests. 
The intervening period of ups and downs in legislative support 
had also shown that the FAA's growth did not necessarily follow the 
contours of state support. Indeed unfavourable decisions by the NLRB 
were responsible for the intensification of industrial activity by the 
union on a number of occasions. Such developments clearly demonstrate 
the problem of interpreting the relative success or failure of the 
union purely in terms of legal sanction. While state support is of 
course one of the central features in retarding or inhibiting the 
union, other immediate and long term factors must be aggregated to 
provide a full explanation. The immediate circumstances surrounding 
1947, a pivotal year in the fortunes of the FAA, include not only the 
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, but also the withdrawal of Ford's FAA 
agreements, and a new managerial stance there resulting in the costly 
defeat for the FAA in the strike of 1947; final unequivocal withdrawal 
of support by the UAW; the reversion to peacetime automobile 
production at high output levels and normalisation of the 
labour 
markets of both workers and supervisors; and the resolution of pay and 
conditions problems with the lifting of wartime government 
restrictions. 
Conclusions -553- 
The range of dynamics leading to the growth of the FAA form the 
obverse of many of the above elements of decline. To eventual, albeit 
fleeting, state support must be added immediate factors such as the 
influence and effects of unionisation of the general workforce and the 
specific support of many UAW locals and individual members; the 
problems and pressures of war production; the prestigious agreement at 
Ford; and the temporary tactical success of FAA leaders such as Keys. 
To these must be added longer term dynamics, particularly effecting 
established foremen in terms of the erosion of their individual levels 
of power and control. We have seen how these came to be formed in the 
labour markets and production methods which emerged through the 1920s 
and 1930s, with the tacit acceptance of higher management. When that 
acceptance was replaced by a new system of industrial relations in the 
late 1930s, managements in general had seemed to abandon the foreman, 
not merely foregoing his levels authority and discretion, but failing 
to provide adequate substitution in the form of training and 
preparation to deal with the new imperatives of a unionised work 
environment. 
When the dust had settled by the early 1950s the foremen had not 
been restored to their original position of authority but rather a new 
balance of power and control of shop floor life had emerged. In many 
ways the arbitrary power and control left in the hands of shop floor 
supervisors for much of the pre-war period had represented an 
imbalance -a system of highly rationalised labour processes overlaid 
with an anachronistic system of personal, arbitrary, confrontational 
and direct authority wielded by the foreman. Such a system was seen 
by 
employers as the solution to implicit problems of a largely unskilled 
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and potentially recalcitrant workforce, employed in conditions which 
did little to foster enthusiasm for the job in hand. The drive system, 
once installed, delivered the goods in terms of output levels, and 
indeed was vital in obtaining the increased productivity and speed up 
which intensified into the 1930s. Unionisation finally produced a 
realignment however as procedure and agreement forced through the 
bureaucratisation of many areas of foremen's power. 
The rebuilding of foremen's prestige and status in the post-war 
era was in reality confined to superficial areas such as pay 
differentials and administrative trappings with a view to reinforcing 
the divisions in the workforce which unionisation had momentarily 
seemed to bridge. The resurgence of interest in human relations 
solutions by the new alliance of Ford and the other major 
manufacturers, and its recurrent limited success in actual practice, 
represent only a token, if widespread, attempt to work with the only 
"solution" readily available to the "foreman problem". The human 
relations answer, to remould the foreman's outlook and behaviour by 
the use of psychology, had the perennial added attraction of being 
promoted as a useful instrument in offsetting the appeal of 
unionisation generally. In reality the "foremen problem" resolved 
itself. The foremen of the 1950s were largely a different set of 
workers to those who had ruled on the shop floor in the 1930s, or 
if 
they were not they had had time to grow accustomed to new methods of 
working. A realignment had finally taken place between the nature of 
factory work, the type of worker engaged in that work, and 
the 
structures of bureaucratically administered and collectively 
negotiated regulation of many aspects of factory 
life - discipline, 
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wages and conditions, grievance procedures, job security and so on. To 
be sure, informal work methods and regulations persisted, and the 
foreman continued and continues to play a central role in such 
activity, but the level of dominance over the experience of factory 
life exerted by the pre-war foreman has been obviated by the limiting 
background effects of modern industrial bureaucracy. 
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Appendix One 
Extract from the job description of a Packard foreman as outlined 
in Brief of the Packard Motor Car Company Before the National Labour 
Relations Board, Case No. 7-R-1884,1944, pp23-32. 
"A foreman must be a good leader and be able to get along with 
the workers. He must have sound judgement and use good common sense, 
be level-headed, even tempered and impartial. Conditions are very 
unusual at the present time and situations arise which are difficult 
to handle. It requires a lot of common sense to handle grievances of 
workers today. 
The foreman must set a good example, show an interest in the 
employees, develop team work among his workers, show appreciation for 
their efforts and maintain uniform discipline standards. He is 
supposed to lead instead of drive; to avoid being authoritative or 
belligerent or assuming unwarranted authority; to be cooperative with 
all other departments and to be willing to call for specialized advice 
where needed from the various service divisions such as industrial 
relations, mechanical, plant engineering, time study, metallurgical, 
material control, etc. 
It is his duty to interpret the duties to higher management to 
the workers with respect to welfare, safety, adjusting grievances, 
wages, etc. It is the duty of the foreman to develop and maintain 
morale by placing the right man on the job, adjusting complaints, 
seeing that workers are given the right classification, 
by taking a 
personal interest in the worker, carefully training the workers on the 
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job, and encouraging the workers to do their best and to see that 
workers are promoted and transferred on ability. The foreman acts for 
the company in the first step of the grievance procedure provided for 
in the workers UAW-CIO contract. 
It is also the duty of the foreman to plan the work in their 
departments according to the work schedules; to requisition additional 
help if needed; to transfer workers from one group to another to 
promote efficiency; to see that production is gotten out on schedule; 
that the operations and the process are performed according to the 
procedure established and to suggest improvements in operations and 
processes; to see that the proper number of people are placed on the 
job; to use judgement in distributing workers through the department; 
to see that materials, when completed, are accounted for and moved. 
It is the foreman's duty and he is responsible to management to 
maintain quality and to see that the parts are made in accordance with 
standard specifications. 
It is the duty and responsibility of the foreman to control the 
costs of the operation by proper training, selection and placement of 
workers and by maintaining proper working conditions; to see that 
machines, tools and fixtures are properly used and are maintained in 
good working order; that the plant is kept clean, and in a safe 
condition; that scrap is eliminated and that the right amount and type 
of machines are used; that unnecessary help is avoided. 
It is also the duty and responsibility of the foreman to analyse 
and know the requirements of the job to be assigned to a worker and to 
advise higher management as to the qualifications required; 
to 
introduce the workers to the job; to take responsibility of 
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instructing the men or delegating this duty to someone else; to insist 
upon accuracy before speed; to follow up instructions to see that they 
are carried out. 
It is also the duty and responsibility of foremen to see that the 
workers are properly rated and to recommend changes in rating; to see 
that the worker gets paid for the time he works and does not get paid 
for the time he does not work... to recommend promotion of rank and 
file workers subject to union contract; to maintain and enforce 
discipline. Foremen have the power and duty to discharge or recommend 
the discharge of workers for inefficiency, failure to produce or 
breach of company rules, and to enforce discipline by assessing 
penalties fixed by the rules and, if no rule covers the offence, to 
use their discretion in fixing the penalty. 
It is also the duty of the foreman to see that his department 
receives the material and parts from the other departments, to check 
and report stoppages, to see that proper containers are used between 
operations, to maintain a steady flow of the parts, to see that proper 
tools are used and to see that defective tools and equipment are 
replaced and to report any and all conditions requiring attention 
promptly to the proper service departments. 
It is also the duty of the foreman to see that the worker does 
good work and his share of the work; that his attendance is regular, 
that he follows instructions, and that the right employees are 
recommended for promotion or transfer. In case of chronic absenteeism 
the worker may be reprimanded by the foreman and if he 
does not 
improve the foreman may recommend discharge. He exercises 
his 
discretion in these matters. 
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The recommendations of the foreman and of the general foreman are 
almost invariably carried out. If not they are informed why it was 
considered inadvisable to carry into effect the particular 
recommendation. 
The general foreman does not usually overrule a foreman as the 
foreman runs his own job, but the general foreman might discuss the 
matter - say the removal of a man from the rolls - and suggest the 
worker be given another chance. 
Foremen are required to initiate and prepare various reports and 
recommendations ... Foremen also record transfer of labour from one 
group to another; issue passes to employees to go to other parts of 
the plant; prepare time exemption records to be used as a check 
against the time clock and to make certain that the workers put in 
full time and do not have someone other than themselves punch their 
time cards. Foremen also grant requests for leave of absence on a form 
prepared for that purpose. Regular forms are issued by the foreman in 
ordering tools and other materials needed by them. They approve and 
sign the layout plan of their department as set forth on plans, and 
also the process routing sheets. 
Recommendation for tool or operation changes in the layout of the 
department and in connection with the operation of the department are 
made on forms prepared for that purpose... Foremen also make out 
trouble reports, shortage reports, and progress reports. 
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145 TYPICAL 'roPIc 
FOR FOREMAN TRAINING MEETINGS 
Selected (the first 124) by the Department of Manufac- 
ture, U. S. Chamber of Commerce, and published as part 
of a survey made in cooperation with 90 separate com- 
panies that have had experience with foteman training. 
These 124 topics have been supplemented by others that 
are suggested by present-day economic problems 
I. 
Z. 
3. 
4. 
S. 
Analyzing Your-, elf 
Dcvclohnfent of Personality 
Effective Leadership 
Importance of Observation 
Investigation before Conclu- 
sions 
Decision vs. Snap Judgment 
Tact and Diplomacy 
Resourcefulness 
Originality 
Inventive Ability 
tmapination 
Enthusiasm--Is It Contagious? 
Adaptability to Conditions 
Does Ambition Produce Initia- 
tive? 
Openinindcdlness 
Willingness to Accept Sttgges- 
tions 
Systematic or Ilahlrýz; trcl 
Physical Fitness 
Mental Alertness 
Example of Character 
Forming Habits 
Utilizing Time 
The Foreman's Responsibility 
Analysis of )ob 
Knowing Men 
Developing Men 
Developing Interest 
Training Workers 
Starting the New Man 
Getting Teamwork 
Labor Turnover 
Safety and Accident Prevention 
Maintaining Discipline 
Attendance 
Orders -- Directions - Sugges- tions 
Securing and Using Suggestions 
Coaching in Understudy 
Service-What Is it? 
The Working Force 
Tile System and the Worker 
Tabor and Product ion 
Loyalty try M, nýRerticnt aril to Men 
honesty and Sonate Dealing 
The Foreman and Labor The Fot cman and Management The Porenvan and industrial' Scrvi'"e 
The Foreman and the Social Order 
The Fot crnhUn and t lie Law The Foreman attcl insl> 'ction The Foreman ar1d Stotl: keepinf; The ForcIIran and tite Inver, - tory 
The Foreman and Costs The Foreman and Waste The Foreman and Production The Foreman as an Instructor The Foreman is a Supervisor The Foreman as a Leader Knowledge 
of Position and Job Basic Factors in Production 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
11. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23: 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37, 
38, 
39, 
40. 
41, 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46, 
47. 
48. 
49, 
5U. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55, 
56. 
57. 
58. 
59. 
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60. Methods of Getting Production 
61. Flow of Work 
62. Departmental Relationships 
63. Loss through Spoiled Work 
64. Keeping Equipment in Order 
65. Records and Reports 
66. Improving Workmanship 
67. Receiving and Storing Material 
68. Issuing Material 
69. Movement of Material 
70. Care of Material 
71. Fabricating Material 
72. Our Labor Policy 
73. Employment-Right Man on 
Right Job 
74. Wage Policy 
75. Wages and Incentives 
76. Non-Wage Incentives 
77. Time Study 
78. Setting of Rates 
79. Rating Employees 
8n. Promotion 
81. Discharge or Transfer-Which? 
82. First Aid 
83. An Attractive Place to Work 
84. Man and Materials 
85. Man and Machine 
86. Buying-Storing-Producing 
87. Management's Responsibilities 
SE, T, I; CTT; TD READING 
TIIF, ART OF LEADERSIIIP 
Ordway Tepid, McGraw-Bill 
Book ConIp-InV. Inc. 
FOREMAN 'I'RAINTNG THAT 
WORKS 
R. G. Adair, F tory and InJus- 
tr inl 1<7nnrprrn rit. M: ny--Octo- 
ber, 193n. 
('I; RSONAL LEADERSHIP IN 
INDUSTRY 
David R. Craig and W. W. 
Charters. McGraw-Hill Book 
Company. Inc. 
PRACTICAL FOREMANSHIP 
G1cnn L. Gardiner, McCraw- 
Hill Book Company. Inc. 
'1'TII; TECIINIQUE OF Exr 
CUTIVE CONTROL 
I: r« in I1. Schell, McGraw-Hill 
Brink Company, I ic. 
I'SVCI10LOGY 
TIVES 
Elliott Dunlap 
Brothers. 
FOR EXFCU- 
Smith, Harper dt 
88. The Art of Manigement 
89. Organization of the Company 
90. Products of the Company 
91. Making the Organization Effec- 
tive 
92. General Factory Equipment 
93. Working Machinery to Capacity 
94. Providing Machinery with 
Power 
95. What Is Purpose of Planning? 
96. Manufacturing Costs 
97. Selling Costs 
99. Industry Yesterday - Today - Tomorrow 
99. Industrial World. a System 
100. Trends in Organization and Spe- 
cialization 
101. Labor-Saving Machinery 
102. How Is Business Financed? 
103. Sources of Material 
104. What Production Is and Who 
Produces 
105. Factors in Production 
106. Production and the H. C. L. 
107. What Is Included in Overhead 
108. Problems of Distribution 
109. Law of Demand and Supply 
110. Business Enterprise and Profit 
111. Economics of Our Business 
112. Competition and Monopoly 
113. Price, the Basis of Ndustry 
114. How Our Product Is Marketed 
115. Credit and Banking 
116. Thrift - Investment - Personal 
Finance 
117. The Source of all Capital- 
Savings 
118. Why Banks ai e Indispensable 
119. St >cks-Bonds-Brokers 
120. Speculation vs. Investment 
121. The Ups and Downs of Business 
122. Governmental Regulations and 
Requirements 
123. Labor Movements 
121. The Foreman's Place in In- 
dustry 
125. Wages and Profits 
126. The Share of Labor 
127. How Business, Begins 
128. The Funds of a Corporation 
129. Off the Gold Standard 
130. Stabilizing the Dollar 
131. War Debts 
132. The Tariff 
133. Poverty and Prosperity 
134. Unemployment Compensation 
135. Old Age- Pensions 
136. health Insurance 
137. Share the Work 
138. Standards of Living 
139. Mechanization 
140. Obsolescence 
141. Technological Changes 
142. Alternatives to Capitalism 
143. NRA 
144. Collective Bargaining 
145. Can We Have Overproduction? 
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ft 
'Qualities That Win Or Lose', from Towson C. R., The Man Next to the 
Men, YMCA, 1922, pp. 5-6 :- 
"Successful Foremen 
Note that three fourths of these relate to the foreman's 
attitude, and one fourth to personal and technical skill. 
Pleasant manner Has studied men 
Leadership Ability to teach men 
Ability to plan work Ability to develop men 
Ability to place men Technical ability 
Ability to cooperate Prompt at work 
Initiative Good judgement 
Pleasing personality Shares information with men 
Approachable Practical 
Good mixer Firm character 
Friendly Tolerant 
Thoughtful of his men Decisive 
Unselfish Pride in his men 
Believes in his men Progressive 
Thrifty Firm 
Keen insight Executive ability 
Warm heart Encourages initiative 
Self-confidence Mechanical ability 
Confidence in others Tactful in correcting men 
Frank and 'above board' Self control 
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Gives credit for suggestions 
Loyal to men 
Eager to learn and teach 
Appreciative 
Enthusiastic to develop work 
Keeps men contented 
Gives men a square deal 
Understands men and their needs 
Ambitious 
Heart and soul in work 
Pride in company 
Discerning 
Treats men as "men" 
Appendices 
Loyal to superiors 
Puts quality first 
Pride in work 
Foresight 
Keeps men interested 
Discharges every responsibility 
Holds respect of men 
Attention to business 
Instils men with right spirit 
Pride in department 
Considerate 
Instructs men 
Moral fibre... " 
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